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2ABSTRACT
The primary purpose o f my research is to analyse the development o f British reactions to 
and perceptions of the May Fourth Movement manifestations, especially in Shanghai 
during late 1910's and early 1920's. The aim is to study what kind o f implications the 
British attitudes and reactions had on the development of the May Fourth Movement. Or 
in other words, the purpose is to identify the various forms of May Fourth activities that 
resulted from the foreigners' operations and so to determine the extent of the British 
influence on the May Fourth Movement in Shanghai.
By researching the British reactions, the objective is to explore more profoundly their 
political, economic and cultural hegemony in Shanghai. The three major British groups 
that are researched here are the governmental and municipal officials, the business 
community and the missionaries.
While I agree with earlier researchers' emphasis on both the ideological and political 
causes of the Movement and the need for China's democratic liberation, we also need to 
take account o f power relationships between the foreign and Chinese communities. 
Hence, another purpose of the study is to assess Chinese May Fourth protagonists' 
activities in relation to the Shanghai foreign community. Accordingly, the focus is also 
on the dynamics of interaction between the British and Chinese and its impact on the 
development of the May Fourth Movement.
The fundamental hypothesis is that the British reactions affected developments of the 
May Fourth Movement activities in Shanghai. When elaborated further, this assumption 
proposes that the contemporary British actions had a certain influence on a subsequent 
new wave of Chinese anti-foreign and anti-Christian movements. This approach supports 
the hypothesis that the succeeding outbreak of radical Chinese nationalism was partly 
influenced by the British reactions to the May Fourth Movement.
This research is based on previously closed materials held in the Shanghai Municipal 
Archives and they are supplemented with sources from British Archives. These include 
the Jardine, Matheson & Company materials, especially its vast twentieth century 
correspondence and access to this material was not available until very recently.
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1. INTRODUCTION
By the evening of June 5, 1919, Shanghai students had succeeded in launching an 
unprecedented strike which within hours paralysed almost all parts of the city. The 
protests in Beijing in response to the international policies and domestic misconduct had, 
a month earlier, opened an avenue for modem Chinese activists to express their 
nationalist sentiments. In turn, the disappointing failure to influence the central 
government's policies had marked the initial May Fourth events in Beijing. Therefore, 
after weeks of demonstrations in response to the denunciation by the fellow students in 
the north, the Shanghai May Fourth protagonists now attempted to freeze all business 
transactions. In contrast to May Fourth activities elsewhere, the Shanghai May Fourth 
demonstrators' radical decision to initiate commercial strike had encouraged merchants 
and workers to join, which resulted in forcing the humiliated Chinese regime to consent 
to the protestors' demands.
In the beginning of the twentieth century, Shanghai was an industrial and commercial 
as well as an educational centre and this broad social and economic transformation had 
influenced the kinds of collective action through which different groups demanded 
justice. Given its politically changing and progressive atmosphere, Shanghai was 
unavoidably closely associated with virtually all the upheavals which China had 
experienced during its modern history. It was not surprising therefore that the May Fourth 
Movement also flourished in the city. Foreigners were generally reluctant to get involved 
with politically motivated strikes, boycotts and demonstrations, but this time, 'the Spirit 
of Shanghai' absorbed all the Shanghai communities in the struggle for the Chinese rights 
and principles. The three administratively contrasting areas of the International
Settlement, French Concession and Chinese city (Map 1, p. 10) were momentarily 
involved in the May Fourth protestors' patriotic regime. The Chinese and foreigners alike 
soon acquired their first experience in urban mass mobilisation through the 
implementation of the May Fourth ideology into activist movement.
1.1. Research aims, questions, hypothesis
The primary purpose of my research is to analyse the development of British reactions to 
and perceptions of the May Fourth Movement and its manifestations, especially in 
Shanghai during late 1910's and early 1920's. The aim is to examine the implications 
British attitudes and reactions had to the subsequent development of the May Fourth 
Movement. In other words, the research seeks to identify the various forms of May 
Fourth activities which resulted from the foreigners' operations and to determine the 
extent of the foreigners' and particularly the British influence on the May Fourth 
Movement in Shanghai1. Another important purpose of the study is to assess Chinese 
May Fourth protagonists' activities in relation to the Shanghai foreign community 
particularly in the International Settlement. Accordingly, the work will also address the 
dynamics o f interaction between the British and Chinese and the impact of this 
interaction on the development of the May Fourth Movement. Furthermore, this thesis is 
an initial attempt to analyse the experiences of British expatriates in Shanghai during the
1 In early 1920's Shanghai was populated by numerous nationalities and although the British residents were 
politically influential, the Japanese and the Russians fonned the largest foreign groups, as will be discussed 
later in detail. See Albert Feuerwerker, The Foreign Establishment in China in the Early Twentieth 
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May Fourth era, and will determine the impact of the May Fourth Movement on the 
British hegemony and the British relationship with the Chinese residents.
While I agree with earlier researchers' concentration 011 both the ideological and 
political aspects which instigated the May Fourth Movement and the emergence of 
China's democratic liberation2, especially in Shanghai, I also need to take account of 
power relationships between the foreign and Chinese communities. Only by inscribing 
the analysis of the May Fourth Movement discourse in a structure of power relations in 
the International Settlement can we understand why the Movement developed 
considerably different symbolic practices and concrete actions in Shanghai. For this 
reason, foreigners' May Fourth experience deserves careful scholarly treatment.
The recent tendency to understand the May Fourth Movement conventionally has been 
to classify it as either "the Enlightened", "the Patriotic and Democratic" or "the 
Revolutionary May Fourth Movement". Furthermore, it has concentrated on events in 
Beijing, as Jeffrey Wasserstrom has pointed out. More notably, Wasserstrom has urged 
scholars to challenge and question this oversimplified picture o f the Movement.3 The 
problem with other May Fourth analyses lies not in what academics have included, but in 
what they have left out. Indeed, categorising the Movement in this manner does not 
explain the activities in other cities or in rural areas nor does it explore the foreigners' 
profound impact on the events. Important exceptions from the prevailing discourse are
2 Tse-tsung Chow, M ay Fourth Movement\ Intellectual Revolution in Modern China, (Cambridge, Mass., 
1960); A rif Dirlik, The Origins o f  Chinese Communism, (Oxford, 1989); Yiisheng Lin, Crisis o f  Chinese 
Consciousness: R adical Antitraditionalism in the M ay Fourth era, (W isconsin, 1979); Vera Schwarcz, The 
Chinese Enlightenment: Intellectuals and the Legacy o f  the May Fourth M ovem ent o f  1919, (Berkeley, 
1986); Benjamin I. Schwartz, ed., Reflections on the M ay Fourth M ovement: A Symposium, (Cambridge, 
Mass., 1972).
3 1 am very grateful to Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom for allowing me to use his paper in this research. Cited with 
author's permission, Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom, "The M issing May 4ths", pp. 1-6, unpublished, paper
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Joseph Chen's in-depth research of the May Fourth Movement in the Chinese city of 
Shanghai and Wen-hsin Yehs concise study on the May Fourth activities in Hangzhou 
and its surrounding areas in Zhejiang province.4 Given the remarkably broad participation 
in the May Fourth boycotts and strikes around the country, wider geographic and 
demographic research is required in order to understand the multi-faced national 
movement that swept across China at the end of 1910's and at the beginning of the 1920's. 
Therefore, this study seeks to enhance our understanding of the May Fourth era and 
provide new perspectives along with the conventional picture of the Movement, and 
moreover, to explore some unanswered questions related to the Movement activities.
In order to accomplish this task we may ask the following questions. How did the 
British react to the May Fourth Movement? What methods were used to interpret the 
Movement and why? How did the observations reflect or diverge from reality? In what 
ways did British reactions affect the development of the May Fourth Movement? What 
implications did the Movement have on British existence in the country? This study will 
attempt to address these questions by using insights from literary criticism, sociology, 
social psychology, international politics and history. The methodology employed in the 
research is critically narrative, but it also examines the May Fourth Movement as the 
British experienced and interpreted it. Thus, the study will explore the British May 
Fourth experiences through the British political culture that predominated in Shanghai.
presented at the May Fourth M ovement Conference, Beijing, 1999. Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom, Student 
Protests in China: The View from  Shanghai, (Stanford, 1991), pp. 51-71.
4 Joseph Chen, The M ay Fourth M ovement in Shanghai, (Leiden, 1971), passim ; Wen-hsin Yeh, Provincial 
P assages: Culture, Space and the Origins o f  Chinese Communism, (Berkeley and Los Angeles, California, 
1996), pp. 147-173.
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We cannot however understand a nation-wide movement in any given city or town in 
purely local terms, since 'the Spirit of Shanghai' encouraged and empowered those in 
rural areas and other cities to join the Movement. In turn the knowledge that thousands of 
May Fourth protestors were active elsewhere strengthened the protests in the 
International Settlement. As a result, although Shanghai and its International Settlement 
are the geographic focus of this study, the British and Chinese interactions outside the 
area will be also discussed.
The fundamental hypothesis is that British reactions affected developments of the May 
Fourth Movement activities in Shanghai. When examined further, this assumption 
proposes that the contemporary British actions had a certain influence on a subsequent 
new wave of Chinese anti-foreign and anti-Christian movements. This approach supports 
the hypothesis that the following outbreak of radical Chinese nationalism was partly 
influenced by the British reactions to the May Fourth Movement.
The British as observers
The British position as observers and commentators of the Chinese national movement 
included various dimensions of colonial encounters that were interpreted in 
correspondence, articles and reports. The British expatriates' three-fold identities which 
consisted of local, British and imperial identity, as aptly described by Robert Bickers, 
were undoubtedly reflected in propaganda materials and policies directed at the May 
Fourth demonstrators5. It should, however, be pointed out that personal May Fourth
5 British local identity was reflected first and foremost in Shanghai politics, whereas 'Britishness' defined 
people as a part o f  the nation. Imperial identity dominated the understanding o f  the Great Britain's position
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experiences were to a large extent echoed not only in private correspondence but also in 
public utterances. A closer look at the British individual May Fourth experiences, as 
illustrated in the chapters by the few examples of personal profiles, will appropriately 
demonstrate the variety o f expressed interpretations.
The imperialist discourse and Western writers' construction o f the non-Westem world 
has attracted a wide interest across academic fields and although it has not been the 
primary focus of this research, it has been included in the various research approaches 
operating in the framework of this study.6 While recognising that British imperial 
discourse included coloured perceptions, it, simultaneously interpreted an objective 
reality of those observed, and transmitted a complex transaction between the observer 
and the observed as historian Nicholas J. Clifford has recently argued.7 In other words, as 
Jonathan D. Spence proposes, "the sightings of China" were expressed by the foreigners 
who not only criticised it, but also regularly contradicted their own judgements, and as a 
result, often expressed respect and understanding towards the society.8 Related to the 
foreigners profound need to "understand the Chinese society", Joshua A. Fogel illustrates
as the world's greatest colonial power. For more insightful discussion o f the evolution o f  three-fold British 
identity in China see Robert A. Bickers, Britain in China: Community, Culture and Colonialism 1900- 
1949 , (Manchester, 1999), pp. 68-108; Robert A. Bickers, "Shanghailanders: The Formation and Identity o f  
the British Settler Community in Shanghai 1843-1937", Past and Present, no 159, 1998, pp. 161-211.
6 Simon Gikandi's work evaluates the colonial texts as tools to impose rule and governance. Simon 
Gikandi, M aps o f  Englishness: Writing Identity in the Culture o f  Colonialism, (N ew  York, 1996), passim .; 
David Spun* establishes extensive list o f twelve rhetorical modes o f  writing about non-W estem people, 
David Spuir, The Rhetoric o f  Empire: Colonial Discourse in Journalism, Travel Writing and Imperial 
Administration, (Durham, 1993), pp. 13-201. For in-depth analysis o f  'informal empire' or 'semi­
colonialism' in China see Jurgen Osterhammel, 'Semi-colonialism and Informal Empire in Twentieth- 
Century China: Towards a Framework o f  Analysis', in W olfgang J. Mommsen and Jurgen Osterhammel 
(eds,), Imperialism and After: Continuities and Discontinuities, (London, 1986), pp. 290-314; Martyn 
Atkins, Informal Empire in Crisis: British D iplom acy and the Chinese Customs Succession 1927-1929, 
(New York, 1995), pp. 1-15.
7 Nicholas J. Clifford, "A Truthful Impression o f  the Countiy": British and American Travel Writing in 
China, 1880-1949, (Ann Arbor, 2001), pp. 14-15.
8 Jonathan D. Spence, The Chan's Great Continent: China in Western M inds, (N ew  York, 1998), pp. xii- 
xviii.
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that travellers frequently justified the journeys by insisting that their primary agenda was 
to comprehend the country. Emphasising the foreigners' tendency to 'domesticate the 
world outside of their own' by classifying it by certain types of generalisations and 
terminology, Fogel highlights the importance of familiarising the alien society to enable 
an understanding of it.9 Although Spence and Fogel refer specifically to travellers, the 
method to understanding China, as they define it, is applicable to foreigners living in any 
non-Western country.
According to Urs Bitterli, the encounters between different cultures are defined through 
phenomenology of the encounter where the personal experience is constructed from 
contemporary documents which are perceived within the current socio-economic and 
political context. In addition, the encounter is an intellectual reflection that in written 
forms interprets the contacts between members of two cultures, and therefore, literature, 
historiography, articles or travel accounts are relevant examples of this encounter.10 The 
encounter is a situation that literature critic Marie Louise Pratt classifies as the 'contact 
zone' or a space between previously geographically and historically separated people 
whose life spans now establish ongoing relations and create interaction that remould both 
sides. Her definition emphasises the interrelated co-presence of people rather than 
underlining separateness of the different groups of people.11 The International Settlement 
was transferred into a unique contact zone where the May Fourth Movement incidents 
unexpectedly connected Chinese and foreigners, and therefore, it is this particular
9 Joshua A. Fogel, The Literature o f  Travel in the Japanese Rediscovery o f  China, 1862-1945 , (Stanford, 
California, 1996), pp. xiii-xvi, 4-5.
10 Urs Bitterli, Cultures in Conflict: Encounters between European and Non-European Cultures, 1492- 
1800 , (Cambridge, 1989), pp. 2,4, 133-153.
11 Marie Louise Pratt, Im perial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation, (London, 1992), pp. 6-1.
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interaction that profoundly moulded not only the Movement but also the entire society 
during the 1920's. Even though the British and the Chinese had previously lived in close 
proximity to each other, their cultural and socio-political encounter had been almost non­
existent. Hence, co-operation and communication between Chinese and foreigners was 
minimal. The May Fourth incidents, however, established shared experiences that 
affected the whole community in the International Settlement and forced the foreigners to 
communicate with Chinese protestors.
Hence, a colourful spectre of British observations interpreted imperialist or colonialist 
expressions of surrounding society that reflected their preconceived moral, theological 
and cultural principles. According to Quentin Skinner's evaluation, in a broader sense 
prevailing conditions and ideologies have to be profoundly considered and he concludes 
that when studying any given text, it is essential to recognise existing general conventions 
behind an author's intentions in order to be able to interpret the meaning of the text that 
the person has produced12. Similarly, Guanhua Wang contends that the conventional 
ideologies that are expressed in texts should be understood through an 'interpretative 
framework' as he calls it. Here he emphasises the importance of recognising 
contemporary intellectual trends that had an effect on the writings.13 Therefore, it is 
important to bear in mind that the British accounts did not necessarily represent an 
unmediated reflection o f reality. On the other hand, the Chinese accounts evaluated in 
previous research interpreted one side of the May Fourth reality that included the Chinese
12 Quentin Skinner, 'Motives, intentions and the interpretation o f  texts' in D. Newton de Molina (ed.), On 
Literary Intention, (Edinburgh, 1976), pp. 210-221.
13 Guanhua Wang, In Search fo r  Justice: The 1905-1906 Chinese Anti-American Boycott, (Cambridge, 
Mass., 2001), pp. 144-145.
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version of it14. The British people, however, personally experienced the events and 
derived authority from direct encounters with real incidents. Hence, they produced a vast 
amount of firsthand information about the unfolding May Fourth incidents, which 
provides another perspective of the whole Movement.
Although biased and coloured with prejudices, values and ideologies, British 
experiences interpreted their encounters with current events, and their experiences as 
such provide valuable information about the May Fourth Movement. Indeed, Paul Cohen 
argues that in 'lived past', that is, in the pasts of people who have directly participated in 
the making of it, people have a profound need to understand and define their experiences. 
This narrative function of the experienced past produced the British version of May 
Fourth rhetoric that was constantly reconstructed as the Movement proceeded. Cohen 
further illustrates that when experience is conceived as a ’’text” and the person living it as 
a ’’reader”, different readers will construct the text in different ways according to their 
values, beliefs and myths they bring with them to the reading,15 The British formed the 
May Fourth discourse that emerged and expressed their common Christian, British and 
Western values. Moreover, they revealed and formed shared expectations on how to react 
towards the Movement. Thus, the May Fourth discussions also created implicit collective 
rules for the British communal behaviour. This cohesion within the British community 
included shared attitudes towards politics as an activity, and it also included the constant 
repetition of key words and principles. However, assuming we can talk of a collective 
group experience, no two British groups experienced the May Fourth Movement exactly
14 Chow, The M ay Fourth M ovem ent; Schwarcz, The Chinese Enlightenment', Wasserstrom, Student 
Protests.
15 Paul A. Cohen, H istory in Three Keys- the Boxers as Event, Experience and Myth, (New York, 1997), 
pp. 5 ,6 1 -6 2 ,9 1 .
in the same way.16 When analysing research materials the focus is on establishing the 
British experience, with a special aim of evaluating the unity among these experiences. I 
will highlight also the disparities in these experiences. For their part, the Chinese 
continued to create their May Fourth experience which partly reflected British 
observations, while simultaneously having a profound effect on the foreigners' existence 
and thinking.
Theories from international politics provide an appropriate framework to obseive the 
British belief systems and their effect on decision-making behaviour. The belief system 
reflects various social, class and ethnic oriented presumptions that are introduced in 
international relations, and therefore, they constantly mould and constrain policy choices. 
Steve Smith argues that focusing on the belief systems is useful when studying policy 
decisions, for example, in a non-routine situation or where the organisational constraints
» 1 7  * 4were non-existent. There is no doubt that the May Fourth activities were obscure to the 
British community and open to various interpretations. Moreover, they were certainly not 
part of daily operations in the International Settlement. It has to be remembered that in 
reality the Shanghai Municipal Council's administration, and especially its British 
members, were free from many governmental or organisational restraints. Thus, in 
making decisions to deal with the May Fourth Movement, the British evaluated the 
situation through their many-sided identities, but their policies also reflected the British 
belief system.
16 Cohen, H isto iy  in Three K eys , p. 63; Lynn Hunt, Politics, Culture, and C lass in the French Revolution , 
(Berkeley, 1984), pp. 13-14, 63; Spun1, The Rhetoric o f  Empire, pp. 3- 4.
17 Steve Smith, "Belief Systems and the Study o f  International Relations", in Richard Little and Steve 
Smith (eds.), B elief System and Internationa! Relations, (Oxford, 1988), pp. 32-35.
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The British identities, the belief system and personal experiences in the Settlement 
formed a framework in which the May Fourth observations were embedded, but in order 
to understand British propaganda's influence on the Movement, it is crucial to identify 
British rhetoric with regard to the May Fourth Movement. It is, however, an 
oversimplification to suggest that the language used reflected only this framework, as 
their multiple political, economic and religious interests were also interpreted in the 
language. Hence, looking at the British manifestos we need to analyse the authorised 
language that they have created and utilised to communicate their objectives and interests 
during the May Fourth period. The language was a part of an activity in which the British 
attempted to define the May Fourth Movement and to control the other community 
members and their understanding of it. Moreover, the language provided tools to 
mythologise the May Fourth events and legitimise the British actions. Finally, it also 
characterised the British expatriate society and ultimately provided an authority to 
execute its policies in the society.
Sociologist Pierre Bourdieu defines discourse of authority or authorised language as a 
symbolic power that is exercised in order to acquire more concrete domination. 
According to Bourdieu's theory, the symbolic power is a linguistically expressed 
'invisible' power, which is 'misrecognised' as such, and therefore, it is 'recognised' as 
legitimate. This, he says, as a condition of its success requires that those subjected to it 
believe in the legitimacy of power and the legitimacy of those who wield it. Hegemony is 
in some sense conferred by those who obey it, and authorised language is a relevant 
example of it. The notion of authorised language includes sets of generally accepted 
foims that describe, for example, a person's style to perform, his status and mode of
20
address, and thus, by fulfilling these requirements his utterances are legitimised. 
Bourdieu argues that "the symbolic power - as a power of constituting is defined in and 
through a given relation between those who exercise power and those who submit to it, in 
the very structure of the field in which belief is produced and reproduced".18 Bourdieu 
continues the discussion on how to implement the symbolic power in society in order to 
sustain domination19 and again his analysis is relevant when observing the British society 
in the International Settlement, since the British society in Shanghai as a whole created 
and recreated the May Fourth rhetoric which was established to maintain the existing 
socio-political order in the International Settlement. Such a textual embodiment of 
authority served particular group interests, which they tend to present as universal 
interests and should be shared by the people in the entire International Settlement 
Therefore, the governing British expatriates contributed to the fictitious integration of 
the dominant class of foreigners by providing a worldview that defined their existence 
and that of the May Fourth Movement. In the hope to receive general support for 
decisions, this discourse was obviously directed at all Settlement residents. Overall, this 
rhetoric was designed to answer questions such as, what was the May Fourth Movement. 
Why was it initiated and what kind of effect would it have on British life in China? The 
last question in particular, appeared to present the most tangible problem to the foreign 
society. In addition, different subcultures of missionaries, businessmen and officials 
within the British community introduced the May Fourth discourse which emphasised 
their own particular principles and served their interests in the country.
18 Pierre Bourdieu, Language and Symbolic P ow er , (Cambridge, 1991), pp. 23, 107-116, 163-170; Ivan 
Snook, 'Language, Truth and Power: Bourdieu's MinisteriunV, in Richard Harker, Cheleen Mahar and Chris 
Wilkes (eds.), An Introduction to the Work o f  P ierre Bourdieu, (Basingstoke, 1990), pp. 160-179.
19 Bourdieu, Language and Symbolic P ow er , pp. 23-24.
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In this context, it is important to briefly examine the audience to whom the British 
directed their May Fourth rhetoric and to look at the effects they had on the produced 
materials and the observations interpreted by them. Three major groups to whom the May 
Fourth rhetoric was primarily communicated were the foreigners in Shanghai, the 
Chinese in the Settlement, and finally, the British in China or in Britain. The British 
circle appeared to represent the most important pressure group and was constantly 
consulted. Many propagandist writings to the foreign society in Shanghai were aimed 
firstly, to unify the opinions towards the Movement and secondly, to receive a formal 
acceptance of the policies to constrain the Movement. The British correspondence 
relating to the May Fourth activities was sometimes ambiguous and therefore, it was 
difficult to determine whether the text was an expression of an individual writer, the 
voice of institutional authority or an interpretation of cultural ideology. In many cases the 
text contained all of these things, often simultaneously.
Obviously official reports to other officials merely reflected British governmental or 
local policies, but fortunately, some private and personal correspondence elucidates 
views behind the official narratives. Similarly, the commercial community frequently 
censored their personal perceptions in the business reports that were distributed to 
London and around companies' local branches in China, but again available private letters 
have provided intriguing perceptions that were concealed from the public. It is also 
evident that the missionaries' published correspondence such as articles, books and travel 
letters did not necessarily represent their genuine perceptions about Chinese people and 
society. Authors regularly hide their own views, and moreover, the missionary officials at 
the headquarters in London carefully censored the most radical opinions before
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publication20. In all, critical analysis and careful comparison of the materials and cross­
checking the given information by using various types of sources has been, in this work, 
an essential basis for researching the May Fourth fringe areas and the foreigners' 
involvement in the development of the Movement.
British May Fourth rhetoric was expressed also in divergent policies that were 
implemented during and after the summer 1919. These manifestos included definite 
attempts to legitimise the British position in the international community and in the 
whole of China. In addition, uncontrollable stories, rumours and gossips tended to change 
and multiply the May Fourth discourse as the communication was never entirely within 
British control. According to Clay Ramsay, rumours are features of social construction of 
reality that require the shared mentality of the community in which they are circulated. 
He adds that rumours regularly act as a 'form of news' which is transmitted, often as a 
response to immense changes that are threatening the society.21 Ralph L. Rosnow 
identifies rumours as an essential part of the social process in an uncertain situation 
where ordinary channels of communication break down or organisational settings prevent
the free circulation of information. Therefore, they reveal much about the culture where
* 22 , , ,they flourish. The fundamental socio-political insecurity of the May Fourth era
characterised British and Chinese interaction and produced a vast array of rumours and 
hearsay in order to explain the situation and also to relieve the racial and political 
tensions in the community. Undoubtedly the rumours served as a validation for the
20 Robert A. Bickers, "To Serve and not to Rule": British Protestant Missionaries and Chinese Nationalism, 
1928-1931", in Robert A. Bickers and Rosemary Seton (eds.), M issionary Encounters, Sources and Issues, 
(Richmond, Surrey, 1996), pp. 213-214.
21 Clay Ramsay, The Ideology o f  the Great Fear: The Soissonnais in 1789, (Baltimore, 1992), pp. xv-xxvii, 
137.
22 Ralph L. Rosnow, Rumour and Gossip: The Social Psychology o f  Hearsay, (N ew  York, 1976), pp. 11- 
12, 30-31.
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collective attitude or for the political course of action. In sum, British May Fourth 
discourse created and responded to a reality that was infinitely adaptable in its functions 
of preserving the basic structures of power.
The Chinese as observers
To explore the interaction between the British community and the Chinese May Fourth 
demonstrators, it is also crucial to evaluate concisely the reasoning behind the Chinese 
propaganda addressed to foreigners and particularly to the British. At best, the 
communities shared some principle ways of observing and interpreting the situation, 
since groups respected some common values such as maintenance of peace and control. 
At the same time, both the Chinese protestors and the British were willing to attain 
control of May Fourth activities and distribution of propaganda. The Chinese definition 
of the Movement and its preliminary targets was certainly quite different to the British 
one. Another significant distinction between Chinese and British observations was that in 
as much as the foreigners participated in constructing the May Fourth Movement, their 
involvement did not include the Chinese cause to protest against imperialist threats from 
abroad and warlord corruption at home. On the contrary, the British attempted, in the first 
place, to control the Movement, secondly, to constrain it and finally, to suppress it 
completely. Officially, the British expatriates tried frequently to distance themselves from 
the Movement by arguing that it was China's internal affair, and thus, had nothing to do 
with the foreigners23. Meanwhile, the Chinese protagonists were participant-observers of
23 Public Record Office, London, [hereafter PRO], FO/228/3526/75b Sir Everard Fraser, British Consul- 
General in Shanghai to Sir John Jordan, British Minister in Beijing, 11 June, 1919.
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the Movement. They demonstrated May Fourth principles and accordingly interpreted 
events differently. Virtually all power in the International Settlement was in British hands 
and the May Fourth demonstrators perceived it as crucial to communicate their ideals 
about the Movement to the authorities in order to receive general acceptance for their 
activities. Finally, fear of clashing with the British authorities and potential suppression 
of the activities naturally affected the Chinese May Fourth propaganda that was initiated 
in the Settlement.
On the other hand, it was apparent, from the beginning that the May Fourth activists 
benefited from operating under the International Settlement's protection since the foreign 
jurisdiction was outside the Chinese government's oppressive policies and as such was an 
ideal place to activate their 'progressive' ideas and actions.24 There is no doubt that it was 
an ultimate meeting place for educational, social and political societies which had been 
banned in other parts of the city and in the capital.
Similar to their foreign neighbours, the Chinese demonstrators formed the May Fourth 
discourse by which they expressed their Movement's values in order to deal with the 
British particularly, and generally with the entire foreign community in Shanghai. The 
established rhetoric was carefully constructed from various Chinese and Western 
elements and it was interpreted through the 'interpretative framework'. Besides the 
prevalent local and national identities, May Fourth propaganda expressed certain class- 
related identities. Marie-Claire Bergere has illustrated the emergence of the new urban 
elite and their attempt to challenge traditional political and social structures in order to 
modernise China. It was inevitable that the May Fourth ideologies, as they began to
24 Nicholas R. Clifford, Spoilt Children o f  Empire; Westerners in Shanghai and the Chinese Revolution o f  
the 1920's, (Hanover, N ew  Hampshire, 1991), pp. 17-21.
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express their national sentiments, activated the radical section of the bourgeoisie. The 
May Fourth activities triggered the formation of political consciousness among the new
elite who wanted a more powerful position in the International Settlement's
« « «administration.
The Chinese May Fourth rhetoric was established firstly, to advocate the Chinese 
constituency and secondly, to convince the Westerners of their ideological seriousness. 
Given the remarkably broad participation in the Movement, it is unreasonable to assume 
that the participants were all inspired by a single ideology. Foreign manifestos and
' J f  0 9  O f t  O Qconcepts were adopted at least from socialism , anarchism , Darwinism , Marxism ,
'  30  31 • 32  *Communism , Bolshevism , liberalism ; and these new interpretative schemes were 
frequently expressed in conjunction with the rejection of traditional Chinese values33. It is 
indisputable that the May Fourth rhetoric always contained contradictory elements. On 
the one hand it provoked a profound critique of traditional Chinese culture and on the 
other hand it advocated radical Chinese nationalism. At that time Chinese modernisation 
was believed to be achievable by adopting particular Western doctrines. Yet, anti­
25 Marie-CIaire Bergere, The Golden Age o f  the Chinese Bourgeoisie 1911-1937, (Cambridge, 1989), pp. 
209-217; Wang, In Search fo r  Justice, pp. 4-7, 144-145. For more extensive discussion about Chinese 
Shanghai identities in modern times see Hanchao Lu, Beyond the Neon Lights: E veiyday Shanghai in the 
E arly Twentieth C en tw y, (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1999).
26 Michael Y.L. Luk, The Origins o f  Chinese Bolshevism: An Ideology> in the Making, 1920-1928 , (New  
York, 1990), pp. 21-22, 33-34.
27 Jean Chesneaux, The Chinese Labour M ovement 1919-1927, (Stanford, 1968), p. 136; A rif Dirlik, 
Anarchism in the Chinese Revolution, (Berkeley, 1991), pp. 148-196.
28 Chow, The M ay Fourth Movement, pp. 293-296.
29 Lucien Bianco, Origins o f  the Chinese Revolution, 1915-1949, (Stanford, 1971), pp. 36, 43-51; Yves 
Chevrier, "Utopian Marxism: "Populist Strains" and Conceptual Growth Pains in Early Chinese 
Communism, 1920-1922", in Yu-ming Shaw (ed.), Reform and Revolution in Twentieth Century China, 
(Taipei, 1987), pp. 33-39; A rif Dirlik, Revolution and H istoiy: The Origins o f  M arxist H istoriography in 
China, 1919-1937, (Berkeley, 1978), pp. 20-46.
30 Dirlik, The Origins o f  Chinese Communism, pp. 10-11.
31 Schwarcz, The Chinese Enlightenment, p. 119.
32 John Fitzgerald, Awakening o f  China: Politics, Culture and C lass in the N ationalist Revolution, 
(Stanford, 1996), pp. 153-154.
33 Lin, The Crises o f  Chinese Consciousness, pp. 6-9, 56-57, 63-81.
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imperialist feeling was already condemning Japanese politics and the Versailles peace 
settlement had undoubtedly increased Chinese reservations towards the Westerners’ 
policies in China. However contradictory the objectives were, the radical nationalism 
urgently demanded change. The strong articulation of these ideals for the foreign 
audience had a profound impact on the development of May Fourth ideologies. In many 
cases, the Chinese intellectuals which included both students and teachers, were the 
major advocates of the May Fourth ideas to the foreigners. This May Fourth discourse 
dominated intellectual discussions during the Movement.
The May Fourth Movement
Sidney Tarrow appropriately defines the movement in general as a collective challenge 
by people with common purposes and solidarity in sustained interaction with the elite, 
opponents and authorities.34 In some cases, the relevant experience of united labour 
strikes had been acquired in Europe when the Chinese workers were sent to work in the 
factories to replace the fighting labour force during the first World War. Apparently the 
Chinese workers were actively involved in the strikes.35 Indeed, the May Fourth 
Movement presented a challenge for Chinese society to recognise their common interests 
and to translate them into collective action. As it turned out, the magnitude of activities 
was comparable to no other modem time movement.
34 Sidney Tarrow, P ow er in M ovement: Social movements, collective action and politics, (Cambridge, 
1994), pp, 3-4. For the recent study o f  the May Fourth activities as a socio-political mass movement see 
Rudolf G. Wagner, "The Canonisation o f May Fourth", in Milena D olezelova-Velingerova and Oldiich 
Krai (eds.), The Appropriation o f  Cultural Capital: China's M ay Fourth Project, (Cambridge, Mass.,
2001), pp. 66-120.
35 Elisabeth J. Perry, Shanghai on Strike: The Politics o f  Chinese Labour, (Stanford, California, 1993), pp. 
71-72.
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Since general May Fourth history has already been thoroughly researched by many 
accomplished scholars, in this study it is necessary only to summarise the events.36 The 
opening of the Versailles Peace Conference in the spring 1919 to end the World War had 
reactivated the patriotic spirit among the Chinese intelligentsia. As the result of secret 
treaties that were made during the war between Japan and Western countries, it was 
decided to cede the former German areas in the Shandong peninsula to China's
37archenemy Japan. From the Chinese perspective the refusal to respect China's
• • • 3 R «sovereignty was a complete betrayal of 'Wilsonian principles' and it infuriated already 
disappointed young Chinese intellectuals. Thus, international politics in Europe 
intensified Chinese anti-Japanese sentiment. Back in China it was disillusionment with 
the political disintegration of warlord China that reflected weakened state authority. 
Finally, the pro-Japanese ministers in the Chinese central government and their perceived 
"betrayal o f the country" to the hands of Japanese militarists, activated the students for 
the May Fourth protests. At this moment, the ingredients for the radical movement were 
visible and international and domestic politics prompted the May Fourth Incident in 
Beijing. The students' operations in the capital foimed a precedent that was successfully
36 For a classic study on the May Fourth Movement see Chow, The M ay Fourth M ovement. Schwarcz has 
illustrated the development o f  May Fourth ideologies in The Chinese Enlightenment and Lin has in his 
book The Crisis o f  Chinese Consciousness explored the historical ideological tendencies that defined the 
Movement. The Shanghai Movement has been carefully constructed by Chen, The M ay Fourth Movement 
in Shanghai. For a collection o f  articles discussing on different aspects o f  the N ew  Culture Movement and 
the May Fourth Movement see Benjamin I. Schwartz (ed.), Reflections on the M ay Fourth Movement: A 
Symposium, (Cambridge, Mass., 1972). Latest addition to the May Fourth discussion is the collection o f  
essays in Milena Dolezelova-Velingerova and Oldrich Krai (eds.), The Appropriation o f  Cultural Capital: 
China's M ay Fourth Project, (Cambridge, Mass., 2001).
37 Chinese and British post-war relations and governmental policies are well assessed in Yungjin Zhang, 
China in the International System, 1918-1920: The M iddle Kingdom at the Periphety, (London, 1991). For 
a survey o f  the British policies with China during the World War see Philip A. Jones, Britain's Search fo r  
Chinese Cooperation in the First World War, (London, 1986).
38 President o f  the United States, Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points were formed to support post-war 
sentiments o f  nationalism and democracy. His programme included policies such as abolition o f  secret 
diplomacy, the guaranty o f  small countries' political independence and national self-determination.
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implemented around China. The emerging political and social awareness was mixed with 
radical nationalism, and as a result, it stimulated expansive protests which changed the 
political culture and practice of student and established elite groups.
The May Fourth Movement’s ideological origins were closely linked with the New 
Culture Movement 39 which had developed by the mid-1910's among the Chinese 
intelligentsia. The New Culture Movement extended and popularised a socially critical 
outlook and added to the urge of intellectuals exploring iconoclastic foreign "isms". The 
World War and the disillusioning outcome of the peacemaking had stirred people to a 
consciousness of China's vulnerability and to the urgency o f action to bring it out of its 
backwardness. However, various distinctive features of the movements separated them. 
The latter was more ideologically cultural, non-political and intellectual, whereas the 
May Fourth Movement was born to protest against global politics in Versailles. 
Furthermore, at least in Shanghai, it activated all classes of Chinese society.
Tse-tsung Chow's extensive work on the May Fourth Movement emphasises the 
importance o f foreign influence upon the developments of the Movement. However, his 
central object is to construct a broad analysis of Chinese social, political and cultural 
aspects of the incident itself. Furthermore, Chow's concise analysis of the foreigners' 
effect on the events includes some incorrect information.40 In contrast to Chow's
39 The N ew  Culture M ovement was initiated among the Chinese intelligentsia in 1915 to promote literary 
reform and to stress self-transformation o f the nation and its intelligentsia by rejecting the traditional 
Confucian principles and emphasising the Western ideologies. For more detailed analysis on the New  
Culture M ovement and its relation with the May Fourth Movement see Chen, The M ay Fourth Movement 
in Shanghai, pp. 6- 25; Chow, The M ay Fourth Movement, pp. 41-83. Charlotte Furth has pointed out 
certain other historical precedents for the May Fourth ideas and activities during the last decade o f  the Qing 
dynasty; see Charlotte Furth, "May Fourth in History", in Schwartz (ed.), Reflections on the M ay Fourth, 
pp. 59- 68.
40 For Chow's analyses o f  foreign attitudes see Chow, The May Fourth M ovem ent, pp. 197-214. On page p. 
205 Chow argues that "a number o f  Chinese workers and merchants were killed and wounded by the 
municipal police in the street fighting". Chow's arguments are based primarily on either American 
secondary sources or Chinese publications, which particularly interpreted the incidents to support the
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approach, Joseph Chen underlines the differences between the Beijing and Shanghai May 
Fourth Movements. He bases his arguments on dissimilarities in demographic, social and 
economic structures of Beijing and Shanghai respectively, and thus, the May Fourth 
Movement developed differently in both cities. Shanghai was a more modem, Western- 
oriented treaty port with influential international communities, and it had vital elements 
of commercialism and industrialism.41 Yet, Chen ignores almost completely the 
foreigners' influence on the development of the Movement. However, as will be 
discussed in the following chapters, various May Fourth activities were possible only 
because of the existence of foreign enclaves and inevitably the foreigners' policies had a 
profound effect on the Movement.
Indeed, in Shanghai the students were able to escape the Chinese government’s 
suppressive measures by establishing offices and publishing houses inside the foreign- 
administered areas. Due to poor co-operation between the International Settlement and 
the French Concession, prohibition in one area would not interrupt the operations in 
another. The students just simply crossed the border.42 A particular feature of the 
Shanghai May Fourth Movement was that it included various sections of Chinese society 
compared with Beijing’s predominately intelligentsia-led movement. In contrast, the 
students, merchants and workers were able to organise a week’s general strike from June 
5-12, 1919, which paralysed the whole commercial city o f Shanghai, an occurrence that 
never happened in the capital.
Chinese nationalist cause. According to the Shanghai Municipal Police records, one Chinese died and nine 
were wounded. The Shanghai Municipal Archives, Shanghai [hereafter SM A], U l-9 1 -1 9 , file 19, Shanghai 
Municipal Police, Headquarters, Central Register, Captain Superintendent o f  Police, K.J. McEuen to 
Fraser, 14 June, 1919.
41 Chen, The M ay Fourth M ovement In Shanghai, pp. 1-3.
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The May Fourth Movement of 1919 has, in retrospect, been perceived as the core of 
anti-Christian and anti-foreign movements43, and as the beginning of women's 
emancipation44, and radical nationalism45. It is also said to have provided the ideological 
basis of the Chinese Communist Party46. The Movement is also continuously referred to 
when explaining the backgrounds of the great Chinese movements during the twentieth 
century, for example, the Hundred Flowers Campaign47, the Cultural Revolution48 and 
the Tiananmen Square Democracy Movement49.
Each researcher interested in the Chinese revolution has defined the May Fourth 
Movement and the period covering it, according to the understanding o f what the 
Movement represented for them. As a result, the timing of the Movement varies from 
1915-192050, 1915-192251, 1915-192752 or 1919-192053, last-mentioned researching only
42 PRO, F 0228/3526/59 Fraser to Jordan, 11 June, 1919; SMA, U l-9 1 -1 9 , file 19, Shanghai Municipal 
Police, Headquarters, Central Register, McEuen to Fraser, 10 June, 1919.
43 Jessie Gregory Lutz, Chinese Politics and Christian M issions - the Anti-Christian M ovements o f  1920- 
1928, (Notre Dame, Indiana, 1988), pp. 5, 17.
44 Yingchao Deng, "The Spirit o f  the May Fourth Movement", in Patricia Buckley Ebrey (ed.), Chinese 
civilization. A sourcebook, (N ew  York, 1993, 2nd edition), p. 363;
45 Kuang-Sheng Liao, Antiforeignism and M odernization in China, (Hong Kong, 1990), pp. 62-79; Evelyn 
S. Rawski, " The Social Agenda o f  May Fourth", in Kenneth Liberthal, Joyce Kallgren, Roderick 
MacFarquhar and Frederick Wakeman, Jr. (eds.), P erspectives on M odern China, Four Anniversaries, 
(New York, 1991), pp. 139-157;Schwarcz, The Chinese Enlightenment, pp. 114-116.
46 Dirlik, The Origins o f  Chinese Communism, pp. 3-15; Sooyoung Kim, "The Comintern and the Far 
Eastern Communist Movements in Shanghai, 1919-1922: The Meaning o f  Internationalism", University o f  
W isconsin-Madison, unpublished PhD thesis, 1996, pp. 102-103; Benjamin Yang, From Revolution to 
P olitics - Chinese Communists on the Long M arch , (Oxford, 1990), p. 253.
47 Maurice Meisner, Mao's China: A H isto iy  o f  the People's Republic, (N ew  York, 1977), pp. 187, 191,192.
48 Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom, "The Evolution o f the Shanghai Student Protest Repertoire; or, Where Do 
Correct Tactics Come From?", in Frederic Wakeman Jr. and Wen-Hsin Yeh, Shanghai Sojourners, 
(Berkeley, California, 1992), pp. 139-140.
49 Richard Baum, " The Road to Tiananmen: Chinese politics in the 1980's", in Roderick MacFarquhar., 
ed., The P olitics o f  China 1949-1989 , (Cambridge, 1993), p. 435; Joseph Fewsmith, China Since 
Tiananmen: The P olitics o f  Transition, (Cambridge, 2001), pp. 111-113, 122- 125; Vera Schwarcz, 
"Memory and Commemoration: The Chinese Search for a Livable Past", in Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom and 
Elizabeth J. Perry (eds.), Popular P rotest and P olitical Culture in M odern China, (Boulder, 1994), 2nd 
edition, pp. 170-183.
50 Bergere, The Golden Age, p. 209.
51 Chow, The M ay Fourth Movement; Schwarcz, The Chinese Enlightenment.
52 Lin, The Crisis o f  Chinese Consciousness.
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the incidents which occurred immediately after the fourth of May 1919. This research 
covers roughly the period between 1919-1925, but particular attention is given to the first 
few years after the May Fourth Incident to which British correspondence constantly 
refers.
Primary sources
This research is based on previously closed materials held in the Shanghai Municipal 
Archives including the Shanghai Municipal Police Headquarters Central Archives, and 
they are supplemented with sources from British archives. Shanghai Municipal Police, 
'Special Branch' or as known in 1919 'the Intelligence Office' materials that are available 
in the West, are only very scattered documents covering the police's activities before 
1920's. Therefore, they contain hardly any information relating to the May Fourth 
Movement. In addition to the Shanghai Municipal Council Secretariat materials in 
Shanghai, the governmental and municipal officials' correspondence was consulted at the 
Public Record Office, London.
Especially interesting materials located in Britain include the Jardine, Matheson & 
Corporation materials, especially its colourful and vast twentieth century correspondence. 
Access to this material was not available until very recently and has therefore never 
before been researched. Newly available materials include also the British-Chinese 
Corporation archives54 which supply Jardines, and the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking
53 Wasserstrom, Student Protests.
54 In spring 2002, the British-Chinese Corporation [hereafter BCC] materials were to be transferred from 
the Cambridge University Library into the HSBC archives in London.
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Corporation (HSBC) materials. Other business archives researched for this study are the 
powerful Eastern trading company, the John Swire and Sons Ltd business archives. The 
John Swire & Sons Ltd archives have been partly destroyed during the World War II, and 
therefore there is only limited amount of materials available related to their Butterfield & 
Swire company's (B&S) 1910-1920's activities and none of them discusses of the May
55Fourth Movement or incidents related to it . However, some other sources indicate that 
the B&S experienced the Movement equally extensively as Jardines.56
Missionary archives that have been relevant for this research are primarily situated in 
the School of Oriental and African Studies archives, but the Regents Park College in 
Oxford holds the Baptist Missionary Society sources and the University of Birmingham 
has the Church Missionary Society materials. Missionary Charles George Sparham's 
private correspondence was consulted at the Westminster and Cheshunt College in 
Cambridge.
The Chinese Maritime Customs papers at the Nanjing No. 2 archives are currently 
under the cataloguing process, and therefore, only the materials available in Britain have 
been researched. The Shanghai Municipal Council minutes have been published very 
recently, and thus, have not been used in this research.
The main criterion used to analyse British people and their responses and experiences 
during the May Fourth Movement has been their presence in China during May-June 
1919. There are various in-depth analyses of the Movement, its origins, developments 
and results from the people who were neither in Shanghai, nor in China at that time. It is
55 For the general history o f  the Butterfield & Swire firm see Charles Drage, Taikoo, (London, 1970). The 
colourful picture o f  the business community's life in Shanghai and other parts o f  country has been 
illustrated by the Butterfield & Swire workers in Christopher Cook's, The Lion and Dragon: British Voices 
from  the China Coast, (London, 1985).
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not relevant, therefore, to discuss their interpretation in this research. It therefore 
excludes China 'experts' such as G.E. Morrison, who was the former Times 
correspondent, London, and political adviser to the president of China and O.M. Green, 
editor of Shanghai’s leading British newspaper The North-China Daily News, and finally, 
J.O.P. Bland, a Shanghai-based journalist for the Times, London and former director of 
the BCC and the former secretary of the Council. Attempts to use correspondence from 
the British travellers or settlers57 in Shanghai have not provided any significant 
contribution to this study.
In all, analysed materials therefore include the British consular and legation 
correspondence, the SMC secretariat and police files, the companies' reports and 
correspondence, missionary correspondence, private letters and diaries, journals and 
newspapers. However, its has to be remembered that all the materials were not equally 
reliable, and as we shall see, intentional misinterpretations and information fabrications 
were part of the British May Fourth experience. Obviously, the diversity of sources has 
given the means to critically compare the materials and eventually it has provided a more 
detailed picture of the British May Fourth experience.
56 PRO, F 0228/3526/9  Acting Consul, Ningbo to Jordan, 29 May, 1919; SM A, U 1-91-18, file 19, Shanghai 
Municipal Police, McEuen to Fraser, 12 June 1919.
57 Robert Bickers has defined four overlapping categories o f  the British in China namely: settlers, 
expatriates, missionaries and officials. Accordingly, the settlers' existence was established on privileges 
developed in the International Settlement and their livelihood was in principle dependent on the existence 
o f  the International Settlement. Bickers, Britain in China, pp. 67-73. For an interesting example o f  the 
British police's life in 1920's-193O's Shanghai see Settlement police, Maurice Tinkler's papers at the
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1.2. The British May Fourth Setting in Shanghai
The British-created treaty port system had flourished since the Treaty of Nanjing 1842 
and a supplementary agreement was implemented in October 1843 when after the first 
Opium War, five Chinese ports including Shanghai, Ningbo, Fuzhou, Xiamen (Amoy) 
and Guangzhou (Canton) were opened to British trade. The agreement was further 
extended and reinforced by the Treaty of Tianjin in 1858. Other Western countries were 
quick to sign similar treaties with China, and therefore, these agreements shaped the 
political and commercial relations between the Western countries and China for the next
58century. The treaties allowed foreigners to live and work in these treaty ports and in 
Shanghai the foreigners were able to rent land within the borders of the International 
Settlement. The setting was thus established for expatriates to expand into the 
international market because of Shanghai's existing internal trade in tea, cotton, silk, 
silver and opium,59 Moreover, the treaties enabled and protected the foreign missionaries 
and merchants when they travelled along rivers and that also facilitated the consolidation 
of their position in the countryside. Numerous other cities and towns were opened to 
foreign political, financial and cultural influence during the nineteenth century.60 (Map 2, 
p. 36)
Imperial War Museum and Shanghai Municipal Archives, U l-3 -320 , file 1385, Shanghai Municipal 
Council, Secretariat, R. M. Tinkler files.
58 William Frederick Mayers, Treaties between the Empire o f  China and Foreign P ow ers, (Shanghai, 
1906), pp. 1-3, 11-19, 5th edition. For British governmental policies in China at the beginning o f  the 
twentieth century see P.J. Cain and A.G. Hopkins, British Imperialism: Crisis and Deconstruction 1914- 
1990, (London, 1993), pp. 263-296; Wm. Roger Louis, British Strategy> in the F ar East 1919-1939, 
(Oxford, 1971).
59 Shanghai's vivid history since early Yuan dynasty to 1850's has been well established in Linda Cooke 
Johnson, Shanghai: From M arket Town to Treaty Port, 1074-1858, (Stanford, California, 1995). Shanghai's 
modem history is vividly captured by the photographs presented in Lynn Pan, Liyong Xue and Zonghao 
Qian (eds.), Shanghai: A Century o f  Change in Photographs 1843-1949, (Hong Kong, 1993).

















At the beginning of the twentieth century Shanghai was a centre o f trade, industry and 
banking. Even though Beijing was the capital and the legations were situated there, 
foreign influence was more dominant and visible in Shanghai61 and Hong Kong62. 
Shanghai was divided into three different jurisdictions: the French Concession, the 
International Settlement and the area of the Chinese municipality. The British 
predominance over the International Settlement was unquestionable, but numerous other 
foreign groups lived under the British protection. The French Concession was 
administered by the French consul-general and it offered another refuge for political 
asylum seekers. The geographically largest and the most populous region was the 
Chinese administered area. It has to be remembered that the overwhelming majority of all 
the communities' populations were Chinese. Administratively these municipalities existed 
side by side each with its own government and laws until 1943. The core of foreign 
existence was the right of extraterritoriality by which the immigrants remained subjected 
to the laws of their own country instead of Chinese laws, and hence, were subjects of 
their own consular jurisdiction. As a result, areas populated by non-indigenous peoples in
61 In recent years, history o f  modem Shanghai lias received extensive scholarly attention and here are just 
few  examples o f  the books published. Stella Dong provides a general overview o f  city's history in 
Shanghai: (he Rise and Fall o f  a Decadent City, (New York, 2000), whereas Hanchao Lu, Beyond the Neon 
Lights and Brian G. Martin, The Shanghai Green Gang: Politics and O rganised Crime, 1919-1927 , 
(Berkeley and Los A ngeles, 1996) bring new perspectives into the city's life by analysing immigrants and 
secret societies. Sherman Cochran has edited a selection o f  articles in which Shanghai's development into 
modem commercial centre is well analysed in Sherman Cochran (ed.), Inventing Nanjing Road: 
Comm ercial Culture in Shanghai, 1900-1945 , (Ithaca, N ew  York, 1999). Well selected collection o f  essays 
on development o f  Shanghai and its surrounding areas is presented in Brian Hook (ed.), Shanghai and the 
Yangtze Delta: A C ity Reborn, (Hong Kong, 1998). For another interesting collection o f  Shanghai essays 
see Frederic Wakeman Jr. and Wen-hsin Yeh, Shanghai Sojourners, (Berkeley, California, 1992).
62 The British colonial history in Hong Kong has produced numerous volum es o f books, but local 
movements are briefly discussed in Linda Butenhoff, Social M ovements and P olitical Reform in Hong 
Kong, (Westport, Connecticut, 1999).
63 The French Concession had been established by 1849 and it was a smaller area than the International 
Settlement. The Concession had a population o f  around 3 200 foreigners and 162 000 Chinese in 1919, The 
North China Herald, 20 September, 1919, pp. 766-767. The French Concession had a powerful underworld 
network represented by the Green Gang and one o f  leaders apparently used his connections to suppress the 
May Fourth strikes in the Concession; see Martin, The Shanghai Green Gang, pp. 20, 37-38, 67.
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Shanghai were distinguished by almost complete political, social, and cultural isolation 
from Chinese life: it was like a virtual colonial reality constructed first and foremost by 
British and other Westerners. There was practically no cultural accommodation between 
the British and the Chinese.
Of over two million inhabitants in Shanghai around 1920, over 24 000 were foreigners, 
the largest group within the International Settlement being the Japanese with 15 500 
habitants64. 5300-6300 were British65, 1 500 American66, 1 400 Portuguese, 1 000 
French, and about 1000 were German residents. Other nationalities such as Danish, 
Dutch, Indian and Russians67 were also represented in the foreign enclaves. Politically 
and financially the most influential British group was the businessmen including traders, 
bankers, manufacturers and the managers of mines, shipping industries and railways. 
Other major groups included missionaries, as Shanghai was the centre of the Protestant 
missions in China, and British governmental and municipal officials. Finally, one of the 
major constituents of Shanghai's British community was the miscellaneous groups 
providing services at the treaty port settlement including, for example, journalists, 
lawyers, estate agents, shopkeepers and engineers. Shanghai's reputation as being 'Paris 
of the East' was supported by lively nightlife, and hence, club owners, prostitutes, 
musicians and entertainers.
64 Christian Henriot, "Little Japan' in Shanghai: and insulated community, 1875-1945", in Robert Bickers 
and Christian Henriot (eds.), New Frontiers: Imperialism's New Communities in East Asia, J842-1953, 
(Manchester, 2000), pp. 146- 169.
65 Estimations vary from 5300 residents, Betty Peh-T'i Wei, Shanghai: Crucible o f  Modern China, (New  
York, 1987), p. 110; to 6300 British residents, Bickers, Britain in China, p. 125.
66 For a more detailed account o f  the formation o f  the American community, see James Layton Huskey, 
"Americans in Shanghai: Community, Formation and response to Revolution, 1919-1928", University o f  
North Carolina, PhD thesis, 1985, pp. 1-72.
67 For a more in-depth discussion o f  the Russian community, see Marcia R. Ristaino, "The Russian diaspora 
community in Shanghai", in Robert Bickers and Christian Henriot, New Frontiers: Imperialism's New  
Communities in East Asia, 1842-1953, (Manchester, 2000), pp. 192-210.
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Although the British were outsiders in China they had been able to create their own 
municipal administration in the International Settlement together with other Western 
countries and Japan. The British had founded a solid municipal government headed by 
the Shanghai Municipal Council (the Council) which was responsible for public utilities 
and security, and in practice controlled the whole foreign community. It was a committee 
of nine annually elected members (six British, two Americans and one Japanese), and 
usually chaired by a British member. The members were frequently managers of large 
companies such as the Jardine, Matheson & Company, Butterfield and Swire or the 
Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, and were elected to the Council at the 
annual Ratepayers General Meeting. Maintenance of this peculiar oligarchy was secured 
by an electoral system that was based on property franchise, it was limited franchise and 
only the wealthiest businessmen had the privilege to vote. The Council perceived that 
administratively it was responsible only to the ratepayers of the Settlement.68
Another exceptional feature of the Council was its ability to operate without obtaining 
its powers from the legislative assembly of any government, as much of legitimacy was 
established on a code of local laws that had been implemented using the foreign residents 
nations' extraterritorial laws. The Council had no internationally recognised judicial 
power and hence its hegemony was built on incoherent Land Regulations and later added 
Bylaws.69 The Council ruled the International Settlement by twelve different departments 
and employed over 600 people, the great majority being British residents. In addition, the
68 A.M. Kotenev, Shanghai: Its M ixed Court and Council, (Shanghai, 1925), pp. 561-564; PRO, 
FO /671/447/507-510 Beilby F. Alston, British Minister in Beijing to Shanghai, 28 January and 6, 15 
February, 1921.




foreign settlement had its own Mixed Court for Chinese-foreigner disputes; the 
Shanghai Municipal Police to secure the safety of the area and in a case of emergency the 
police was assisted by the Shanghai Volunteer Corps which was the case during the May 
Fourth Movement's activities. With the assistance of its various organisations, the 
Council's power of policing and taxation asserted sovereignty over the municipality and 
the population, foreign or Chinese.
British investments helped support her predominant position in Shanghai since almost a 
third of foreign investment was British. Stocks, land, buildings, and factories often 
financed by Chinese, British and other foreigners were primary sectors in the 
contemporary investor's portfolio. Out of all land owned by the Chinese, over 80% of
foreign registered land in the International Settlement was held by the British and half of
■ 11the land value in the French Concession was nominally in their names. Even the
Shanghai Municipal Council seized the opportunity to control the municipal investments
and established its own Municipal Investment Bank to attract foreign and Chinese
investors to avail themselves of the Council's debenture loans.72 In 1920, Shanghai's
share of China's total exports was 35,7 % and almost 48% of the country’s foreign
* 73imports . The same year foreign trade statistics show that Britain and its crown colony 
Hong Kong had combined imports to China of 36.4% with exports 33.7%.74 The British 
merchants exercised control over this business.
70 The Mixed Court's history during the Republican China is well illustrated in Thomas B. Stephens, Order 
and D iscipline in China: The Shanghai M ixed Court 1911-1927, (Seattle, 1992).
71 Clifford, Spoilt Children o f  Empire, pp. 41-42, these figures are from years 1926-1927.
72 SMA, U l-3 -4 , file 1001, Shanghai Municipal Council, Secretariat, Council Treasurer to the Secretary, 4 
June, 1919.
73 Liang-lin Hsiao, China's Foreign Trade Statistics 1846-1949 , (Cambridge, Mass, 1974), pp. 24, 176.
74 Chinese Maritime Customs, Foreign Trade o f  China, 1920, (Shanghai, 1921), p. 7.
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It was true that the British missionaries were not anymore the largest group of 
missionaries in China in 1919, but they had established an extensive network of 
missionary stations across the country. Their headquarters were usually situated in 
Shanghai. Moreover, the missionaries tended to operate in the interior areas of China and 
were rarely active in British politics in Shanghai. Yet, as we shall see in chapter four, the 
May Fourth Movement stimulated the missionary community to participate actively in 
local and national politics. The London Missionary Society, the Baptist Missionary 
Society, the Church Missionary Society and the Religious Tract Society all had 
headquarters in Shanghai. Therefore, the missionaries were inevitably affected by the 
May Fourth events.75
Obviously, the International Settlement had not escaped the problems of crowds, 
boycotts and riots, as earlier incidents such as the anti-American boycott of 1905 had 
demonstrated. The boycott was provoked by recently renewed American exclusion laws 
which severely restricted Chinese immigration to the country. As a result, the boycott of 
American products, strikes, petitions and mass rallies were organised and Shanghai was 
chosen as the centre for anti-exclusion activities. Such operations were a type of 
’rehearsal' for the May Fourth boycotts, and indeed, the anti-American boycott has been 
claimed as representing one of the first manifestations of modem Chinese nationalism.76 
Similar 'operational preparation' which immediately followed this event was the Mixed 
Court incident of 1905 when the dispute over the court proceedings allowing the court the 
right to extradite an imprisoned person to the Chinese authorities prompted fierce
75 All major British missionary societies and their activities are thoroughly explored in Dan Cui, The
Cultural Contribution o f  British P rotestant M issionaries and British-American Co-operation to China's 
National D evelopm ent D uring the 1920's, (Lanham, Maryland, 1998).
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demonstrations and meetings. Inciting propaganda was strengthened by the wide 
distribution of pamphlets, and as a result attacks against foreign residents and property
77took place. All these operations culminated in the burning of the police station. In 1918, 
scarcely a year before the May Fourth Movement began its activities, a fracas occurred 
between Chinese and Japanese residents in the northern part o f the Settlement. The 
Council predicted serious consequences and thus put the Shanghai Volunteer Coips on 
duty for few days. This Hongkou incident evidently exacerbated already strained
• 78  * *relations between these groups. In spite of minor episodes during the period of 
instability in the International Settlement and its surroundings, it was a relatively peaceful 
decade. Therefore, the scale o f the May Fourth Movement's activities was somewhat 
unexpected and the foreigners in the Settlement found the events extremely disturbing.
The opening chapter of this thesis sets out the British officials' experiences during the 
May Fourth Movement's activities, and both governmental and municipal officials' views 
are analysed. The following chapter discusses the ways in which the British commerce 
and finance community observed and reacted to the Movement. The formation of the 
British missionaries' May Fourth rhetoric is described in the chapter four. Chapter five 
shifts to late summer 1919, when the notable aspects of British policies were directed to 
suppress demonstrators' further activities. Finally in chapter six the Chinese May Fourth 
demonstrators' reactions to the British May Fourth policies are examined.
76 Wang, In Search fo r  Justice, pp. 4-5, 81-107. For more extensive discussion about labour strikes and 
boycotts in Shanghai before 1919 see Chesneaux, The Chinese Labour M ovement, pp. 125-131,
77 Kotenev, Shanghai: Its M ixed Court, pp. 121-131.
78 Shanghai Municipal Council, Annual Report 1918, pp. 58A- 62A, 70A-75A.
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2. ‘A WORLD ALREADY IN PLACE’ -  BRITISH OFFICIALS’ 
EXPERIENCES
The primary purpose of this chapter is to analyse participants’ immediate experiences and 
to emphasise the British officials’ reactions to and their influence on the May Fourth 
Movement, It is also important to evaluate whether the conception and practice of British 
administration affected the Movement. Some of the Chinese protestors’ reactions will be 
discussed here in connection with British actions, while Chapter Six will concentrate on 
analysing the Chinese response more thoroughly.
The analysis of British officials’ experiences, reactions and opinions is, in the following 
discussion, organised in two parts according to the major developments of the Movement 
in Shanghai. This partition is created purely to describe the intensification of various 
British opinions and not to outline the consecutive nature of the Movement. Its events 
and actions proceeded with their own rhythm, often in response to the foreigners’ actions. 
The first part examines British officials' initial reactions at the beginning of the May 
Fourth Movement. The stirring moments in the British community will be dealt in the 
second part which stretches roughly from June to July 1919, covering the general strike 
and the weeks immediately following it. The May Fourth Movement ideologies and 
activities changed after the June strikes. Therefore, late summer and autumn events will 
be discussed in the Chapter Five.
A terminological problem occurred in defining the concept ‘a British official’ in 
Shanghai. Consulate workers were clearly British government representatives in 
Shanghai. But in the case of the Shanghai Municipal Council and its workers, the 
definition was more complicated. All six British members o f the Council were also 
directors of large enterprises in Shanghai, and they acted in their companies' interests 
primarily, and therefore, had different agendas to pursue. In principal, they were British
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officials protecting foreigners5 privileges in the city, but in practice the Council members 
supported only local British businessmen’s interests. These interests occasionally collided 
with British government policy, but during crises, like that of World War, the home 
country's international interests were defended, as many Shanghai Britons went back to 
Europe to fight in the war1. In this case British identity was stronger than local 
‘Shanghailander5 identity . After all, the British Empire provided them with gunboats and 
rifles, for protection, and offered the governmental, or more ‘official5 justification for the 
British presence in Shanghai. Therefore, in this research, the British members of the 
Council and the British members of different departments are perceived as representing 
the local British officials in Shanghai. It should be remembered, however, that sometimes 
they acted as members of the British Empire, and in contrast, in some situations, they 
supported their own regional interests in the city.
It is evident that after the Movement some of the police reports were compiled from the 
records written during the incidents, and in general, the official reporting concealed 
police personal views on the subject. The reports merely explained the concluding and 
generally accepted views, neglecting personal police experiences, and how these related 
to the development of the May Fourth Movement, which is one of the main interests of 
this study. The extracted reports were published in the Shanghai Municipal Council’s 
Annual Report of both 1919 and 1920, and similarly, most o f the Shanghai Municipal 
Police (SMP) Special Branch files which analysed May Fourth Movement were 
summaries o f the files written in the summer o f 1919. The SMP Special Branch files 
alone inadequately describe foreign police views and actions towards the May Fourth
1 Shanghai Municipal Council, Annual Report 1919 , pp. 258-259A.
2 For analysis o f  the 'Shanghailander' identity see Bickers, "Shanghailanders", pp. 170-178; Huskey, 
"Americans in Shanghai", pp. 36-49.
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Movement. This is because only one compiled and embellished report was originally 
published in July’s Municipal Gazette3, and with three extracts of police evidence added, 
with memo, to inspectors. Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom’s excellent work on the student 
protests in Shanghai and its informative bibliographic essay argues that none of the 
Shanghai or other Asian archives hold the Shanghai Municipal Police files4, and 
obviously many o f the International Settlement materials were closed at the time of his 
research. However, the Shanghai Municipal Archives possess the bulk of the SMP 
Headquarters Central Register files. I was allowed access to the files that dealt with May 
Fourth Movement only. They include, for example: internal police memos and their 
correspondence with the Council and its various departments; police reports and letters to 
British and other foreign consulates in Shanghai; copies of May Fourth handbills and 
posters; extracts of the Council minutes; police’s letters to some British, Japanese and 
Chinese businessmen, and finally, the plans for a new security system in the Settlement. 
But in all likelihood the archives also hold an extensive collection of police files that will 
illustrate the whole foreign community’s presence in Shanghai at the beginning of the 
twentieth century, that is, during the time Special Branch files fail to report. The initial 
statements found in the SMP Headquarters Central Register files, the Shanghai Municipal 
Council Secretariat files, and reports to the Shanghai Consul-General in the Foreign 
Office files have been most relevant in analysing individual views. When comparing 
these reports they accurately reveal differences between the Council and the police 
officials’ personal reactions.
3 M unicipal Gazette was a supplement paper published by the NCH  and it was the Shanghai Municipal 
C ouncil’s official paper.
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2.1. Launching the May Fourth Movement in the International Settlement
The first telegrams of the Beijing May Fourth incidents and students' arrests arrived at 
Shanghai on May 5, 1919 via Tianjin's British concession. Due to the Chinese 
government's attempt to restrict escalation of the demonstrations, the Chinese cable 
connections had been temporarily suspended, and therefore, students had to circumvent 
the problem by using foreign agencies. Local Chinese newspapers in Shanghai, e.g. Shen 
Bao and Minguo Ribao, reported the news in the following day's issue and various 
educational organisations sent telegrams to the other cities encouraging them also to 
support the movement.5
When the British daily newspaper in Shanghai, The North-China Daily News (NCDN), 
broke the news on May 6, 1919 of the students’ riots in Beijing, 6 British officials' 
correspondence expressed no immediate reaction. On the following day the Movement 
was visible also in Shanghai when the Citizens Association7 held a meeting at the Public 
Recreation Ground just outside the Chinese City and later had a discussion with the Peace
n
Conference Southern delegates at the old German Club. Estimates of the total attendance 
varied. The Shanghai Municipal Police reported 7 000 persons, whereas Chinese press 
reported 10 000 people which included around 3 000 students.9 The North-China Herald 
(NCH), in an article dated May 8, 1919 acknowledged the Citizens Association’s meeting 
in Shanghai and complained about the Beijing government's incompetence, which was
4 Wasserstrom, Student Protests, p. 383.
5 Chen, The M ay Fourth M ovement in Shanghai, pp. 75-76; Chow, The M ay Fourth Movement, p. 124.
6 The North-China D aily News [hereafter NCDN\, 6 May, 1919, p. 6.
7 More than 30 business and educational organisations had formed the Citizens Association on May 6th, 
1919 to support the capital’s movement. Chen, The M ay Fourth M ovem ent in Shanghai, p. 77.
8 The Peace Conference between North and South military leaders had assembled in Shanghai since 
February 1919.
9 NCH  was a w eekly version o f the NCDN, 10 May, 1919, p. 370; School o f  Oriental and African Studies 
[hereafter SOAS] Shanghai Municipal Police Special Branch Files [hereafter SMP], roll 65, dossier 6691, 
Extracts from the file on the 1919 Japanese Boycott and the activities o f  the Students in connection 
therewith, C hief Detective Inspector Reeves to Headquarter Staff, 25 September, 1925.
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allegedly shown by its release of the students on bail. Furthermore, the NCH  expressed a 
long-lasting policy o f the Shanghai foreign municipal administration in the statement: "in 
this Settlement, order will be insisted upon any event".10 This announcement formed the 
core of the British officials’ May Fourth Movement rhetoric. It appeared repeatedly in 
government and municipal officials' correspondence for the duration of the May Fourth 
Movement, sometimes worded differently but constantly maintaining the same message: 
peace and order of the Settlement must be maintained. The newspaper continued with 
the warning:
"The students release as a result o f  the str ike o f  students at Peking University and the higher schools, and 
also the acceptance o f  the resignation o f  president o f  the University, can not but stimulate these young men 
to further acts o f  rowdism i f  not to violence. Students in other cities are holding demonstrations - there is a 
large assembly outside the German Club at the moment o f  writing - and the bad example o f  the authorities 
in the capital may lead to excesses in the provinces." 11
When consulting the records, it is obvious that a SMP member was either present, or a 
local informant was observing the Citizens Association’s gathering. Captain- 
Superintendent of Police, K.J. McEuen perceived the gathering as an avocation of an 
anti-Japanese boycott that was convened by various educational, political and 
commercial institutions, but which revealed no specific political party connections12. 
Throughout the demonstrations McEuen was a rare exception among British officials, as 
he was consistently reluctant to combine the May Fourth Movement with particular 
political associations.
By contrast, his colleague Deputy Commissioner of Police, A.H. Hilton-Johnson 
declared after the general strike that the Citizens Association meeting had been the first 
endeavour to recruit students to join the Guomindang party in Shanghai. In the same
10 NCH, 10 May, 1919, p. 343.
11 Ibid.
12 Unless otherwise stated all the Shanghai Municipal Archives' police materials are the Headquarters, 
Central Register files. The Shanghai Municipal Archives, Shanghai [hereafter SM A], U 1 -91 -19, file 19,
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* * 13report Hilton-Johnson attempted to connect students with Bolshevik activities. Shanghai 
was an important meeting-place for northern and southern politicians travelling either to 
Beijing or Guangzhou, and Hilton-Johnson had been investigating political operations in 
Shanghai for a few years. Apparently he had been alarmed by students' direct 
confrontation with Chinese officials in Beijing and anticipated that the Bolsheviks would 
advocate similar 'rebellion' in Shanghai. Once more in July 1919, he perceived the 
meeting as a landmark of anti-Japanese agitation and was suspicious, but he admitted that 
although Bolshevik propaganda had been distributed among the students there was 
nothing definite to connect the unrest with Bolshevism. This was an interesting 
confession when connecting the statement with the fact that a week after the Citizens 
Association meeting, police had confiscated books and documents from the Settlement 
bookshop that reportedly advocated socialism and anarchism.14 Not only the British 
police, but also most of the other Westerners confused Bolshevik supporters or socialists 
with anarchists or liberals despite their ideological differences, and therefore, seizure of 
any political materials was frequently associated with the Bolshevik propaganda in the 
region.15 Many contemporary foreigners indeed deeply feared the spread of Bolshevism. 
As a result, Shanghai was commonly perceived as a stepping stone for distributing 
Bolshevism to various parts of China, and furthermore, to the Chinese living in England, 
France and America.16 The above examples demonstrate the disparity in the police
Shanghai Municipal Police, Headquarters, Central Register, Captain-Superintendent o f  Police K.J.McEuen 
to Consul-General Sir Everard Fraser, 6 June, 1919.
13 SMA, U l-91 -19 , file  19, Shanghai Municipal Police, Deputy Commissioner o f  Police, A.H. Hilton- 
Johnson to Acting Consul-General J.W. Jamieson, 16 July, 1919.
14 M unicipal G azette , 26 July, 1919, p.258; A.M. Kotenev, Shanghai: Its M unicipality and the Chinese, 
(Shanghai, 1927), pp. 5, 83.
15 Chow, The M ay Fourth M ovem ent, p.208.
16 PRO, F 0228/3211 , China Command Intelligence Diaries, series o f May 31,1919, Headquarters, 
Singapore, Strait Settlements, p. 23; SMA, U l-91 -19 , file 19, Shanghai Municipal Police, Hilton-Johnson 
to Acting Consul-General in Shanghai, J.W. Jamieson, 16 July, 1919. A further point to emphasise the 
SMP's grave situation was that it was seriously understaffed because o f  the World War, Robert Bickers,
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commanders’ views. Hereafter, it was obvious that certain police officers looked 
continuously for signs to connect the Movement with revolutionary political parties or 
activities. As I will discuss later in detail, the British attached various political ideologies 
to the Movement when trying to define it and implemented policies in order to control it.
The Shanghai Municipal Police hastily assumed that the Shanghai Student Union (SSU) 
was inaugurated during the May 8, 1919, gathering at Fudan University and therefore 
suspected that the Chinese politicians were involved in forming the union immediately 
after the news of launching the May Fourth Movement had arrived from the north. 
However, according to the students’ own statement the SSU was formally established on 
May 11, 1919. Its headquarters were situated in the building of the World Association of 
Chinese Students and this location brought the Movement directly into the core of the
» 17International Settlement. The Shanghai Intelligence Bureau was immediately interested 
in the SSU's activities and collected its anti-Japanese pamphlets named “The Evils of the 
Sino-Japanese Industrial co-operation" and “An Explanation of the Sino-Japanese 
conventions”. Save the Nation Daily was similarly recognised as a students’ paper that
1R ■promoted a Japanese boycott and the use of native goods. From the beginning, foreign 
officials perceived the SSU's establishment as a serious venture to co-ordinate and 
maintain local patriotic activities and to spread ideas around the countryside and towns. 
In this matter, the foreign predictions appeared to be correct: by forming a complex 
hierarchy o f interconnected organisations and establishing the disciplinary coips, the SSU
"Who Were the Shanghai Municipal Police, and Why Were They There? The British Recruits o f  1919", in 
Bickers and Henriot (eds,), New Frontiers, pp. 170-191.
17 NCH, May 17, 1919, p. 441; Shanghai Municipal Council, Annual Report 1919, p. 84A.
18 As elsewhere in the world, the British military establishment maintained a secret service in China. The 
Shanghai Intelligence Bureau was established during the World War and it consisted o f  foreign naval and 
civil members augmented by local British police representatives, the Censor and officers in charge o f  
surveillance o f  Indian and Japanese affairs. PRO, F0228/3214, Shanghai Intelligence Bureau Minutes o f  
Meeting, Summary o f  Intelligence for week ended May 29th, 1919.
succeeded in controlling its members and their actions.19 Before long the student patrol 
troops were perceived as presenting a tangible threat to the municipal authorities’ 
privileged order in the Settlement.
May 9, 1919 was a Chinese “Day of National Humiliation” and it commemorated the 
implementation of the Japanese government’s Twenty-one Demands to control certain 
sections of Chinese internal affairs. In principle, the fourth anniversary of this shameful 
event was organised to remind the nation of the Beijing officials' operations to "betray the 
country to the Japanese militarism". In practice, the day introduced a new dimension to 
the Movement when the boycott of Japanese goods and banknotes was officially 
implemented, and the police were on a high state of alert when the systematic distribution 
of anti-Japanese handbills and posters began in the Settlement. As a result, three Chinese 
students were caught with over 600 circulars in their possession at the comer of the 
Nanjing and Henan Roads. When questioned by the foreign police, the students said they 
were boarders from the local commercial school. Moreover, they claimed that their 
school Principal had sent the students all over Shanghai to circulate the handouts.20 
Whether foreigners wanted it or not, the May Fourth Movement had entered the 
International Settlement, as the incidents of handbill distribution and the establishment of 
the Shanghai Student Union undeniably demonstrated.
The Shanghai Intelligence Bureau’s weekly report expressed fears of serious rioting in 
the Chinese City, though simultaneously explained that the overall situation was 
becoming quieter21. It has to be remembered that at this stage the May Fourth operations 
were concentrated in the native city and were gradually growing in other parts of the
19 Wasserstrom, Student P rotests , p. 62.
20 SMA, U l-9 1 -1 9 , file 18, Shanghai Municipal Police, McEuen to Japanese Consul General, 10 May, 
1919.
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town. In the eyes of the British, the May Fourth activities had not dramatically threatened 
the foreigners' presence. Apparently, in this situation it was hoped that the crisis would 
pass without disturbing life in the Settlement and this provided an excuse for the British 
officials' inaction in the beginning of May, 1919.
The students’ operations finally reached the point where the British officials' 
intervention was perceived crucial. Accordingly, snatching the Japanese straw hats from 
Chinese people’s heads and then publicly destroying them was declared a violent action 
towards all the Settlement residents.22 On May 19, 1919, the Council published a 
notification in the local Chinese and foreign press condemning the intimidation of 
residents in the Settlement, The statement warned people not to force Chinese merchants 
and residents to refrain from selling and buying Japanese products, as pressure of this 
kind was seen to be causing unrest and threatened the peace and good order. Moreover, it 
stated that attempts to use force or the threat of force was understood to be an unlawful 
act and persons doing so would be arrested and severely punished. The instructions were 
directed to gain the attention of the Movement participants and spectators.23 To 
emphasise the seriousness of the orders, a few Chinese students and workers were 
immediately arrested for rowdy behaviour, and some of them were sentenced to prison24. 
Probably a fear o f public anger prevented officials from imprisoning more students. The 
police confirmed that the notification had a calming effect on demonstrators and offences 
of this kind ceased after ten days. In reality, by the end of the month students were active 
participants in various other “offensive” operations in spite o f the Council’s warnings.
21 PRO, F 0228/3214 , Shanghai Intelligence Bureau Minutes o f  Meeting, Summary o f  Intelligence for week  
ended May 8th, 1919.
22 Shanghai Municipal Council, Annual Report 1919, p. 85A.
23 M unicipal Gazette, 24 May, 1919, p. 179.
24 Shanghai Municipal Council, Annual Report 1919 , p. 85A; M unicipal Gazette, 21 June, 1919, p. 202.
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The Council’s first serious endeavour to constrain the May Fourth Movement had proved 
to be unsuccessful.
The Council’s order described above was in accordance with the treaty port reasoning 
as it manifested that the Settlement was a specially protected area for its inhabitants 
governed by the Council with the assistance of the police and the Mixed Court. Another 
significant point was that the notification failed to indicate or accuse any special group 
for causing the troubles, although it was commonly known that students were the 
principal provocateurs and conducted boycotts. In all, the Council appeared to follow the 
policy of ‘deeds not words’ as the notification was their only official and public reaction 
towards the Movement during May.
On May 26, the official student strike was launched in Shanghai and included patriotic 
speeches and oaths. It ended in a parade inside the native city.25 For the Settlement 
officials it meant more disruption by students on the streets, who now encouraged fellow 
students to form volunteer groups to execute their duties properly.26 Each school had 
been organising Publishing, Lecturing, Inspection, Editorial, Disciplinary, and Service 
Coips since May 13, 1919, and after the initiation of the students’ strike, their presence 
became increasingly visible in the Settlement. In addition, the Liaison Committees, 
Groups of Ten, Students Volunteer Groups and the Consultative Branch Offices were 
established to maintain order and control student activities. In particular, the Volunteer 
Groups and Groups of Ten were patrolling the streets of Shanghai as a peacekeeping
25 NCH, 31 May, 1919, pp. 578-579.
26 SMP, Special Branch, roll 65, dossier 6691, Extracts from the file on the 1919 Japanese Boycott and the 
activities o f the Students in connection therewith, Chief Detective Inspector Reeves to Headquarter Staff, 
25 September, 1925.
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27  *force to emphasise the importance of avoiding violence and rowdyism. By doing so,
they, for the first time, seriously challenged, - and as the British perceived it, threatened -
the Settlement’s peace and order. For the British officials the legitimate guardians were
the police and volunteer corps appointed by the Shanghai Municipal Council and no other
Chinese or foreign force was allowed to even enter the International Settlement without
special permission. If permission was applied for, it was usually rejected on the grounds
2 8of the Settlement’s neutrality policy.
The Settlement's municipal schools, both Chinese and foreign, became slowly affected 
by the strike. Although the NCH  had reported some problems between students and 
school authorities from the beginning of the Movement, it was not until the formal 
commencement of the strike that the school life became entirely confused.29 By the end 
of May all schools had been influenced by the May Fourth ideologies and many of them 
had been shut down. Meanwhile, foreign school authorities tried to prohibit their students 
from getting involved with ‘political activities’, as the Movement was described.30 But 
their efforts were rendered unsuccessful, as every school reported of unrest, strikes, 
disturbances, agitation, intimidation, poor attendance and enrolment in late spring and 
summer 1919.31
Throughout May, the British Consul-General in Shanghai, Sir Everard H. Fraser, 
ignored the Movement in his correspondence with the British Minister, Sir John Jordan in 
Beijing. Beijing’s Acting First Secretary, Miles W. Lampson, had earlier complained
27 NCH, 17 May, 1919, pp. 415-416, and 24 May, 1919, p.490. For insightful discussion o f  the formation 
and functioning o f  the SSU and its organisations see Chen, The M ay Fourth M ovement in Shanghai, pp. 59- 
63 and Wasserstrom, Student Protests, pp. 57-70. For the 'Groups o f Ten1 see also chapter six.
28 Kotenev, Shanghai: Its M ixed Court and Council, pp. 24-29.
29 NCH, 10 May, 1919, p. 371.
30 SM A, U l-3 -747 , file 1816, Shanghai Municipal Council, Secretariat, Annual Inspection o f  Schools by 
the Permanent Education Committee, December, 1919.
31 Shanghai Municipal Council, Annual Report 1919, pp. 201-211A.
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about Fraser's incoherent reports of the Shanghai Peace Conference and his inefficiency
32in providing brief summaries even though the meeting was “under his very nose”. In 
June, 1919, Lampson raised a question about the Shanghai Consulate’s silence 
concerning the May Fourth boycotts, and again later in June he complained about 
Fraser’s disjointed reports. Contrary to Fraser's passive attitude, Jordan was concerned 
about current developments and sent a circular to all British consuls in China asking them 
to observe the situation carefully, and furthermore, he required them to inform the 
Legation about potential boycotts across China.33 It took over one week for Shanghai to 
send a response to the Minister’s enquiry. Another urgent telegram was sent from the 
capital during which time a full-scale general strike had already begun in Shanghai on 
June 5, 1919. Fraser stated that it would not have been worthwhile reporting before the 
beginning of June when the situation had become, in his opinion, more serious.34 Some 
understanding o f Fraser’s reactions to the Movement might be obtained by exploring 
possible explanations as to why he did not interpret the events as alarming for the 
Settlement's security.
Having served in China for over three decades, Sir Everard Fraser was one of the 
foreign ‘old hands’ in the country. He was in his sixties and had experienced the Boxer 
rebellion, the collapse of the Qing dynasty, the revolution of 1911 which had established 
a republican state, and the warlords' intrusion into Chinese politics. Lastly, from February 
1919 onwards Fraser had observed the Chinese government’s desperate attempt to restore 
peace at the North-South Peace Conference in Shanghai. Those years in China brought
32 PRO, F 0228/2986/21, Fraser to Sir John Jordan, 15 May, 1919.
33 PRO, F 0228/3526/5 , Jordan's Draft Circular to all Consuls, 30 May, 1919; PRO, F 0228/3526/87, Fraser 
to Jordan, 13 June, 1919.
34 PRO, F 0228/3526/22 Fraser to Jordan, 6 June, 1919; SMA, U l-91 -19 , file 19, Shanghai Municipal 
Police, Fraser to McEuen, 5 June, 1919.
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quite turbulent times in internal and external politics, and in this context, he was used to 
China5s unstable affairs of state.
Compared with other foreign officials, Fraser's Chinese language skills were 
exceptionally good, as he not only produced his own correspondence with local officials, 
but he also wrote an extensive Chinese language book. Furthermore, he contributed 
articles on political economy to the Chinese newspaper and to the North-Chinci Daily 
News.35 For him, it was effortless to read Chinese newspapers and pamphlets and be 
updated with the development of the Movement. In addition, the Shanghai Intelligence 
Bureau had received reports for some weeks from around China confirming the 
Movement as being nation-wide and the Bureau had frequently informed Fraser about the 
May Fourth incidents36.
Fraser was described as a reserved and earnest man with a strong sense of duty, in that 
“he would never let the Empire down” 31. Yet even if he was the British Crown Advocate 
at the port, it took him an exceptionally long time to carry out his duties on reporting the 
situation in Shanghai. But the years had affected Fraser’s health and at his preceding 
station in Hankou, special arrangements had been made to allow him to administer his 
works for three months a year from Guling, which was the foreigners’ resort area in 
central China. As early as 1910 he had applied to retire and return home on health 
grounds, but had finally unwillingly accepted the post in Shanghai, where he remained 
until his death in 1922.38 In the spring of 1919 Fraser was old and tired, and had been ill
35 P,D. Coates, The China Consuls, British Consular Officers, 1843-1943, (Hong Kong, 1988), p. 376; 
NCH, 25 March, 1922, p. 825 and 8 April, 1922, p. 124.
36 PRO, F 0228/3214 , Shanghai Intelligence Bureau Minutes o f  Meeting, Summary o f  Intelligence for week 
ended May 8th, 1919,
37 NCH, 8 April, 1922, p. 124.
38 Coates, The China Consuls, pp. 376-377 ,444 ,
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39  •for some months . Therefore, he undoubtedly eagerly anticipated his long leave home 
which was due at the end of June. Initially he must have been irritated by the incidents 
that disturbed his last weeks in office before a well needed half year’s vacation, as his 
correspondence in June revealed40. It is possible, however, that because of his life-long 
career in China he compared the May Fourth Movement with the other twentieth-century 
violent turbulence in the country, and did not perceive it as a serious threat to the 
International Settlement as the previous ones had been. Otherwise, it is difficult to 
understand why an official with his experience, interest and expertise in Chinese politics, 
culture, and life in general, failed to fulfil his duties immediately when the whole country 
was in the grip of a student protest movement, with all foreign trade being affected by the 
boycott of Japanese goods.
Apart from general unrest, the first month of the May Fourth Movement brought a new 
threat to the Council’s dominion in the form of student associations, Japanese trade 
boycott and a students’ strike, but as long as the activities continued in a peaceful 
manner, the British were unwilling to get involved. At this stage prohibiting official look- 
alike parades and peacekeeping forces might have made the Council appear unjust 
towards the demonstrators. The unpleasant reality was that the popular support of the 
Movement was steadily strengthening among the Chinese and foreigners, and the Council 
was clearly eager to maintain good relations with both groups.
39 A O / , 14 June, 1919, p. 690.
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2.2. ‘Maintenance of Peace and Good Order’ - Reactions Towards the General 
Strike
The following discussion will demonstrate firstly how the Shanghai Municipal Council 
and its various departments took a stand against the general strike and the May Fourth 
Movement in order to maintain authority in the Settlement. Secondly, the British 
Consular, Royal Navy and British controlled Chinese Maritime Customs efforts to 
constrain the strike will be analysed.
It is true that various incidents in May, for example, the students’ strike; anti-Japanese 
boycott; distribution of handbills; parading and lecturing on the streets, and finally, the 
formation of the Students’ Union had demonstrated the intensification and seriousness of 
the May Fourth Movement. Indeed, the active centre of a month-long student agitation 
had gradually shifted from Beijing to the streets of Shanghai, but when the general strike 
was launched throughout the city, it still took the British by surprise.
If the Council had merely observed developments in May, their opinion, in contrast, 
was made perfectly clear in June with their four notifications and other actions taken 
during the general strike. On the morning of June 5th, immediately after the shopkeepers 
had begun to close their premises, the Council’s British-run sub-committee, the Watch 
Committee, held a special meeting. As a result came the prohibition of “inflammatory 
handbills in connection with the Boycott of Japanese goods”. The statement also 
condemned the flags bearing texts that encouraged people to act in a disorderly manner.41
Obviously the Council was irritated by the turn of events and on the same day the 
whole force of the Shanghai Volunteer Coips (SVC) and the Police Specials were 
mobilised to assist the police in keeping order. Cannons were placed in the centre of the
40 PRO, F 0228/3526  Fraser to Jordan, 9 June, 1919.
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Settlement and squads on patrol, for example mounted men of the Light Horse, were 
controlling the streets. Before long a number of sailors of the Royal Navy were called out 
to serve as Special Constables to emphasise the military power in the Settlement.42 
Immediately after mobilisation, one of the SVC members, who was most likely British, 
expressed his wish not to use force if the maintenance of order could be achieved without 
it, as the work stoppage was not against the Anglo-Saxons. He revealed his sympathy 
towards the students’ cause by saying, “I have talked with Students and have had a good 
opportunity to know that they have thought out China’s situation with a great deal of 
intelligence”. It was a courageous act to write a letter to the most important British 
newspaper making his divergent opinion known. Two other correspondents’ letters in the 
same paper blamed the Council’s actions as having “the quality of the Hun” which would 
"strengthen the anti-foreign feeling” 43 
The Shanghai Volunteer Corps (SVC) consisted of Light Horse, Field Artillery Battery, 
Engineering Company, Machine Gun Company, Maritime Company, Italian Company, 
the British Infantry Reserves and various sections of Special Reserves. Mobilisation of 
this scope was unusual, and could therefore, have been understood as a sign of the 
Council’s obstinate attitude to the ongoing Movement. Anticipating even more severe 
civil disturbances, the secret SVC Mobilisation Manual was renewed and published to 
regulate operations while the SVC assisted the police in maintaining order. The special 
blueprint listed protected services and localities including telephone service, water and 
gas supply, electric light systems and tramway depots. These were services that had been 
most severely affected by the general strike and which were the backbones of the
41 M unicipal G azette , 7 June, 1919, p. 191 and 14 June, 1919, p. 196.
42 Shanghai Municipal Council, Annual Report 1919, p. 7A; SMA, U 1-91-19, file 19, Shanghai Municipal
Police, McEuen to Fraser, 6 June, 1919; SMA, U 1-91-21, Shanghai Municipal Police, the Council to the 
Commander o f  H.M.S. Bee, 20 June, 1919.
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foreigners’ modem life in the Settlement.44 These large-scale preparations revealed that 
thereafter the Council reacted very seriously to the developments of the Movement. 
Another indication of the Council’s strategy to prevent similar incidents in future was to 
equip the SVC with five armoured cars that were to be used at the first sign of civil 
disturbance in the Settlement. The Commandant of the SVC stressed it was a matter of 
imperial security and proposed that the British government should lend the armoured cars 
for the Shanghai authorities’ use. Special attention was given to the continuance of 
British preponderance in the corps’ personnel 45 One of the most distinguishable long­
term consequences of the May Fourth activities was the strengthening of armament, and 
different plans were made to ensure foreigners’ authority over the Settlement. Various 
other new measures adopted by the foreign community during the civic unrest will be 
elaborated on throughout this chapter.
The third Municipal notification followed suit on June 6, and this time the Council’s 
objective was complicated. The statement was issued to prevent the spread of rumours, 
which, it was alleged, caused animosity and fomented trouble. Various rumours 
flourished among foreigners and Chinese during the May Fourth Movement and this will 
be illustrated later in this chapter. Yet another almost impossible mission was the 
Council's attempt to prohibit the assembling of crowds on the streets. Moreover, 
surprisingly the statement advised shopkeepers and merchants to re-open their businesses 
and assured a complete protection to all Settlement residents in peaceful pursuit of their 
work and other duties.46 Contrary to the Council's expectations, prohibition brought forth
4 iNCDN, 10 June, 1919, p. 4.
44 Regulations fo r  the Shanghai Volunteer C orps, (Shanghai, 1914 and 1921); Shanghai Volunteer Corps 
M obilization M anual, (Shanghai, 1921), pp. 2-5, 10.
45 SMA, U l-3 -157 , file 1167, Shanghai Municipal Council, Secretariat, the Council minutes, 11 June and 
3 December, 1919; Commandant o f  the SVC to the Council, 27 July, 1920 and 20 May, 1921.
46 China Press, 6 June, 1919, p. 1; M unicipal Gazette, 14 June, 1919, p. 195.
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another rumour, and handbills were distributed widely to spread the story. The story 
accused the Council of taking a bribe of $150,000 from the Japanese to publish the 
notifications against the May Fourth demonstrators, but as in other similar cases, the 
rumour was proven to be unfounded.47 On the one hand, the presence of police, volunteer 
forces and navy had a pacifying effect on Chinese demonstrators, but on the other hand 
they also served as a provocative and artificial stimulus to excitement. It was the 
Council*s decision, as explained above, to display military force that provoked more local 
Chinese residents to walk on the streets where they were automatically, but often 
unintentionally, part of the assembling of the crowds causing the disturbances. Fear of 
restless crowds accelerated the May Fourth Movement protestors’ determination to use 
their own peacekeeping forces, which in turn once more threatened the foreign society.
The Council’s inflexible attitude was about to change within the next 48-hours when 
two special meetings were held, exceptionally on Sunday, June 8. Here their honour, 
prestige and authority were on the agenda. For the first time the foreign authorities 
threatened to “enforce these terms with the utmost rigor” towards those who violated 
orders or interfered with the police or other authorised officers. Its warnings were severe.
1. N o person unless a Consular Officer or a member o f  the naval or military force o f  any Treaty
Power or unless duly authorised by the Council shall, under any pretence whatsoever, appear in the streets
or in any public place, in unifonn or wearing any distinctive dress or badge or headgear signifying
membership o f  any particular organization, association or body. 2. N o person shall, under any pretence
whatsoever, carry any flag or banner or wear any sash or other device in the streets or in any public place,
4 8bearing any description in Chinese or in any Foreign language.[..]”
The Council perceived the May Fourth student demonstrators’ white uniforms and 
caps49 as political symbols that expressed the Movement's political position in the 
society, and they were therefore understood as a potential source of conflict within the
47 M unicipal G azette , 26 July, 1919, p. 256,
48 China Press, 10 June, 1919, p. 7; M unicipal Gazette, 14 June, 1919, pp. 195-196.
49 See picture o f  May Fourth students in their uniforms in The Chinese Recorder, vol. L, July 1919, p. 432.
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Settlement. The Council recognised the power of unified dressing as a threat to the 
foreign community and prohibited them in the name of peace and order.
The meetings acted as a watershed in outlining the Council’s attitude and were 
followed by other repressive proceedings. Due to discussions between Consul-General 
Fraser and the Chairman of Municipal Council, E.C. Pearce, the Shanghai Student Union 
was forced to close its offices in the International Settlement. Fraser’s rigid opinion was 
that “the Council will not allow the Settlement to be used as political centre”, and more 
interestingly, “or to let others usurp its authority”. Furthermore, this attitude was strongly 
expressed in the Council’s letter to the SSU, ordering them to end their peace threatening 
operations.50 Accordingly, the police memo summarised the actions which were to be 
taken in order to implement the notification. It ordered new police patrols on the streets 
and instructed the removal of articles from students using non-violent means, but it also 
authorised the police to arrest students who were distributing handbills. Furthermore, 
firearms were only to be used in defending life or property and warning shots in the air 
were prohibited.51 It was evident that the Council was unwilling to accept the students’ 
new role as a peacekeeping coips, wearing uniforms and badges. The students' corps 
looked like officially-sanctioned forces that challenged the British duties, and thus, 
threatened their prestige in the International Settlement.
Fraser had simultaneously sent telegrams to Beijing, hoping to receive an authorisation 
for the Council’s procedures, but the British, American and French Ministers in Beijing 
feared that the Council’s actions could alienate the Chinese from the three powers, and 
that it might eventually provoke a large-scale anti-foreign movement. The Diplomatic
50 NCH, 14 June, 1919, p. 718; PRO, FO228/3526/20, Fraser to Jordan, 8 June, 1919.
51 SMP, Special Branch, roll 65, dossier 6691, Extracts from the file on the 1919 Japanese Boycott and the 
activities o f  the Students in connection therewith, Copy o f  Memo to Inspectors issued by the Deputy 
Commissioner o f  Police, Hilton-Johnson, 9 June, 1919.
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Body of foreign legation Ministers also claimed that the Movement was a part of Chinese 
internal politics, which was directed primarily against the Japanese. Hence, when two 
days later they dispatched guidelines to the Settlement, the Ministers demanded that the
• S9foreigners avoid repressive measures towards the May Fourth protagonists in Shanghai.
In practice, the Ministers' instructions had no influence on the Council's policy. 
Evidently the Council and Fraser had had intensive consultations with all the bodies 
involved in suppressing the Movement, and the British Legations continuously 
commented and instructed them. It was obvious that the Council’s dictatorial commands 
went far beyond any foreign or Chinese authority in China or abroad. In other words, the 
Council maintained total mastery over the International Settlement.
The general strike notification that the Council issued in June was similarly related to 
the containment of protestors’ actions. It was aimed to stop vicious rumours concerning 
the Japanese who allegedly walked around poisoning food markets and water wells. The 
Council had to act promptly and the notification prohibited similar rumours and attacks 
on the Settlement residents.53 Rumours, as Ralph Rosnow illustrates, are a form of public 
communication that are infused with private hypotheses about how the world operates, 
and in addition, they contain unverified information and often express the collective 
concerns of a certain society54. The first notices of the poison scare had already been 
reported in the beginning of June55. Rumours that included poisoning foreigners’ food 
and water sources were naturally a matter of deep concern in the Settlement and required 
immediate counteraction. The Council tackled the problem by appointing police forces 
and officials from the Health Department to investigate samples of water and food
52 PRO, FO 228/3526/20-23,36-37, correspondence between Fraser and Jordan, 8 June-10 June, 1919.
53 M unicipal G azette , 21 June, 1919, p. 199.
54 Rosnow, Rumour and G ossip , pp. 30-31.
55 SMA, U l-91 -19 , file 19, Shanghai Municipal Police, Police daily report, 6 June, 1919.
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supplies in the Municipal laboratory. As a result, the Council sent a letter to the foreign 
newspaper editors and proclaimed that the accusations of poisonings were absolutely 
baseless.56 In spite of widely published assurance, tensions continued to run high and 
before long a Chinese man was beaten to death when the Chinese crowd mistakenly 
thought that he was a Japanese man poisoning food and water supplies. Similar attacks on 
suspected poisoners continued and the atmosphere, as the local press reported, was 
becoming extremely tense. Fears were inflamed also in the American magazine the Far 
Eastern Review which revealed a number of rumours in which the Council was allegedly 
about to close down the water supply on the Chinese streets.57
Foreigners thought that the May Fourth Movement activities might endanger their 
society’s existence and indeed, the activities disturbed its daily functions such as 
supplying food and water, maintaining defence systems and trade and traffic service. The 
fear of Boxers’ return initiated rumours and these stories expressed foreigners’ collective 
concerns of a possible anti-foreign outbreak. The Boxer rumours were clearly a threat 
against foreigners’ existence in China and the contemporary anti-Japanese atmosphere 
was predicted to indicate the arrival of a general anti-foreign movement58. These mental 
images were actively circulated in foreign newspapers and officials’ correspondence, 
creating extra tension among the foreign community. A British newspaper editorial even 
confessed “how close we have been to a catastrophe compared with which the Boxer 
trouble o f 1900 might have been a child’s play [sic]”59. The Council, however, did not 
want to share these collective worries, yet it was eager to quell rumours in order to
56 SMA, U l-9 1 -1 8, Health Officer A. Stanley to the Secretary o f  the Council, 6 June, 1919; N.O. Liddell, 
Secretary o f  the SMC to the Editors o f  the NCDN, China Press, Shanghai Gazette, Shanghai Times and 
Shanghai M erctay, 11 June, 1919.
57 China P ress , 11 June, p .l and 17 June, 1919, p .1; F ar Eastern R eview , vol. XV, no 7, July 1919, p. 504.
58 C elestial Empire, 14 June, 1919, p. 517; N CH , 17 May, 1919, p. 420.
59 C elestial Em pire, 14 June, 1919, p. 517.
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maintain stability. Dealing with organised anti-foreign activities was not taken lightly, 
since these could become unmanageable and produce dangerous consequences for the 
foreigner's presence in China. Hence, the May Fourth protagonists' anti-Japanese slogans 
such as "Yellow Peril", "Huns of the East" or "Hun Oriental Militarism" intensified the 
strained atmosphere among the foreigners in Shanghai. It was evident that the general 
disorder created by rumours of any kind was a serious insult which threatened foreigners’ 
protected inviolability within the Settlement boundaries.
In reality, the May Fourth Movement ideologies, operations and collaboration with 
Westerners deviated quite radically from the Boxers’ activities, yet there was fear of a 
similar outcome. Consequently the contrast between the movements was acknowledged 
in a British newspaper60, but the article had no effect on the circulation of the rumours. 
Similarly, later research has interpreted these poisoning rumours as representing part of a 
different tradition of collective action, which diverged from the patriotic and highly 
organised May Fourth Movement. For example, the mass poisoning rumours during the 
Boxer uprising seemed to convey symbolic information that was related to the collective 
worries of societies in crisis where the whole society was potentially at risk, and the lack 
of verified information created all kinds of stories. In the case of the May Fourth 
Movement the situation was different, as the students attempted to control the 
information flow by continually providing updated information and supervised the 
crowds by their own volunteer corps.61
60 C elestial Empire, 14 June, 1919, p, 556.
61 Cohen, H istory in Three K eys , pp. 171-172; Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom, “Taking it to the streets: Shanghai 
students and political protest, 1919-1949”, University o f  California, Berkeley, unpublished PhD thesis, 
1989, p. 74.
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It is true that various rumours relating to the new activities of Guomindang, Bolshevik, 
or Anfu-club62 members, or stories about the future ascendancy of the North or South 
military leaders had been continuously circulating during the spring and summer of 1919. 
Excitement provoked by the strike strengthened these rumours and created new ones. 
Inevitably, the foreigners and Chinese officials frequently associated the May Fourth 
Movement with these political activities.63 It is also true that the Guomindang members 
were working in Shanghai, especially in the French Concession where Sun Yatsen lived. 
Similarly, rumours of Bolshevik agents' activities had been circulating since they 
captured power in Russia. At the same time, the North and South militarist leaders’ peace 
negotiations in Shanghai had come to a standstill, thus creating endless discussions about 
its future. In addition, certain inland provinces had reported ongoing conflicts between 
military cliques, and the Anfu-club members’ pro-Japanese policy was the May Fourth 
demonstrators' common enemy. But according to the students’ statements, no political 
party or faction supported the Movement64. It is questionable, though, whether the 
foreigners ever believed the students’ declarations.
In the light of the Council’s military performances throughout the strike activities in 
Shanghai, Joseph Chen’s assumption of the Council’s “tolerant and positive action” 
towards the May Fourth Movement appears to be incorrect. His argument that the 
Council actually promised, in the middle of general work stoppage, to refrain from
62 Anfu-club was a political w ing o f  the northern militarist clique that formed three-quarters o f  the current 
parliament in Beijing. It was known to be an instrument o f  Japanese imperialism and was one o f  the main 
targets o f  the May Fourth demonstrations. Andrew J. Nathan, Peking Politics 1918-1923, Factionalism and  
the Failure o f  Constitutionalism , (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1976), pp. 106-107, 160.
63 C elestial Em pire, 10 May, 1919, pp. 262, 294, 15 [supplement paper]; N CH , 24 May, 1919, pp. 491-492; 
PRO, F 0 2 28 /3526 /116, Acting Consul-General in Shanghai, H. Phillips to Jordan, 21 June, 1919; PRO, 
F 0228/3214  Shanghai Intelligence Bureau Minutes o f  Meeting, Summary o f Intelligence for week June 
12th, 1919.
64 NCH, 14 June, 1919, p. 696.
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further interruption of the general strike is also questionable.65 There is the possibility, 
though, that the Council made the students a secret promise in order to achieve wider 
popular acceptance from the Settlement’s Chinese residents. But if  the promise was ever 
made, and there is no evidence of this agreement in the British officials’ papers, it did not 
last longer than a day. Consequently on Sunday, June 8, the Council’s ordinances 
prohibited all the protestors' activities in the Settlement.
The notifications and operations described above indicate that the British Council 
representatives feared that the May Fourth Movement was a danger to their existence. 
British opinion was decisive when acknowledging this 'fact' that in the Council’s 
meetings, the majority’s opinion, that is the British one, always overruled the opposing 
views.66 As a result, the Council’s unanimous decisions were published as notification 
and only on rare occasions were Council members’ dissenting opinions made public. The 
Special Ratepayers’ meeting assembly of July 1919 to implement a new Press License 
bylaw, a question which was prompted by the May Fourth activities, revealed an unusual 
public dissociation in the Council’s rank, and the incident will be discussed in more detail 
in Chapter Five. There was, however, no evidence of such disagreement in the Council’s 
policy during the May-June demonstrations. In principle, the Council’s command 
expressed only very few British people’s perceptions, but in practice their actions 
controlled the politics in the Settlement. Their reactions were conveyed both through 
direct orders to restrain the Movement, and indirectly by the immense prestige they
65 Chen, The M ay Fourth M ovement in Shanghai, pp. 125, 134, 145.
66 See e.g. when the American Council representative Mr. Merriman opposed levying the special 1% tax on 
Chinese residents that was invented to pay salaries for the municipal employees during their service in war. 
His opposition was overruled and the tax amendment was introduced and accepted in the following Annual 
M eeting o f  the Ratepayers in April 1919. SMA, U l-3 -1 , file 1000, part 1, Shanghai Municipal Council, 
Secretariat, the Shanghai Municipal Council Minutes, 2 April, 1919.
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possessed within the British and foreign society in Shanghai. Therefore, the orders acted 
as authoritative guidelines for foreigners’ opinions and actions.
In addition to the written commands, non-written messages that were executed by the 
Shanghai Municipal Police and Volunteer Forces were clear: the Shanghai Municipal 
Council worked with councillors taking collective responsibility for decisions in the 
International Settlement. Moreover, the notifications assured the residents that the 
Settlement had not been established for Chinese agitators to use it as a testing laboratory 
to exercise their nationalist politics, or to publish anti-governmental materials. The 
‘neutral stance’ towards Chinese politics was the Settlement's unique characteristic, and 
foreign military forces were stationed to protect this impartial politics and the area's 
territorial integrity.67
As I have already discussed, the SMP had carefully observed events not only in the 
Settlement, but also by using the informants around the city. Following the Council’s 
notification of June 5, the police and the SVC had removed prohibited placards, flags, 
handbills and posters from the streets of the International Settlement68. An increase in the 
police headquarters’ translation office’s work indicated an intensification of police 
investigation and 40 Chinese newspapers instead of normally 28 papers were read daily69. 
The Students’ Union had reported to the NCH  and the Chinese newspapers that around 
120 students had been taken into custody by the police during the first night of the 
general strike in the International Settlement and the French Concession. The newspapers 
assured readers that the students had been subsequently released,70 Interestingly neither 
the police, nor the Council nor the Consulate reports revealed any information about such
67 Kotenev, Shanghai: Its M unicipality, Special Police Laws for the Preservation o f  Order, 1914, pp. 448- 
451; M unicipal G azette, 11 July, 1919, p. 242.
68 See picture o f  removal o f  the flags in Far Eastern Review, vol XV, no 7, July, 1919, p. 503.
69 M unicipal Gazette, 26 July, 1919, p. 256.
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arrests. The police reported 49 arrests on charges of riotous behaviour and intimidation of 
the Settlement residents, but half of those initially arrested were later sent to prison, nine 
were fined and fourteen were released with a caution and two cases were dismissed71. 
Apparently over one hundred student arrests were not included in this report. If the 
arrests took place, the police must have been extremely alarmed by the students’ 
activities. In this situation it was probable that the fear of public indignation ensured the 
students’ quick release, and afterwards, caused the foreign authorities to conceal the 
incident.
It is important to remember that even at the very top level, police perceptions about the 
Movement varied quite dramatically. When analysing a situation where both the chief 
officials received similar information about the Movement but ended up with diverse 
conclusions, it appears obvious that their personal experiences, beliefs and backgrounds 
affected their interpretation. Unfortunately there is little information available about 
police officials’ personal lives and even less direct information o f what might have 
possibly explained their contrasting perceptions. However, some ideas are suggested 
below in accordance with the limitations of existing materials.
Even at the height o f the general strike, the Captain-Superintendent of the Police, 
McEuen, continued his own neutral stance towards May Fourth demonstrators. Although 
Guomindang and Bolshevik elements were constantly suspected, and rumours of their 
actions circulated, McEuen was firm in his opinions and was reluctant to connect the 
Movement with any political party. He acknowledged the presence of Bolshevik activists 
and their propaganda work in Shanghai, and finally, at the end of the year he embedded 
them firmly in the Shanghai’s political scene. Nevertheless, he saw that the May Fourth
70 Chen, The M ay Fourth M ovement in Shanghai, p. 119, footnote 3; NCH, 7 June, 1919, pp. 649-650.
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Movement was not connected with Bolsheviks' operations.72 The second-in command, 
Hilton-Johnson, held a completely opposing view which was most likely strengthened in 
the course of incidents in May. He stubbornly perceived “a clever political game” behind 
the May Fourth demonstrators’ behaviour. Bearing in mind that Hilton-Johnson’s work in 
Shanghai included the production of police intelligence reports, the May Fourth 
Movement's participation in counter-government activities indicated that his suspicions 
were not entirely unjustified. Leaving no stone unturned he tried to find connections 
between student associations or universities, and the Guomindang members or 
Bolsheviks long after the May Fourth general strike and demonstrations were over.73 In 
his mind the May Fourth activities continued during the summer and autumn as his in- 
depth reports about the Movement and local situation revealed.
McEuen had been serving in Shanghai from 1900 and Hilton-Johnson from 1908 but 
prior to that, at the end of the nineteenth century, he had already worked as a soldier in 
the Weihaiwei Regiment.74 Consequently, they were both experienced foreign ‘old 
hands’ in China. McEuen was later described to be a person who is “easy going, but 
otherwise of little use and certainly not worth of the high salary [sic]”75, according to one 
policeman under him. But the materials do not reveal any information about McEuen’s 
own past experiences that may have affected his opinions about the May Fourth
71 M unicipal G azette , 26 July, 1919, p. 257.
72 PRO, F 0228/3526/71 Police reports attached with the letter from Fraser to Jordan, 10 June, 1919; SMA, 
U l-91-19 , file 19, Shanghai Municipal Police, McEuen to Fraser, 7 June -14 June and McEuen to Phillips, 
15 June - 10 July, 1919; SM A, U l-91 -18 , file 18, Shanghai Municipal Police, McEuen to Jamieson, 24 July 
-1 9  September, 1919.
™Municipal Gazette, 26 July, 1919, p. 258; PRO, F 0 6 7 1/447/557-558,560 Hilton-Johnson to Consul- 
General, 1-2 and 5 January, 1920; SMA, U l-91 -19 , file 18, Shanghai Municipal Police, Hilton-Johnson to 
Jamieson, 10 July - 17 July, 1919; SMA, U l-91 -18 , Shanghai Municipal Police, Hilton-Johnson to 
Jamieson, 22 September - 25 September, 1919.
74 Robert Bickers, ‘Shanghai Policemen: a guide to a foreign members o f  the Shanghai Municipal Police 
1919-1945, http://mail.bris.ac.uk/~hirab/smp2.html ; SMA, U 1-3-592, file 1652, Shanghai Municipal 
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Secretariat, A.H, Hilton-Johnson files.
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Movement. Furthermore, research materials raised no doubts about his efficiency in 
police work. His colleague’s background details were slightly more informative. Hilton- 
Johnson had returned shell-shocked from the World War in 1916.76 Being a man of war, 
he obviously had a reputation for roughness among the British officials, and to confirm 
his authority a British official explained that Hilton-Johnson’s presence in Shanghai was 
an indication that the Council had no intention of acting leniently with the 
demonstrators.77 This argument is further supported by Hilton-Johnson’s own actions as 
chairman of the United Services Association in Shanghai. In the middle of the general 
strike, Hilton-Johnson made a suggestion to the Council to form a new Expeditionary 
Forces Emergency Unit of returned British war officers. Without hesitation, the Council 
accepted the creation of the force. On the same afternoon they informed Hilton-Johnson 
that they would “gladly equip a unit of this character” with revolvers to “assist in the 
protection of foreign interests in Shanghai”, as the United Services Association 
represented by its chief Hilton-Johnson had requested.78 As an example of Hilton- 
Johnson’s personal authority and his negotiation skills was the meeting with public 
garage representatives, chauffeurs and private car owners where he persuaded these May 
Fourth strikers to return to work. By doing so, he prevented a complete cessation of car 
traffic in the Settlement.79 His competency in political investigation was recognised after 
the May 30th Incident of 1925, when he became a specialist in dealing with Chinese
75 Imperial War Museum, London, R.M.Tinkler papers, letter, 29 December, 1925.
76 Robert Bickers, ‘Shanghai Policemen: a guide to a foreign members o f  the Shanghai Municipal Police 
1919-1945, http://mail.bris.ac.uk/~hirab/smp2.html ; SMA, U1 -3-592, file 1652, Shanghai Municipal 
Council, Secretariat, K.J. McEuen files; SMA, U 1-3-602, file 1675, Shanghai Municipal Council, 
Secretariat,
A.H. Hilton-Johnson files; Shanghai Municipal Council, Annual Report 1918, p. 22A.
77 M. W. Lampson’s hand written comments on the letter, PRO, F 0228/3526/26  Fraser to Jordan, 6 June, 
1919.
78 Shanghai Municipal Council, Annual Report 1919, pp. 46A, 75A.
79 China Press, 11 June, 1919, p. 4.
70
• Rf)political activists . Perhaps it was his war experiences and previous employment as a 
soldier that made him become 'a bloodhound' in political activities in China. It might also 
explain his enthusiasm to implement repressive measures to suppress the May Fourth 
Movement, and also to create, in the autumn, new means and regulations to prevent 
similar civil disturbances in the Settlement.
The forming o f a new unit during a crisis and reinforcing the old forces was not an 
unusual method for foreign authorities to adopt in order to strengthen hegemony over the 
municipality. The last time it had occurred was in May 1918, when the volunteer police 
Special Forces, or the Special Branch as it was also called, was formally established to 
act as a supervisory organ for the Sikh and Chinese branches, and to work as a preventive 
unit for armed robberies. Before starting to patrol, the Specials had one month’s training 
behind them, which included lectures, handling weapons and the basics of jujitsu  and
drill. The Specials were initially a voluntary force, although later they were paid a salary
* 81for their services. Their work was recognised as being important since they controlled 
the May Fourth demonstrations and helped the police. Similarly, the Expeditionary 
Forces were formed from volunteers. The crucial difference, however, between the two 
groups was the latter's composition. The recruits were professional soldiers armed with 
revolvers, and therefore authorised by the Council to use the strongest possible measures 
and even to shoot, in order to protect the Settlement. Furthermore, the Expeditionary 
Forces recruited only British ex-servicemen men, where as the Specials’ ranks were 
accessible to other foreigners and Chinese men. Bringing the British Expeditionary 
Forces on to the streets gave the impression that the Settlement needed protection against 
a war-like enemy and only the British were deemed trustworthy for this assignment.
80 SMA, U l-3 -602 , file 1675, Shanghai Municipal Council, Secretariat, A.H. Hilton-Johnson files.
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The Settlement police adopted another emergency measure when a complete strike of 
the telephone companies threatened communication. The police stations prepared 
themselves to use wireless sets, flags, heliographic signals and lights to transmit 
messages between the SMP forces around the city.82 These arrangements demonstrated 
the police’s diverse efforts to prepare themselves for contingencies that might arise. By 
contrast, the British Municipal police in Tianjin hardly commented on the incidents 
which occurred during the May Fourth demonstrations and boycotts, and according to 
police reports the foreign community was able to continue its business as usual83.
Back in Shanghai, the police official’s monotonous daily reports acquired an excited 
tone when they described the May Fourth demonstrators. In the official's opinion the 
protestors had accepted a wide variety of “undesirables” and “hooligans” in their groups, 
and without a significant police presence, “the processions would have certainly turned to 
serious ruffianism”. Moreover, this rank policeman shared his British officers’ perception 
that the strike leaders were eager to maintain good relations with the foreign authorities 
and preserve a good order in the Settlement. Yet he accused the May Fourth leaders of 
losing control of their followers.84 There was an overwhelming feeling of superiority, 
which radiated from the police reports that described events during the last night of the 
general strike. Reportedly, the police had announced commands in English, and Trooper 
Sergeant Rock tried arrogantly, only six troopers behind him, to control over 300 
celebrating Chinese people, and attempted to push them back to the French Concession,
81 NCH , 11 May, 1918, p. 345; Shanghai Municipal Council, Annual Report 1918 , p. 42A.
82 China P ress , 10 June, 1919, p, 2.
83 M unicipal Gazette, Tianjin, 15 July, 1919, pp. 4-5.
84 SMA, U l-9 1 -1 9 , file 19, Shanghai Municipal Police, Police daily report, 6 June, 1919; McEuen to 
Fraser, 13 June, 1919.
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In seconds an orderly procession was turned into an affray that ended when police opened 
fire on the crowd, killing one person and wounding nine.
Not all the Shanghai foreigners perceived these actions necessary for peace keeping. 
Counter narratives coincided with the Council's justifying articles in the NCH, and the 
newspaper continued its indisputable support o f the British authorities' operations 
throughout May-June 1919. However, a reporter of the American China Press newspaper 
who had personally followed the police's actions inquired, “Who is working for order and 
who for disorder, when a student distributing leaflets ‘Help the Students Movement, 
Commit no Violence’ gets arrested?”. The editorial continued with the same opinion and 
accused the Council of “unqualified, unmitigated and inexcusable” mistreatment of the 
student demonstrators.86 The foreign police had embraced opinions and procedures that 
supported those o f the existing British authority in the Settlement, which in contrast were 
constantly being speculated upon by the foreign officials in Beijing. Contemporary 
British correspondence includes numerous examples of contradictory arguments between 
Shanghai and Beijing officials. Here are just a few samples relating to the May Fourth 
incidents. When the Captain-Superintendent of Police had reported the incidents relating 
to the Citizens Association meeting of May 7, 1919 he explained that it had ended “in 
processional order that marched to the Chinese territory”. The British Legation official 
questioned the statement and claimed that “is it not all Chinese territory? This little 
expression is the key to much at Shanghai”. In addition, the same Beijing official blamed 
the police for a lack of communication between them and protestors. After the shootings 
on June 12th the British Minister at Beijing also complained of the Shanghai Police’s
85 SMA, U l-91 -19 , file 19, Shanghai Municipal Police, Chief Inspector T.Vaughan’s report, 13 June, 1919; 
SMP, Special Branch, roll 65, dossier 6691, Extracts from the file on the 1919 Japanese Boycott and the 
activities o f  the Students in connection therewith, C.I. Vaughan’s and Trooper Sergeant E. Rock’s reports, 
13 June, 1919.
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inexperience “at handling the crowds. [And that] their action turned a peaceful procession
• 9 7into a ‘howling mob’.”
Not a single section of the British hierarchical administration system was able to avoid 
the "May Fourth disturbances", as it was called in common parlance. Core services in the 
modem Settlement included its water, sewage, light and power systems, all controlled by 
the Electricity and Public Works Departments. The Council perceived protection of these 
stations as essential for the foreigners’ well being, and positioned the SVC troops with 
machine guns and extra sentries on guard. Even if some Chinese fitters, blacksmiths and 
other workers went on strike, the foreign municipal workers were able to provide a 
constant supply of power and tram services throughout the general strike.88 The 
engineers’ inability to mobilise with the Shanghai Volunteer Corps created a problem, as 
the necessity to maintain the running of the water and power stations was prioritised and 
joining the defence forces was prohibited. This in turn created a lack of men in service 
and the situation was strongly criticised by the Engineers’ Commander.89 The 
departments’ contribution to the defence system was to provide electric light trucks for 
the police when they tore down the May Fourth protestors’ flags that hung over the 
streets. Obviously, the threatening incidents in May-June had encouraged the Deputy 
Commissioner of Public Works to support the suggestion to supply the SVC with trucks 
and armoured cars to protect vitally important power stations.90
86 China Press, 20 June, 1919, p. 10.
87 M iles W. Lamps o il’s hand written comments on the Captain Superintendent o f  Police’s reports on the 
files PRO, F 0228/3526/61,71 Fraser to Jordan, 8 June and 10 June 1919; Jordan's and Lampson’s hand 
written comments on file PRO, F 0228/3526/98 Phillips to Jordan, 15 June, 1919.
88 NCH, 14 June, 1919, p. 721; SMA, U l-91 -19 , Shanghai Municipal Police, McEuen to Fraser, 14 June, 
1919.
89 SMA, U l-3 -1 7 4 , file 1268, Shanghai Municipal Council, Secretariat, Commandant o f  the SVC Trueman 
to the Council, 23 June, 1919.
90 SM A, U l-1 4  (2)-23, Public Works Department, Memorandum by Deputy Commissioner o f  Public 
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The Health Department produced daily summaries about available meat, fish, fowl and 
vegetable supplies in the Settlement markets which had been immediately affected by the 
strike. Slaughterhouses’ work stoppage created a shortage of meat, which was soon 
visible in butchers’ shops, and even though the health officials tried to convince master 
butchers to open their doors, their efforts proved fruitless. The Council was not beaten by 
the Chinese protesting butchers. It hastened actions and secured meat production for 
foreigners by forcing some butchers to slaughter animals and arranged transportation 
under police guard. In spite of various measures taken to prevent any problems arising 
from food shortage and poison rumours, various cases of diarrhoea were reported among 
the Settlement residents. The British health officer alleged that food supplies being sold 
off the streets and alleyway comers had caused these. The British Hall & Holtz Bakery 
issued a notice explaining that it could not deliver bread, but instead a local hotel boldly 
claimed that its meat “storage is sufficient for 100 strike days”. To uplift the British 
people’s spirit, the newspaper wrote an entertaining article on how the absence of 
servants, due to their strike activities, actually prevented all heavy cooking in the house 
and exonerated women from charges of being lazy. Consequently, the female society was 
encouraged to “keep a stiff upper lip”.91 It appeared obvious that the foreigners' 
anticipated scenarios would not necessarily materialise during the May Fourth 
Movement. By preparing themselves for the worst, in this case it was the siege that never 
happened, their activities were related to the outcome-blindness of people who were
* * * i 09experiencing a dangerous situation . They had no knowledge that the general work 
stoppage would be over within a week. Furthermore, many foreigners had either personal
n China Press, 7 June, p. 4 and 10 June, 1919, p. 7; NCH, 14 June, 1919, pp. 689-690, 721; SMA, U l-91 -  
18, Shanghai Municipal Police, Health Officer, Arthur Stanley to the SMC Secretary, 5 and 6 June, 1919; 
Shanghai Municipal Council, Annual Report 1919, p. 140A.
92 Cohen, H isto iy  in Three K eys , p. 61.
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memories o f the Boxer siege or they had heard horrifying stories of the food deficiency 
and these vivid images encouraged the people to prepare themselves for the worst 
possible scenario.
The female workers comprised the majority among the Health Department employees 
as the five Shanghai Municipal Council hospitals were staffed with foreign and Chinese 
nurses. Nevertheless, foreign women’s opinions about contemporary issues in Chinese 
politics or life in Shanghai often remained concealed, because at the beginning of the 
twentieth century it was not thought appropriate for women to discuss these matters93. 
The important individual exceptions were some of the women missionaries. However, the 
male dominated Council and its departments had to acknowledge women’s changing 
position in the International Settlement by admitting their eligibility for election as 
members to the Council. A list of over one hundred women paying sufficient taxes to 
qualify for election was gathered, but much was revealed in the attached comment “the 
Council has no power to reject the nomination under the Land Regulations even if  such a 
person be, for example, undischarged bankrupt, a Bolshevist agent or a woman” 94. The 
British nurse A.A. Thomlinson who worked at the Victoria Nursing Home provides an 
exceptional woman’s perspective on the May Fourth events in Shanghai. She had arrived 
in Shanghai just before the World War in 1914 and had since been overworking due to a 
lack of nurses. To a certain extent, she obviously observed political issues in China and 
abroad, and perhaps received some information from her soldier patients. According to 
Thomlinson’s correspondence the students had initiated the strike because of “some 
grievances against the Government in Peking”. She confirmed that the students’ real
93 For a colourful study o f  Western women in China who speak up against the grain, see Susanna Hoe, The 
P rivate Life o f  O ld Hong Kong: Western Women in the British Colony 1841-194 / ,  (Hong Kong, 1991), 
passim .
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motive was the transfer o f Germany’s old concession Qingdao, to Japan, The Council had 
fulfilled all her expectations and prepared the SVC and other forces for the worst, but like 
many other British people, she was relieved when nothing serious happened. Her interest 
to analyse current issues continued as she carried on commenting on major political 
incidents in Shanghai throughout her 15-year assignment in China.95
As soon as the May Fourth general strike had closed shops in the International 
Settlement, Fraser intensified his communication. It seemed that the Consul-General had 
modified his indifferent attitude to the May Fourth Movement and was prepared to 
implement powerful measures to suppress it. In keeping with an aggressive approach, he 
urged the Council to publish a notification, firstly, to guai*antee residents’ safety, and 
secondly, to advise people to continue their work96. His orders were too late however. By 
the time his letter was received, the Council had already issued two statements that have 
been discussed earlier in this chapter. Once again the Council had acted independently 
before any advice was asked or orders received from the Consulate officials. The Council 
had indeed adopted a more 'firm' attitude, in accordance with Fraser’s request, not 
necessarily because of his influential position as the head of British Consulate, but more 
likely to enforce their own inflexible policy toward strikers.
Fraser ordered the closure of the students’ union office because he believed that it was 
the headquarters of activities that could undermine the Settlement’s authority. Just a day 
before, the SSU had approached foreign consuls in a letter stating their motives for
94 SMA, U 1-3-238, file 1303, Shanghai Municipal Council, Secretariat, Dr. Margaret Polk to the Council, 3 
March, 1923; Legal Adviser Duncan M cNeill to the Council, 13 March, 1923.
95 Rhodes House Library, Oxford University, Papers o f  the Overseas Nursing Association, MSS Brit. 
Emp.s. 400, box 140, Letters from nurses overseas 1910-1950, file 3, the Far East, f f  43-119, Nurse A.A. 
Thomlinson to M iss Middleton, 7 July, 1919; Thomlinson’s papers passim .
96 PRO, F 0228/3526/16, Fraser to Jordan, 6 June, 1919.
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97demonstrations, and outlined efforts to maintain the movement as a non-violent one. 
The Consul-General hesitantly admitted that protestors had extensive support among the 
Chinese people. Nevertheless, their final mistake had been a “blind folly in interfering 
with provisioning of the town”. Incidents like the chauffeurs’ strike, shortage of food 
supplies and workers who abandoned their ships made him blame students for 
persecuting the foreigners. “The strikers leaders' audacity grows with their impurity", 
Fraser argued, and "it is evident that we are to be harassed and 'bullied' into pressing 
Governments to do what the agitators want”. At this time also, the private letters to 
Jordan expressed Fraser's harsh attitude, and in addition, he gave the impression that the 
Bolsheviks were in the background of the strike, but later he alleged that 
"KuoMinTangHui" i.e. Guomindang with Sun Yatsen as the leader were aiding the 
Movement. His greatest fear, similar to that o f the Council's, was the students' usurpation
OQ
of foreign areas. Fraser’s personal fury was apparent and it was targeted directly 
towards the students as he felt that their propaganda work had questioned the foreign 
authority that he represented. Instead of addressing ultimatums universally towards 
agitators and disorderly persons as the Council did, he requested repressive measures to 
control students.
A contrasting view came from the Consul-General in J i’nan, as Sir John T. Pratt's views 
demonstrated that Fraser's opinions and actions in Shanghai were unparalleled among the 
British officials in China. Pratt was convinced that students’ participation in politics, 
when combined with organised public opinion and rising national consciousness were 
exceptionally hopeful signs for China's modernisation. Furthermore, in his private 
correspondence Pratt urged the British government to clarify its stance on the Shandong
97 Chen, The M ay Fourth M ovement in Shanghai, pp. 128-129; PRO, F 0228/3526/33 , Fraser to Jordan,
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issue and to support China’s endeavour to eliminate Japanese influence from its internal 
politics." Fraser’s views about the May Fourth Movement however, were never so 
positive or supportive.
The Shanghai Council’s principals appeared to follow uncompromising lines, and 
therefore, Fraser regularly defended their activities. Yet another example o f the Council’s 
stubborn stance to suipass all foreign and Chinese authorities in Shanghai was to arrange 
the British gunboat H.M.S. “Bee” to be placed along the Bund and Customs Jetty, in 
front of the Nanjing Road. Action was taken without any consular approval and it created 
an immediate diplomatic quarrel among the foreigner officials. Meanwhile, the American 
Consul-General insisted on following the proper proceedings, but Fraser supported the 
Council’s self-willed operation by claiming that the maintenance of peace and order was 
more important than the “possibility of setting up a procedure apparently offensive to 
national or official amour proper”. Quite plainly, the Council was eager to strengthen the 
naval forces and required the British Admiral and all available ships to arrive in 
Shanghai. Fraser accepted the suggestion wholeheartedly assuring that it would have a 
calming effect on furious May Fourth agitators. In fact, two British gunboats prepared 
themselves to organise a landing party if needed. At this stage the officials’ certain fear 
was the liability of the Movement becoming anti-foreign.100
Indeed, the British officials feared the demonstrators’ actions a security threat. The 
decisive moment had come during the protestors’ celebrations which had been organised
7 June, 1919.
98 PRO, F 0228/3526/38, 67b, 68, Fraser to Jordan, 9-10 and 12 June, 1919.
99 PRO, FO 228/3022/6, Sir John T. Pratt to Jordan, 19 January, 1920; SOAS, Sir John Pratt Collection, Box 
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after the foreign consuls had confirmed the resignations of three hated Beijing officials. 
Fortified by a third gunboat, the British Navy began to exercise a landing party, which 
continued into the evening and exactly at the same time the SMP was shooting at the 
Chinese celebration procession in the Settlement. In addition to the landing party 
exercises and police fire towards protestors, fear and order were, the following morning, 
accentuated by the Navy’s machine gun drill.101 'The Navy card' was a characteristic 
response from the British officials in a situation where their authority was threatened. To 
a lesser extent the Americans also appeared to protect their interests by positioning 
vessels on the rivers to fight against the pirates102. Apparently the May Fourth Movement 
had become too menacing for the Settlement's police and the response was an 
uncompromising defence policy. This ‘gunboat diplomacy’ seemed to have a reassuring 
effect on the British people and it acted as an effective deterrent to the protestors.
Fraser had pushed his personal influence to its limits and was eventually able to 
convince the Commander-in-Chief of China Station, F.C.T. Tudor, to provide another 
boat, a cruiser with torpedo aimaments, to secure the city’s peace. Tudor had doubts 
about the Settlement’s urgent requirements, but finally agreed to keep the fourth boat in 
Shanghai.103 During journeys around China, Tudor had had an opportunity to observe the 
Movement. Contrary to many o f his colleague's opinions, the orderly demonstrations and 
the Chinese universal rejection of the Versailles Peace Treaty had impressed him. Along 
with his countrymen, Tudor predicted that the Movement would eventually agitate anti-
I. Cohen, "America and the May Fourth Movement: The Response to Chinese Nationalism, 1917-1921", 
Pacific H istorical Review, vol. XXXV, no 1, Feb. 1996, pp. 83-100.
101 PRO, Admiralty [hereafter Adm], 53/35007, H.M.S. “Bee” Copy o f  Log for June, 1919; PRO, 
A dm 53/43154, H.M.S. “Gnat” Copy o f  Log for 1 May-30 June, 1919; PRO, Adm 53/43154, H.M.S. “Teal” 
Copy o f  Log for June, 1919.
102 George B. Clark, Treading Softly: U.S. M arines in China, 1819-1949, (Westport, Connecticut, 2001), 
pp. 56-57.
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foreign feelings, but instead of accepting perceived connections between the Movement 
and local political parties, the Commander-in-Chief anticipated that the Chinese might 
turn towards German officers and soldiers to receive moral and material support for their 
cause.104 The World War was obviously in British recent memory and the peace talks in 
Versailles continued to bring war issues under discussion. Questions about the procedures 
with enemy officials and properties, and the punishment of war criminals were constantly 
discussed in all foreign newspapers and in the correspondence between allied officials. 
Given the situation it is not surprising that foreigners were afraid of the students’ 
endeavours to seek outside help to preserve the country’s integrity. The Germans were 
perceived as the most alarming potential foreign supporter together with the Russians. A 
further interesting point was that the May Fourth Movement was recognised as having 
the potential power to obtain assistance from abroad. The British officials recognised the 
fact that the Chinese Western returned students and their active involvement in the 
Movement probably provided an important connection abroad.
The Statistical Secretary of the Chinese Maritime Customs (CMC) suggested that in 
Beijing particularly the political parties’ conspiracies, and the Beiyang army’s105 internal 
fractions had inflamed student protests which followed in Shanghai. At his hometown in 
Shanghai, the Secretary blamed student associations for executing the general strike and 
he repeated the Council's repressive rhetoric towards the May Fourth Movement. In his 
opinion, the mob had caused the death of a few Chinese people when they collided with 
the foreign police. Therefore, he accused the crowd and exonerated the SMP from 
responsibility. His summary of events expressed a strong disapproval o f using the boycott
104 PRO, Adm 125/67, Vice-Admiral Sir Fredrick C.T.Tudor, Commander-in-Chief, general letter, 13 July, 
1919.
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as a method to attain “the effective recognition and preservation of China’s sovereign 
rights”.106 The Commissioner of the CMC in Tianjin, Sir Frederick Maze was concerned 
about the strike’s influence on government departments' work and admitted that 
“students’ agitation” has created a serious situation in the city. Similar to his Shanghai 
colleague, Maze was disturbed by the use of the strike to boycott Japanese trade, but he 
proudly informed that the British Concession in Tianjin was prepared for military
•» \ 0 7operations and had made plans to encounter arising situations. Compared with 
Shanghai’s ‘gunboat diplomacy’ and other radical measures implemented during the 
demonstrations, the British officials in Tianjin approached the Movement in a more 
lenient way. Notably, both CMC officials’ statements complained of using a boycott as a 
method, but they were not especially alarmed by the boycott’s outcome.
The British, as the controllers of the CMC, had reserved themselves the right to 
regulate international trade and monopolise the customs system in China. Agreements at 
the beginning of 1910 had strengthened the Chinese Maritime Customs’ domination over 
Chinese revenues from wine, tobacco and salt tax. Subsequently, the collecting and 
depositing revenues in foreign banks was under foreign, and especially under the British 
control. But the general prediction was that the Chinese would eventually attempt to 
control carefully protected trade privileges given to the British by the Treaty of Nanjing 
(1842) and Treaty o f Tianjin (185 8).108 Shanghai’s International Settlement had been 
established for foreign trade and the boycotts had a deteriorating effect on the business
105 Yuan Shikai had compiled Beiyang army around Beijing in the beginning o f  the 20th century. After his 
death in 1916 the army gradually spilt into Anhui and Zhili cliques o f  which the first group supported 
Anfu-club. Nathan, Peking Politics 1918-1923, pp. 57-58, 226.
106 Returns o f  the Trade and Trade Reports 1919, China, the Maritime Customs, (Shanghai, 1920), pp. 1-2.
107 SOAS, Sir Frederick Maze papers [hereafter Maze papers], Semi-Official Letters, 5, no 413, letter to Sir 
Francis Aglen, 10 June, 1919.
108 Roberta A. Dayer, Bankers and Diplom ats in China 1917-1925, (London, 1981), pp. 21,24; William F.
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world, because by boycotting the Japanese trade, the May Fourth protestors had already 
appropriated foreigners5 trading rights and disturbed export and import transactions. The 
use of native goods had become a patriotic deed for Chinese protestors throughout May 
and June 1919 and it supported the political statement against Japanese intrusion which 
will be analysed in the following chapter. As a result, the Chinese used Western products, 
particularly British and American, rather than Japanese goods. It was evident that the 
British commercial community ultimately benefited from the Japanese trade embargo, 
because Japan was their strongest business competitor in China. Hence, disturbances in 
Japanese trade were directly profitable for the British business community.
Conclusion
The foreign society's ultimate fear was that the May Fourth demonstrators’ upsurge 
would demolish their privileges in the International Settlement. In addition, the 
extraterritorial jurisdiction had made the foreign authorities responsible for restraining 
aggressive enthusiasm, and for maintaining law and order in Shanghai for the sake of 
their economic and political interests. The British officials perceived the demonstrators’ 
activities as intimidating towards the Land Regulations which formed a legitimate 
constitution for foreign presence in the city. In May, the notification had referred to 
“persons’ unlawful pressure upon residents” and hereafter the Council’s attempt was to 
stop misconduct by using legislative coercion. At that stage, the Movement was 
perceived merely as a potential risk that had to be dealt in a precautionary way. In many 
instances, however, the Movement seemed to fulfil the requirements for organised
Mayers, (ed. o f  1st edition, 1877), Treaties between the Empire o f  China and Foreign P ow ers , (Shanghai,
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uprising or riot, and the Council’s response was accordingly suppressive as their actions 
during the general strike revealed. Here the British officials once more failed to 
recognise, or refused to recognise, the characteristic actions of the May Fourth Movement 
that separated it from riot or mob. The most significant denominator was the May Fourth 
participants’ recognition of their common interests that translated the potential for 
movement into collective action and this common solidarity was something that common 
riot or mob was able to construct only on a temporarily basis109. Throughout the early 
part of the Movement, the British officials' May Fourth discourse remained sceptical, but 
reasonably understanding towards the activities. The intensified encounter with the May 
Fourth demonstrations, and finally, June's general strike aggravated the hostile rhetoric, 
and this was followed by aggressive measures to suppress the Movement.
A co-operative approach between the Council and Fraser closed the SSU’s office in the 
Settlement, secured extra British naval forces and justified all foreign officials’ 
operations during the May Fourth Movement. As an alternative to verbal propaganda, the 
additional police, navy and volunteer forces were ordered to patrol the streets, to tear up 
posters and flags, and if  necessary, to arrest those students who violated the Settlement’s 
peace and order. Moreover, the new Expeditionary Forces were established and civil 
disturbance emergency regulations were implemented to restrain the Movement. In spite 
of Fraser’s status as the leader of the British community, the British-run Council 
practised real decisive and executive power in Shanghai. Fraser's correspondence during 
the May Fourth Movement seemed to strengthen the image o f him being a ‘rubber stamp’ 
for the Council’s activities. The British government officials frequently dominated the 
foreign power relations in Shanghai and Beijing. Here, it is important to remember that
5th edition, 1906,), pp. 1, 13-19.
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neither the Consular Body in Shanghai nor the Diplomatic Body in Beijing had legal 
power over the Council’s operations. The Court of Foreign Consuls held the exclusive 
right to prosecute the Council as a corporation, in a situation where the Council was sued, 
and furthermore, all the Land Regulation amendments were subject to diplomatic 
approval110. The Diplomatic Body sent instructions and memos of protest against the 
Council’s heavy-handed operations during the May Fourth Movement, but apart from 
writing irritating comments there was nothing the diplomatic powers could do to alter 
Shanghai policy. The British Minister's remark after the May Fourth Movement’s 
explained much of the Legation’s attitude: “I have always endeavoured to refrain from 
unnecessary interference with the local affairs in Shanghai”111.
The police leaders had dissenting views about the Movement’s origins and organisers, 
and from the beginning Hilton-Johnson evaluated the Movement as being a political 
revolt. Following the Council's May Fourth rhetoric, he implemented extreme measures 
to suppress the Movement. Not surprisingly, his plans formed a blueprint for police 
action during the general strike and his suggestions composed the core of the future 
security system in the International Settlement.
In the crucial period during the general strike, the British officials' May Fourth 
discourse was defined to establish common principles in order to understand the 
Movement. At this stage several distinctive features were repeatedly manifested. First, 
the Movement was an illegal act that threatened the Settlement's security, and therefore it 
was a "riot" or "rebellion" against the foreign authority. Second, the international or 
national political parties controlled the May Fourth activities. However, the British could 
not quite decide whether it was the Bolsheviks, the Guomindangs, the North/South
109 Tatrow, Power in M ovement, pp. 4-5.
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military leaders or the Germans who were orchestrating the Movement. Third, the fear of 
anti-foreign sentiment was constantly expressed as a possible future outcome after the 
May Fourth operations. Understandably the Boxer uprising and poisoning rumours 
played a significant part in enforcing British fears.
Parallel with the concerns of potential insurrection, the diverse rumours flourished in 
the city. The Boxer rumours particularly expressed not only symbolic collective fears, but 
also very realistic worries about how foreign society would act in an emergency situation. 
The Boxer rumours formed a metaphor for the fear of brutal cruelty and provided 
immediate images of the Chinese crowd attacking and killing the foreigners, as this had 
happened almost twenty years previously. Rapid spreading panic and mass hysteria were 
associated with the Boxer uprising and seemingly some of the May Fourth activities 
encouraged similar mental images. In this context, it was not unreasonable to sustain such 
images especially when the newspapers reported the success of the Movement around 
China. To complete the British officials' fears the attacks on Japanese residents had 
intensified, the general strike had closed Shanghai, and moreover, the students’ 
peacekeeping troops were patrolling the streets and rumours of poisoned food and water 
supplies circulated. Such rumours therefore conveyed emotionally significant messages 
of general fear among the foreigners. The British officials’ correspondence, however, 
provided no evidence that they associated the May Fourth Movement directly with the 
Boxer uprising, but obviously the rumours influenced their decisions and actions to 
suppress the May Fourth operations.
The British officials’ reactions had an instant effect on the development of the May 
Fourth Movement, and this will be examined more closely in Chapters Five and Six. Some
110 Land Regulations and Bye-Laws, (Shanghai, 1923), pp. 11-12.
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initial results were obvious however. The Movement had to reorganise itself in order to 
continue operations inside the Settlement. Still, whatever measures the May Fourth 
demonstrators had taken to prevent unlawful operations in the Settlement, the Council 
instantly condemned all actions. The foreigners feared that the students’ uniformed 
peacekeeping forces would to take over the work o f the SMP which patrolled the streets 
and restrained people from violence. Similarly, the May Fourth protagonists' flags, 
handbills and posters were supposed to emphasise the non-violent nature of the activities, 
but the British interpreted them differently and believed that the prevailing hegemony had 
been challenged by the protestors' written propaganda. Meanwhile, the foreign officials 
received regular reports from students and other May Fourth organisations explaining their 
objectives and stressing their willingness to co-operate with the Council.
Students had temporarily succeeded in uniting various Chinese classes of literate, 
merchants and poor people to join the general strike112 and not only the Chinese people, 
but also many foreigners supported their cause. As a result, the May Fourth 
demonstrators’ actions and operations challenged the Settlement's foreign administration 
in the city. The British officials especially were strongly defensive and tried desperately 
by all means to control the Movement, but all officials' life and work were inevitably 
affected by the May Fourth protests, boycotts and strikes. The British businessmen and 
missionaries however had their own views to express and a slightly different kind of 
Movement to describe, as the following chapters will explain.
111 PRO, F 0 6 7 1/447/566, Jordan to Jamieson, 9 January, 1920.
112 For more detailed analysis on succeeding student-worker-merchant disunity see e.g. Mary Backus 
Rankin, "State and Society in Early Republican Politics, 1912-18", in Frederic Wakeman, Jr. and Richard 
Louis Edmonds (eds.), R eappraising Republican China, (Oxford, 2000), pp. 6-27.
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3. 4OVERHEATED MARKETS’ - THE BRITISH COMMERCIAL 
COMMUNITY AND THE MAY FOURTH MOVEMENT
This chapter will consider the way in which the British business community perceived the 
May Fourth activities as an advantage and also as a threat to its presence in China. As 
argued in the previous chapter, there were various ways in which the British officials 
considered the activities deliberately destructive for the International Settlement in 
Shanghai. As the Shanghai official and business communities worked in close co-operation 
to maintain the foreign society's economic and political stability, it is essential to analyse 
the other half o f this marriage.1
A primary objective of British foreign policy was to create a world market economy 
based on free trade, freedom of capital movements and a unified international monetary 
system. Therefore, the relationship between economics and politics was the key issue in 
British relations with China. At the dawn of twentieth century the Americans and Japanese 
had intensified their influence in China, whereas the World War had exhausted Britain, 
leaving her struggling with her own domestic and imperial problems. Generally, the rise of 
British economic power in the nineteenth century and the feeling of superiority which 
spread simultaneously with industrial progress at home and the expansion of territory 
abroad, was gradually weakening in China. Unrealistic aspirations of enormous Chinese 
markets in reality shrank to 2-3% of Britain's total exports between 1911-19372. Britain, 
however, had to act to perpetuate her established position within the economic and political 
spheres of influence in China. In this sense, British interests were less important in terms of 
the domestic economy than in terms of the regional supremacy they represented. The war
1 In this research unless specially mentioned the business community or the com m ercial community refers to 
the British businessmen and the bankers.
2 Cain and Hopkins, British Imperialism, p. 238.
had offered a welcoming boost for British sales in the East, yet, the Armistice had brought 
a sharp cut in market prices. The Jardine, Matheson & Co.'s (Jardines) agent in Hankou 
complained that prices obtainable in Europe had dropped by about 50% since the peace 
negotiations began3. The prices of commodities were higher than companies were able to 
sustain, as during wartime normal processes of production and distribution had been 
restricted. Thus, prices had risen phenomenally. In spite of diminishing government exports 
to China the British companies' investments in property, industry, land, commerce and 
banking guaranteed their domination in Shanghai's municipality administration. 
Understandably, the businessmen's decisions had significant effects not only on each other 
but also in the larger sectors of China's economy, culture, society, politics and foreign 
affairs. As business community's interests and motives in China differed from those of the 
British officials and missionaries, their May Fourth rhetoric was based on different 
assumptions.
Since the opening of Shanghai as a treaty port, trade had shifted from Hong Kong -based 
business to cover larger regions of northern and western China, making Shanghai the most 
active trading port. This multifunctional economic centre was ideally situated at the mouth 
of Huangpu, a tributary of the Yangzi River, close to the sea. It was located approximately 
halfway along the coast and served as a centre not only for north-south trade, but also 
between the western and eastern parts of China. Furthermore, in Shanghai, the International 
Settlement's location was good, in comparison with the French Concession, as it had long 
shoreline, and the wharves had berthing accommodation even for the steamers. Successful
3 Cambridge University Library, Jardine, Matheson & Corporation Archives [hereafter JMA], Twentieth 
century correspondence, Semi-Official Correspondence exchanged between Shanghai and Other Ports 
[hereafter S/O Shanghai and Other Ports], August to September 1919, no. 32/65-81, W.S. Dupree, Hankou to 
Alfred Brooke-Smith, Shanghai, 14 August, 1919.
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business was, however, strongly dependable on the internal peace in the country, and as 
will be demonstrated, the foreign traders willingly supported the means to maintain 
stability. In particular, British businessmen and bankers were conservative, but influential, 
and as a rule were prepared to protect their interests in Shanghai. The political authority 
that British businessmen possessed was not always accompanied by political responsibility 
and when the objective was to make profit, their first and foremost responsibility was to the 
clients and stockholders.
Jardines, established in 1832, was the largest foreign trading concern in China. Its 
massive twentieth century correspondence has so far not been researched, as the materials 
were only made available two or three years ago and have still not been examined by 
scholars. Hence, the materials provide a fresh perspective on the British expatriate society, 
life and business in China during the turbulent twentieth century. An independent part of 
Jardines was the British-Chinese Corporation and their materials form an extensive and 
previously non-researched part of the British presence in China. The Hongkong and 
Shanghai Banking Corporation, since its establishment in 1865, served not only as the 
British governmental and company trade financier in China, but also as banker to the 
Chinese government. A comprehensive collection of the bank's correspondence has 
remained and is invaluable in the analysis of the May Fourth influences among the business 
community. These three companies, along with the Butterfield and Swire Company, were 
the most influential agents in the formation of commercial politics around 1920 in 
Shanghai. Of the various multinational companies that were partly British owned, the 
British-American Tobacco Company is briefly discussed in relation to the May Fourth 
activities. The Asiatic Petroleum Company (today Shell), a joint venture between Britain
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and the Netherlands, had opened offices in Shanghai in 1908 and saw the city as the most 
important trading centre in the East Asia. During the May Fourth Movement the company 
had many representatives in Shanghai, but unfortunately, the Shell archives do not provide 
any correspondence relating to their May Fourth activities4.
In addition, the commercial community used special pressure groups such as the China 
Association, the British Chamber of Commerce and the Shanghai General Chamber of 
Commerce as instruments to implement their business strategies and political agendas 
relating to China and Asia as a whole. The associations' minutes and journals have been 
analysed in this research. The China pressure groups were established by British enterprise 
and bank directors and they possessed open and secret connections with the foreign and 
Chinese officials on both local and government levels. Inevitably the network stretched to 
the companies' headquarters in London, and via the Foreign Office to the British 
government. To incorporate the British enterprises' mutual interests, a member was 
appointed to another company's directorate, a manoeuvre which also strengthened 
horizontal integration within the mercantile community. Hence, Jardines frequently had a 
representative in the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank Corporation's directorate in London5.
3.1. 'Serious Inconvenience' Troubled Jardines
Jardines had nearly a century of experience in trading across the Pacific and Atlantic 
Oceans and the company history reveals its excellent survival skills and ability to modify
4 Shell Group Archives, GHS/2b/24, The History o f  the Group, working papers -country files: China and 
Hong Kong 1891-1959, Personnel, agreements.
5 Maurice Collis, Wciyfoong: the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking C orporation , (London, 1965), footnote in 
p. 155 and Appendix A. p. 257; Frank H.H.King, The H istory o f  the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking
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its activities throughout the turbulent nineteenth century in China.6 Jardines provided 
various seivices such as buying and selling inside China and shipping products to Europe, 
India and America. It also promoted railways and founded banks and insurance companies. 
Altogether, it had positioned agents in twelve different cities and towns from Harbin to 
Hong Kong and from Chengdu to Shanghai. The number of representatives was augmented 
by an extensive network of Chinese middlemen, and therefore, Jardines' business covered 
most of the provinces. In Shanghai alone the company owned, for example, three cotton 
mills, a silk filature, a brewery, a coal company and an insurance company.7
At the time of the May Fourth Movement, Alfred Brooke-Smith was Jardines' Senior 
Director in Shanghai, the Council member of the Shanghai Municipal administration, and 
an active member of the British Chamber of Commerce, the China Association and the 
Shanghai General Chamber of Commerce. Undoubtedly he was one of the three most 
influential British businessmen in Shanghai and besides his extremely omnipotent position 
in China, his views were widely respected in the Jardines' headquarters in London and at 
the Foreign Office. It is notable that he recognised immediately the profitable situation 
created by the Japanese boycott and encouraged Jardines to benefit from it. The company's
Corporation, III, The Hongkong Bank between the Wars and the Bank Interned 1919-1945: Return from  
Grandeur, (Cambridge, 1988), pp. 46-47.
6 Jardine, Matheson & Company' s vivid nineteenth century trade is described in Robert Blake, Jardine 
M atheson: Ti'aders o f  the Far E ast, (London, 1999); W.E. Cheong, M andarins and Merchants: Jardine 
Matheson & Co., a China agency o f  the early nineteenth century, (Malmo, 1979); M aggie Keswick, (ed.) A 
Thistle and Jade: A Celebration o f  150 years o f  Jardine, Matheson & Co., (London, 1982); Edward 
LeFevour, Western Enterprise in late Ch'ing China: A Selective Survey o f  Jardine, Matheson & Company's 
Operations, 1842-1895, (Cambridge, Mass., 1970); Alain Le Pichon, Aux origines de HongKong, Aspects de 
la civilisation comm erciale a Canton: le fon ds de commerce de Jardine, M atheson & Co. 1827-1839, (Paris, 
1998).
7 JMA, Twentieth century correspondence, passim .
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record profits probably provided him with incentive to express a surprisingly sympathetic 
view towards the May Fourth demonstrators in the International Settlement.
Post-war universal financial stringency and the deflation in value of all commercial 
commodities had a depressing influence on all business and Jardines had been hit by the 
recession as severely as the other companies. Jardines had struggled to find new products, 
clients and markets to balance its China trade. Hence, there was a relentless search for 
marketing strategies to enhance the appeal of goods and to find potential customers. To 
make circumstances even worse, the fluctuation of currencies had made business and 
investments highly insecure and unprofitable. In contrast, the May Fourth protestors' 
economic weapon in the form of a strike at the Japanese factories and a boycott of Japanese 
products respectively, were remarkably profitable actions from Jardines' perspective. In 
these circumstances, the important short-term implication was a boost of Jardines' business 
which resulted in a multiplied demand when the prices increased. As it happened, most of 
their goods were cleared directly from the wharf, which allowed the foreign traders to keep 
the prices exceptionally high. Extra value for Jardines' sales was created by an invaluable 
business takeover from the Japanese companies and in terms of the business activities it 
revived the company's golden times during the World War. Auspicious trading conditions 
guaranteed Jardines' supportive opinions and reactions towards the Movement. As far as 
Jardines was concerned, the May Fourth boycotts had strengthened its influential position 
and presence even further.
The Chinese campaign against Japanese commodities was effective. Numerous Chinese 
consumers participated in the boycott. Consequently, Jardines succeeded in securing extra
8 JMA, S/O Shanghai and Other Ports, April to May 1919, no 6/1, Brooke-Smith to John Johnstone, Hong 
Kong, 12 May, 1919; S/O Shanghai and Other Ports, June to July 1919, no 12/1, Brooke-Smith to Johnstone,
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sales in sugar, seaweed, cotton, yarn, cloth and mill products, that is, commodities that had 
recently been delivered mainly by the Japanese. Jardines' boats were running down the 
river carrying more cargo than before, and meanwhile, the Japanese vessels were standing 
idle in the harbour. To avoid total bankruptcy, the Japanese enterprises were further 
humiliated by being forced to borrow money from Chinese banks at an extremely high 
interest rate.9 During the following weeks, the May Fourth activities initially boosted all 
British trade throughout China. Since the business conditions continued to be beneficial for 
foreigners, except the Japanese, a Chinese protestor cleverly demonstrated it in the open 
letter to the Anglo-Americans.
"[.] Friends if  you happened to be inconvenienced for having no beef for a day, please be patient with us. If 
we happened to put money in your pocket in our fight against Japanese goods, please be quiet. [.] English 
piece goods have gone up 20% since boycott stalled.[.]" 10
However, in the longer run the success of the Shanghai May Fourth demonstrators' 
struggle caused a change in Jardines' tone, hitherto favourable as the full-scale general 
strike was causing "serious inconvenience, not to speak of losses". The Jardines 
subsidiaries, the China Coast Steam Navigation Co. and the Indo-China Steam Navigation 
Co. steamers, were gradually paralysed as their dockyard workers, seamen, coolies, engine 
drivers and firemen joined the patriotic movement and stopped working at the Shanghai 
wharf. The increasingly volatile shipping transportation was paralysed when the British 
rival, Butterfield and Swire, encountered similar problems with their boats in Shanghai. As 
a final blow, stagnation of business became apparent when the steamers' cargo, already
29 May, 1919; Brooke-Smith's JMA correspondence passim .
9 Chinese M aritim e Custom s, I, Statistical Series: Nos. 2 to 5, Foreign Trade o f  China, 1920 , (Shanghai, 1921), 
pp. 8-9; JMA, S/O Shanghai and Other Ports, June-July, 1919, no 12/1, Brooke-Smith to Johnstone, 29 May, 
1919; no 12/85, Qingdao Agency Business Report for May 1919; no 14/135-147 Hankou Business Report for 
May 1919; PRO, F 0371/3695  no 111300, Consul Cecil K irketo Jordan, 5 June, 1919; PRO, F0228/3526/29  
British Consul at Jiujiang to Jordan, 5 June, 1919.
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cleared by customs, was now held up in the port, as the Chinese workers refused to handle 
it. Not only the workers forcefully supported the Movement, but the Chinese merchants 
also refused to buy, sell or ship any products.11
An interesting report at the height of the general strike stated that a large Japanese mill 
was attacked and was forced to close. Jardines, meanwhile, succeeded in keeping their mill 
running in spite of Chinese public pressure.12 It is true that the May Fourth activities were 
systematically mobilised against the Japanese presence and politics in China. The May 
Fourth strikes against the Japanese represented the articulation of widely approved political 
demands, and consequently, workers in the Japanese enterprises were susceptible to 
demonstrators' manipulation. On the other hand, the actions against Western firms were 
more difficult to justify, but at this stage Chinese national sentiment was becoming more 
powerful than rational arguments to keep factories running. The Jardines' mill, however, 
seemed to represent an exceptional case among the Western enterprises in Shanghai as 
many of the other enterprises were forced to close their doors due to the workers' strike. It 
is possible therefore that the manager's inflexible attitude on the one hand, and Jardines' 
good working conditions on the other were strong incentives to make the workers remain in 
the factory, even though it meant extremely long working days of 11 3/4-13 3/4 hours. 
Overall abuse of authority in the form of striking, beating and squeezing was apparently 
less practised in the Jardines' mill than in the Japanese or Chinese establishments. As 
another convenience, the Jardine mill had organised a night school for young men and 
Jardines had a tradition of paying advances promptly. According to the Jardines directors'
10 China P ress , 8 June, 1919, p. 20.
11 China Press, 11 June, 1919, p. 4; JMA, S/O Shanghai and Other Ports, June-July, 1919, no 14/1-12, 
Brooke-Smith to D.G.M. Bernard, Hong Kong, 1 i June, 1919.
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13strategy, the skilled, well-fed and housed labourer was the element of future success. In 
terms of local twentieth century standards Jardines' working conditions were advanced in 
comparison with the Japanese or Chinese mills. In practice, though, the fear of losing work 
was probably an even stronger motive to continue working. With so much at stake, the 
Jardines' mill workers remained at work throughout the May Fourth Movement.
At the same time, Shanghai's Chinese cotton industry received special attention from the 
May Fourth protestors. This was a logical outcome of the national goods campaign to 
promote Chinese products that had been actively advocated among the cotton 
manufacturers in response to the May Fourth students' need for white uniforms, banners, 
caps etc. continued throughout the summer of 1919. While the Chinese manufacturers were 
unable to produce enough fabric for the patriotic movement's requirements, the British 
cotton entrepreneurs were perceived as a non-conflicting alternative for the Japanese cotton 
goods. Thus, the growing consumption may have saved the Jardines' factories from closure. 
These developments initially increased the British post-strike cotton sales, but later 
endangered smaller businesses in China as the demand and production was soon severely 
imbalanced. As we shall see, the May Fourth activities eventually caused complete disorder 
among the British cotton traders.
Brooke-Smith's position on the Council was in accordance with the Jardines' corporation 
tradition. Thus, the London headquarters required the Jardines' director to join the Council 
and similar was the compulsory-like membership of the other China pressure groups. But
12 NCH, 14 June, 1919, p. 723; SMA, U 1 -91 -18, Shanghai Municipal Police, Manager o f  the Nagai Wate 
Kaisha Ltd to McEuen, 9 June, 1919.
13 Sherman Cochran, Encountering Chinese Networks: Western, Japanese and Chinese Corporations in 
China 1 8 8 0 -1 9 3 7 (Berkeley, 2000), pp. 99-100; JMA, S/O Shanghai and Other Ports, June to July, 1919, no 
25/1-15, Brooke-Smith to Bernard, 14 July, 1919; JMA, Semi-Official Letters Shanghai to Hong Kong, 1925, 
see reports o f  July, 1925, to the Consulate; NCH , 7 June, 1919, p. 657.
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the private correspondence revealed his real opinion as follows, "I hate like anything going 
to the Council it is a poor game and the firm's business interests me more than Municipal 
affairs". Jardines' political dominance was practised in the treaty port's foreign municipal 
administration as representatives were placed in both Hankou and Tianjin.14 In Jardines' 
case the paralysed markets of Shanghai were hit by alarming news of strikes and boycotts 
in the countryside and other towns. Moreover, all the financial transactions were risky as 
the continuing considerable currency fluctuation confused the situation. However, Jardines, 
followed by the other foreign companies, were not willing to adopt any direct measures 
towards the May Fourth protestors, and as explained in the preceding chapter, the Council's 
notifications provided an official and anonymous channel to express their hard-line policy. 
Brooke-Smith was present at every Council meeting where the repressive measures to 
suppress the May Fourth demonstrations were implemented and although his earlier 
comments supported Chinese public opinion, there is no evidence that he ever disagreed 
with the Council's decisions. Obviously, in the situation, the company's interests were more 
important than any personal opinions.
The British commercial community's fear of growing anti-foreign sentiment, similar to 
the British officials' anticipations, was again articulated in Brook-Smith's predictions on 
Chinese politics. In his arguments, Chinese patriotism was frequently affiliated or confused 
with rising anti-foreign feeling and the May Fourth protestors' post-strike atmosphere was 
predicted to advocate anti-foreign attitudes. Another of Brooke-Smith's assumption related 
to the May Fourth Movement's consequences was that if  in future either the Chinese
14 British Municipal Council, Hankou, Annual Report, 1919, p. 2; JMA, S/O Shanghai and Other Ports, June- 
July, 1919, no 19/29-32 E.P. Peters, Tianjin to Brooke-Smith, 28 June, 1919; no 23/1-8 Brooke-Smith to 
Bernard, 9 July, 1919; JMA, S/O Shanghai to Hong Kong, Originals, January-March, 1920, no 97-98 Brooke- 
Smith to Johnstone, 6 February, 1920.
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government or the Council treated the Chinese residents wrongly, another uprising would 
certainly occur. The incidents in the summer of 1919 stimulated Brooke-Smith to advocate 
a strengthening of the Settlement's foreign police forces by suggesting the recruitment of 
one hundred new men to secure political and economic stability in the city. The Council's 
minutes revealed a heated discussion of an urgent need to build up a modem security 
system to guarantee foreigners' safety during future conflicts. It was, however, Brooke- 
Smith's authoritative remarks and his discussions with Chinese informants, and finally, his 
profound analysis of current political and financial situation that convinced other Council 
members. Accordingly, at this meeting the immediate need was recognised to order 
armoured cars and to strengthen the Settlement's armament.15 In tracing the reasoning for 
Brooke-Smith’s arguments we find that they were undeniably based both on his personal 
and Jardines' experiences during the May Fourth strikes. Consequently, his main concern 
was to secure the continuation of their trade. Implementing his ideas into the framework of 
'peace and order in the International Settlement', he convinced his colleagues of the 
emerging urgency to enforce new measures to protect the status quo in the Settlement. 
Since the spring o f 1919, Brooke-Smith's May Fourth rhetoric had become more inflexible 
towards the students' activities and more protective, at first towards the trade balance and 
secondly, towards the foreigners' quasi-colonial position in Shanghai.
As soon as Shanghai, the commercial heart of China, stopped beating, various Jardines' 
agents in the interior saw a decrease in their business. In addition to the stoppage of 
ordering products, the railway and river communications to Chengdu, Chongqing, Hankou, 
Qingdao, Tianjin cities were interrupted along with Jardines' business between the interior
15 JMA, S/O Shanghai and Other Ports, June-July, 1919, no 14/44-46 Brooke-Smith to C.H. Ross, London, 20 
June, 1919; no 15/1-13 Brooke-Smith to Bernard, 19 June, 1919; SM A, U 1-91-23, Shanghai Municipal
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and Shanghai. The trade relations between Shanghai and other cities in the west and north 
were completely reciprocal and as a result, the interior agents' business relied on the 
Shanghai merchants orders, which in turn was heavily dependent on the internal peace of 
the city.16 Shortly afterwards, Jardines' own workers provided an ultimate surprise when 
some of the reliable Chinese managers, or compradors17 as they were called, refused to 
consummate their business. Even if these incidents did not result in the complete cessation 
of business in the countryside, they provided a serious warning of the national movement's 
potential to interfere with Jardines' trade. Moreover, the boycotts crossed national borders 
rapidly and deals were cancelled in Japan when the Chongqing and Chengdu mint 
managers refused to buy Japanese copper that Jardines had shipped from Kobe, Japan.18
Qingdao, the old German lease in Shandong province, represented a financially strategic 
territory not only for Jardines, but also for the whole British business group. The city had 
an excellent harbour for water transportation, as it was ice-free and suitable for the ocean 
ships. Moreover, it had railway connections to Tianjin and Beijing and to the western 
interior areas and with these advantages it challenged British business life in Tianjin which 
had already been threatened by the Japanese entrepreneurs. The Jardines agent's feisty 
message attempted to unite the British businessmen in pursuing the country's interests in 
Qingdao. More importantly, it revealed a desire to form shared British attitudes towards the
Police, the Shanghai Municipal Council Minutes, 28 November, 1919.
10 China P ress , 8 June, 1919, p. 4; JMA, S/O Shanghai and Other Ports, June-July, 1919, no 15/43 J.F. Owen, 
Chongqing to Dupree, Hankou, 12 June, 1919; no 22/64-65 Qingdao A gency Business Report for June, 1919; 
no 23/84-85 Chengdu A gency Business Report for June, 1919; no 23/86-93 Tianjin Agency Business Report 
for June, 1919.
17 The comprador was the foreign company's Chinese manager or middleman in China and he was employed 
on contract to its Chinese side. For more detailed study o f  the compradors see Yen-p'ing Hao, The 
C om prador in Nineteenth Century China: Bridge between East and West, (Cambridge, Mass., 1970).
18 JMA, Sem i-Official Letters from Yokohama to Hong Kong [hereafter S/O Yokohama to Hong Kong], 
1919, no 158-159 [most likely J.F. Owen] Chongqing to C. Chicken, Kobe, Japan, 25 June, 1919; JMA, S/O  
Shanghai and Other Ports, June-July, 1919, no 22/39-40 A.E. Smith, Harbin to Brooke-Smith, 30 June, 1919.
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trade politics in the area. Ironically, the Jardines agent's comments on the issue seemed 
quite irrelevant, because the British had already succeeded in securing the Japanese trade 
for themselves during the summer of 1919.19
Jardines formed the May Fourth rhetoric, which in many respects followed closely and 
was intertwined with the British officials' perceptions in Shanghai. Not surprisingly, when 
the strikes disrupted sales, Jardines relied on the Council's policy in the Settlement. 
Consequently, the widely distributed correspondence around the country instigated shared 
expectations of how to react towards the Movement. In the short term, the regional and 
economic power struggle with Japan was the determining factor in Jardines' politics. It was 
related to the Shandong question and undeniably this fear was reflected in the company's 
discussions and especially articulated in the arguments relating to the May Fourth's legacy. 
As I have already discussed, Brooke-Smith required more than the mere application of 
standard operating procedures in a non-routine business environment, caused by the May 
Fourth Movement. In the long term, Jardines1 objective was to stabilise the trading systems 
and return to the profitable pre-strike conditions when only Japanese trade was boycotted. 
Therefore, the May Fourth rhetoric defined Jardines' further strategies, which were later 
realised as the requirement for a revised defence policy and also as a willingness to obstruct 
the Chinese representation on the Council, and finally, as an eagerness to support 
regulations to licence the press in the Settlement. Jardines' May Fourth analysis revealed 
various presumptions of their presence in China. It was based on the principle of free trade, 
but in reality, the concept was often interpreted as solely a Western right, excluding for 
example Russian and Japanese traders. In addition, it reflected the British imperial interests
19 British Chamber o f  Commerce Journal [hereafter BCCJ], Shanghai, vol. IV, no 6, July 1919, pp. 89-91; 
JMA, S/O Shanghai to Other Ports, August - September, 1919, no 36/42-45 J.W. Bateman, Qingdao to
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in China and in the whole of Asia. The May Fourth discussion certainly reflected local 
foreigners' political and economic fears of the Chinese community's expanded presence and 
influence in the International Settlement. Furthermore, it clearly expressed the British 
desires for their future life in Shanghai.
The British commercial community's hegemonic stability was shattered after the June 
strikes. Earlier weeks' profitable business secured from the Japanese merchants was 
brought almost to a complete standstill in June 1919. The limited remaining business was 
characterised by considerable fluctuation in prices and trade was therefore highly unstable 
and vulnerable to speculation. Commercial instability increased rapidly as the local stock 
markets closed down following the Chinese banks' suspension of business. The closure of 
the native banks in Shanghai was followed by restricted transactions of the Chinese bank 
drafts and cash, and eventually, limited sales across China.20 In the words of a bank 
manager, "the nightmare situation" progressed among the British bankers, when the 
Nanjing mint personnel decided to join the patriotic strike and stop the coinage of dollars. 
The direct outcome was a cessation of circulation of currency, and later the Chinese 
prohibited money export to Shanghai and this decision was potentially going to force the
9 1foreign banks to shut down.
Brooke-Smith, 27 August, 1919.
20BCCJ , vol. IV, no 6, July 1919, p. 102; NCH, 14 June, 1919, pp. 741-743.
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3.2. The HSBC Encountered ’Nightmares’
There is no doubt that China's financial stability depended upon private foreign bankers,
and accordingly, their decision to invest acquired considerable political influence in the
nation's domestic and international issues. The bankers were said to be the most influential
unofficial British people in China, and ultimately their predominance was above any other
civil group in China. The Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC), as the
largest foreign bank in China, formed the hardcore of bankers, and it played an important
role in advising the internally weak and fragmented Chinese government on monetary and
banking policies. It also implemented schemes that were beneficial to British investors and
businesses in China. Public loans for railway construction and other infrastructure projects
and in 1910's especially, the direct political loans to the Republican-era governments
guaranteed the bank's indisputable influence in Chinese politics. The authority to issue
banknotes was also an important contribution to the foreign business services in China. In
Britain, the HSBC's resolutions were frequently decisive in directing the course of imperial
foreign policy. Hence, from the end of nineteenth century onwards the HSBC stood as the
British Foreign Office's financial arm that supported the British commercial and territorial 
• • • 22interests in China. However, the bank's functions were vulnerable to unpredictable local 
politics, as seemed to happen during the era of the May Fourth Movement. In order to 
understand the bank's reactive policy, their May Fourth rhetoric will now be evaluated.
The British government's decision to exclude the British Minster at Beijing, Sir John 
Jordan, from the Versailles Peace Conference evidently disillusioned the bank's demand to
21 HSBC Holdings pic, Group Archives [hereafter HSBC], SHG 11/60 Shanghai Managerial Correspondence, 
A.G. Stephen, Shanghai to N.F. Stabb, Hong Kong, 18 June, 1919; PRO, F 0228/3526/45  Fraser to Jordan, 10 
June, 1919.
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have a powerful participant in Paris to represent the British economic interests in China. 
This disappointment explained partly the bank's attitude to the Peace Conference, and 
initially, they shared the Chinese feeling of disappointment and betrayal after the spring of 
1919 negotiations. Beijing manager E.G. Hillier, was dissatisfied with the part played by 
the League of Nation in the peace process and perceived "the integrity of China" as a 
meaningless concept. In terms o f political failure the bank blamed all 'the Big Powers' 
namely Britain, the USA, France and Japan for betraying China, but in particular American 
policy seemed to reflect double standards in relation to its politics in East Asia.23 The bank 
itself was hardly in a position to accuse anyone, as it found no difficulty in discarding 
British ideological baggage in order to trade with war enemies. On the contrary, the bank 
traded equally with all applications which were found credit-worthy. Rumours of the 
Japanese government's massive loans to China's military factions added tensions in the 
banking world, and in so far as the Peace Conference had not been willing to constrain the 
Japanese expansion in the East Asia, it challenged the British financiers to organise similar 
loans to China24.
Like some other contemporaries, Hillier feared that possible Chinese reaction towards the 
Big Powers' politics might be comparable to "the madness in 1900", that is, the Boxer 
uprising. It has to be remembered that Hillier was one of 'the old China hands' and his 
career in China had passed the milestone of 35 years at the HSBC office and before that he 
had been working for Jardines in Hong Kong. In spite of vivid 'Boxer images', he had no 
past experiences o f the Boxer uprising as he had been on leave in England in 1900. Yet
22 Cain and Hopkins, British Imperialism, p. 238; E.W. Edwards, British D iplom acy and Finance in China, 
1895-] 914, (Oxford, 1987). For an interesting analysis o f  the HSBC's long history see Frank H.H. King's four 
volumes The H isto iy o f  the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation.
23 HSBC, K.1.7, King letters 1919, E.G. Hillier, Beijing to C,S. Addis, London, 13 May, 1919.
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foreigners' collective 'mental images’ were concretely part of his reality, because he was 
almost totally blind. He was not able to see the May Fourth demonstrators or their 
activities, and thus, his May Fourth experience was completely based on other peoples' 
visual recounts.25 As in the officials' case, the collective memories were maintained also 
among the British bankers. Thus, these past images were projected onto the highly 
ambiguous May Fourth atmosphere and the situation was interpreted through collective 
memories. In Hillier's case, he had created an association between the Boxer's mass 
activities after the Germans' seizure of Qingdao as a sphere of influence in 1900, and the 
May Fourth actions in 1919, when Qingdao was intended to be transferred to Japan. 
Hillier's arguments were based on the Western powers' political situation in China in 1900 
and 1919, and according to his observation, conditions appeared to be similar. Even if the 
Boxers' massacre was definitely on his mind, his analysis emphasised political aspects of 
the situation particularly in Beijing. Another one of his 'prophecies' coincided with Brooke- 
Smith's and the Shanghai Municipal Council's warnings. Therefore, a fear of increasing 
internal troubles in China seemed to be prevalent in Hillier's mind.
At this point it is important to recognise that despite the gravity of the situation, Hillier 
remained supportive towards the Movement in Beijing, and by doing so he offered a more 
positive counter narrative alongside that of his British colleagues' antagonistic approaches 
in Shanghai. In general, the British officials', businessmen and bankers' opinions tended to 
be more understanding towards the students’ activities in the northern cities of Beijing,
24 HSBC, K.1.7, King letters 1919, Hillier to Stabb, 21 May, 1919.
25 HSBC, K.1.7, King letters 1919, HSBC Beijing to Stephen, 3 March, 1919; Hillier, Beijing to Addis, 
London, 13 May, 1919; Hillier to Stabb, 21 May, 1919; HSBC, SHG 11/60 Shanghai Managerial 
Correspondence, Stephen to Hillier, 25 February, 1919; King, H istoiy o f  the HSBC, vol. Ill, p. 27; Frank H.H. 
King, The H isto iy  o f  the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, II, The Hongkong Bank in the 
P eriod  o f  Imperialism and War, 1895-1918, Wayfoong, the Focus o f  Wealth, (Cambridge, 1988), pp. 164- 
165.
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Tianjin and Qingdao. Apparently the British May Fourth reactions were related to the 
political and economic influence in each city. This detail emphasises how differently 
British officials and businessmen perceived themselves in Shanghai, compared with cities 
elsewhere. In reality, the British had more influence in local Shanghai politics than in any 
other treaty port in China. The International Settlement's status quo became the central 
slogan for political and economic stability in Shanghai. Later, in the 1920's, this 
imperialistic attitude was described as the 'Shanghai Mind'26 by a visiting British journalist.
In Shanghai, the HSBC manager A.G. Stephen who also had decades of experience in 
administering China's financial policies, opposed Hillier's May Fourth rhetoric. Earlier in 
the spring Stephen's pro-British attitude led him to accuse the China Association of 
"pernicious and unpatriotic agitation". Furthermore he warned the association of their 
"Hunward policies". His German antagonism was obvious, as his son had died in the World 
War. It is possible that this outburst was related to the personal arguments within the 
association where Stephen was a committee chairman. Because of this complaint and his 
actions, he was temporarily removed from the chair.27 Nevertheless, this incident illustrated 
his public patriotic British and anti-German attitude, which in turn created the framework 
for his judgements on the May Fourth Movement.
Stephen's financial nightmare was caused by the Nanjing mint's closure and the cessation 
of circulation o f currency, in other words, incidents that on their own caused the bank to 
lose control over money transaction into Shanghai. Unluckily for the bank, the strike had
26 Arthur Ransome, The Chinese Puzzle, (London, 1927), pp. 28-32.
27 HSBC, SHG 11/60 Shanghai Managerial Correspondence, Stephen to Stabb, 15 March, 1919; King, H istoiy  
o f  the HSBC, vol. Ill, pp. 12, 25.
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coincided with the post-war depreciation of dollars28 and the bank's cash stocks were 
limited because it had recently lent large quantities of dollars outside the city. The bank had 
been momentarily left with insufficient cash reserves and the uncertain financial situation 
prevented the money flow back to the bank. Another blow came when twelve Chinese 
banks suddenly decided to suspend their businesses, partly for patriotic reasons, but the 
general cash shortage had also accelerated this process. As a consequence, all the foreign 
banks headed by the HSBC were in trouble.29 Speculations - which appeared to be the 
business and finance community's concept for rumours - over the impact of the strike had 
caused instability in Shanghai and the panicking Chinese investors had started to cash their 
notes. After the Chinese banks closure investors turned to the foreign banks, but the foreign 
bankers were completely unprepared for this action. In fact, the HSBC had no cash stock 
left due to its earlier investments. As already explained, the closure restricted transactions 
of Chinese bank drafts and cash, and inevitably the local banks were not able to meet their 
obligations to the foreign banks. In addition, when business was at a standstill, the 
merchants and investors were not able to pay their loans back to the banks. The Japanese 
banks, particularly, relied on the HSBC's survival ability and were eager to continue 
normal business in spite of the tense political situation.30 As a result, the restricted 
monetary transactions seemed to paralyse the trade within the city and in the interior.
28 Foreign bankers used several currencies in China and the exchange process was a complex mixture o f  the 
Hong Kong dollars, the Shanghai taels, the Mexican dollars and silver, and their exchange rate was compared 
with sterling. King, The History o f  the HSBC , vol. Ill, p. xxxv.
29 China Press, 8 June, 1919, p. 4; HSBC, K.1.7, King letters 1919, Stephen to Stabb, 17 June, 1919; NCDN, 
14 June, 1919, p. 741.
30 HSBC, SHG 11/60 Shanghai Managerial Correspondence, Stephen to Stabb, 18 June, 1919; HSBC, SHG 
11/48 Tianjin Managerial Correspondence, 1919, A .B. Lowson, Tianjin to A.C. Hynes, Shanghai, 10 June, 
1919.
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With the financial world of Shanghai in chaos, the foreign bankers urged the Senior 
Consul of the International Settlement, D. Siffert to alert the Diplomatic Body in the capital 
to persuade Chinese central government to stabilise the situation. This manoeuvre 
prompted an emergency meeting of the Diplomatic Body but the capital's diplomats were 
apparently as confused as their counterparts in Shanghai and too cautious to react promptly. 
In addition, they were hesitant to take any radical measures in order to manipulate the 
Chinese government. The internal report recounted the diplomats' fear of arousing already 
nervous Chinese public opinion even further, and by practising extremely prudent politics 
they rejected the bankers' request and demanded further information in the form of required 
help.31
What determined the bankers' actions was the fact that recently ended World War had 
dislocated the economic system and the resulting world depression had made the bankers 
lose their confidence in the 'political wire-pullers', as the politicians were called. Therefore, 
the bankers began to secure for themselves a more active role in local and international 
politics, sometimes in a more subtle and invisible manner than the diplomats. Hence, the 
HSBC had no intention o f relying solely on the politicians' attempts and they had already 
implemented a supplementary plan. The bank manager, Stephen, presumably personally 
instigated the rumour of cash arriving from Hong Kong, as $ 5 000 000 cash reserves were 
said to arrive to rescue the bank and its clients. Stephen had indeed asked for $ 500 000 to 
be sent to Shanghai to reassure the community and to stabilise the financial world, but the 
sum had multiplied in transit and these speculations were never denied. The rumours
31 PRO, F 0228/3352 , 148eme Seance du Coips Diplomatique, 11 Juin, 1919; PRO, F 0228/3526/49, 50 
Chartered Bank o f  India, Australia and China, Beijing to Jordan, 11 June, 1919; Dean's circular, Beijing, 11 
June, 1919.
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eventually calmed the situation and according to Stephen's satisfactory explanation, they
32saved the HSBC's Shanghai branch from closure.
Undoubtedly, there was a difference between the rumours feared in the business 
community and in the official and missionary communities. The rumours and speculation 
related to circulation of money were dreaded in commercial circles, but they differed from 
missionaries' or officials' Boxer rumours in the sense that the latter type of stories were 
greatly encouraged by violence and the threat of physical harm. In this respect the May 
Fourth rumours' had encoded the imagined collective threat that was possessed by one class 
to another or one race to another, and therefore, the imagined "outside"33 of the British 
world in China was expressed in the form of the Boxer threat. When the Boxer rumours 
were unnerving Shanghai's populace and while anxiety was being aggravated by the water 
and food poisoning rumours, the British municipal officers attempted to control and 
terminate them. In contrast, as happened during the May Fourth Movement, the business 
related rumours were sometimes purposely created and distributed to maintain trade and 
banking services throughout unstable political and financial times. The British commercial 
community used rumours skilfully as a tool to circulate news and the process involved 
many participants including their Chinese and foreign clients. Both Jardines and the HSBC 
represented the British political and economic oligarchy. Therefore, continuation of 
business throughout strikes was unquestionably a matter o f prestige and honour, reinforced 
by a fear of financial losses.
32 HSBC, K.1.7, King letters, 1919, Stephen to Stabb, 17 June, 1919; HSBC, SHG 11/60 Shanghai Managerial 
Correspondence, Stephen to Stabb, 18 June, 1919.
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3.3. S.F. Mayers, Observer Connecting the Communities
An insider’s view of the interaction between the British commercial and official community 
is personified both in the profile of Sidney Francis Mayers, Director of the British and 
Chinese Corporation (BCC)34 and in his May Fourth discussion. He arrived China in 1895, 
aged 22, afterwards he had over 14 years tenure in the British consular service. Following 
in his father’s footsteps, Mayers had had a successful career initially as Vice-Consul and 
Mixed Court Assessor in Shanghai, and at the time of his resignation he was the Assistant 
and Acting Chinese Secretary at the British legation in Beijing. Moreover, his family 
connections were influential as his brother worked for the Chinese Maritime Customs. 
Mayers was one among many British Foreign Service's men to be recruited by a private 
foreign company in China. In 1909 his ambitions led him to choose a more profitable 
career and he left the diplomatic service in order to become a highly competent director of
->C I
the BCC. In this position he represented the British diplomatic service's, the HSBC's and 
the Jardines' economic and political interests. Extensive consular, legation and business 
connections afforded him easy access to uncensored private and official sources, which 
were otherwise classified materials closed to the public. Indeed, Mayers' May Fourth 
analysis reflected his in-depth knowledge of Chinese domestic and international affairs in 
the after-war situation. Consequently, his reports offered invaluable guidelines for all 
British people in contemporary China. Moreover, his May Fourth rhetoric provided 
glimpses of collective British fears but also common hopes connected with the Movement.
33 Ramsay, The Ideology o f  the Great Fear, p. 242.
34 The British-Chinese Corporation (BCC) was founded in 1898 by the HSBC and the Jardines who acted 
jointly as the BCC's managing agents in China. The company's function was to conduct public works and 
undertakings and acquire working rights in China, King, The H istory o f  the HSBC, vol. II, pp. 295-298.
35 Coates, China Consuls, pp. 352, 505, 523; JMA, Semi-Official Correspondence 1900/1911, envelope title: 
Letters from Hong Kong & Shanghai to W. Keswick, London, 1903-1911, Gresson, Hong Kong to Mr. 
Keswick, London, 24 December 1909.
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Although based in Beijing, Mayers was in Shanghai during the first weeks of the May 
Fourth Movement and thereafter evaluated the situation in the capital and Shanghai. Instead 
of perceiving the Movement as economic aggression executed by the boycotts, strikes and 
demonstrations as understood by Brooke-Smith and Stephen, Mayers' perceptions were 
different from those of his colleagues. Mayers' descriptions of the Movement changed from 
"a state of great confusion" in May 1919, to an "outburst of popular feeling" in June. 
Finally, in July he defined the Movement as "the most remarkable manifestation of national 
consciousness".36 During these one and half months his perspective changed notably, 
which is a significant point, in that Mayers appeared to present exceptionally 'progressive' 
opinions, whereas his British colleagues' attitudes, in contrast, tended to grow more 
negative as the Movement deepened. Once more the different reactions among the British 
in the capital and in Shanghai were visible. In the latter city foreign trade and 
administration privileges were fiercely defended when the May Fourth activists were 
perceived as a threat to an existing system.
The political stirrings affected to a part of Mayers' May Fourth rhetoric and he blamed 
the Americans for not living up to their principles, and in doing so he seemed to emphasise 
their failure to implement President Wilson's thesis to assist China against Japanese 
invasion. In the same letter Mayers expressed not only the British economic fears of post­
war competition with the Japanese and the Americans, but he also revealed the unchanging 
nationalistic power struggle between the Western countries and Japan over regional 
hegemony in Asia. The international political threat was expressed in the form of the old 
war enemy and he associated the Germans' persistent influence in China with the May
36 Cambridge University Library, the British and Chinese Corporation Archive [hereafter BCC], box 75, 
Letters to G. Jamieson, 1911-1920, S.F. Mayers to G. Jamieson, London, 17 May, 1919; 14 June, 1919; 7/8
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Fourth activities. Mayers confidently argued that German firms had funded the pro-German 
Chinese who now actively encouraged violence among students, whereas abolition of the 
German extraterritoriality rights was thought to result, in exchange, in a separate peace 
between China and Germany. Apparently his thoughts followed similar lines to those of the 
British Commander-in-Chief of China Station, F.C.T. Tudor, which were discussed in the 
previous chapter. Tudor predicted that the Chinese would turn towards German officers and 
soldiers to receive moral and material support, whereas Mayers believed that their old 
German competitors in the business world were manipulating Chinese domestic politics. At 
the same time, ideological fear was, once again, built up around the Bolshevik doctrines 
and Mayers was absolutely certain that the Russians were mastering the Movement behind
37the scenes. At the same time, Mayers and Tudor appeared to continue the British wartime 
propaganda with the calculated puipose of instilling in the British business and official 
community certain convictions inherited from the war.
Mayers speculated that Chinese political factions had assisted the Movement and alleged 
that the leaders of the Southern and Northern military parties had acted as student agitators. 
According to Mayers' predictions, the Jin-bu-dang38 -party had encouraged students to 
organise boycotts and strikes, and public indignation has been demonstrated to scare their 
Chinese political opponents and the Japanese militarists. Mayers noticed that in a situation 
where the Jin-bu-dang was to return to control the Chinese government, foreign assistance
July, 1919.
37 BCC, box 75, Mayers to Jamieson, 17 May, 1919; 14 June, 1919; 7/8 July, 1919; PRO, F 0228/2986 M.W. 
Lampson's notes o f  information given to Mr. Mayers by General Ting, 11 June, 1919.
38 The Jin-bu-dang, or the Progressive Party was established by Yuan Shikai in 1913 to integrate all anti- 
Nationalist politicians and it formed the parliament in 1913-1914. Richard T. Phillips, China since 1911 , 
(Hampshire, 1996), pp. 19-20.
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was required. Therefore the Consortium's39 financial aid and large measures of foreign 
control had to be implemented. The British newspapers came to the same conclusion, 
namely promoting the necessity for its direct intervention in China's political affairs, if 
certain political factions were to take power in Beijing. No doubt the local press's 
arguments inspired Mayers' perceptions.40
By understanding China's contemporary political environment, Mayers, succeeded in 
formulating a comprehensive list of domestic and international parties as potential actors in 
the May Fourth Movement. A mixture of nationalistic, political and economic British 
interests were filtered into his May Fourth rhetoric, interwoven with sympathetic comments 
on Chinese intense feeling against the Japanese. This, according to Mayers, was supported 
by all the foreigners in the area.
3.4. Weathering the Stormy Markets
It is necessary, at this stage, to evaluate the wider commercial community's activities 
during the May Fourth Movement in Shanghai. Japanese predominance in China was based 
not only on the political articles of the 'Twenty-one Demands', but also on effective trade 
and investments. As time went on, Chinese protestors found it intolerable to purchase
19 The first International Banking Consortium o f  1909 was negotiated between the American, British, French, 
German, Japanese and Russian Groups that consisted o f  banks and enterprises. The Consortium's original 
purpose was to manage the Qing-dynasty by controlling its supply o f  capital by proving loans and acquiring 
contracts to build e.g. railways and mines. In 1919 the N ew  Consortium negotiations were under discussion 
and the treaty included all other old consortium members except Germany and finally it was signed in 
October 1920. Hence, the idea was to eliminate special claims in spheres o f  influence and to open China for 
co-operative and international development. Fur further information see Warren I. Cohen, "America's New  
Order for East Asia: The Four Power Financial Consortium and China 1919-1946", in Kwan Wai So and 
Warren I. Cohen, E ssays in the H istory o f  China and Chinese-American R elations, (Michigan, 1982), pp. 44- 
52; Dayer, Bankers and Diplom ats in China. 1917-1925, pp. xvi, 49-56, 75-82; King, The H istoiy o f  the 
HSBC, vol. II, pp. 397-415; King, The H isto iy  o f  the HSBC, vol. Ill, pp. 84-98.
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Japanese products or use their shipping services because of the initiation of the Movement. 
Instead, they encouraged fellow citizens to buy national products, and as a result the 
Japanese merchandise was rejected as being of inferior quality and the use of Chinese 
commodities was pronounced a patriotic act. If national goods were not available, 
American and British equivalents were requested to be used.
The May Fourth demonstrators supported the cotton industry, as I discussed earlier in this 
chapter, and the continuous need for cotton products such as yarn and cloth brought 
substantial sales for businesses. Shanghai was traditionally an important centre for the 
Chinese cotton industry: out of sixteen foreign cotton mills in China all but one was 
situated in the city41. At this point there was no fear of Japanese rivalry as the boycotts had 
terminated their operations and the markets were wide open for other foreign 
manufacturers and retailers. Within weeks the demand and production of cotton was 
imbalanced which caused shaip price rises and record results for the companies, and for the 
smaller British entrepreneurs it provided a refreshing boost in sales. The D. & Co.'s 
performance throughout 1919-1921 illustrates how unexpected and far reaching the May 
Fourth incidents were in Shanghai and how quickly, in less than two years, enormous 
expectations had been replaced with an atmosphere of impending bankruptcy.
Prompted by an increased demand for cotton commodities and trusting in over-optimistic 
predictions of future trade, the D. & Co.42 placed huge cotton orders for manufactures in 
Britain to supply overheated Chinese markets as their native dealers were lacking in cotton 
products. Encouragingly high prices, up to an 80% rise between the summer of 1919 and
40 BCC, box 75, Mayers to Jamieson, 14 June, 1919; NCH, 17 May, 1919, p. 405; NCH, 24 May, 1919, pp. 
491-492.
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the spring of 1920, advanced the value of cotton and the British manufacturers were in a 
position to determine their own terms for deliveries. Hence, they took more orders than 
they could realistically manufacture on time. As a result, when the products were finally 
shipped to Shanghai, after several months' delay, and in some cases after one year, 
Japanese cheap cotton had already broken the trade embargo and the prices had collapsed. 
To make the situation worse, the Chinese dealers did not carry out their contracts and 
refused to buy expensive goods from the D. & Co. At the same time valuable cotton goods 
were piling up in the D. &Co.'s warehouses and huge profits were turning into severe 
losses. A 50% drop of in the value of their stocks had paralysed the company's trade. The 
unreliable business damaged the D. & Co.'s performance on many levels and finally in 
1921, the firm had to appeal for financial assistance from the HSBC to avoid complete 
bankruptcy.43 This example typified small foreign firms since they usually had no interest 
beyond Shanghai, assuming that their interests in the city would serve the whole foreign 
business community's interests.
In contrast to small foreign companies, the Chinese commercial world was developing 
faster than was generally expected. During the World War a marked decline in imports to 
China had promoted the development of national capital, which was promptly invested in 
local tobacco or cotton industry. As a result, 32 cotton mills were established between 
1920-1922, most of them in Shanghai. Inevitably stiff competition in the textile industry 
grew as the May Fourth boycotts had enabled the Chinese industry to develop
41 Shanghai Academy o f  Social Sciences, Institute o f  History, fVusi yundong za i Shanghai shiliao xitanji 
(Selected historical materials on the May Fourth Movement in Shanghai), (Shanghai, 1960), table between 
pages 8 and 9.
42 The HSBC archivist's condition to make a reference to their clients is to use only the company's initials.
43 BCCJ, Shanghai, vol. IV, no 5, June 1919, pp. 61,66; no 6, July 1919, pp. 98, 102; HSBC, SHG 764.1 
Correspondence between Shanghai and London and copies o f  correspondence to branches in China 1918-
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independently with the help of invested national capital and without overwhelming 
Japanese traders' dominance. National cotton industries were promoted also in Tianjin, 
which inevitably threatened British business in the area.44 Accordingly, the May Fourth 
commercial boycotts and strikes were later recognised as the promoters of new domestic 
production in China. As considerable British capital had been invested in Shanghai, the 
situation was perceived as alarming for British entrepreneurs, since the developing local 
industries introduced a new threat to their business in the area. Moreover, the revivalist 
May Fourth atmosphere instigated the fear that political disputes between the British and 
Chinese communities would result in a boycott of British products 45 Therefore, it was 
apparent that economic nationalism, promoted partly by the May Fourth ideologies, 
stimulated the future growth of national industries and commerce in Shanghai. As a result, 
some o f the Chinese businessmen rejected foreign capitalism and imperialist powers, 
whereas others tended to compromise with foreigners, as illustrated below.
In a situation where a Chinese company was found to have Japanese business 
connections, May Fourth Movement's patriotic labour sometimes attacked their own 
company. This was the case in the Nanyang Brothers Tobacco Co. in Shanghai and Hong 
Kong. Generally, apart from boycotts and sporadic strikes, the British Crown colony of 
Hong Kong was relatively peaceful during the May Fourth activities in the summer of
1932, D. &  Co., Shanghai to the HSBC, Shanghai, 18 February, 1921; HSBC, SHG /470 the HSBC Ordinary 
Yearly M eeting Minutes 1917-1935, Yearly meeting, Hong Kong, 26 February 1921.
44 Chen, The M ay Fourth M ovem ent in Shanghai, pp. 34-35; NCH, 5 July, 1919, p. 17; SOAS, Maze papers, 
1 Confidential letters and reports etc., vol. I Chinese Maritime Customs Service, Annual Trade Reports 1900- 
1928, Tianjin Trade Report 1919, pp. 178, 195; Zhongli Zhang, "The Development o f  Chinese National 
Capital in the 1920’s", in Tim Wright (ed.), The Chinese Economy in the Early Twentieth Centuiy, 
(Basingstoke, 1992), pp. 45-49.
45 PRO, FO228/3527/105, Hairy Fox, Commercial Counsellor, Shanghai to Sir Beilby Alston, Minister at 
Beijing, 13 June, 1921.
1919. Apparently later movements and resistance activities which occurred in the 1920's in 
Hong Kong were not direct results of the May Fourth activities.46
The Western multinational competitor, the British-American Tobacco Company (BAT) 
and its local agents successfully inflamed May Fourth protestors' intentions to boycott the 
native tobacco manufacturer, and in spite of aggressive advertising campaign, the Nanyang 
Brothers suffered severe losses in sales. Both tobacco companies earned out expensive 
countercampaigns to defame the competitor and publicise their patriotism. An extra asset, 
added to the BAT's commercial and nationalistic appeal was its ongoing structural 
management transformation. This occurred partly because of an intensified request, if not 
to nationalise the enterprise, to at least allocate contracts to Chinese agents. The year 1919 
marked a clear change in the BAT's management in which Chinese mediators and their 
networks were given more personal responsibility to trade across the country. The 
appropriate timing of this managerial change seemed to guarantee the patriotic May Fourth 
protestors' support for the company.47 Interaction between the BAT and the Nanyang 
Brothers Co. provides an interesting example of an alternative Westerners' operation during 
the May Fourth Movement. Unfortunately, the researched sources do not explore this point 
any further. Nonetheless it offered a significant counter narrative to the usual foreigners' 
perceptions of May Fourth activities.
Meanwhile, Jardines' discussions revealed a totally opposing attitude on negotiating the 
shifting of administration to Chinese agents. This hard-headed stance resulted in the
46 Hong Kong Adm inistrative Reports fo r  the yea r  1920, (Hong Kong, 1921), p. 1; Butenhoff, Social 
M ovements, pp. 15-30, 49; China Press, 21 June, 1919, p. 2;
47 Shennan Cochran, B ig Business in China: Sino-Foreign Rivalry in the C igarette Industiy, 1890-1930, 
(Cambridge, M ass., 1980), pp. 103-122; Cochran, Encountering Chinese Networks, pp. 57, 69. Much detailed 
research on the BAT's marketing and advertising strategies can be found in Sherman Cochran, "Transnational 
Origins o f  Advertising in Early Twentieth-Century China", in Shennan Cochran (ed.), Inventing Nanjing 
Road: Com m ercial Culture in Shanghai, 1900-1945, (Ithaca, New York, 1999), pp. 37-58.
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company's withdrawal from the Anglo-Chinese Trade Corporation negotiations initiated by 
the British government. Jardines refused to continue discussions as the Corporation's 
original objective was to allocate more responsibility to Chinese management. A more 
broad-minded British Commercial Secretary, Archibald Rose predicted that in future the 
co-operative enterprises, like the ones set up between China and America, would 
characterise business in China. Moreover, he recognised Chinese disappointment following 
the Versailles peace negotiations, and their increased distrust created by foreign powers' 
policy towards China. Rose acknowledged the May Fourth boycotts as the first signs of an
• * 48increasing consciousness of China's own potency and success in the business world. 
Nevertheless, Jardines was too colossal and influential company to be frightened by the 
British Legation official. Moreover, it had not been shaken by the Chinese government or 
warlord crusades throughout the decades of trading in the country. In contrast, the May 
Fourth activities had alarmed company directors and agents across China and it reflected 
Jardines' vulnerability to confront the mass movement.
3.5. Business Associations' May Fourth Scenarios
Overall, British trade was flourishing during the first month of the Japanese boycott and it 
was echoed in the British Chamber of Commerce's (BChC) journal in June 1919. The 
articles covering the May Fourth activities revealed cautious optimism and the Movement 
was praised for its non-violent nature and for not acquiring any Chinese politicians' 
support. At this stage, the Chinese merchant associations had already approached the
48 JMA, S/O Yokohama to Hong Kong, 1919, no 168-170 Johnstone, Yokohama to Archibald Rose, 
Commercial Attache, Beijing, 7 July, 1919; JMA, S/O Shanghai and Other Ports, August-September, no
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British companies by sending circulars in order to justify their patriotic activities. The 
Chinese traders' manifesto included the ordinance to refuse to handle any Japanese 
products or money. Moreover, goods shipped by Japanese boats were also part of the 
embargo. The Chinese merchants declared that first, they had the right to limited liability 
and second, they were justified in claiming damages for orders made in contrast to their 
regulations. Another British business lobby, the Shanghai Branch of China Association 
(CA)49, had as early as May 8, 1919, expressed its disagreement with the Versailles Peace 
Conference clause to transfer former German holdings to Japan.50
Obviously neither of the organisations complained when the students' movement 
successfully paralysed their worst rival's business in the area. In addition, the materials 
suggest that in spite of closed businesses, Chinese merchants were constantly monitoring 
the markets and were prepared to return to business as soon as domestic political conditions 
would allow. Therefore, they kept Westerners well informed of this fact. Although the 
competition in China was severe, the Chinese merchants were anxious to co-operate with 
the foreign business partners and in many cases, were eager to substitute the Japanese 
competitors.
The British Chamber of Commerce's initial comments regarding the boycott revealed that 
the activities were cautiously accepted. Consequently, the May Fourth observations were 
connected with the Japanese merchants' inability to do business in a British manner. 
Critical analysis was made of the Japanese unfair business style which included the forging 
of trademarks, unreliability in fulfilling contracts and favouritism of their own people. As
41/27-29 Archibald Rose, Beijing to Brooke-Smith, 8 September, 1919.
49 For details o f  establishing the China Association and the politics behind it see Nathan A. Pelcovits, Old 
China Hands and the Foreign Office, (New York, 1948), pp. 157-189.
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expected, after the general strike the BChC's attitude had changed thoroughly,51 and 
organisation separated itself entirely from the Movement, as reported in its journal:
"Part o f  the Chamber's time during the past month was taken up by deliberation in connection with so 
called students' strike, a movem ent which, in its later phases, passed out o f  control o f  the students and 
assumed political characteristics with which as a commercial body the Chamber felt it had nothing to do ." 52
According to the Chamber's conclusion, the boycotts in May against Japan's intrusion 
into Qingdao and against the Japanese manipulation of the Beijing government, had not 
been politically motivated. Only when the May Fourth strikes intimidated the foreign 
community in Shanghai and disturbed business, it turned - as stated by the BChC - into a 
Movement with political characteristics.53 Yet in reality, the whole May Fourth Movement 
began as a massive action to resist the imperialist oppression and domination of China. 
Presumably, it was politically correct to protest against Japanese imperialism, and to see 
instead, the British quasi-imperial dominance as a more acceptable form of supremacy.
It is a different question, though, as to whether the BChC was a democratic and 
representative association among the British commercial community. Similar to numerous 
other foreign organisations in Shanghai, it was controlled by taipans, heads of the local 
British merchant houses and banks such as the Butterfield and Swire, the HSBC and 
Jardines. Reflecting the Council's hegemony, the taipans exercised political as well as 
economic leadership in the Settlement and organisations like the BChC and the CA 
emphasised their dominance among their business colleagues.
50 BCCJ, Shanghai, vol. IV, no 5, June 1919, pp. 39-42, 61, 66; SOAS, China Association Archives [hereafter 
CA], China Association Circulars, vol. XVII, number 261-278, 28th Feb. 1918-15Ul April, 1920, China 
Association Shanghai Branch to CA in London, 8 May, 1919.
51 BCCJ, Shanghai, vol. IV, no 5, June 1919, p. 2; no 7 August 1919, p. 113.
52 BCCJ, Shanghai, vol. IV, no 6, July 1919, p. 76.
53 Ibid.
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In this case, the British manufacturers' spokesman raised the issue of representation 
during the Chamber's May Fourth discussions by accusing the association for neglecting 
the British imperial interests in favour of local interests. In alleging this, he refused to join 
the Chamber. The Chamber journal's editorial fiercely opposed this argument and insisted 
that the BChC has never taken a purely Shanghai perspective on any question related to the 
city. That statement was certainly not true as the BChC's reports and activities towards the 
May Fourth Movement had already been proven. Another example revealed that individual 
voices were indeed occasionally allowed to be presented in the journal. An article in the 
August 1919, supported "the Young China and the Students' Party" of Shanghai as "the 
intellectual capital of China" against "the militarist government" in the capital. It was an 
exceptionally radical view to be written and published in a British business journal, 
especially as it was published just after the May Fourth general strike. But in the next issue, 
published correspondence revealed mainstream British businessmen's perceptions of the 
Movement, and at this point, the opposing article strongly criticised students' disturbances 
and underlined the special status of the International Settlement as a politically neutral 
enclave built for its foreign residents. Furthermore, the journal projected foreigners' rights 
to protect their privileges when they were confronted by Chinese political agitators in the 
Settlement.54
On the question of security in the International Settlement, the China Association had 
independently decided to be an appropriate instrument in conveying demands for the 
London governmental officials, and at this juncture, the CA pressed the Foreign Office and 
the Admiralty to reinforce the British military presence in East Asia. "The very serious
54 BCCJ, Shanghai, vol. IV, no 7, August 1919, p. 124; no 8, September 1919, pp. 171-172, 191.
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recent troubles" was behind the reasoning for the request to firstly, get a strong fleet in 
Eastern waters, and secondly, to have at least one large gunboat permanently situated in 
Shanghai's harbour. To intensify pressure on the British government, the report published 
in the autumn entitled 'Future in Shanghai' reflected the British commercial community's 
common concerns over the Settlement's defence system. In the light of recent events, the 
future of Shanghai, which undoubtedly meant British future presence there, 'was in the 
clouds', as the CA secretary metaphorically expressed.55 Fear for their future existence in 
Shanghai guided the British commercial community's decisions in preparing the society for 
the worst possible scenarios. It is therefore not surprising that the CA's 'gunboat diplomacy' 
coincided with the Council's decision to strengthen the armed force as they, together with 
the British businessmen, formed an inseparable unit. Intimidated by the May Fourth strikes 
and boycotts, the foreign community used all means to secure extra British police, naval 
and volunteer forces in the city as described in the previous chapter. In addition, the 
Expeditionary Forces were established, new armed cars were to be ordered and civil 
disturbance emergency regulations were implemented. Heated discussions concerning these 
issues continued among the British officials and the commercial community throughout 
1919-1920 and are examined more closely in Chapter Five.
In contrast to the two above-mentioned associations, the Shanghai General Chamber of 
Commerce (SGCC) was not exclusively British, although over 50% of its member 
companies were. In 1919, the chairman and most of its committee members were British 
merchant house directors, and therefore, undeniably dominated the SGCC policies.56 In
55 CA, China Association Circulars, vol. XVII, number 261-278, 28th Feb. 1918-15th April, 1920, China 
Association Shanghai Branch to CA in London, 9 July, 1919; China Association Shanghai Branch to CA in 
London, 14 October, 1919.
56 Shanghai General Chamber o f Commerce [hereafter SGCC], Annual Report 1919, pp. 1-3.
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spite o f the British enterprises' supremacy, the SGCC was reputed to be the whole foreign 
mercantile community's representative organ in the city and an excellent pressure group to 
utilise when negotiating with the Consular Body in Shanghai or with the Diplomatic Body 
in Beijing. In addition to the British taipans1 personal representation on the Council and in 
other business pressure groups, the SGCC was able to provide an alternative organ used to 
manipulate Shanghai expatriate politics.
Similar to the British associations, the SGCC received petitions from various Chinese 
Christians, students, educational and mercantile groups in order to persuade the companies 
to contact their home governments and appeal to them to return Germany's possessions in 
Shandong to China. A short time later, following the BChC's hard-line policy the SGCC 
disassociated itself from Chinese domestic politics, and instead contacted the Diplomatic 
Body. In the name o f all foreign nationalities in Shanghai, and basing their arguments 
primarily on the Settlement's Land Regulations and the statement "to maintain peace and 
good order", the SGCC addressed a letter to the Senior Consul and demanded that he must 
intervene in order to relieve the situation in Shanghai. The letter naturally reflected foreign 
commercial society's trade interests in Shanghai. The SGCC's strong statement accused 
Chinese activists of intimidating and blackmailing the foreigners in the Settlement during 
the general strike. Even more significant were the serious losses in business and the 
inconvenience o f closure of the International Settlement. The SGCC had predicted that 
future riots and bloodshed related to these events would occur. Certain unrest among the 
workers did trouble the foreign companies throughout following years, but not for the 
reasons the foreigners' anticipated during summer and autumn 1919. Thus by the spring of 
1920, the worldwide labour movement advocating better working conditions and higher
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wages had already reached Shanghai.57 The SGCC's decisions seemed to support those of 
the CA and the BChC. It is evident, therefore, that British bankers and business directors 
constantly manipulated the Western merchant majority's opinion towards the May Fourth 
Movement in Shanghai.
Conclusion
The events of 1919 not only reflected the world's changing dynamics in Great Power 
relations in Europe. China too was a natural platform for international economic and 
political disputes as various countries projected their expansionist foreign policy into the 
Asian area. The worst possible scenario was, however, the weakening of hegemonic power, 
an essential component of the British ideological vision and part o f its regional supremacy 
strategy which they stood for in China. It was obvious that the British trading position was 
threatened by the group of May Fourth students who had advocated that workers and 
merchants protest against the domestic and international mistreatment of China. The extent 
to which the May Fourth strikes were aimed directly at other foreigners apart from the 
Japanese or the British is open to debate. Nevertheless, all the business activities were 
seriously affected. Since the general strike began, the British expatriates' existence which 
depended on trade, industry and banking was their main concern. In spite of British 
initiatives to encourage the people to resume business, Chinese public opinion condemned 
all business transactions and the strikes continued. Evidently, as the situation rapidly 
deteriorated the British began to lose capital, shares, investments, contracts and
57 SGCC, Annual Report 1919, Minutes o f  the Annual General Meeting, Letter from Chinese organisations in 
Shanghai to the SGCC, June 4, 1919; the SGCC to D. Siffert, Senior Consul, June 12, 1919; SGCC, Annual
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connections at accelerating speed. Therefore, it is not an exaggeration to highlight the 
severe impact of the May Fourth strikes on British economic stability in China during the 
next few years. When vast commercial interests were jeopardised by the May Fourth 
strikes, the British mercantile community refused to compromise with its commercial 
interests and its May Fourth rhetoric reflected its inflexible policy.
Inasmuch as the May Fourth demonstrators' rights to express their indignation publicly 
towards Japanese imperialism was recognised at least on the personal level, the general 
strike and its results were collectively condemned by the British businessmen, their 
companies and by the business associations. Hence, the unity among the commercial 
community's May Fourth rhetoric was based on their business discourse. Therefore, the 
purpose was to produce implicit collective principles for their strategies against the strikes. 
By continually repeating the commonly accepted principles in correspondence and 
presumably in their meetings, the community held shared expectations in reaction to the 
Movement. What followed was a set of key expressions which emphasised various needs 
and fears that defined and ratified the British mercantile community's position in China. 
Collective principles of security, stability, active markets and equal rights for free trade 
appeared to form the united front of the business community's May Fourth rhetoric. When 
business associations generally disclaimed official connections with the Movement, 
personal correspondence and articles published in papers provided a forum for individual 
perceptions. The businessmen's fears relating to the Movement seemed to align themselves 
with those of British officials, namely the fears of growing anti-foreign sentiment and 
Bolshevik intrusion. One significant difference, however, separated the business 
community's point of view from the officials. The businessmen were first and foremost
Report 1921, pp. 19, 61.
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interested in trade and all their fears and demands reflected this principle. In contrast, the 
officials had to consider other aspects such as British national interests in China.
The last part of the analysed British triangle in China introduces the largest and 
politically least influential group, the missionaries. Their influence, however, on social and 
cultural 'grass root1 level was profound in Chinese society and their perceptions towards the 
May Fourth Movement and their influence on its developments are important as the 
following chapter will illustrate.
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4. ‘SPIRIT OF SHANGHAI’ - MISSIONARIES AND THE MAY 
FOURTH MOVEMENT
This chapter explores the British missionaries' responses to the May Fourth Movement. 
As discussed in the previous chapters, the following analysis concentrates on British 
missionaries who personally experienced the Movement. The approach therefore 
embraces the missionary organisations that had a permanent resident station in Shanghai: 
the Baptist Missionary Society (BMS), the British and Foreign Bible Society (BFBS), the 
China Inland Mission (CIM), the Church Missionary Society (CMS), the London 
Missionary Society (LMS), the Religious Tract Society (RTS), the Young 
Men's/Women's Christian Association (YMCA/YWCA)1. The BFBS, the BMS, the 
CMS, the LMS and the RTS were solely British associations. The missionaries, more 
than Western businessmen or officials, came into daily contact with the Chinese people, 
and their extensive correspondence network distributed news of Shanghai 
demonstrations, strikes and boycotts rapidly across the whole country. For this reason the 
missionaries were more 'tuned' to the May Fourth Movement than other foreign groups. 
The 'Spirit o f Shanghai'2 slogan, invented by a British missionary from the countryside, 
initially established a negative image of the Movement, but the Shanghai missionary 
society willingly turned it into a positive one and transmitted this positive May Fourth 
image into the interior areas. Simultaneously, the news from the countryside was widely 
discussed in the Shanghai newspapers. Moreover, personal and official letters narrated 
the events around China. Obviously all this information had a profound effect on the 
Shanghai missionary community's perceptions of the Movement. Therefore, it is
1 Charles L. Boynton (ed.), Directory! o f  Protestant M issions in China 1917, (Shanghai, 1917), passim . Dan 
Cui, The Cultural Contribution o f  British P rotestant M issionaries and British-American Cooperation to 
C hina’s National D evelopm ent during the 1920 ’s, (Lanham, 1998), pp. 355-358.
2 NCH, 21 June, 1919, p. 766.
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necessary to also evaluate some of the British May Fourth experiences in other 
missionary centres.
Assuming we can talk of collective group experience3, no two British groups 
encountered the May Fourth Movement in the same way. The purpose of this chapter is 
to establish the missionary context of the May Fourth Movement, to evaluate differences 
of experience, but especially to highlight analogies between the encounters and the ways 
in which these experiences were described to other Christians. Like British officials and 
businessmen, the missionaries formed the May Fourth discourse by which they expressed 
their common Christian, British and Western values. Moreover, they revealed and formed 
shared expectations on how to react towards the Movement. The May Fourth discussions 
also created implicit collective rules for their communal behaviour. This coherence 
within the missionary society created common attitudes towards the May Fourth 
Movement, and it also formed key words and principles which were constantly repeated. 
Not only did foreign Christians analyse the Movement, the converted Chinese also talked 
about the situation with their foreign counterparts and undoubtedly these encounters had 
a significant influence on the British missionaries' reactions to the May Fourth 
Movement4. As soon as the Chinese Christians joined the Movement, they provided 
extensive firsthand information about the May Fourth activities.
Researchers have argued that missionaries' published correspondence such as articles, 
books and travel letters did not necessarily represent their genuine perceptions about the 
Chinese people and society. It is argued that missionary authors regularly concealed their
3 Cohen, H isto iy  in Three Keys, p. 63.
4 For the Chinese Christians’ discussion o f the May Fourth Movement see for example the articles in the 
missionary journals during 1919-1921, C hina’s Millions, The Chinese Recorder, The Chronicle o f  the 
L.M.S  [hereafter The Chronicle]', or the annual reports Annual R eport o f  the Wesleyan M ethodist
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personal views, and in addition, the missionary officials at the headquarters in Britain 
carefully censored the most radical opinions before publication.5 The London Missionary 
Society’s (LMS) publications were no exception to this policy and various articles 
published in their monthly journal, The Chronicle, were notably censored. This procedure 
becomes particularly apparent when comparing the published articles with the original 
letters and reports. The careful comparison between original materials and printed 
materials has revealed that modification of texts was usually made by cutting out some 
parts of the contents, but not generally changing the wording of texts. As a result, the 
statements were taken out of context and this alteration occasionally created new 
meanings to the original writings and produced something that was nearer to the LMS’s 
officially accepted views than individual missionary’s perception of the events. 
Therefore, on occasions where the original correspondence was not found it was essential 
to evaluate missionaries' printed materials cautiously as the published opinions about the 
May Fourth Movement did not necessarily represent the personal point of view. The 
study o f their private and published correspondence, however, has provided one story of 
the Movement and has created a more comprehensive picture of the British May Fourth 
Movement discourse.
4.1. The London Missionary Society and the Students' Movement
Every missionary working in China seems, sooner or later, to have come to Shanghai. It 
was the administrative centre of Protestant work and as one missionary ironically stated,
M issionary Society 1919 and 1920\ and the English newspapers Celestial Empire, China Press and NCDN  
o f  1919.
5 Bickers, "To Serve and not to Rule", pp. 213-214.
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“Shanghai was the place for talking”. Being an executive member of 10 missionary 
committees, this missionary appeared to have sound reasoning for this statement.6 
Shanghai was an important resident station for the LMS and in the 1920's there were 
about twenty missionaries placed in the city. Conveniently, two of the three centres were 
situated in the International Settlement and the first station combined the self-supporting 
Chinese church and the hospital. The second centre was the Medhurst School compound 
incorporating girls’ and boys’ boarding schools and the college. Shanghai’s surrounding 
district formed the third centre.7
Reverend Charles George Sparham had accepted an invitation to become Secretary of 
the China Advisory Council and moved to Shanghai in 1917.8 He was, therefore, in the 
middle o f the turbulent May Fourth Movement and commented on it frequently. His 
journeys were intensified with the new post and constant evaluation of the Chinese 
society was expressed in his letters, articles and books. Sparham's letters to his wife 
contained regular remarks on Chinese politics and the topics he commented actively 
covered areas such as the government's problems with the north-south civil war, 
manipulation of elections, corruption of the government, widespread distrust towards the 
regime, and finally, current developments of public opinion and nationalism.9 Here he 
differed significantly from the average missionary as he observed and evaluated the 
surrounding political environment. Many missionaries, besides narrating their
6 SOAS, Council for World M ission archives, London Missionary Society [hereafter LMS], Central China, 
Correspondence, box 26, folder 1, W. Hopkyn Rees to Francis H. Hawkins, 25 February, 1915.
7 LMS, Foreign F ield Series IX, ca 1910; LMS, The 73*d Annual Report o f  the Chinese Hospital, Shanghai, 
fo r  the yea r  1919, (Shanghai, 1920), passim .
8 LMS, Central China, Reports, box 8, folder 3, A Year's Work for the Advisory Council, C.G. Sparham, 
1918.
9 Sparham's articles: 'China in the Meting Pot', The Chronicle, vol. 28, April 1920, p. 91; ’ Co-operation in 
China1, The Chronicle, vol. 29, March 1921, pp. 62-65; 'Christian Education in China', The Chronicle, vol. 
30, Nov. 1922, pp. 258-259; Westminster and Cheshunt College, Cambridge, B6 Sparham papers, 
[hereafter Sparham papers],passim .
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evangelisation, education or hospital work, often wanted to leave politics out of their 
discussion. Therefore, Sparham’s vast correspondence offers an exceptional perspective 
of the Movement. Moreover, his in-depth knowledge of Chinese culture and his personal 
interest towards current issues made him a meticulous observer of the Shanghai May 
Fourth Movement. Personal experiences combined with authority had been achieved 
throughout the country and made Sparham’s views meaningful in missionary circles. In 
addition, his extensive contacts with British officials added credibility to his views in the 
whole foreign community10. In order to understand his passion to observe the May Fourth 
Movement and to provide background for his perceptions some of his earlier works and 
life will now be discussed.
Initially Sparham had received an education in Brighton in the 1870's which would 
have, according to him, "fitted me for a commercial life". However, his personal interests 
and activities with the Sunday School, School Bible Class, and missionary meetings at 
the home church encouraged him to choose another path. Sparham had studied at the 
Cheshunt College in Cambridge where he obtained good grades from his examinations in 
languages and religious subjects. The Principal's comments on his qualifications as a 
preacher were extremely encouraging. Furthermore, he was ordained a minister. 
Sparham's aspiration "I have a strong desire to throw myself into the battle of the Lord's 
against Heathenism", became true in 1885 when, aged 25, he sailed to C hina.11
In Hankou, Dr. Griffith John, 'the grand old man' of missionaries, who had arrived in 
China 30 years earlier, took Sparham as his disciple. They travelled around Hubei and
10 LMS, Central China, Correspondence, box 30, folder 3, Sparham to Hawkins, 1 July, 1919; LMS, 
Central China, Correspondence, box 30, folder 4, Report o f A.C. Secretary’s visit to Central China, Nov 1- 
Dec 11, 1919.
11 LMS, Candidate's Papers 1864-1885, box 28, Answers to Printed Questions, 451-632, Folder 24, C.G. 
Sparham; LMS, Candidate's Papers 1796-1899, box 15, names Sh-Ste, C.G. Sparham.
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Hunan province hinterlands spreading the Christian word, and they wrote reports about
12 * * * local conditions in order to evaluate areas for missionary work. Missionary co-operation
was further strengthened with the marriage between Sparham and Griffith John's
daughter Mary, in 1891.13 While staying in Hubei province in the spring of 1900, the
Boxer rebels attacked Sparham's family, but even at the height of this dangerous situation
Sparham remained calm, and later, did not criticise the Chinese attackers. Instead, he
thanked the British Consulate for the offered help and was delighted by the opening of an
anti-foreign district for missionary work.14 In 1920's Sparham was one of the most
experienced missionaries among the LMS community and his May Fourth observations
reflected this mature background.
A slightly contrasting picture of his acceptance of Chinese traditional culture was
conveyed in his book Christianity and the Religions o f  China - A B rief Study in
Comparative Religions. In this book Buddhism, Daoism, Confucianism and popular
religions were presented as inferior religions.15 This perception was reasonably common
among contemporary missionaries in China and because the publication was directed to
the larger mission congregation, it was most likely purposely provocative. Consequently,
it described Chinese religions in the way the missionaries wanted to perceive them. It was
also published immediately after the Boxer uprising when the Buddhists, especially, were
understood to be extremely dangerous to the Christian missionaries. Unlike some of his
countrymen’s perceptions, and based on his own experiences, Sparham never connected
the May Fourth Movement with Buddhist or Boxer activities. In spite of his book’s
12 Sparham papers, Box 2, Files B6/4-6, Rev. Griffith John to William Gladstone, 28 January, 1892; 
Griffith John and C.G. Sparham, The Situation in Hunan, no date.
13 The Chinese R ecorder, October, vol. 62, 1931, p. 655.
14 Sparham papers, Box 2, Files B6/4-6, Sparham to Fraser, 13 and 16 March, 20 April, 1900.
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critical tone, Sparham had quite an understanding attitude towards the Chinese people, or 
more precisely he had a hopeful perception of society’s future. As I will discuss below, 
his May Fourth Movement observations promoted this belief.
Sparham described the general strike in Shanghai of 1919 as "a state of great 
excitement" that had surrounded the city. He explained that students’ activities were a 
part of the passive resistance movement protesting against the transfer of the Shandong 
area to the Japanese. The Chinese railway workers' boycott had had an immediate effect 
on Sparham's work as it caused a suspension of the missionaries' administrative council 
meeting in J i’nan city, forcing him to stay in Shanghai until the situation was resolved.16 
Sparham's letter opened dialogue with the LMS missionaries on the May Fourth 
Movement. None of the other missionaries' or Sparham's earlier correspondence revealed 
any comments about the strained situation. Simultaneously, regional foreign and Chinese 
newspapers had bombarded their readers with reports on the Versailles Peace Conference 
and the students’ strikes o f Shanghai which were spreading around the country. 
Moreover, a peaceful atmosphere in the city had changed into a highly tense situation 
during students mass meetings, demonstrations, and boycotts against the Japanese 
products and in June it had all culminated in the general strike. O f all the foreigners, the 
missionaries were always physically closest to the Chinese, and many Chinese LMS 
members without doubt supported the Movement, which affected the society’s activities 
directly. The events could not have gone unnoticed by missionaries and it was just matter 
of time before they would write down their experiences.
15 Charles G. Sparham, Christianity and the Religion o f  China - A B rief Study in Com parative Religions, 
(Hankou, ca. 1902), pp. 3-4, 11.
16 LMS, Central China, CoiTespondence, box 30, folder 2, Sparham to Hawkins, 9 June, 1919.
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The LMS Shanghai District Council, however, made no official comments concerning 
the Movement even though it had a meeting in the middle of the strike, which included 
Sparham as an invited guest, but the issue was presumably evaluated at least in their 
informal discussions. Instead, characterising factors of the Movement’s background, 
Sparham expressed his special interest towards it. He supported the students’ national 
objectives openly and spoke of the "obnoxious statesman", who was forced to resign after 
the May Fourth demonstrations. At this point he was presumably referring to the former 
Minister of Communication, Cao Rulin, who had become the demonstrators’ archenemy 
by advocating Japanese interests in the Chinese government.17 Sparham sympathised 
with the Chinese people’s frustration over the Versailles Peace Conference's 
unsatisfactory outcome. Moreover, he argued that their bitterness towards the British was 
provoked by the wartime affiliation with Japan. According to Sparham, Japanese militant 
interests in China were, in turn, to be defined as frightening and disliked just as though 
they were “Huns of the East”.18 Undoubtedly Sparham utilised effectively the collective 
Allied wartime memories and fear o f the Germans to justify contemporary Chinese 
feelings and actions. His other metaphor defined the situation as follows:
" [..] The feeling is largely one o f  national fear; the fear that China may suffer as Corea has done. It also 
touches a deep sentiment for Shantung which contains a birthplace and sepulchre o f  Confucius is in a sense 
the Chinese Holy Land.[..]"19
By indicating that the Shandong area was the Chinese Holy Land, Sparham created an 
association between the Confucian sacred place and the Christian Holy Land. Therefore,
17 LMS, Central China, Conespondence, box 30, folder 2, Minutes o f  the Shanghai District Council, 10 
June, 1919; LMS, Central China, Correspondence, box 30, folder 2, Sparham to Hawkins, 14 June, 1919; 
Schwarcz, The Chinese Enlightenment, p. 17.
18 This concept was used in articles to describe Japanese expansion in the East Asia, see NCH  , 14 June, 
1919, p. 714.
19 LMS, Central China, Correspondence, box 30, folder 2, Sparham to Hawkins, 14 June, 1919.
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in writing this he wanted to make the reader understand the symbolic significance of the 
place. As a Christian he approved the protection of sacred land and sympathised with the 
Chinese actions to preserve it. The original symbolic connotation of Shandong as a Holy 
Land was created by the Chinese Versailles Peace Conference negotiator, Wellington 
Koo's metaphor expressed in January 191920.
In contrast, another British missionary saw the place as a destination for Buddhist 
pilgrims to practise heathen worshipping. Moreover, one declaration explained that 
Christianity was receiving a deserved phenomenal public recognition after the church 
members had successfully participated in the Movement.21 In many instances the 
missionaries interpreted Chinese aggression towards the Japanese as an outcome of 
awakening from paganism. Furthermore, missionaries acknowledged that the May Fourth 
Movement demands were understood to be appropriate promoters of the Christian 
religion. Missionaries frequently analysed the Shandong question as their spiritual 
triumph followed by a national enlightenment that would convert more Chinese to 
Christianity, whereas the British officials perceived the May Fourth demonstrators’ 
debate over restoration of Shandong as a politically motivated movement to restrain 
Japan’s escalation policy. It is important to understand that all British groups interpreted 
the May Fourth Movement in a way that was suited to their own interests in Shanghai.
Mr. and Mrs. Sparham accidentally encountered a more real confrontation between the 
May Fourth demonstrators and the SMP forces during their evening walk outside their 
missionary premises. It happened on the last evening of the strike when protestors were
20 LMS, Central China, Correspondence, box 30, folder 2, Sparham to Hawkins, 14 June, 1919; Yongjin 
Zhang, China in the International System, 1918-1920: The M iddle Kingdom at the P eripheiy , (London, 
1991), pp. 54-55.
21 LMS, North China, Correspondence, box 21, folder 5, travel letter from Rev. George T. Scott and Rev. 
William P. Schell, 8 October, 1919; LMS, North China, Reports, box 8, J.Murray, Tianjin, 1919.
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celebrating their victory from ‘the three traitor officials’ and were intending to continue 
festive activities in the International Settlement.
As Mrs. Sparham and I left the compound we heard the hospital Christian Endeavour singing their 
closing hymn - one o f  Sankey's - while from the Ma Kia Chuan church where a big evangelistic service was 
being held came the sound o f  another hymn - also Sankey's - most lustily sung. W e were scarcely out o f  the 
compound before w e came on the fracas - mounted Sikhs, officers in Khakhi, one man lying on the ground
and the men firing at that time into the air. Before long the wounded were being earned into hospital and
22reinforcements were being hurried up. Such is China! "
This story summarised the Western missionaries' position in China. After all, the 
spreading o f the Christian gospel was their primary reason for being in China, in a 
country where revolutions, rebellions and demonstrations gave an interchangeable 
rhythm of life. Only God's word appeared to be permanent and according to the 
missionaries' parlance, it would eventually save China from moral turmoil. Obviously 
Sparham interpreted the May Fourth Movement's activities as an excellent opportunity to 
manifest the Christian belief among the Chinese.
In his letter, quoted above, Sparham used various expressions manifested in the 
Shanghai Students' Union pamphlet that was attached to the letter, and in synchrony, the 
American and English newspapers published concise versions of the message.23 The 
students' pamphlet was printed on fine paper and written in English, and therefore, was 
directed particularly at the foreign community. “The Students' Strike - An explanation” 
(see Appendix 1) as its name illustrates, was a sentimental appeal to "the Allied Friends 
of China", to join the students' battle against militarism, and according to the pamphlet, 
this was the first genuine democratic movement that had been able to combine all 
Chinese classes. In addition, the historical settings of May Fourth campaign were 
discussed together with students’ current demands, and a blueprint of their actions was
22 LMS, Central China, Correspondence, box 30, folder 2, Sparham to Hawkins, 14 June, 1919.
23 China Press, 10 June, 1919, p. 6; N CH  14, June, 1919, p. 715.
135
introduced. The plan outlined foreigners’ responsibilities in Shanghai as being the fight 
against militarism in Asia, and a demand to pressure their governments to return the 
Shandong area to China. The pamphlet gave an alarming example of the missionaries' 
destiny in Qingdao where the Japanese had excluded the foreign missionaries from the 
region. In the near future, as predicted in the pamphlet, the Japanese would certainly 
restrict the Westerners’ trade in their territory. Sparham declared that this manifesto was 
"a sane statement of the situation from the Chinese point of view".24 Sparham obtained a 
wider perspective on the May Fourth activities by travelling around the country, but as 
his correspondence revealed, he remained very understanding towards the Movement. 
Although he opposed the use of boycotts as a method to resist Japanese politics, the May 
Fourth Movement was “ a wonderful movement, intensely patriotic, and well guided 
from every point of view”. He was convinced of China’s future capacity to be a modem 
country with an independent church that would organise Christian education to all 
Chinese. This would be, in his opinion, the only way to save China.25
Another British missionary experience of the May Fourth Movement was presented by 
Dr. W. Hopkyn Rees who had arrived in China in 1883, two years prior to Sparham. Rees 
was bom in Wales and was forced to leave school at the age o f eleven to work in the 
cotton mills. He was able to continue his education by attending evening classes which 
also helped him to be promoted gradually from errand boy to bookkeeper at the mill. Like 
Sparham, Rees studied theology at college and was actively engaged with Sunday School
24 LMS, Central China, Correspondence, box 30, folder 2, Sparham to Hawkins, 14 June, 1919.
25 LMS, Central China, Correspondence, box 30, folder 2, Sparham to Rev. Frank Lenwood, 11 October, 
1919; Sparham papers, Box 1, Files B6/2-3, Sparham to Mary Sparham, 19-20 and 22, March, 1920.
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and missionary work. He had been working as a pastor for two years before he and his 
wife followed the call: "God points me to the foreign field".26
Rees had been working in Beijing and Tianjin but was transferred to Shanghai in the 
second decade of the twentieth century. The Chinese Emperor had honoured him with the 
exceptional decoration o f the "Blue Button" with the rank of Mandarin for his services. 
The badge of honour was given in connection with the settlement of the Boxer indemnity 
money paid by the Chinese government to the foreigners to cover destruction of life and 
material expenses caused by the Boxer uprising.27 Rees too was an 'old hand' in China 
and even though he had experienced the Boxer uprising, his May Fourth encounters 
revealed a relatively 'modernist' approach to Chinese society. Rees’ network throughout 
the British community was impressive and his duties combined various Christian, 
patriotic and educational activities. Missionary and educational interests encouraged him 
to join the China Continuation Committee and the Christian Publishers Association, and 
since 1916, he had acted as the General Secretary of the Christian Literature Society. At 
the end of the decade he was also the Secretary of the LMS in Shanghai. Rees' British 
engagements were fulfilled by participation in the British War Propaganda Committee, 
the Patriotic League of Overseas British, the Navy League and his Welsh identity was 
emphasised with the St. David's Society. The Shanghai Municipal Council respected his 
advice by appointing him a member of the commission, which improved the Volunteer 
corps regulations. The school run by the British Chamber o f Commerce organised 
Chinese language classes outside the missionary communities and Rees was one of the 
school’s leading teachers. He also worked as an interpreter for the British and Chinese
26 LMS, Candidate's Papers 1864-1885, box 28, Answers to Printed Questions, 451-632, Folder 27,
W. Hopkyn Rees.
27 LMS, Annotated Register o f  L.M.S. missionaries 1793-1923, W. Hopkyn Rees.
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Chamber of Commerce. Moreover, the Chinese and foreign press asked frequently for his 
advice on translating technical terms and other types from Chinese to English or vice 
versa. Apparently, the Chinese names for foreign individuals and enterprises were 
constantly requested as the foreign population of Shanghai increased steadily. Finally, 
long lasting co-operation with Fraser had secured Rees’ contacts with the pre-eminent 
British officials.28
In addition to the services in the missionary community, his numerous activities 
verified that Rees' working field comprised both the foreign and Chinese communities. 
Enthusiastic commitment to assist co-operation between different communities and his 
numerous projects probably lowered barriers between missionaries and the rest of 
society. He was a highly esteemed and exceptionally trusted missionary in Shanghai, 
which explains his close connection with the May Fourth students, which I subsequently 
will discuss. In combining his personal connections with fluency in the Chinese language, 
it is obvious that he was up to date with current issues in Shanghai.
Sharing Sparham's hope for a stronger Chinese government to secure peace and growth 
in the country, Rees called on the attention of the Christians, who would be the crucial 
actors in this strengthening process. Believing that sensible patriotism instead of bigoted 
antagonism would eventually win Chinese minds and hearts, Rees, likewise, cautiously 
supported the contemporary Republican government established after the 1911 revolution 
and which was, in the 1920's, centred in Beijing.29 Just after Shanghai’s May Fourth 
general strike he accused the Versailles Peace Conference participants of making “a huge 
blunder” by allowing the Japanese to demand the Shandong area. It is interesting to note
28 LMS, Central China, Reports, box 8, W. Hopkyn Rees, Shanghai, 1917; LMS, Central China, 
CotTespondence, box 30, folder 2, Rees to Hawkins, 21 June, 1919; LMS, Central China, Correspondence, 
box 30, folder 3, Sparham to Hawkins, 1 July, 1919.
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that he actually confessed to having worked as an adviser to the Shanghai Students’ 
Union during the May Fourth Movement. Furthermore, he proudly claimed to be the only 
British adviser for students. According to his story he had, as an adviser, supported 
student activities in keeping the agitation within limits of order and justice. Evidently, he 
was extremely honoured to have been chosen to assist the May Fourth students. Yet, he 
simultaneously wanted to disguise it from other missionaries and foreigners in China and
30Britain for reasons he never explained. Unquestionably the British and American 
newspapers would have eagerly reported the well-known and widely respected 
community member’s May Fourth connections, if  it had been revealed.
A few American missionary teachers openly supported the May Fourth operations by 
attending the inauguration meeting of the Chinese Students’ Union, and offered advice on 
how to organise the democratic election of a national assembly. In another case, the 
American lawyers Mr. Jemigan, Mr. Lineberger and Mr, Rose served as a 'warning 
example', since they provided counselling services to May Fourth demonstrators. Their 
activities were widely reported in the papers and strongly criticised by the Settlement 
police.31 It can be presumed, therefore, that fear of an active British missionary being 
labelled as a supporter of the Chinese mass movement forced Rees to participate 
anonymously and to conceal his activities. Rees’ participation remains unclear with 
regard to what instructions he offered to the students, along with his overall influence on 
the development of the Movement. It is significant, however to recognise Rees as the 
only British missionary participant in the May Fourth Movement in Shanghai. None of
29 LMS, Central China, Reports, box 8, Rees, Shanghai, 1917.
30 LMS, Central China, Correspondence, box 30, folder 2, Rees to Hawkins, 21 June, 1919.
31 SMA, U l-91 -19 , file 18, McEuen to Jamieson, 12,13,14 and 18 August, 1919; SMA, U l-91-19 , file 19, 
McEuen to Phillips, 17 June, 1919; SMP, Special Branch, roll 65, dossier 6691, Extracts from the file on
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the official reports or newspapers revealed any information related to Rees' activities, but 
the British missionary's political functions would certainly have infuriated local British 
officials on the Council and at the Consulate. Unquestionably his operations would have 
shocked the British conservative community.
As Rees was leaving for his furlough to Britain, an American newspaper interestingly 
wrote that the local Chinese educational bodies had asked him to forward a petition to the 
British Premier Mr. Lloyd George to gain his sympathies in assisting China. This claim 
was never discussed in any other paper or correspondence, and therefore, its reliability is
• 32 •questionable. Even if  the argument was suspicious, it confirmed the well-known 
connections between Rees and the Chinese educationalists.
It certainly was true that missionary engagements with the May Fourth activities were 
not completely uncommon phenomena in an attempt to pursue further co-operation with 
the Chinese people, especially to attain the students’ confidence. The Young Men's 
Christian Association’s (YMCA) agenda to “build of a new world civilisation” and its 
American secretaries’ operations in Shanghai provided a relevant example of missionary 
involvement. By establishing a Christian patriotic association, which integrated both 
Chinese educational and student unions, they tried to promote interaction between 
Westerners and students. Officially, the YMCA separated itself from its individual 
members’ activities, and as an organisation disclaimed its connection with the May 
Fourth Movement, predominantly because of its alleged political connections. In spite of 
official statements, on various occasions the International Settlement police identified the 
YMCA schools with the May Fourth boycotts and assumed that foreign tutors were
the 1919 Japanese Boycott and the activities o f the Students in connection therewith, C hief Detective 
Inspector Reeves to Headquarter Staff, 25 September, 1925.
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encouraging the activities. Indeed, in contrast to the British missionaries' hesitant 
response to the May Fourth activities, the American YWCA women in Shanghai joined 
the protest against the Versailles Peace Treaty decision to transfer Qingdao to Japan.34 
None of the British YMCA missionaries seemed to publicly advocate the May Fourth 
operations, but it is difficult to estimate whether this was from personal choice, or fear of 
general judgement that prevented participation. Some missionaries, however, strongly 
disagreed with the YMCA’s activities and claimed that their participation in Chinese 
politics would discredit their spiritual influence within the Christian community35. Fraser 
shared this opinion with some other British consulate officials and was convinced that the 
Chinese YMCA members and foreign YMCA missionaries had been inflaming students 
towards political activities during the summer of 1919.36
The LMS’s Medhurst College’s academic term was seriously affected by general unrest 
among the students, and consequently, enrolment numbers dropped from 190 in 
September 1918, to 128 in September 1919, almost one-third of whole intake of students. 
The British missionary teachers confronted the May Fourth protagonists with a firm 
attitude and consequently the Movement leaders were expelled from the college. This 
action gave the remaining students an opportunity to continue their studies even though 
other schools had joined the strike. Reasons for some British missionary institutes’ 
success on restraining students’ activities were usually twofold. Firstly, the British
32 China Press, 13 July, 1919, p. 2.
33 Shirley S. Garret, Social Reformers in Urban China, the Chinese Y.M.C.A., 1895-1926, (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, 1970), pp. 165-166; SMA, U l-91-19 , file 19, Shanghai Municipal Police, Hilton-Johnson to 
Phillips, 21 June, 1919; Jun Xing, Baptized in the Fire o f  Revolution, the American Social Gospel and the 
YMCA in China: 1919-1937, (Bethlehem, USA, 1996), pp. 55-56.
34 Hollis A. Wilbur and Mary Mattenson Wilbur, "An American Missionary Family in Asia IV", C. Martin
Wilbur (ed.), Chinese Studies in H istoiy, Summer 1999, vol. 32, no. 4, p. 22,
35 NCDN, 23 July, 1919, p. 4; NCH, 21 June, 1919, p. 782.
36 PRO, F 0228/3526/8  X iam en’s consul to Jordan, 20 May, 1919; PRO, F 0 6 7 1/447/591, Fraser to Jordan,
30 January, 1920.
141
Christian schoolteachers had no similar external political reasons to support the 
Movement as their counterparts in the governmental institutes had. It was also well- 
known that various May Fourth Movement ideologies and activities had originated from 
the Chinese university professors. Furthermore, Chinese educational leaders such as 
school principals and college presidents had quickly approved the new radical 
nationalism. As a result, political pressure on Chinese educators to advocate the 
Movement was immense, and negligence of nationalist duty was perceived as a strongly 
unpatriotic act. Secondly, since the missionaries preferred that converts should attend 
mission institutions, the British Christian institutions generally had limited contact with 
the Chinese educational community. In addition, the Chinese government had refused to 
formally recognise missionary schools. Therefore, graduates from governmental schools 
were granted special privileges which were denied to the Christian college's alumni. This 
fact split Christian and non-Christian educational communities even further. If the 
Christian students chose not join the Movement, the government school students accused 
them of betraying their country and of being under foreign imperial influence. However, 
in Shanghai, the May Fourth demonstrators found it difficult to disseminate their 
ideologies among the British missionary school students.37
In contrast to the British missionary schools, many o f the American missionary 
institutes, led by St. John’s University, especially its Middle School, operated as the 
centre for student activities in Shanghai. Immediately after the May Fourth Movement 
was launched, the university provided premises for patriotic meetings and for publishing 
a newspaper, and also for organising volunteer patrol groups to maintain peace and order
37 Chen, The M ay Fourth Movement in Shanghai, pp. 75-77; Jessie G. Lutz., China and the Christian 
Colleges 1850-1950, (Ithaca, 1971), pp. 206-207, 214; LMS, Central China, Reports, box 8, folder 4, Gerald 
Luxor, Shanghai, 1919 and Ernest Box, Shanghai, 1919.
142
on the streets. St. John's University administrators finally decided to close the school 
before the end of summer term, thus, avoiding more embarrassing confrontations with 
students as the Movement had gone beyond the missionaries’ control. To emphasise the 
administrators’ toughened stance some students were expelled from school. In all, the 
university was forced to close down three times during the 1919-1920 student 
demonstrations. Nevertheless, the university continued to promote Chinese nationalism 
actively, and opposed the missionary authorities constantly throughout the 1920's, and 
especially after the May Thirtieth Incident in 1925.38
In general the LMS missionary teachers in Shanghai perceived growing national 
consciousness as a positive symbol in a changing China, but disapproved of the 
Movement’s political side and suggested instead more spiritual and ethical dimensions to 
enlighten growing nationalism. Obviously the missionaries promoted the Christian belief 
and practices as appropriate guidelines for the Chinese students pursuing political 
liberation. The British educators encouraged their students to direct their energy to serve 
God, instead of the country. Hence, the above-mentioned operations were strictly 
restricted in the British schools. Participating in the patriotic demonstrations, however, 
was usually prohibited for academic reasons and the British missionaries maintained the 
view that students’ primary duty was to study and not to get involved with the nation’s 
politics.
The 'Spirit of Shanghai' continued to spread across the country, encouraging people to 
actively participate in the Movement. In fact, Shanghai's May Fourth events served as a 
clear example of how the students and labour should react to the growing radical
38China Press, June 1, 1919, p. 16; June 8, 1919, p. 8; December 6, 1919, p. 12; Lutz, China and the 
Christian Colleges, pp. 212-213, 248-249; NCH, May 10, 1919, p. 371; Wen-hsin Yeh, The A lienated  
Academy: Culture and P olitics in Republican China, 1919-1937, (Cambridge, Ma., 1990), pp, 83-84.
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nationalism. Operations initiated in the city were frequently repeated in the smaller towns 
and the idea of a general strike was adopted particularly from Shanghai. Numerous socio­
political factors, however, prevented the nation-wide general strike, and this will be 
discussed in more detail in Chapter Six. In the end Shanghai was the only place where it 
was successfully implemented. The foreign presence and the city's peculiar three-fold 
administration system undoubtedly had an impact on the successful launching of a full 
strike.
The British missionary centres in the interior reacted vigorously to the May Fourth 
Movement and updated their colleagues in Shanghai by writing letters and articles about 
the incidents. The London Missionary Society’s Griffith John College in central Hubei 
was attacked by a massive student rally which disturbed the whole town's life and 
annoyed especially some of its British missionaries. The yearly report, given by the Head 
of the Anglo-Chinese Department, Stanley V. Boxer, was instantly censored in the 
London headquarters with the comment “Not for publication”, and indeed, Boxer's 
analysis o f contemporary Chinese society and politics provided a striking contrast to 
those described above.
Boxer had arrived in China in 1910 as an engineer under the United Universities 
Scheme and became connected with the Griffith John College. Consequently, in few 
years time, he was appointed to work for the LMS. The past ten years at the college had, 
in Boxer’s opinion, shown a steady growth of character and seriousness among students. 
Moreover, Christian education had been able to suppress the “maudlin characteristic of 
Chinese” .39
39 LMS, Central China, Reports, box 8, folder 4, Stanley V. Boxer, Hankou, 1919.
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Even if  we acknowledge Boxer’s threatened position as a missionary authority, his 
further remarks proved that he was extremely intolerant towards the Movement. As his 
disillusion deepened, he judged the anti-Japanese boycott operations as “a sickly cant of 
the so-called patriots”40. As far as Boxer was concerned, the missionary institutions were 
firstly, not venues for political propaganda, and secondly, the students were not mature 
enough to handle situations potentially arising from their political activities. Boxer 
further emphasised the Chinese government's mistakes in international and domestic 
politics, and therefore, concluded that the present difficulties were due to China's own 
failures. Boxer's fierce statements claimed that the American educators had advocated the 
Movement participants to act, and as a result of this foreign agitation, the Boone 
University was forced to close its doors. Their students were walking around the streets 
encouraging other students to join them. Boxer explained that the students at Griffith 
John College had not been involved in the demonstrations, the preventive factors being 
taught school discipline, and confidence in the missionaries.41 In some cases, Boxer's 
accusations appeared to be reasonable, as nearer Shanghai in the treaty port of Hangzhou, 
an American missionary was inspired by the Christian students' involvement in the 
Movement and wrote a four verse poem to commemorate their patriotic activities as the 
following extract from the poem illustrates.
"Students Rise!
Students Rise! Your count y needs you, Rise and make her strong. Follow  where the Right w ill lead you, 
[.] Rise for country, home and freedom - with the battle song.[.]"42
40 LMS, Central China, Reports, box 8, folder 4, Stanley V. Boxer, Hankou, 1919.
41 LMS, Annotated Register o f  L.M.S. missionaries 1793-1923, Stanley V. Boxer; LMS, Central China, 
Correspondence, box 30, folder 2, Boxer to Hawkins, 27 April, 1919; LMS, Central China, Reports, box 8, 
folder 4, Stanley V. Boxer, Hankou, 1919.
42 China P ress , 7 December, 1919, p. 6.
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The May Fourth Movement threatened to undermine the missionaries’ position by 
introducing newly formed student unions that challenged educators' discipline in the 
schools. Thus, to a certain extent, Boxer’s fears for losing authority were also 
understandable. As a matter of fact many British teachers around China resented the 
authority which student unions could exercise over the students and perceived this as the 
most threatening feature of the Movement. On the other hand, some missionaries 
accepted student unions as a predicted sign of Christian unity among "the Young China" 
which will be discussed later. Obviously, in a more peculiar way, Boxer was deeply 
offended by the Movement. It seemed almost that the demonstrators had attacked him 
personally. None of the other analysed missionaries experienced the Movement in such 
an utterly hostile manner, or at least there is no remaining evidence of it. It made Boxer 
“almost physically sick” when he suspected that the Movement could, without an effort, 
dismantle his decade’s work with the students and the energy devoted 'to cultivate the 
Chinese character' with the Scout movement43. Indeed, one of the important methods of 
interpreting the British educational ideals to the Chinese students had been to connect 
them with the Scouts activities, which in Hankou included the celebration of the World 
War Armistice at the British Consulate and salutation of the British flag44.
For the Head o f Higher and Middle Schools in Hankou, Rev. Bernard Upward, it had 
been “a year of success” and this argument was strengthened by the growth of college 
students’ self-restraint, and self-control when facing the “wave of mental unbalance” of 
the May Fourth Movement. He too accused the student union of provoking "the quasi- 
patriotic" student strikes. Upward urged students to leave politics until their education
43 LMS, Central China, Reports, box S, folder 4, Stanley V. Boxer, Hankou, 1919.
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was completed, and he gave a tangible order to disperse the student assembly at the 
college. In Upward's opinion, people in the West often misleadingly perceived the 
Movement's activities as the spontaneous actions of the educated Chinese. However, he 
understood it to be a professional politicians’ carefully arranged plot against the 
government. Both Boxer and Upward praised Chinese colleagues for supporting the 
missionaries’ stem and intolerant attitude, and mentioned that the parents’ co-operation 
had further strengthened the college’s conduct. In opposition to his colleagues, the third 
British missionary at the college, the Principal and Head of Divinity, Arthur Bonsey, 
provided a different point of view. Apparently, his reassuring and understanding attitude 
allowed him to deter students’ attempts to join the May Fourth demonstrations. Yet he 
admitted that if  the Griffith John College had been in any other city in the Hubei 
province, the situation might have been impossible to control. Bonsey's observations 
made him sympathetic towards students who had decided not to join the patriotic 
movement, and who, consequently, were accused of being traitors to the country and 
cursed on the streets by their fellow students.45 Throughout the duration of May Fourth 
Movement's existence, the missionaries were strongly convinced o f the fact that British 
education was the primary force behind the development of modem China. A long-term 
missionary educator had expressed it as follows.
"[..]We are not in the first instance “British”. W e are in purpose and desire Christian; but by our 
upbringing and our educational instincts, w e are British, and we believe that the best contribution that will 
be made to Education in China will be that which conies from those in a w ide and progressive British 
manner.[..]" 46
44 Stanley V.Boxer, ‘The B oy Scouts and the League o f  N ations’, The Chronicle, vol. 29, March 1921, pp. 
107-108.
45 LMS, Central China, Reports, box 8, folders 4 and 5, Rev. Bernard Upward, Hankou, 1919 and 1920; 
LMS, Central China, Reports, box 8, folder 4, Arthur Bonsey, Hankou, 1919-1920.
46 LMS, North China, Reports, box 8, Samuel Lavington Hart, Tianjin, 1918.
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The missionary secondary schools were, therefore, managed rigorously following the 
lines of British state middle schools and the Griffith John College obviously was 
fulfilling its duties honourably.
The LMS educational circles were forced to respond to the May Fourth Movement, and 
the missionary schools across China reacted in their own peculiar way. The students’ 
anti-Japanese boycott and strike had immediately affected the northern part of the country 
and the teachers at the Tianjin Anglo-Chinese College (TACC), which was the best 
known British Protestant institute in North China, were unanimously sympathetic 
towards the May Fourth activities. The Principal, Samuel Lavington Hart, defended 
students’ passive resistance as a necessary act to express their national spirit. 
Furthermore, he accepted changes in the curriculum and changed some Chinese staff 
members as the students had requested. The recently established, “Independent 
Government” student society at the college had also earned Hart’s approval. This was not 
surprising since the student society's leader was a Christian scholar, and Hart explained 
enthusiastically that the leader had had a significant influence on shaping the Movement. 
Another positive aspect that Hart recognised was the Gospel’s intervention in students’ 
politics, especially when many of the college students were not Christians. Moreover, his 
colleague listed other positive effects of the Movement as follows: the formation of a Boy 
Scouts corps, practice in organisation skills, submission to student authority, and finally, 
a sense of responsibility and a development of a stronger college spirit.47 It is important 
to note that out of the many British missionary establishments in China, the TACC was 
one of the very few institutions, which openly supported the May Fourth Movement.
47 LMS, North China, Reports, box 8, Samuel Lavington Hart, Tianjin 1919; A.P. Cullen, Tianjin, 1919 and 
1920; Freer Kelsey, Tianjin, 1919; C.H.B. Longman, Tianjin, 1919 and 1920; Sparham papers, Box 1, Files 
B6/2-3, Sparham to Mary Sparham, 19 and 20 March, 1920.
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Recognising the agitated political situation in the country, the British missionaries 
expressed empathy and support for the students’ cause, and not only did they allow 
students to hold meetings at the college in Tianjin, they showed their approval by 
attending some o f their gatherings. Compared with their missionary fellows in Shanghai 
and Hankou, the Tianjin educators revealed exceptionally courageous and 'progressive' 
thinking when accepting May Fourth activities in their own institution. The direct result 
of the missionaries’ supportive involvement with the Movement was shown by increased 
student enrolment at the TACC in September 1919. The Griffith John College had been 
able to stabilise, numerically, its staff and students and the admission numbers increased 
slightly in autumn 1919, whereas at the Medhurst College the enrolment numbers had
A Q
dropped drastically.
In view of the situation in Shanghai, a woman missionary from Beijing, Mrs. Georgina 
Biggin, was alarmed by the Movement’s effect on the school’s future in the capital, as the 
Boys’ school, due to the sharp decrease of students’ attendance had been forced to close 
down before the end of the term. Further reductions in teaching stuff seemed inevitable. 
Another uncertainty created by the May Fourth Movement was the school’s worsening 
financial situation. In spite of the missionary societies’ financial support, numerous 
institutions were increasingly dependent on non-Christian students’ higher tuition fees. 
Secularisation of the student body had been a general phenomenon among urban 
missionary institutions. For instance, in the Tianjin Anglo-Chinese College’s Middle 
School only 19-20% of students were Christians or from a Christian background. About 
the same proportion of non-Christian students had been accepted to the missionary
48 LMS, Central China, Reports, box 8, Gerald Luxon, Shanghai, 1919; LMS, North China, Reports, box 8, 
A.P.Cullen, Tianjin, 1919.
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institutions in Shanghai. Thus at the St. John’s University only 20-25% of students were 
Christian. Christian institutions therefore faced financially disastrous months when 
students went on strike and refused to pay their fees.49
Southern China had experienced thrilling moments when the Guangzhou Christian 
College’s Christian and non-Christian students argued over the commitment to join the 
Movement, a dispute which put the school authorities into immediate conflict with 
students and local police. The missionaries’ reports expressed their willingness to act as 
mediators not only between school students and local authorities, but also between the 
students themselves. Missionary educators tactfully commented on the college’s leading 
role “in a purely patriotic movement”, but on the other hand they convincingly denied 
any direct involvement with the May Fourth strikes. Obviously, the local British 
missionaries did not view of the boycott as a patriotic deed. This understanding was in 
shaip contrast with the May Fourth ideology where the greatest patriotic act was to 
boycott Japanese products and to join the strike. In the countryside, some of the LMS 
chapel schools had been used as headquarters to provoke an anti-Japanese climate, which 
in turn created a fierce protest from the local British missionary, who accused the 
Chinese Christians of misusing the society’s money. The allegation was that “a man paid 
from the Society’s funds will spend an enormous amount o f energy on anti-foreign 
propaganda”. Meanwhile, the missionary girls’ schools were actively promoting the 
Movement, as the reports from Fujian province explained.50 The local British Consul
49 Cui, The Cultural Contribution o f  British Protestant M issionaries, p. 160; LMS, North China, 
Correspondence, box 21, Mrs. Georgina Biggin to Hawkins, 12 June, 1919; LMS, North China, Reports, 
box 8, J.D.Liddell, Peking, 1919; LMS, North China, Reports, box 8, C.H.B. Longman, Tianjin, 1918; Yeh, 
The A lienated Academ y, p. 66.
50 LMS, South China, Correspondence, box 21, W.W. Clayson to Hawkins, 10 June and 17 November, 
1919; Alex Baxter to Hawkins, 10 October, 1919; LMS, South China, Reports, box 5, Alex Baxter, 
Guangzhou, 1918-1919,1919 and 1920; W.W. Clayson, Guangzhou, 1919; C. D ixon Cousins, 1919; LMS,
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confirmed the news and requested the missionaries to stop abusing their premises for 
political purposes.51
Foreign evangelists soon discovered that the wave of nationalism was problematic, as 
patriotic duties isolated people from Christianity. Instead of spreading the Gospel, many 
Chinese Christians preached national salvation. When the Chinese Christians neglected 
the Bible classes, Sunday Schools and evangelistic volunteer work, the missionaries were 
annoyed yet hesitant to interfere as they were unwilling to get involved in the activities. 
Therefore, when after the summer holidays the May Fourth operations continued through 
autumn and winter, they caused regular class disturbances and cancellations in schools. 
The situation created further tension when complaints began about poor teaching, and 
finally, students demanded complete reform of the curriculum. Undoubtedly all these 
problems exhausted many foreign educators. As time passed, the foreign school 
administrators inevitably lost their enthusiasm and exerted pressure on students to keep 
them in the classrooms. Hence, critical views of students’ activities became apparent in 
the correspondence.
The coming months confirmed that the May Fourth Movement had exacerbated already 
existing problems within the Protestant missionary society. Despite the fact that the 
evangelisation of 'heathen China' had been the shared objective of all missionaries, at the 
turn of the twentieth century disagreements arose over the question o f how to accomplish 
this goal effectively. Both Sparham and Rees represented the liberal approach among the 
LMS missionary circles in supporting the principle of education and the formation of 
independent churches in China. On the other hand, many pioneering evangelists
Fujian, Correspondence, box 12, Miss G. Ovenden, to Hawkins, 1919; LMS, Fujian, Reports, box 4, Mora 
Wheeler, 1919; LM S, North China, Reports, box 8, A.P. Cullen, Tianjin, 1919.
51 PRO, F 0228/3526/8 , 107 X iam en’s consul to Jordan, 20 May and 9 June, 1919.
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promoted the traditional method of direct preaching and foreign missionary controlled 
churches. The May Fourth Movement experiences widened this division between some 
liberal/progressive educators and fundamental/traditional evangelists. The disunity in the 
Protestant church will be discussed in more detail later in this chapter.
The fundamentalist approach was well articulated in LMS veteran J. Wallace Wilson’s 
correspondence. After 40 years' work in the field he continued to believe in the primacy 
of direct evangelism. He condemned the modem school education and the Chinese New 
Literature Movement as insufferable and the anti-Japanese boycotts as a "stupid affair". 
Wilson supported the North China Herald's demand to introduce an outside power to 
organise Chinese politics, but instead of suggesting the obvious option, that is, the 
Western countries' administration in China, Wilson surprisingly approved Japanese 
political activities and was willing to see the Chinese government under their control. 
According to the LMS missionaries’ May Fourth rhetoric, Wilson was certain of the 
Gospel’s saving power in uplifting the nation.52 None of the other British missionaries 
dared to express their admiration of Japan, especially since it had become the archenemy 
of China during the May Fourth Movement.
4.2. 'Man’s Extremity is God’s Opportunity1 -  British Missionaries’ Reflections 
across the Country
The final part o f this chapter evaluates other British missionary societies’ discussions 
about the May Fourth Movement. No other British missionary society, however, has such
52 LMS, Central China, Correspondence, box 30, J.Wallace Wilson to Hawkins, 24 June and 10 December, 
1919; LSM, Central China, Reports, box 8, J. Wallace W ilson, Hankou, 1918, 1919 and 1920; NCH , 17 
May, 1919, p. 405.
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vivid surviving correspondence about the May Fourth experiences in Shanghai as the 
London Missionary Society. Possible reasons for missing materials will be discussed 
together with materials that have been found.
The notoriety of the Shanghai May Fourth Movement had activated people in various 
towns and villages to join the mass movement. The stimulating atmosphere had enhanced 
socio-political participation to pursue nationalist ambitions which the Shanghai 
operations had provided as a relevant example. By the beginning of June, 1919, Shanghai 
had become the promoter of the surge of Chinese nationalist fervour. Given the size and 
diversity of China, regional responses to 'the Spirit of Shanghai1 were in some respects as 
important as the national ones and will now be analysed.
In the course of 1919, the Church Missionary Society’s (CMS) strategy was to 
withdraw its activities from Shanghai even though China and Japan had become core 
areas for their missionary work in the East. In doing so, they attempted to concentrate 
their efforts in the Zhejiang province, which is just below the Jiangsu province. It is 
important to remember that Shanghai was the centre for over 40 evangelistic, literature, 
medical, philanthropic, educational and other Christian societies. Therefore, competition 
had turned out to be overwhelming in some societies.53 Nevertheless, Ningbo’s treaty 
port remained an active CMS base, and Bishop Herbert Molony expressed his concerns 
for the British evangelists’ position in China. He realised that the Versailles Peace 
Conference had had serious negative effects on British missionary work, since from the 
Chinese perspective Britain was an ally of the deeply hated Japanese government. 
Undeniably, the contemporary patriotic Movement had strengthened these negative
53 Boynton (ed.), Directory> o f  Protestant M issions, passim ; Kevin Ward and Brian Stanley (eds.), The 
Church M ission Society and World Christianity, 1799-1999, (Richmond, Surrey, 2000), p. 23.
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attitudes. If this situation was not fragile enough to shake the British missionaries’ 
position, Molony reminded his colleagues of their enduring role as a foreign church using 
foreign money in an attempt to establish an indigenous Chinese church. Instead of 
forming an authentic Chinese church, the missionaries had once more created “a very 
foreign thing”, as he called it. Here, Molony anticipated the foreign-native disputes which 
escalated in the 1920’s into the anti-foreign and anti-Christian movement, and as time 
went by, anti-Christianity fears were reported from other CMS centres. By the end of 
1919, the CMS body, at the Zhejiang Conference finally decided to prohibit their 
students' participation in strikes, as it had instigated other CMS schools to join the 
Movement.54 Obviously, the ban was unable to prevent students from joining student 
unions, and as a consequence, reports to the British officials highlighted revolts in the 
classes which took place throughout the academic year. In response, the British 
government officials' reports blamed the missionaries for supporting students' activities, 
and, in a malicious tone, expressed satisfaction when the May Fourth activities began to 
trouble the missionary schools.55
Parallel development with the 'Spirit o f Shanghai' progressed in the Western areas of 
China in distant Sichuan province where the CMS missionaries’ May Fourth discourse 
was echoed in the West China Missionaiy News. The journal reported on the distribution 
of the “Ten Men Squad Pamphlet” and it was feared that activities would disturb the 
schools’ work. A teacher was furious when students wanted to “spend time in
54 NCH, 28 June, 1919, p. 839; University o f  Birmingham, Church Missionary Society Archives [hereafter 
CMS], Original papers, G 1/C H 2/0, Bishop M olony’s Annual Letter, Ningbo, 1 October, 1919; 
Recommendations and resolutions o f  the C.M.S. Chekiang Conference, Hangzhou, 9-12 March, 1920; 
Statement by M iss Weightman at the Meeting o f  the Mary Vaughan High School Committee, Hankou, 10 
March, 1920.
55 PRO, F 0 2 2 8 /3 527/80 A. Martin, Acting Consul, Ningbo to Jordan, 1 January, 1920; PRO, FO228/3280  
Ningbo Intelligence Report for Quarter Ended June 30th, 1920, by J.W.O. Davidson.
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‘pamphleteering’ and make speeches on the street to stir up patriotism”. The writer 
further described students’ activities to be "folly and potentially seditious" for the 
school’s discipline. The NCH  newspaper had described the ‘Group of ten’ in May 1919 
issue. Therefore, the author clearly knew that the students were faithfully imitating the 
Shanghai students’ duties which included patrolling streets to promote patriotism. The 
NCH  and the Celestial Empire were widely read British newspapers in the interior. Thus, 
the missionaries frequently used the newspapers to get wider foreign and especially 
British acceptance for their views. Consequently, probably the same author as above, 
publicly accused the May Fourth circulars called “Qingdao gone, Shandong lost, China 
lost”, o f fusing “the misguided patriotism among the students [which] is all bred in 
ignorance”.56
Further south, the May Fourth Movement’s power had already shocked the CMS’s 
Fujian mission workers. In spite of the missionary educators’ joint efforts to constrain 
activities, unrest among the middle schools and in the Fujian Christian University 
continued, and the institutions were forced to close. The closure appeared to be inevitable 
as the student union was directed by the Christian students, and the missionary educators 
proudly described their pacifying effect on the Movement. Again, the self-controlled and 
balanced Christian students were praised for their exemplary behaviour. When the 
Christian students voluntarily chose to join the Movement, and took authority into their 
own hands, some CMS members recognised this as the country’s grave desire to hear the 
Christian Gospel. Accordingly, the May Fourth Movement was acknowledged to be its
56 NCH, 21 June, 1919, p. 782 and NCH, 28 June, 1919, p. 839; The West China M issionary News, vol. 
XXI, August, 1919, p. 23. More about establishing the 'Groups o f ten' in Chapter Six.
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divine instrument.57 In some cases, however, British missionary assessments accused 
unsettled Chinese government school students of provoking and forcing Christian 
students to join patriotic activities.58
The missionary strategies towards the May Fourth Movement appeared to be 
constructed according to a particular local situation, and in juxtaposition with the worst 
possible scenarios in other places like Shanghai. In principle, the missionaries’ reactions 
seemed to support the May Fourth demonstrators’ protests against the corrupt Chinese 
government, as long as they did not interfere with the missionaries’ own projects, that is, 
spreading the Gospel and educational objectives at schools. But a conflict of interest with 
the May Fourth ideology arose when the May Fourth protagonists changed the British 
missionaries’ daily routines. As a result, when students challenged and in some cases 
took over authority, they, according to the missionaries, were questioning Christian 
principles. Beyond doubt the missionaries eagerly protected Christian values and rules, 
and their presence in China was based on these principles. Therefore, the May Fourth 
students’ threatened their existence by assuming control in the schools. Similarly, the 
British official community felt intimidated by the May Fourth demonstrators’ activities to 
assume power in the International Settlement.
The Baptist Missionary Society’s work (BMS) had been affected similarly by the 
World War as other missionary societies. Numerous members had joined the war service 
and had worked for the Red Cross or the YMCA. Meanwhile, others in the field found
57 CMS, Original papers, G 1/C H 4/0, John B. Carpenter, 18 June and 1, 6 December, 1919, and Fujian 
Christian University President’s Report, 10 October, 1919.
55 The Chinese government schools were blamed also in other missionary societies' correspondence see e.g. 
LMS, Central China, Reports, box 8, Gerald Luxor, Shanghai, 1919; LMS, South China, Correspondence, 
box 21, W.W. Clayson to Hawkins, 17 November, 1919; SOAS, Methodist Church Overseas Division, the 
W esleyan Methodist Missionary Society [hereafter WMMS], W om en’s Work Collection, South China, 
1920-1947, fiche box 1, Sadie K, Laird to Miss Hellier, 3 February, 1920; SOAS, Presbyterian Church o f
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that the situation was becoming increasingly difficult for financial reasons. In addition, 
the lack of fresh recruits seriously limited evangelistic work.59 The war had 
unquestionably restricted all missionary correspondence, but in the case of the BMS, for 
reasons not known, there is a visible discontinuity of male missionaries’ correspondence 
between 1914-1922, whereas the women's correspondence is available. As a result, 
several May Fourth assessments presented below are based on the secondary materials.
Modern BMS educator’s perception of the May Fourth Movement was presented in Dr. 
Harold Balme’s booklet The Awakening o f  China in Relation to the M odem Missionaty 
Programme. The analysis of the Movement was combined with the suggestion that a new 
missionary strategy should be implemented in China. After presenting a concise history 
of Shandong province and an account of the injustice which happened in China’s 
domestic and international politics, Balme praised the growing power of Chinese public 
opinion which expressed common national principles. Emphasising Western liberal 
values, he described May Fourth participants’ fight for liberty and democracy as being 
against the burden of militarism. According to Balme, contemporary student leaders had 
been influenced by “the free and democratic gospel of Jesus of Nazareth”, and that the 
Western education system introduced by the Protestant missionaries had naturally formed 
a framework for change, and the permanent influence of Christianity in China would be 
achieved by reinforcing the missionary education work. Above all, to achieve a more 
permanent position in the country, Balme believed that the missionary programmes 
should be primarily educational, not evangelistic as the fundamentalist missionaries were
England, Foreign Missions Committee and W om en’s Missionary Association, [hereafter PCE], South 
Fujian, Individuals A-J, box 18, A.S.M . Andersson to Rev. Dr. Maclogan, 20 June, 1919.
59 In total, there was over 70 British missionaries engaged in war service, China M ission Year Book 1918, 
(Shanghai, 1918), p. 409; H.R. W illiamson, British Baptists in China 1845-1952 , (London, 1957), pp. 100- 
1 01 .
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proclaiming.60 Balme was among the first British missionaries to have made concrete 
suggestions on how to attach contemporary nationalist sentiment with Christian 
objectives. He perceived that the primary goal was to educate enlightened May Fourth 
leaders.
Shandong was one of the three principal areas where the BM S’ evangelists worked 
and an escalation of the Japanese boycott immediately reduced the numbers of church 
volunteers and caused problems in daily missionary routines. Further West, Miss C.A. 
Waddington convincingly stated, in contrast, that her school had not become affiliated 
with patriotic fervour. On the contrary, her report explained that prayer sessions had been 
held to support Chinese nationalism. Furthermore, it boasted the founding of the 
Women’s Patriotic League, in which the objective was to intensify women's practical 
duties for the country.61 Inevitably these activities were practised primarily to support the 
strengthening o f Chinese nationalism. Her narration was undoubtedly another example of 
missionary reasoning during the May Fourth Movement. Formally, as explained, most 
church organisations maintained an official position of neutrality towards the May Fourth 
Movement, while at the same time they made no effort to suppress students' operations.
Nevertheless, there were obvious signs of more official missionary society's approval. 
The BMS deputation touring China in 1919-1920 portrayed the May Fourth Movement 
demonstrators as an excellent recruitment group for Christian evangelism. Furthermore, 
the report described widely the positive signs of the Movement and once more 
emphasised the missionaries’ opportunities among the Chinese youth. Even the China
60 Harold Balme, The Awakening o f  China in Relation to the Modern M issionary Program me, (London, ca. 
1921), pp. 1 ,4 , 9, 11-12.
01 Regents Park College, Angus Library, Oxford, Baptist Missionary Society Archives [hereafter BMS], 
Annual Report o f  the BMS, 21 March, 1920; box CH/24, Secretariat: Shaanxi, Miss C.E. Waddington, 
Report o f  Girls’ School, Xi'an, January, 1920.
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Sub-Committee in London expressed hopeful opinions about the perplexed condition of 
Chinese politics that had been described by the Rev. Evan Morgan in Shanghai.62
Long before 1919, Protestant Christianity had had a profound influence on the process 
of creating the New Culture Movement and May Fourth ideology in China. Since the 
1870’s, the BMS member Timothy Richard’s missionary agenda had placed special 
emphasises on teaching Western values and sciences. When the programme was first 
implemented, it included translation of Western books into Chinese and ‘the Society for 
the Diffusion o f Christian and General Knowledge among the Chinese’ (later the 
Christian Literature Society for China) was established for the publication work. 
Moreover, the YMCA’s educational programmes that had been established on Richard's 
ideas preached the virtues of Western science and technology. Therefore, the May Fourth 
Movement’s educated elite studying at the missionary schools had the opportunity to 
integrate the ideas of Western liberalism with the awakening o f Chinese radical 
nationalism.63
So far, all the missionary societies analysed have had some correspondence materials. 
Unfortunately the China Inland Mission (CIM), easily the largest Protestant missionary 
society in China, has no surviving correspondence related to the May Fourth Movement. 
In general, a few scattered personal memoirs and letters have survived from that period. 
Therefore, the missionary journals have been the only available source to evaluate the 
society’s attitudes. In contrast to other analysed missionary materials, the initial editorial 
comments in the CIM's China's Millions about the May Fourth activities warned of a
62 The Challenge o f  Chifia, Being the Report o f  a Deputation sent out to visit the China Mission Fields o f  
the B.M.S. 1919-1920, (London, 1920), pp. 8, 70-72; BM S, China Sub-Committee, Minute Books 1919- 
1923, Meeting, 16 September, 1919, p. 20.
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danger of rising anti-foreign sentiment that would endanger the missionaries’ presence, 
and which would eventually complicate their evangelistic work. Strong negative attitudes 
continued in the following year when the May Fourth Movement was discussed in the 
journal under the subtitle “Forces of Evil” together with “the Military Peril”, “the Menace 
of Bolshevism” and “the Opium Peril”. It may not have revealed the individual 
missionaries’ attitudes, but officially the CIM appeared to condemn the Movement 
openly.64 The reasons for their hostile approach might differ, but obviously incidents of 
the Boxer uprising were vivid in their memory as the CIM had lost more members than 
any other missionary society during that crisis. Consequently, the renewal of a Boxer - 
type mass movement was a fearsome threat to the society’s existence. It has been 
acknowledged also that the CIM as a nondenominational mission usually attracted 
fundamentalists of the missionary community. Moreover, it was a strongly evangelistic 
society, which sponsored little educational work.65 When the students launched the May 
Fourth Movement their activities appeared to be outside the CIM missionary agenda. The 
detachment was also physical, because even though its headquarters was situated in 
Shanghai, most of the CIM stations were situated in the interior, far away from active 
student centres. Furthermore, the CIM’s decision to oppose May Fourth activities seems 
to support the assumption of a visible friction between the liberal and conservative wings 
within the Protestant church.
63 Jessie G. Lutz, Chinese P olitics and Christian Missions, The Anti-Christian M ovements o f  1920-28 , 
(Notre Dame, Indiana, 1988), pp. 45-46; Brian Stanley, The Bible and the Flag, P rotestant M issions and 
British Imperialism in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, (Leicester, 1990), pp. 138-139.
64 China's M illions, Editorial Notes, vol. XLV, September, 1919, pp. 107-108; China's M illions, vol. 
XLVI, May, 1920, pp. 59-60.
65 Cui, The Cultural Contribution o f  British P rotestant M issionaries, pp. 155-156; Kenneth S. Latourette, A 
H isto iy  o f  Christian M issions in China, (N ew  York, 1929), pp. 385-386, 517.
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Various changes in the distribution of the Christian Gospel in the nineteenth century 
Protestant missionary society had by the 1910's developed into a perceivable disunion 
within the missionary community in China. The social gospel method supported by 
Timothy Richard, Charles Sparham and W. Hopkyn Rees and many others, formed the 
liberal or progressive faction which promoted Christianity through education and medical 
work. Moreover, the liberal missionaries encouraged the inauguration of indigenous 
churches and supported literary reform in China. By contrast, the CIM was at the core of 
the conservative/fundamentalist or evangelical approach where traditional preaching was 
seen as the most successful way to teach Christianity.66 Both sections were well 
represented in the May Fourth discussions and apparently the Movement found more 
support among the liberal missionary societies than from the conservative community. 
This situation was hardly surprising since the progressive missionaries had established 
many of the institutions where the Movement flourished, and educated some of the 
students who led the student unions. For the fundamentalists, the May Fourth Movement 
represented indisputable disorder allegedly advocated by the liberal missionary education 
programmes.
The missionary societies already discussed all had a resident station in Shanghai, and 
had, therefore, a direct connection with their colleagues. However, a brief discussion of 
the missionaries who did not have formal connections with Shanghai is necessary in 
order to unravel a more complete British missionary May Fourth experience and to see 
whether 'the Spirit of Shanghai1 had spread into these missionary communities. The 
Wesleyan Methodist Missionary Society's (WMMS) views seemed to fit with some
66 Cui, The Cultural Contribution o f  British Protestant M issionaries, pp. 8-30; Latourette, A H isto ty  o f  
Christian M issions, pp. 794-795.
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British missionaries’ discussions. Therefore, they spoke about the “undeveloped Chinese 
school children passing over a wave of madness” and believed that “they need caning 
rather badly” .67 At the same time, in their journal, the May Fourth activities were mainly 
praised as the students tried to sway public opinion by using Christianity as an 
instrument. The missionaries wrote of May Fourth Movement leaders who, they said, 
possessed qualities required for 'the earnest Christian' such as aptitude of service, 
willingness to sacrifice, and the ability to lead groups. Many of the desired characteristics 
had been exposed during the Movement and were therefore appreciated by the foreign 
missionaries.68
The Presbyterian Church of England (PCE) correspondence provided an inclusive view 
of educational administrators’ actions at the height of the Movement's activities in June 
1919. Again, in public, the missionaries were initially sympathetic towards the students’ 
actions, but the fear of spreading insubordination at schools diminished the missionary 
authorities’ readiness to continue their support. Like the WMMS missionaries, the PCE 
accused government institutions of inflaming sentiment in the missionary schools by 
arguing that “the Students from Government’s schools here were sending letters accusing 
them [Christian students] of unpatriotism and being under foreign influences and even the 
shop people were taking quite a strong attitude”.69 The missionaries seemingly resented 
the influence the student union could exercise over its students. Moreover, the
67 WMMS, Correspondence, Hubei, 1905-1945, fiche box 7, Dr. W .A. Tachhell to Rev. C.W. Andrews, 15 
June, 1919; W MMS, Correspondence, Hunan 1907-1945, fiche box 4, Mr. Gilbert G. Warren to Mr. 
Loudis, 10 January, 1920; W MMS, W om en’s Work Collection, South China 1920-1947, fiche box 1, Sadie 
K. Laird to
M iss Hellier, 3 February, 1920.
68 The Story o f  1919, Being the 106th Annual Report o f  the Wesleyan M ethodist M issionary Society, pp. 58- 
60; The Story o f 1920, Being the 107th Annual Report o f  the Wesleyan M ethodist M issionary Society , p. 67.
69 PCE, South Fujian, Individuals A-J, box 18, A.S.M . Andersson to Rev. Dr. Maclagan, 20 June, 1919; 
W estminster College M agazine , vol. Ill, no 1, September, 1919, pp. 1,20; PCE, South Fujian, General
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'irresponsible' use of strikes and demonstrations caused great concerns over the future 
developments within the missionary community.
Indeed, the May Fourth Movement had developed a nation-wide question for the 
Christian church to answer in China and it required a unanimous reaction. The 
controversy over the church’s participation in the Movement created an immediate 
division of opinion, which was visible within the Chinese Christians and within the 
foreign missionary community. It became obvious that whilst the missionary societies 
should not get involved officially, the Christians as individuals were encouraged to 
support the Chinese cause. These questions were reflected in the widely distributed and 
multi-denominational journal, The Chinese Recorder, which in July’s editorial discussed 
the proper means to promote the national movement. In the same issue two pictures of 
“the recent student-commercial passive revolution”, as it was described, reminded the 
readers about the May Fourth demonstrators and their objectives. The picture of the girls’ 
school parade with girls wearing white uniforms and caps and carrying the Movement 
banners presented the students’ deep commitment to the present situation. In addition, the 
Chinese-English signs in the shop windows brought images of the commercial 
community’s connection with the Movement.70 These pictures and texts conveyed a 
message of peaceful and rightful revolution that was inviting the Western Christians’ 
acceptance, and that the general Protestant missionaries’ sentiment therefore encouraged 
their members to support Chinese nationalism. Yet in practice the degree and substance 
of missionaries’ involvement were unregulated. Dr. Rees in Shanghai seemed to
Correspondence, 1910-1919, box 10, Reports o f  the year 1919, Westminster C ollege, A.S.M. Andersson 
and R.D. Rogers.
70 Editorial, The Chinese R ecorder, vol. L, July, 1919, pp. 432-437; the LMS reports and correspondence, 
passim .
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represent the active side of the participation, whereas others just expressed their 
sympathy and support for the Chinese and commemorated the patriotic activists quietly in 
their prayers.
While the Protestant missionary congregations were generally hesitant to be officially 
identified with the May Fourth activities, the Tianjin Missionary Association sent a 
petition to the British and American ministers in Beijing. Signed by 42 British and 
American missionaries, including for example A. Lavington Hart, C.H.E.Longman and 
A.P.Cullen from the LMS, the appeal was addressed to the British and American 
governments, and was an unusual step outside the missionary community’s non-political 
presence in China. A similar petition was dispatched also by the Beijing Missionary 
Association. The plea criticised the pro-Japanese Peace Treaty in Versailles and 
predicted that it would eventually endanger the Allied Powers relations with China and 
would in future, generate distrust and unrest in the country.71 The Tianjin missionaries 
were naturally concerned about the May Fourth activities around the area, but mainly, 
they were disturbed by Japanese anti-American, anti-British and anti-Christian 
propaganda published in local papers. Translations of these hostile articles were also sent 
to the Ministers in Beijing, and to the English newspapers in Shanghai.72 The fact that 
newspapers had connected the churches and the Shandong Christian University with May 
Fourth activities in a very inauspicious manner probably explained the urgency behind 
the missionaries’ petition.
71 PRO, F 0371/3695 , no 111286, Copy o f  the Tianjin Missionary A ssociation’s petition to Jordan and Paul 
Reincsh, 11 June, 1919.
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Conclusion
As I have illustrated throughout this chapter, the British missionaries’ May Fourth 
experiences and discussions were not always in unison. The missionaries’ understanding 
of their experience was in many ways circumscribed by the geographical, cultural and 
social space within which they operated. Not only had the foreign observers sets of 
contextual co-ordinates, the May Fourth Movement also changed its appearance and 
activities from city to village. Therefore, the coherence of the missionaries’ May Fourth 
experiences was based on the use of certain rhetoric, that is, key expressions and 
principles that were expressed to produce implicit collective instructions for their 
communal behaviour. By continually repeating the common Christian and Western 
values in their correspondence and most likely in their meetings, they formed shared 
expectations of how to react towards the Movement. When the church organisations 
generally disclaimed official connections with the Movement, these missionaries’ May 
Fourth discussions set rules for their individual participation. The other feature of the 
May Fourth rhetoric was that it was embraced more enthusiastically in some places and 
by some missionaries than in others.
Missionaries used different concepts to describe the May Fourth Movement, and by 
classifying the Movement, they revealed their attitudes and perceptions towards it. 
Hence, their writings formed a framework for individual experience, for example, within 
a particular missionary community. The missionaries occasionally suggested more 
general behaviour models for all missionaries or for all Britons in the city and even for all 
foreigners in China.
72 NCH, 28 June, 1919, p. 836; Peking and Tientsin Times, 14 May, 1919; PRO, F 0228/3526/25 and 70 
Report o f  Consul o f  Ji'nan to Jordan, 5 June, 1919 and Jordan to FO, 14 June, 1919.
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In the writings from Shanghai, the Movement was labelled as the “passive resistance 
movement” or “patriotic/national movement”. Sometimes it was referred to as “creating 
general unrest among the students”, but there was scarcely any negative associations 
attached to the Movement. It was more acceptable, when it supported the Western values 
of liberalism and democracy, and thus, the terms “patriotic/national movement” were 
constantly repeated in the missionary reports. To increase the messages’ effectiveness, 
the passive nature of the Movement was highlighted in order to guarantee foreigners’ 
safety during the activities. Despite the troubles caused by the student strikes and 
demonstrations in Shanghai, British missionaries were willing to present a positive side 
of it.
In terms of geography, 'the Sprit o f Shanghai' was soon given more negative and 
contrasting characteristics as the May Fourth Movement approached all comers of the 
country. When comparing reflections across China, repeated definitions such as “pseudo- 
patriotic student strike”, “misguided patriotism”, “grotesque movement” or “wave of 
madness” provided a different perspective of the Movement. Geographically, the most 
negative characteristics were given from the interior stations especially from Hankou, but 
convincingly cynical attitudes were also communicated from the larger coastal cities of 
Guangzhou and Hong Kong. Generally, the interior missionaries seemed to have a 
rapidly declining tolerance towards the Movement. One practical reason behind this type 
of reaction was that the smaller towns and the countryside were more vulnerable to 
violent movements and in the case of an emergency, the treaty ports’ “gunboat 
diplomacy” -  style protection was not automatically available. In that situation, any kind 
of mass movement was approached with suspicion and caution.
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Another type of May Fourth discussion was created around the missionary institutions’ 
authority. New student unions were mushrooming around China and every self- 
respecting government school, and most of the missionary schools had either formed 
their own, or had joined the national students' union. The Shanghai Student Union (SSU) 
was one of the leading unions and already during its inaugural meeting on May 11, 1919, 
represented over 12 000 students from 61 schools in Shanghai. Various other student 
unions replicated the SSU policies and activities and they disseminated May Fourth
ideology around the country. Finally, the separate unions formed a nation-wide student
73network. In a short time, the national student union members were knocking on the 
missionary institutions’ doors encouraging students not only to join the demonstrations, 
but also persuading them to leave the classes and to contribute time to patriotic activities. 
Many of the Movement leaders were educated by the missionaries, and for some 
missionaries, the May Fourth era had become an opportunity to demonstrate the value of 
Christianity to the Chinese people. As such, indigenous Chinese nationalism appeared to 
fulfil the missionaries' aspirations for the nation's spiritual growth. Occasionally this 
situation created special connections between foreign missionaries and May Fourth 
activists. Rees’ active involvement as an adviser quelled the inflamed sentiments of 
patriotism and provided a good example of trust and co-operation between the May 
Fourth activists and the missionaries. In contrast, other British educators in Shanghai 
restrained their students from partaking in the May Fourth activities, if necessary 
expelled students from school and remained confident of their control over the students. 
Taken as a whole, when the missionaries understood that the May Fourth Movement 
represented the Christian and Western values of free speech, liberty and democracy
73 Chen, The M ay Fourth M ovem ent in Shanghai, p. 83; Wasserstrom, Student Protests, pp. 62-63.
167
against the corruption and oligarchy of the Chinese government, the student unions and 
their duties were also accepted. The Christian Gospel’s positive role in leading the 
Movement and providing spiritual guidance was constantly praised in the published 
articles74.
In the smaller administrative towns, the student union was perceived as a recognised 
threat for the missionary authority at the school. Fear of losing control produced strong 
negative comments such as “the Students’ League, however noble its objectives were, 
undermined school discipline and must ultimately lead to lawlessness” and further “the 
Students’ Associations have begun to feed their power and are exercising a tyranny’s 
influence over the students” 75. These missionaries were so concerned of being defeated 
by the student union’s expanding influence on the Christian students that they ignored 
their students’ difficult position. For students, placing studies before politics was selfish 
and unpatriotic, whereas the action of the British missionaries was seen as proof of intent 
to denationalise their pupils. Hereafter, some Chinese Christians found it difficult to 
reconcile their church allegiance with patriotism and decided in favour of their country.
Differences between missionary and government institutes were highlighted in the May 
Fourth discussions in favour of the former. Therefore, 'our students and the government 
school students' was a commonly used concept in order to demonstrate the superior 
position of the former. The missionary school students were proclaimed as self-controlled 
and disciplined leaders, whose possible involvement had only a pacifying effect on the 
Movement. Troublemakers were frequently found in other schools. Furthermore, various 
comparisons were made between unrest in Shanghai and Beijing, and more so with the
74 A.P. Cullen, ‘Young China Seeks a Prophet’, The Chronicle, vol. 28, May 1920, pp. 121-122; A.H. 
Jowett Murray, 1 Patriotic Strikes in China’, The Chronicle, vol. 29, April, 1921, pp. 80-81.
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problems at the American missionary institutions. Troubled centres were constantly 
under discussion, and incidents were enumerated to remind everyone how bad the 
circumstances were somewhere else. According to British missionary rhetoric the 
boycotts, demonstrations, strikes etc. always happened elsewhere, not in their 
constituency, nor in their institutions. Even if a missionary conceded the occurrence of 
May Fourth activities in his own area, by definition the advocator was found to be an 
outsider. Usually this outsider was from the Chinese government school.
Previous chapters have concentrated mainly on British reactions during the first months 
of the May Fourth Movement. It is now necessary to evaluate the British May Fourth 
discourse during and after the summer of 1919, and to analyse its possible short and long­
term consequences in Shanghai.
75 CMS, Original papers, G 1/C H 4/0, John B. Caipenter, 6 December, 1919; LMS, Central China, Reports, 
box 8, folder 4, Stanley V. Boxer, Hankou, 1919.
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S. ’APPEAL FOR STATUS QUO’ - THE MAY FOURTH 
MOVEMENT AFTER JUNE 1919
Though briefly discussed in the previous chapters, it is now essential to examine 
incidents which the British perceived as May Fourth activities after the general strike was 
over in June, 1919. The theme of this chapter relates to changes in British rhetoric on the 
May Fourth activities and it suggests possible reasons for these changes in attitudes.
In contrast to the previous three chapters, the British community is analysed as a 
combined unit rather than focusing on one group at a time. Here, British May Fourth 
rhetoric is categorised under sub-headings that are roughly in chronological order, 
according to unfolding events occurring after the general strike. Different groups are 
discussed together in order to follow the general development of May Fourth rhetoric and 
common experiences, and also because the framework for British perceptions has been 
discussed in the earlier chapters. At this stage, such an approach is relevant for two 
reasons. Firstly, the collective experience of the general strike that was contrived by the 
Council had similar attitudes towards the May Fourth Movement. Hence, collective 
perceptions seemed to prevail in the British community. Secondly, the Council's 
ambiguous policies during May-June 1919 prompted severe collective criticism from 
other foreigners living inside and outside the city, and significantly among the Shanghai 
British society itself. The former group of people seemed to approve of the May Fourth 
Movement as such, and therefore, they opposed the Council's repressive operations, 
hence, challenging the existing power structures in the International Settlement. This 
dualistic understanding o f the Movement was especially reflected in the British municipal 
and consulate officials' and businessmen's correspondence after the general strike. Thus, 
by carefully comparing the second phase of British May Fourth rhetoric, my aim is to
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extract initial British attempts to mythologise the events, and moreover, to legitimise their 
actions taken during the May Fourth general strike.
Among the British there were certain general features which accelerated the creation of 
a logical continuity between pre- and after-strike conditions, even after the strain of the 
general strike was lifted and business was gradually returning to normal. At first sight, 
the Chinese students appeared to be continuing with Japanese boycotts, since their 
demands were only partially fulfilled. Releasing students from bail and the dismissal of 
three pro-Japanese officials in Beijing, were perceived merely as a stepping stone on the 
way to a victorious modem China. Newly established Chinese newspapers and magazines 
supported their representatives in Paris who were still, in June 1919 struggling against 
international pressure to sign the Versailles peace agreement. Encouraging articles and 
pamphlets were written to strengthen the May Fourth spirit and the Chinese delegates' 
determination in Paris. In addition, the Chinese associations which were based on shared 
interests such as the shop-owners' street unions, student groups, labour unions, and 
finally, anti-Japanese boycott societies, were mushrooming in Shanghai. All of them 
ceaselessly supported the May Fourth principles. Untamed rumours spread around the 
Settlement, notwithstanding the Council's efforts to restrain them. Moreover, many o f the 
notifications issued during May and June 1919 were still in force. The British gunboats 
remained in the Customs Jetty for some weeks to build up foreigners' predominance and 
to recover their control system which had been shaken during the June strikes.
5.1. The Council's Hard-line Policy and the Press Licence of July 1919
The second phase o f the May Fourth Movement was, according to the foreign municipal 
officials, to be regulated strictly by the Council's orders. The Council Chairman, E.C.
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Pearce's speech at the Ratepayers' Special meeting on 10 July 1919 drew lines for tougher 
policy and emphasised local British nationalism exercised in Shanghai. It is therefore 
necessary to quote it in its entirety (see Appendix 2). It was without doubt the textual 
embodiment of British authority in the International Settlement.
Pearce's utterances provide a relevant example of the discourse of authority or 
authorised language discussed by sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, and since the audience - 
the International Settlement's ratepayers - recognised it as authoritative, much of the 
Council's power was articulated in Pearce's speech. This sounds feasible as the speech 
was given in legitimate circumstances at the Ratepayers' meeting which in practice 
represented the highest 'quasi-democratic parliament' in the International Settlement. 
Only the Consular Body in Shanghai and the Diplomatic Body in Beijing had the 
authority to veto its decisions. Moreover, the Council Chairman held the legitimate 
license to express foreign Shanghailanders' requests in the meeting and as the leader of a 
privileged business and financial community, he was allowed to propagate this particular 
type of discourse. Finally, the speech was enunciated according to the sanctioned forms 
of rhetorical speech, that is, Pearce used impressive metaphors such as "our needs as a 
cosmopolitan community" and threatened with "paths of violence" or the Settlement 
being "a pawn in Chinese politics".1 By using them he communicated the Council's 
commanding message. Coupled with its authoritative and executive tone, the speech also 
conveyed the symbolic power possessed by the Council. Again, as in the case of 
authorised language, it has to be remembered that symbolic power can be exercised only 
if  it is acknowledged as such. Initially, the audience had belief in the legitimacy of the 
Council Chairman's words in that it created hegemony to maintain the existing political 
and social order in the International Settlement. What followed was that during unsettled
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times, such as during rebellion or movement, the Council had to actively maintain their 
position by presenting themselves as having the legitimate right to rule the community. 
However, to be able to strengthen its control, the Council wished to manifest its symbolic 
hegemony over the Sino-foreign residents. In other words, it was obliged to confirm the 
united vision of the world within the borders of the International Settlement. In so doing, 
the Council's discourse insisted on providing to others a sufficient understanding of the 
reality in the Settlement. All this indicated that by expressing its perception of the May 
Fourth Movement, the Council attempted to form a collective, appropriate myth-like 
understanding of the incidents and to legitimise their actions towards the Movement. 
Another case of creating 'the official myth' after the May Fourth strikes in Shanghai will 
be analysed later in this chapter.
Yet another dimension of Pearce's speech was to redefine the nature of foreigners’ 
presence in the city. In contrast to Britain and America, Shanghai was described as a 
cosmopolitan community, with unique conditions beyond any comparison. It was not a 
coincidence that comparison was made between the city and two Western independent 
countries . In this context the Council used 'the Shanghailander' identity to emphasise the 
whole foreign community's special nature.3 For this reason a code o f local laws, that is, 
the Land Regulations and Bylaws, had been implemented based upon foreign nations' 
extraterritorial laws. In doing so the Council expressed its willingness to operate within 
the symbolic framework of a modem democratic society, but reserved for itself the
’ Bourdieu, Language and Symbolic P ow er , pp. 107-116, 163-170; M unicipal Gazette  10 July, 1919, p. 242.
2 Clifford, Spoilt Children o f  Empire, pp. 17, 36.
3 Pearce's speech offered a partly different perspective to conventional 'Shanghailander' identity. For similar 
usage o f  the Shanghailander concept, see M unicipal Gazette, 9 April, 1920, p. 157. Compare with Robert 
A. Bickers' in-depth evaluation of'th e Shanghailander’ identity, which excluded particularly the managers 
o f larger British companies and missionaries. In contrast, on July 1919, the meeting included all the 
influential Ratepayers to the 'Shanghailander community'. It seemed that when needed, the Council used 
the term to form a united front and therefore categorised the powerful British business managers under the 
concept. See Bickers, Britain in China, pp. 15, 67; Bickers, "Shanghailanders: The Formation and 
Identity", pp. 161, 171-172, 175-185.
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privilege of constituting its own laws according to particular needs. The Council had no 
internationally recognised judicial power and had established its jurisdiction on 
incoherent Land Regulations and later, added Bylaws.4
Nevertheless, at the Ratepayers' meeting the Council sought foreign acceptance on 
dealing with the aftermath of the May Fourth activities. To begin with, arguments were 
based on the Council's claimed knowledge of the Settlement's affairs. Secondly, they 
alluded to the Council's practical experience on maintaining peace and good order, and 
lastly they trusted in its own accurate evaluation of the Movement's potential threat to the 
foreign society. Relying on such statements, the Council claimed to possess a qualified 
understanding of the Movement while simultaneously presenting its world vision to the 
ratepayers. Accordingly, the Settlement had been "dictated by the students, political 
malcontents and agitators" who had propagated violence by "malicious press and 
distributed false rumours creating more unrest"5. For the model world of Shanghai6 "the 
seditious, violent and scurrilous printed materials" were not appropriate instruments to 
communicate. Hence, the Council called for an immediate implementation of the Bylaw 
of Press Licence.
The Council had tried to introduce the press licence before7, but the Consular Body of 
Shanghai had blocked it. This time, by connecting it to the May Fourth strikes, rumours, 
and moreover, to printing and publishing disturbing pamphlets and newspapers, the 
Council was committed to introduce the law. Without hesitation the Ratepayers' meeting 
approved the law proposal despite the fact that the American Council representative, the 
Chairman of the Ratepayers and allegedly over 100 British ratepayers opposed it, some of
4 Kotenev, Shanghai: Its M ixed Court, pp. 557-575
5 M unicipal Gazette 10 July, 1919, p. 242.
6 ’The model world o f Shanghai' was an ideal o f  the city created by the British and it was frequently 
referred to in the British correspondence and books to define its advanced characteristics when comparing 
it with surrounding Chinese areas. Charles M, Dyce, The M odel Settlement, (London, 1906), passim .
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them by walking out of the meeting8. To implement the press licence, the Council had, 
via Senior Consul D. Siffert, sought the Consular Body's approval on revision of the 
Land Regulations. Instead it received firm rejection from even the British consulate. The 
French Concession had already adopted a press law and after the May Fourth incidents 
this law was introduced to convince doubting foreign officials in the International 
Settlement. In addition, just 24 hours before the Ratepayers' meeting the Council revised 
the press licence, presumably to satisfy the foreign consuls. Thus, from the beginning, it 
was clear that the ultimate decision of the press licence question depended upon the 
Consular Body, which eventually, though not unexpectedly, rejected the law.9 The 
Council's propagandised communication was, however, published in local foreign 
newspapers and the law itself was the subject of wide debate during the summer of 1919, 
as I shall demonstrate in this chapter.
Why was the Press Licence so crucial to the Council's hegemony and legitimacy after 
the May Fourth incidents that a Special Meeting of Ratepayers needed to be convened? 
Why, on the other hand, was the press bylaw strongly opposed especially by Americans 
and some other foreigners and Chinese citizens?10 In principle, the suggested press bylaw 
gave the Shanghai Municipal Police and the Revenue Office officials free access to 
search any printing or publishing houses, Chinese and foreign, in the International 
Settlement without a warrant. Besides having permission to confiscate and seize any 
printed materials perceived as being "published in breach o f seditious or scurrilous
7 Shanghai Municipal Council, Annual Report 1918, pp. 82B-84B.
8 NCDN, 10 July, 1919, p. 6; NCDN, 17 July, 1919, p. 8.
9 China P ress , 9 July, 1919, p. 7; M unicipal G azette , 5 July, 1919, pp. 216-217; PRO, F 0 6 7 1/447/661-665 
Pearce to Siffert, 25 June, 1919; the British, American, Spanish, Dutch, Italian and Portuguese Consulates 
responses to Siffert, June-July, 1919; SMA, U l-91-19 , file 19, Shanghai Municipal Police, Pearce to 
Siffert, 26 June, 1919.
10 As Bryna Goodman has pointed out British-American transnational press interests also collided here, since 
both the British and the Americans also represented Chinese interests whose publications they supported. 
Bryna Goodman, "Improvisations on a Semicolonial Theme, or, How to Read a Celebration o f  Transnational 
Urban Community", in The Journal o f  Asian Studies 59, no 4 (November 2000), pp. 902-912.
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character or of a character that is calculated to incite a breach o f the peace or the 
disturbance of good order", the printing houses that were deemed dangerous were subject 
to immediate suspension11. Thus, the Council had the ultimate power to decide which 
materials fitted into the above mentioned categories and in times of unrest, such as the 
May Fourth demonstrations had brought to the International Settlement, the 'seditious' 
printing materials and houses were certainly primary targets to censure. In other words, 
according to the China Press, by implementing the Press Licence the Council wanted to 
muzzle all voices of protest against its administration, while simultaneously they 
inconsistently claimed to respect freedom of expression12.
In the present circumstances the Mixed Court, at the Council's request, gave permission 
to search. However, the ruling process was too inefficient and slow for the Council's 
operations to be effective during emergency situations. In addition, the foreign controlled 
Mixed Court had authority over the constitution and jurisdiction at the Settlement, and it 
possessed disciplinary measures such as the closure of illegal premises which the Council 
was willing to acquire for themselves, as their report revealed. Traditionally, the primary 
function of the Council had been to possess an executive control over the municipal 
affairs and it had limited legal authority under the Land Regulations. This was not, 
however, the position that the Council wished to hold. As a result, the report required 
amendments to the Land Regulation to enlarge its legislative powers by empowering the 
Ratepayers' meeting to issue laws without final approval from the Consular Body, the 
Diplomatic Body or the Chinese government.13 The Press Licence argument seemed to 
fortify the Council's 'grand plan' to expand its self-government in the International
11 M unicipal Gazette, 11 July, 1919, p. 242.
12 China Press, 26 June, 1919, p. 10; China Press, 3 July, 1919, p. 12: China Press, 8 July, 1919, p. 10.
13 CA, China Association Circulars, vol. XVII, number 261-278, 28th Feb. 1918-15°’ April, 1920, China's 
Future and the Future o f  Shanghai, N.O. Liddell, Secretary o f  the Council, 10 December, 1918; Stephens, 
O rder and D iscipline in China, pp. 51-52, 103-106.
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Settlement. The Press law appeared to demonstrate the Council's persistent policy to 
control the region and by superficially amending the details, the foreign oligarchy 
unsuccessfully attempted to restrict the press during the next consequent five years in the 
annual ratepayers' meetings14.
During May Fourth activities, the Council had experienced attacks from two separate 
quarters. Firstly, in spite of the prohibitions issued, publications printed by fervent 
Chinese students and merchants flooded into the Settlement, therefore undermining the 
Council's prohibitions. As a response, the foreign municipal police confiscated massive 
amounts of printed materials which propounded issues such as the poison rumours; the 
spread of Bolshevism; the boycott of Japanese products etc. Moreover, an appeal to the 
foreigners to provide support in fighting against Japanese imperialism was distributed 
throughout the Settlement.15 According to the Council's perception, these messages 
threatened its well-maintained control system and incited people to disturb peace and 
order. The uncontrollable press was associated with 'dictatorial students and political 
agitators' who had provoked strikes. Initially this type of rhetoric accused the press of 
causing recent political disturbances. Once the press law had been implemented, the 
Council would possess the means to censure opposing publishing houses in the 
Settlement.
In fact, outside the student and educated class, illiteracy levels among the Chinese 
populace were high, and mouth-to-mouth communication remained the most common 
and fastest way to transmit information. Indeed, the May Fourth students used vivid 
imagination to invent means to promote their cause. Popular lectures were held on street
14 Land Regulations and Bye-Laws: Amendments proposed  and Amendments completed: 1898-1931, 
(Shanghai, no date), pp. 1-2.
15 SMA, U l-91-18 , Shanghai Municipal Police, McEuen to Consul-General de France, Auguste Wilden, 20 
June, 1919; SMA U l-9 1 -1 9 , file 18, Shanghai Municipal Police, McEuen to Wilden, 18, 19, 20 June, 1919;
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comers, parades passed through the city and patriotic plays were shown in the markets16. 
The crucial factor deliberately ignored by the Council during their campaign for the press 
licence, but pointed out in the NCH , was that the Chinese newspapers, handbills and 
posters printed in other parts of Shanghai nonetheless flooded effortlessly into the
• 1 7 *International Settlement regardless of the printing prohibitions. Apart from their efforts 
to restrain the students' 'virulent press' and 'malicious rumours', this detail revealed that 
the Council's primary intention was to attain control, particularly over the American press 
in the Settlement.
The second type of criticism came from the American press. At the time of the May 
Fourth events especially, the daily China Press had been a frequent nuisance to the 
British municipal authorities. Soon after the general strike had loosened its grip over 
Shanghai's commercial world, the American newspaper began to criticise the Council and 
its actions towards the Movement. In its six point declaration of 'things that were done 
wrongly', the paper entirely condemned the Council's policies. Mishandled operations 
included the SVC's display of military pomp, enforcement of opening the shops and the 
rule to remove all banners including those urging the crowds not to commit violence. In 
addition, the paper mentioned the Council's order to close the students' headquarters at 
the Settlement and it also marvelled at their non-acceptable stance towards students' 
victory parade. Finally, the China Press criticised the Council's refusal to co-operate with 
the strike leaders. Later, the readers' correspondence seemed to adopt the paper's 
accusations. The British citizen who remarkably expressed strong criticism in his letter, 
accused the Council of despotism and for unconstitutional jurisdiction. Further, the 
Council was accused of instigating an anti-Chinese atmosphere. In this situation, the
SMA, U l-91 -22 , Shanghai Municipal Police, Rough translation o f  note from the commercial, educational 
and labouring communities to the Council, 9 June, 1919.
16 Wasserstrom, Student Protests, pp. 60-62.
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writer recommended that the Council should take a prolonged holiday and forget 
Shanghai for a while. On the other hand, the China Press had no delusions about the 
consequences when it criticised the authorities' operations, therefore, acknowledging the
* * • » 1Rpossibility of becoming muzzled by the Council if the press licence was implemented. 
Another American paper, the Far Eastern Review assumed a provocative tone, but 
attempted to represent diversified opinions at the Settlement. While recognising the May 
Fourth demonstrators' aims, the editorial saw the Council's policy as destructive and as 
mismanaged as foreigners' operations had been preceding the Boxer uprising. 
Furthermore, even the capital's military government was declared to be more tolerant 
than the foreign authorities. Elsewhere, the Far Eastern Review's attitude was more 
reconcilable in providing a lengthy expose of the "non-Japanese foreigners" confused 
position in relation to the Shandong question and analysed reasons for foreigners' active 
responses against the Versailles Peace Treaty implementations in China.19
A few years later, the consular materials confirmed the assumption that the British 
officials were eager to connect "the Young China - movement" with American 
propaganda against the British. The anti-British provocateurs were said to include 
professor John Dewey, and "the American hot heads of the YMCA".20 Prof. Dewey was 
indeed touring China during the May Fourth incidents and also held lectures in Shanghai 
in May, 1919. Yet according to his account he merely observed the situation with great 
interest rather that get involved with the May Fourth Movement itself.21 Undoubtedly 
Dewey's radical lectures had a profound impact on the 1920's student movements in
17 NCH, 26 July, 1919, p. 204.
18 China P ress , 20 June, 1919, p. 10; China Press, 26 June, 1919, p. 10; China P ress , 27 June, 1919, p. 10; 
China Press, 2 July, 1919, p. 12.
19 Far Eastern R eview , vol. XV, July 1919, pp. 485-489 and 494-497.
20 PRO, F 0 6 7 1/437/560 Letter from Shanghai [possibly Sir Everard Fraser] to British Minister at Beijing, 
25 August, 1921.
21 John and A lice D ewey, Letters from  China and Japan, (New York, 1920), pp. 150- 311.
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China, but apparently in the summer of 1919 he was merely observing the situation and
22not directly involved in the May Fourth activities.
It is easy to recognise the Council's impulsive operations from the American 
newspaper's articles in the summer of 1919. Obviously, with its reputation already 
bruised from the May Fourth incidents, the Council was not happy to receive any 
criticism from foreign newspaper columns. However, such criticism was representative of 
a growing body of opinion, which considered that the British authorities' harsh responses 
had precipitated the events.
In contrast to the major American papers, the British press supported strongly the 
Council's repressive measures executed during the May Fourth demonstrations. By 
engaging in constant repetition of the mantra "in this Settlement, peace and order will be 
maintained", the British papers reproduced the authorities' principles. The Celestial 
Empire urged that "our Settlement streets should be sacred". Their rationale for this 
statement was the perceived intimidation of foreigners. As a consequence, the paper 
argued that in future, the strategy was to equip the authorities with efficient powers to
23prevent similar unrest. Serving as the location of the Council's notifications and the 
most respected English publication in the city, the NCH  had no reason to fear closure 
during the unsettled times. Therefore, it eagerly supported the implementation of the 
press licence. The moment for 'a complete insult' to the American journalists came 
immediately after successful voting for the press licence, and the American "unworthy 
accusations and hysterical language" towards the Council were condemned in the NCH  
"as outrageous". Throughout the summer of 1919 the NCH  had carefully supported the 
Council's actions and when necessary, obediently defended its policy. As a result, China's
22 John and A lice D ewey, Letters from  China and Japan, pp. 150- 311; Cecile Dockser, "John D ewey and 
the May Fourth movement in China: Dewey's social and political philosophy in relation to his encounter 
with China 1919-21", Harvard University, unpublished PhD thesis, 1983 , passim .
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demands at Versailles were treated as a joke. Indeed, Chinese requests starting from 
nationalising all police and army forces on Chinese soil and ending with the abolition of 
foreign municipal concessions must have sounded over-optimistic for the British 
residents in Shanghai. The opinions of Chinese society or supportive comments 
expressed by the foreign community were sporadically published. If they criticised 
municipal authorities or their actions, however, the paper frequently separated itself from 
such accusations.24 The Settlement's organisational structure and its Council were praised 
in a newspaper and in its reader's letter which urged the ratepayers to act as 
'Shanghailanders' and not as individuals or representatives of particular nations. The 
reader's letter advocated that all British people express their loyalty to the Council by 
voting for the Press Licence.25 Finally, one May Fourth article in the American paper 
favoured British attitudes and it clearly approved the mobilisation of troops as a 
precautionary measure to prevent anarchism. It conveniently omitted to mention, 
however, the shooting incident of 12th June, 1919. Moreover, cleverly created images of 
the Boxer uprising were utilised to refresh the foreign society's collective fear when 
dealing with Chinese crowds, and to justify, therefore, the Council's earlier operations to 
restrain them.26
In spite of some supportive opinions within the NCH  originally, as I briefly discussed in 
the third chapter, it may be argued that the majority of journalists fitted meticulously into 
British municipal officials' policy during and after the May Fourth strikes. Since the 
famous editor of the paper, O. M. Green did not return to Shanghai until the beginning of 
July 1919 and since most of the reporters were not named, it is difficult to link the 
editorial articles with their authors. Therefore, only incomplete traces of the NCH
23 C elestial Empire, 14 June, 1919, pp. 517-518, 524; Celestial Empire, 21 June, 1919, pp. 565, 571.
24 NCH, 5 July, 1919, pp. 9,13; NCH, 12 July, 1919, pp. 75, 80.
25 NCDN, 10 July, 1919, p. 4.
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journalists’ private May Fourth rhetoric were revealed throughout the May Fourth 
Movement. Moreover, the Council's legitimate understanding of these activities often 
prevailed over personal perceptions, making it difficult to separate the personal from the 
Council's rhetoric.
In an effort to prevent journalists and agitators, Chinese and foreigners alike, from 
distributing 'seditious' materials and publishing judgmental articles, the Council 
advocated a more intrusive hegemony over the Settlement. The Ratepayers' meeting, 
propaganda for implementing the press licence, and a careful construction of a collective 
May Fourth image as 'a menacing movement' were signs of the Council's clever attempts 
to legitimise their operations. At the same time, it was an early attempt to mythologise 
their actions in the eyes o f the Shanghai foreigners.
Meanwhile, British businessmen seemed to accept a course taken by the local foreign 
authorities. In spite o f an apparently united opinion recording the May Fourth Movement, 
revisionist views were occasionally voiced among the commercial community that 
supported, for instance, the Chinese representation in the Council or freedom of public 
opinion and some of these ideas were expressed in newspapers and in annual reports27. It 
can scarcely be denied that the political importance of such views was minimal, but at the 
individual level it represented a slowly changing attitude in creating a more open society 
in the International Settlement.
To a certain extent the Council succeeded in manipulating some foreign residents' 
opinions to agree with theirs and the Japanese obviously belonged to this group. The rest 
of the Shanghai foreigners were left to express their dissenting views along with 
foreigners living outside the city. In the capital, the Shanghai Municipal Council's efforts
26 Far Eastern R eview , vol. XV, July 1919, pp. 503-504.
27 BCCJ, Shanghai, vol. IV, no 7, August 1919, p. 124; China Association, Annual Report, Shanghai 
Branch, year ending March 31, 1920, pp. 3, 7.
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28 * *to license the press had seriously affected the New Consortium negotiations as the 
Council's campaign to muzzle press freedom had antagonised many Americans in 
Shanghai and Beijing, therefore, complicating co-operation between Britain and America. 
Some Chinese political parties eagerly encouraged disagreements among the Westerners 
in China since their objective was to undermine the consortium. Apart from warning the 
Council for abusing its legal power, Sir John Jordan, the British Minister at Beijing, 
accused the organisation of being out-of-date with the rest o f the world. In particular, the 
HSBC's Hillier agreed with Jordan and together they struggled to neutralise the British 
sensitive political position in the country and to resume normal business after the 
Council's hard-line operations in Shanghai.29 The British in Beijing were understandably 
disturbed by the Council's operations which endangered their economic and political 
interests in the country and threatened British prestige in Asia.
On the political front, the smouldering anti-British atmosphere was evidently spreading, 
because the news of British interests in Tibet, Gansu, Yunnan and Sichuan province was 
published in the newspapers around China. From the British perspective this seemed to 
be a part o f Japanese propaganda and a tactically skilful attempt to shift public scrutiny 
from the Shandong issue to the British regional politics in China. Yet another sensitive 
question was added to British politics in China when Mayers' scheme on unification and 
internationalisation of the Chinese railways, introduced in the Versailles Peace 
Conference, was again brought out in the open. The British officials denied the 
accusations immediately. However, if Chinese propaganda was to continue, more 
permanent damage to the British reputation was expected to occur. The anti-British
28 More detailed information about the N ew  Consortium see chapter three.
29 BCC, Box 112, Mayers to E.M.Gull, Secretary o f  British Chamber o f  Commerce, 27 September, 1919; 
John and A lice D ewey, Letters from  China and Japan , Peking, 17 July, 1919, p. 284; HSBC, K.1.7, King 
letters, 1919, Hillier to Stephen, 8 July, 1919; Hillier to Stabb, 17 July, 1919; PRO, F 0671/447/539 Jordan 
to Jamieson, 16 August, 1919.
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pamphlets distributed in Beijing, Shanghai and Tianjin verified British fears of Japanese 
propaganda activities.30
The Japanese propaganda machinery undoubtedly modified the information to serve its 
own political purposes, but the British government had indeed sent researchers to 
Western China to investigate possible business ventures in the region. The Tibet 
negotiations particularly were a matter of imperial importance for British government 
representatives, as Jordan's correspondence during autumn 1919 illustrates31. The 
internationalisation programme for the Chinese government railways was 'an open secret' 
as many newspapers had included reports on it in relation to the Versailles Peace 
Conference.
5.2. Rate Agitation
The May Fourth mass protests, parades and strikes had demonstrated the great potential 
of public opinion to force the Chinese central government and foreign municipal officials 
to change their policies in Shanghai. Perhaps the most significant accomplishment had so 
far been its success in exercising authority over the foreign municipal administration. As 
numerous demonstrations among the Settlement's Chinese community continued, the 
British frequently associated them with the May Fourth Movement and the Council 
accordingly exercised its non-tolerant policy against the protestors. However, public 
attention began to focus upon the increasingly energetic operations o f street unions and
30 BCC, Box 42, 'Internationalisation & Unification o f  the Chinese Government Railways' -file, S.F. 
Mayers in 1918-19; JMA, S/O Shanghai and Other Ports, June-July, 1919, no 23/84-85 Chengdu Agency 
Business Report for June, 1919; PRO, F 0228/3526/57  W.P. Thomas to Lampson, 11 June, 1919; PRO, 
F 0228/3526/85 , 93 Jordan to FO, 16 June, 1919; PRO, F 0228 /3526 /115 Ji'nan's consul to Jordan, 17 June, 
1919; PRO, F 0228/3276  Political and Intelligence Reports, Guangzhou, September, 1919; see also various 
articles during summer and autumn o f  1919 e.g. in the China Press, NCH, North China Star, Peking 
Leader , Peking and Tientsin Times.
31 PRO, W O l06/37 Jordan to FO, 10 and 13 October, 1919 and 20 November, 1919.
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student associations established throughout May-June of 1919. The students had already 
proven that they were capable of organising disciplined political operations and were 
therefore carefully observed by the local British police members and press. In addition, 
new political pressure groups such as the patriotic street associations, shopkeepers' and 
labour unions took part in the campaigning32. Soon after the general strike, various 
associations instigated a different style of agitation among the Settlement Chinese by 
encouraging the people to refuse to pay municipal taxes that were due in July. In the days 
immediately following the launch of the rates agitation, the British perceived it as an 
continuation o f the May Fourth operations.
Rate Agitation, as the British named it, had started unexpectedly and was quickly 
understood as another direct attack against foreign predominance in the city. As long as 
the Chinese at the International Settlement obediently paid taxes, the foreigners allowed 
them to live in 'the model Western style community'. The Settlement was, after all, 
allegedly "a Foreign Settlement" built up primarily for the foreign community and the 
Chinese were tolerated only if they obeyed the Land Regulations which required 
remittance of various kinds of licences, fees, tariffs, taxes and rates. Of these, the General 
Municipal Rate which was assessed as a percentage of paid rent was a particularly 
important source of revenue. Income from various payments was used to cover the 
routine maintenance of the Council's administration including police, health, education 
and public works.33
32 NCH, 12 July, 1919, pp. 84, 86; SMA, U l-91 -19 , file 19, Shanghai Municipal Police, McEuen to 
Jamieson, 3 July, 1919; SMP, Special Branch, roll 64, dossier 2882, Report on: Wen Tsung Yao and 
alleged meetings at the Cantonese Club, J. Sullivan, D.S.I., 23 July, 1919. For more detailed discussion on 
formation o f  labour unions and societies just after the May Fourth strikes see Jean Chesneaux, The Chinese 
Labour M ovement 1919-1927, (Stanford, 1968), pp. 159- 163.
33 BCCJ, Shanghai, vol. IV, no 8, September 1919, p. 172; NCH, 19 July, 1919, pp. 143, 148-149; PRO, 
F 0228/3526/75 Fraser to Jordan, 11 June, 1919.
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Rate agitation was not in a new phenomenon at the International Settlement34. This 
time, however, British existence in Shanghai and world politics precipitated the agitation. 
O f the hundreds of British volunteers who had joined the war service and returned to 
Europe to fight in 1914-1918, many worked for the International Settlement's municipal 
administration and in return were granted half pay for the period they served with H.M. 
Forces during the war. To meet these extra municipal expenses it had been decided in the 
Ratepayers' meeting in April 1919 to levy a special tax of 1% payable only in 1919, and 
in addition, to impose a 2% increase on the general municipal rate. As it happened, a new 
framework for international politics had taken shape in the Versailles Peace Conference 
and it had drawn the Chinese public's attention. Therefore, in April the resolution was 
passed without notable Chinese opposition. Instead in the summer of 1919, the May 
Fourth spirit to protest against the Council's unfavourable notifications, as Brooke-Smith 
from Jardines had predicted, continued in the form of the rate agitation almost in 
conjunction with the rallies against licensing the press.35
Meanwhile, another crucially important justification for levying additional taxes was 
the fact that the Council had, for years, lived beyond its means and was near bankruptcy. 
Hence, the foreign banks, presumably guided by the HSBC, were pressing it for larger
36revenues. Undoubtedly the Council was conscious of rising opposition that would greet 
any announcement of increased taxation of the Chinese community in the Settlement, and 
that was the main reason why the Council had attempted to implement the new rate 
quietly. In contrast, the peace negotiations in Paris and the May Fourth demonstrations 
across the country had activated people to react vigorously and crossing class boundaries.
34 For statistical information o f the anti-taxation mass actions see C.K. Yang, "Some Preliminary Statistical 
Patterns o f  Mass Actions in Nineteenth-Century China", in Frederic Wakeman Jr. and Carolyn Grant (eds.), 
Conflict and Control in Late Im perial China , (Berkeley, California, 1975), pp. 189-191.
35 M unicipal G azette , 11 April, 1919, Annual Meeting o f  Ratepayers, pp. 125-133; JMA, S/O Shanghai and 
Other Ports, June-July, 1919, no 15/1-13 Brooke-Smith to Bernard, 19 June, 1919.
186
Therefore, the rate increase infuriated the whole Chinese community in the International 
Settlement.
The refusal to pay the required rate led to confrontation with British officials and to a 
series of protests including the distribution of pamphlets and to a partial closure of shops. 
Due to the shopkeepers' and street associations' resistant campaign, the collection of taxes 
in July had to be temporarily suspended.37 The situation reminded the British of the 
recent May Fourth operations and it was instinctively judged as such. As a result, the 
Council announced promptly that the protests were politically motivated and required an 
uncompromising response according to the policy constituted in the previous Ratepayers'
• 38meeting. In contrast to the Council's statement, the American press persistently 
condemned this hard-line policy along with British municipal officials' operations during 
the May-June 1919 demonstrations, and also blamed them for arousing the present rate 
agitation.39
While the more prominent Chinese groups such as commercial guilds and associations 
had been traditionally granted access to negotiate with British senior officials and 
businessmen, the newcomers, representing the street unions, were also eager to have their 
existence recognised. With the help of formal protocol, the newly formed organisations 
sought opportunities to express their collective opinions on current issues such as 
taxation, rents and salaries. Shortly after the rate agitation was launched, they sought 
discussions with the Settlement foreigners, which in turn irritated some British officials 
including the Council members and the Consul-General. The Council's superior attitude 
was reiterated in the authoritative language articulated as follows: "[.] in the past the
36 PRO, F 0671/447/536 , Jamieson to Jordan, 12 August, 1919.
37 Shanghai Municipal Council, Annual Report 1919 , p. 65A.
38 PRO, F 0 6 7 1/447/534, N.O. Liddell, Secretary o f  the SMC to Phillips, 21 July, 1919; PRO, 
F 0 6 7 1/447/542, Jamieson to Jordan, 21 August, 1919.
39 China P ress , 1 August, 1919, p. 10; China P ress , 14 August, 1919, p. 10.
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Council had never communicated with the Chinese officials on the subject of taxation. 
After the new taxes had been voted at the Ratepayer's meetings, they were supposed to be 
known to all concerned."40 It was obvious that if the Chinese officials' opinions were not 
taken into consideration, the new associations' petitions had even less chance of being 
taken seriously in the British municipal politics.
In addition to increased visible presence on the street by student and labour unions, the 
rate agitation strained the Sino-foreign relations even further and again challenged the 
foreign municipal administrators' authority. Chinese public opposition towards foreigners' 
repressive operations during the May Fourth activities was expressed through various 
anti-foreign circulars distributed around Shanghai41 Of these, the messages projecting 
incidents of June 12 1919 were especially sensitive to the British, since during that night 
the British police inspector, with his troops, had opened fire at the unarmed crowd. The 
incident was embarrassing and afterwards British officials criticised it quietly, but the 
issue was omitted from public discussion42. One Chinese anti-foreign pamphlet predicted 
that the shooting of a Chinese shoemaker had been an example of the future era in 
Shanghai, whereas another leaflet complained of foreigners’ insulting policies during the 
Chinese celebrations just after the May Fourth general strike. 'Rebellious' exhortations 
were written in Chinese and sometimes translated in English to warn foreigners. These 
arguments gathered increasing momentum among street associations' propaganda. By 
distributing pamphlets the new associations such as "The Real Patriotic Society" and 
"The National Disgrace Memorial Party" appeared eager to operate as a radical wing for
40 PRO, F 0 6 7 1/447/542, Jamieson to Jordan and an attachment 'Notes o f  the m eeting held at the Consulate- 
General1, 21 August, 1919.
41 PRO, F 0671/447/536  Jamieson to Jordan, 12 August, 1919; Shanghai Municipal Council, Annual Report 
1919 , pp. 95A-99A.
42 Jordan's and M.W. Lampson’s hand written comments on file PRO, F 0228/3526/98 Phillips to Jordan, 
15 June, 1919.
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the commercial or student organisations.43 The latter groups, however, frequently 
detached themselves from the anti-foreign agitation44 and the following chapter will 
analyse, in detail, the measures taken to assure foreigners of their pro-foreign sentiment, 
and while simultaneously maintaining the Japanese boycott.
Fear of raising anti-foreign sentiment connected all the British communities and it also 
expressed foreigners' collective feelings in China. As I have discussed in the previous 
chapters, the fear of a Boxer type popular uprising appeared to illustrate the worst 
possible manifestation of the anti-foreign movement. Elsewhere in China, British national 
interests had generated opposing comments against Shanghai officials' imprudent 
operations which had agitated an anti-British atmosphere around the country. In 
researching the rate agitation it seems apparent that the May Fourth participants, for the 
first time, critically analysed the Council's, and accordingly, the municipal police's 
actions during the general strike. Certainly, the operations did not seem to respect the 
Chinese people's principal rights to express their public opinion in the manner which 
Western ideologies had illustrated. One method of displaying their disapproval was to 
refuse to pay the rates and to disseminate negative pamphlets that criticised the British 
municipal authorities. Moreover, rumours of potential new strikes and protests were 
circulated throughout the city to emphasise popular dissatisfaction towards the foreigners' 
policies45.
A reluctant compromise, at least from the Council's perspective, was reached in August 
when a special levy of 1% was agreed. This was to be collected in three equal quarterly
43 SMA, U l-91 -19 , file 19, Shanghai Municipal Police, McEuen to Jamieson and attached circulars 7, 11, 
12, 14 July, 1919.
44 NCH, 5 July, 1919, pp. 42-43; NCH, 12 July, 1919, p. 85.
45 SM A, U l-9 1 -1 9 , file 18, Shanghai Municipal Council, McEuen to Jamieson, 3 August and 3 September, 
1919.
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payments in October 1919, and later in January and April, 1920.46 Each time, however, 
the Chinese taxpayers ignored the payments and organised instead demonstrations and 
strikes. Using effective pamphlet campaigns, the protestors once more intimidated the 
Settlement authorities and their activities undoubtedly complicated business transactions 
and also irritated the British business community.47
In a politically active atmosphere one recognised injustice brought about another one 
and rate payment soon became cleverly connected to the requirement for Chinese 
representation in the International Settlement's Council48. Discussion about the Chinese 
merchants' legitimate privilege to add their own representatives in the Council was a 
question that foreigners had tided to avoid since the establishment of the foreign 
administration in Shanghai. So far the prominent Chinese residents' efforts to include 
Chinese representation had failed, but in the current turbulent situation debate could no 
longer be avoided.
5.3, Chinese Representation on the Council
As early as 1864, the Diplomatic Body had, in theory, established the principle of "a 
Chinese element that was essential for the municipal system" that would have made 
Chinese representation possible in the Settlement's governance. But because this clause 
was not found 'feasible', it was soon eliminated from the Land Regulations, the Council 
envisaged no legal obligation to fulfil the Chinese merchants' sporadically presented 
demands for representation. Thus, for the first forty years of the Settlement's existence
46 Shanghai Municipal Council, Annual Report 1919, p. 97A.
47 CA, China Association Circulars, vol. XVII, number 261-278, 28th Feb. 1918-15Ql April, 1920, the 
Shanghai Branch o f  CA to CA in London, 14 October, 1919; JMA, S/O Shanghai and Other Ports, January- 
March, 1920, no 70/2-10 Brooke-Smith to Johnstone, 7 January, 1920.
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there was no tangible pressure to include Chinese merchants in municipal self- 
govemance.49 The Council's operations to restrain the local disturbances in 1905 
instigated an anti-foreign and especially anti-British campaign which culminated in the 
demand to appoint a Consultative Committee of Chinese Merchants to promote Chinese 
issues in municipal politics. In spite of failing to receive the ratepayers' recognition for 
their committee, this initiative resulted in manifestation of Chinese rights in municipal 
politics.50
The issue had last been debated in 1915 in connection with an extension of the 
International Settlement's territory51. This time the proposal had suggested the formation 
of a Chinese Advisory Board consisting of representatives from the merchant guilds and 
one delegate from the local Chinese administration. But by concentrating on global 
politics, the Council's operations focused on World War which provided a suitable excuse 
to postpone the decision-making procedures, and as a result, the board was never 
installed.52
By contrast, the post-May Fourth atmosphere coupled with heightened Chinese public 
opinion praised Chinese co-operation with the Allies during the war in Europe and in 
return demanded a modem Westem-type democratic representation in the International 
Settlement. In retrospect, the landmark for Chinese demands for self-representation in the 
Council was the summer of 1919 and throughout long and futile negotiations, the Chinese 
never withdrew their demand for it, or never reached any agreement that would allow the 
prevention of it. Newly established associations raised the issue of Chinese representation
48 Bryna Goodman, N ative Place, C ity and Nation: Regional Networks and Identities in Shanghai, 1853- 
1937, (Berkeley and Los A ngeles Ca., 1995), pp. 260-277.
49 Kotenev, Shanghai: Its M ixed Court and Council, pp. 14-15, 35-36.
50 NCH, 22 December, 1905, pp. 645-646; NCH, 9 March, 1906, pp. 505-506, 534-535; NCH, 16 March, 
1906, p. 625.
51 Shanghai Municipal Council, Memorandum on Settlem ent Extension, (Shanghai, 1912).
52 Kotenev, Shanghai: Its M ixed Court and Council, p. 37.
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ill Shanghai politics much stronger than ever before. In addition, fresh memories of the 
May Fourth shootings placed the Council in an unfavourable position and it could no 
longer avoid or postpone the question.
Thus after intense negotiations, the Chinese Advisory Board was established in theory 
in 1920, but the first three Chinese full-members of the Council were not accepted before 
192853. In comparison, French Concession regulations allowed the consul-general to 
appoint a few 'respectable' Chinese members to participate in discussions relating to their 
interests54. In Tianjin, the local British Municipal Council already had a Chinese 
representative.55
This was certainly not a simple issue to deal with, as the colourful correspondence 
illustrated, and British political prestige, especially, appeared in Shanghai to be 
undermined by the protestors' demands to achieve representation. Deep seated British 
prejudices tended to underestimate Chinese competence to govern in an appropriate 
Western style. The central government's constant problems seemed to confirm British 
suspicions. Throughout the process the Council and British political and commercial 
pressure groups launched propaganda programmes which involved politicians not only in 
China, but the Foreign Office members in London were also frequently consulted and 
pressed to influence this issue,56 The Council faced the dilemma of whether to delegate 
authority to Chinese merchants and, as it was feared, gradually lose control over the 
Settlement or attempt to maintain its 'old-fashioned foreign bastion' against Chinese 
public opinion and international pressure. The option taken was predictable. Apart from
53 For an in-depth discussion o f  the question see for example PRO, F 0 6 7 1/477 Chinese representation files. 
SMA, U l-3 -157 , file 1167, Shanghai Municipal Council, Secretariat, the Council minutes, 19 April, 1928.
54 Clifford, Spoilt Children o f  Empire, p. 24.
55 M unicipal G azette , 9 April, 1920, p. 156.
56 CA, China Association Circulars, vol. XVII, number 261-278, 28th Feb. 1 9 1 8 - 1 April ,  1920, the 
Shanghai Branch o f CA's correspondence 7 August, 1919 - 9 January, 1920; PRO, F 0 6 7 1/447/568 
Jamieson to Jordan, 12 January, 1920.
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using every legal manoeuvre to prevent Chinese access to the municipal administration, 
certain illegal and politically ugly features of the foreign oligarchy were revealed in the 
process.
The Shanghai Intelligence Bureau was promptly activated to assess the representation 
question and the topic was soon connected to the Cantonese Guomindang members who 
had allegedly agitated local residents to challenge the Council by demanding 
representation. Rumours of new strikes and demonstrations circulated in the Bureau 
informants' ears and they predicted similar riots as witnessed in the summer of 1919.57 
None of the British police reports analysed, however, indicate that there was any 
particular political party behind these activities. It is more likely that, by requesting 
access to the Council's meetings, the associations expressed their newly adopted Western 
ideas of free speech and democratic representation. Obviously the strengthening Chinese 
merchant class was restlessly searching for new means to extend its influence in the city 
and perceived the situation as suitable for attaining it.
Misleadingly, the Bureau later concluded that the Amalgamated Association of Street 
Unions (AASU) had been established in order to support Chinese representation in the 
Council. In contrast to the Bureau's assumptions, British police reports revealed that 
although representation became a crucial part of the AASU's agenda, it was initially 
organised to strengthen shopkeepers' group power to protest against signing the Treaty of 
Versailles and to reduce increased rates.58 Interestingly, this Council's 'reliable source' 
appeared to produce a significant amount of inaccurate information, and as a result, 
exaggerated assumptions and far-reaching associations were constantly revealed. Since
57 PRO, F 0228/3214 , Shanghai Intelligence Bureau Minutes o f  Meeting, Summary o f  Intelligence for 
weeks ended July 31st, August 14th, August 21st, September 4th, 1919.
58 PRO, F 0228/3288  Political and Intelligence Reports, Summary o f  Intelligence Reports, December 
quarter, Shanghai, 1920; PRO, F 0671/447/557, 558 Hilton-Johnson to Jamieson, and attached handbill, 1 
and 2 January, 1920; Shanghai Municipal Council, Annual Report 1919, p. 65A.
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rumours were taken as news, they then reflected the uncertain situation59 in the British 
community. The rumours were interpreted in a manner which reinforced British 
preconceptions, which in this case prevented the Chinese from achieving full membership 
of the municipal administration in the Settlement.
In explaining the street unions' influence in the Settlement, it is worth noting that 
neither Jeffrey Wasserstrom nor Joseph Chen, notwithstanding one footnote in his 
book60, paid any attention in their research to the AASU's political activities around the 
city in the summer 1919. But as Bryna Goodman argues 61 the AASU, however, had 
become a significant shopkeepers' lobbyist, and when necessarily, supported Chinese 
national interests, therefore forming an important component of the collective political 
protests in Shanghai. The Chinese community acknowledged its power when the AASU 
representatives held discussions with the British Consul-General and the Council 
members as they were then comparable with the honourably treated Chinese Chamber of 
Commerce and the Commissioner of Foreign Affairs.62
In such tense circumstances and against British Consul-General Jamieson's advice to 
approach the situation with extreme caution, the Council stubbornly sent tax collectors to 
collect increased municipal rates, using force if  necessary. Since the rates payment and 
representation had been interwoven into the same issue, the rate collectors were met with 
general refusal, and this agitated the Chinese associations even further.63 Consequently, 
confrontation with the foreign officials deepened.
Due to the British quasi-imperial oligarchy, continuance of the Council's undemocratic 
composition was decided without compromise or consideration. In spite of American
59 Ramsay, Ideology o f  the Great Fear, p. 137.
60 Chen, The M ay Fourth M ovement in Shanghai, p. 185f; Wasserstrom, Student Protests, passim .
61 Bryna Goodman, N ative Place, C ity and Nation, pp. 271-272.
62 PRO, F 0671/447/542  Jamieson to Jordan, 21 August, 1919; SMA, U l-91 -19 , file 18, Shanghai 
Municipal Police, McEuen to Jamieson, 14 and 20 August, 1919.
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member, Mr. Dollar's opposition, the British majority, including another American 
representative, Mr. Merriman who operated in close association with them, the Council 
voted strongly against Chinese representation. In response to political pressures, and to 
reduce the associations' agitation, the Council agreed to create a Chinese Advisory 
Board.64 At the following year's Ratepayers' meeting, the deeply hostile attitude had been 
modified into the following 'understanding rhetoric'.
"We want to get in closer touch with the view s o f  our Chinese fellow  residents. We want to be in a 
position to feel the pulse o f  the Chinese feeling better than we now can, and on the whole we have com e to 
the conclusion that it is through a Chinese Advisory Committee that we can best achieve this end."65
Meanwhile in the autumn of 1919, the Council was preoccupied with ensuring control 
over the Chinese Board and its constitution. As a result, it developed divergent 
instructions to regulate the formation of the Board. Whether it was intentional or not, 
some of these peculiar prerequisites complicated the process of selecting Chinese 
members. Hence, the convocation of Board was once again postponed.
The Council directives required from the Chinese nominees were as follows: five years 
residence in the Settlement immediately prior to nomination, and according to the 
property-based nomination it meant five years assessed rental of not less than 1200 taels 
per year. In comparing this rent sum with the British community, it was the same amount 
that already excluded most local British expatriates from standing for the Council 
election. Therefore, in this sense it was an equal requirement, as all the foreigners had to 
fulfil similar requirements. But in the case of a Chinese resident it even more radically 
diminished the possibility of being nominated. Moreover, fear o f transforming the 
Council into a body for dealing with local political disputes, or even worse, to be utilised 
"as a pawn in Chinese politics" as Pearce's authoritative speech had warned, the Council
63 PRO, F 0 6 7 1/447/536, 542 Jamieson to Jordan, 12 and 21 August, 1919.
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added a few more prerequisites. Hence, the Chinese Advisory Board member was not 
permitted to hold any official appointment under the Chinese government. As a final 
safeguard to prevent any unsuitable Chinese member disturbing the Council's 'invaluable' 
work, the Consular Body had a veto over all nominations.66 In reality, these clauses 
blocked most Chinese residents from standing for election and it took another year before 
the Board was finally accepted by the Council in May 1921.67
The China Association, as the right-hand organ for promoting the Council's policies, 
launched a lengthy propaganda project to attain British officials' support in Beijing and 
London in order to prevent direct Chinese representation. The Council's detailed 
memorandum on the subject was thoroughly analysed and fears rising from the notion of 
Chinese representation were listed in the CA's report The Future o f  Shanghai. To 
illustrate their ideas, the CA carefully created the image of unlimited attempts by the 
Chinese to occupy posts at the Consular Body and at the Ratepayers' meeting, or to attain 
the privilege to vote in the municipal administration's meetings. Consequently, it was 
feared that this would end by forcing foreigners out of the Settlement. By interpreting the 
political situation in such a manner the Shanghai foreigners' future seemed uncertain. 
Hence, the current state of affairs initiated the CA's cry for maintenance of "the Status 
Quo in Shanghai" and this message was addressed directly to the British governmental 
officials in London.68 By making use of the fashionable concept of regional political 
balance, the CA sought the British government's acceptance for the British expatriates'
64 PRO, F 0671/447/553 the Council to Siffert, 24 October, 1919,
65 M unicipal Gazette, 9 April, 1920, p. 153.
66 Land Regidations and B ye-law s , p. 10; M unicipal Gazette, 9 April, 1920, p. 153; PRO, F0671/447/553  
Pearce to Siffert, 24 October, 1919.
67 Shanghai Municipal Council, Annual R eport 1921 , p. 194A. According to the British official reports the 
Board was not elected before October 1922 see PRO, F 0 6 7 1/447/629 Fraser to B.F. Alston, British 
Minister in Beijing, 16 October, 1922.
68 CA, China Association Circulars, vol. XVII, number 261-278, 28th Feb. 1918-15th April, 1920, China 
Association Shanghai Branch minutes, 7 August, 1919; China Association Shanghai Branch to CA in
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authoritarian rule in Shanghai. The CA probably expected also a confirmation in the form 
of additional gunboats or funding for the additional police forces. The determined request 
coincided conveniently with the ongoing debate in the Council to purchase aimed cars. 
An expensive purchase had, during the autumn, been transformed into a matter of 
imperial security. Therefore, from the Council's perspective it needed the British 
government's commitment69. Moreover, in support of the Council, the CA's concept of 
the ’status quo' followed the rhetoric to 'maintain peace and good order' that had been the 
ordinance manifested particularly during and after the May Fourth demonstrations.
The CA, at its London headquarters did not hesitate in approving the Shanghai branch's 
requirement in accepting Chinese participation only as a consultative Advisory Council 
and "ensuring that the right class o f responsible men should be elected". Accordingly, 
direct representation in the Council was not thought to be advisable. At this stage the 
Foreign Office had also expressed its acceptance for the plans, but this compromise was 
in practice an empty manoeuvre since it was commonly known that the Chinese Advisory 
Council would not have a share in the municipal decision making process.70
At this stage, Hilton-Johnson submitted a fourteen page in-depth report on the local 
situation and the report reflected the political and social unrest which had captured all 
foreigners' attention since the May Fourth Movement was launched in Shanghai. 
According to Hilton-Johnson's prediction, the trouble in June was merely a forerunner to 
greater disturbances, and the Press licence protests, Rate agitation, the Chinese 
representation arguments and the Land Regulation revision demands were examples of
London, 14 October, 1919; CA Shanghai Branch to CA in London, 13 December, 1919; China Association  
Shanghai Branch, Annual Report 1920, p. 7.
69 SMA, U 1-3-157, file 1167, Shanghai Municipal Council, Secretariat, the Council minutes, 27 November 
and 3 December, 1919.
70 CA, China Association Minute Book E, 1911-1922; China Association General Committee minutes, 6 
September, 1919; China Association General Committee minutes, 16 March, 1920; China Association, 
London, Annual Report 1920, p. X.
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these crises. Inevitably, the Settlement was forced to prepare for similar incidents in the 
near future. In Hilton-Johnson's imaginary emergency situation, the Chinese activists 
from trade and street unions would agitate the crisis and he colourfully described in detail 
how events would develop within the Settlement borders. Hilton-Johnson predicted that 
indecisiveness and an inactive policy would lead to disaster and to the indiscriminate 
killing of foreigners. Consequently, the strengthening of the police and the purchasing of
71new motor cars was required to prepare the police for the future crisis. Accordingly, the 
Council issued a list o f emergency notifications which were categorised according to the 
seriousness of the situation. Thus, in the case of a general strike, the same prohibitions 
were issued as those during the May Fourth activities in the previous summer, for 
example, the forming o f processions and the distribution of inflammatory materials. 
During the potential labour strike, the police would in future give further instructions to 
foreign companies to deal with the disturbances. For the convenience of all foreigners, an 
emergency supply of food was stored,72 These emergency declarations and orders were 
immediately implemented to control the demonstrations that followed the shootings 
which occurred during the May Thirtieth Incident in 1925 and which I will now discuss.73
Apart from the instructions given by the Council, Hilton-Johnson, in late 1919, had 
amended the Police Mobilisation Instructions which he first drafted in 1914. None of the 
research material indicates whether the Council had ever ordered these changes. 
Nevertheless, it was apparent that these revisions were approved by British authorities. In 
fact these mobilisation instructions were a direct outcome of the foreign authorities' May 
Fourth Movement containment policy and the same orders were later to change
71 SMA, U l-91 -23 , Shanghai Municipal Police, Hilton-Johnson to the Council, 13 December, 1919; Liddell 
to Hilton-Johnson, 4 January, 1920.
72 SMA, U l-91 -23 , Shanghai Municipal Police, Liddell to Hilton-Johnson, 5 January, 1920; Hilton-Johnson 
to the Police Officer in duty, 11 January and 4 February, 1920.
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drastically the future o f the Settlement. The mobilisation instructions were unexpectedly 
found in the Diplomatic Body Board's file, the Board that had investigated the causes of 
the May Thirtieth Incident of 192 574 and which examined the foreign police's 
responsibilities during the troubles. Part of Hilton-Johnson's instructions issued in 1919 
stated as follows:
"Action to be taken out-stations.
[..] i f  disorder occurs in his district he [police] w ill immediately take what steps he considers necessary to 
deal with it bearing in mind that a display o f  force at the outset may nip the trouble in the bud and that any 
undue delay may result in the situation getting out o f  hand. In regard to the real rioters the drastic action is 
not only justifiable but essential in the public interest. Police officers acting alone or in charge o f  parties 
will accordingly not hesitate to open fire i f  necessary. The necessity arises when it appears that loss o f  life 
or serious damage to persons or property at the hands o f rioters is imminent, and that the occurrence of 
such loss or damage can be prevented by no other means. If circumstances allow , due warning o f  the 
intention to open fire should be given but on no account w ill shots ever be fired over the heads o f  a riotous 
or unruly mob to frighten it. This is a dangerous and unnecessary practice and one which has accounted for 
many innocent lives. It is to be understood that whenever the police are called upon to use firearms during 
riots and other disturbances in the Settlement, the object is to kill or disable the persons or person fired at.
In 1925, the British police had dutifully followed the British inspector's orders, who in 
turn obeyed the police regulations, and police opened fire on the Chinese crowd, 
immediately killing twelve people and wounding more than ten. Further deaths among 
the Chinese community resulted from the repression of riots around the country. Even 
then Hilton-Johnson persistently argued that there was very little change required in his 
instructions. These police rules were valid until 29 April, 1926, when the board, 
appointed by the Diplomatic Body, demonstrated that the rules had constituted one of the 
causes of the May Thirtieth Incident. As a result, the clause "object is to kill" was 
replaced with the more lenient regulation "to use minimum amount of fire to prevent loss
73 NCH, 6 June, 1925, p. 414; Richard W. Rigby, The M ay 30 Movement, Events and Themes, (Canberra, 
1980), pp. 41-42.
74 The incident happened when the Chinese were demonstrating in the International Settlement on 30 May, 
1925 and the foreign-Chinese police opened fire towards the protestors. A s a result, the events provoked 
severe anti-foreign and especially anti-British protests, strikes and boycotts across the country. For further 
information and detailed description o f  the events related to the May Thirtieth Incident see Rigby, The M ay  
30 Movement.
75 Underlines according to original text. SMA, U l-91-23 , Shanghai Municipal Police, Hilton-Johnson, 
Police Mobilisation Instructions, 22 November, 1919.
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of life or serious damage".76 However, the damage had been, done as the numerous anti-
77British and anti-imperialist protests, boycotts, and strikes around the country revealed. 
One British business magnate summarised the troubled situation as follows "the whole 
British position in China is now at stake, our reputation, our trade, our shipping our 
investments and the extraterritorial status".78 Another immediate outcome of this serious 
misconduct was that the Captain-Superintendent of Police, McEuen was forced to a 
humiliating resignation after twenty-five years service in the International Settlement 
police force. The Council had to pay later also the indemnification money for the dead 
and wounded to calm the demonstrating people.79
When analysing the contents of police reports during 1919, the above quoted police 
regulations might easily have partially described the fracas during the May Fourth 
general strike already discussed in the third chapter.80 In a peculiar way Hilton-Johnson 
had revised the police operations during that last night of the strike into regulations, and 
accordingly, legitimised them. From the viewpoint of the British police force, these 
instructions mythologised the May Fourth demonstrators as a 'riotous or unruly mob' 
which had to be suppressed by police in order to maintain peace and order in the 
Settlement. In addition, the police operations were officially legalised. Therefore, 
opening fire on unarmed demonstrators and shooting them blindly were approved as 
necessary conduct in a given situation. Indeed, the regulations transformed the actions
76 SM A, U l-3 -2998 , file 4301, Shanghai Municipal Council, Secretariat, Hilton-Johnson, Police 
Mobilisation Instructions, 22 November, 1919; Hilton-Johnson's note, 18 January, 1926; Board formed for 
the puipose o f  considering regulations governing the use o f  firearms in time o f  riot and disorder by the 
Shanghai Municipal Council, 27 April, 1926.
77 See for example the BCC, HSBC, JMA, John Swire & Sons archive materials during 1925-1926.
78 JMA, S/O Shanghai to Hong Kong, 1925, Brooke-Smith to Bernard, 19 August, 1925.
79 SMA, U 1-3-592, file 1652, Shanghai Municipal Council, Secretariat, K.J. McEuen files, McEuen to the 
Council, 21 December, 1925.
80 SM A, U l-9 1 -1 9 , file 19, Shanghai Municipal Police, C hief Inspector T. Vaughan’s report, 13 June, 
1919; SMP, Special Branch, roll 65, dossier 6691, Extracts from the file on the 1919 Japanese Boycott and 
the activities o f  the Students in connection therewith, C.I. Vaughan’s and Trooper Sergeant E. Rock’s 
reports, 13 June, 1919.
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into the norm that was to be followed when taking action against future rioters. Similarly 
to sentiments in Pearce's speech in July 1919, the amended police mobilisation 
instructions also reinforced the formation of another type of mythologisation, which 
could be called 'an official mythologisation'. Apparently, Hilton-Johnson's police 
regulation amendments were based 011 British official and business communities' 
immediate mythologisation of the May Fourth Movement.
Paul Cohen has established comprehensive categories to mythologize the past in the 
following way: to interpret events past with poems, stories, autobiographies; or to 
publicly remember them by celebrating anniversaries or establishing museums. The 
official myth, as suggested above, serves as a supplementary explanation of past 
incidents. In principle, the official myth is interrelated with Cohen's genre myth where 
the myths are published in newspapers, periodicals and books.81 Beyond this, the British 
official myth intentionally created a collectively accepted understanding of the incidents 
while simultaneously justifying British operations to suppress the May Fourth 
Movement. One of the British objectives was to unify all foreigners behind this 
reasoning. In particular, though, the official myth was implemented to strengthen British 
economic and political supremacy in the city. As I have analysed in this chapter, the 
British successfully increased their dominance over Settlement politics.
Economic reality of British hegemony in the city connected the British commercial 
community with the Council in opposing Chinese representation. Brook-Smith from 
Jardines again provides a relevant example of this connection. It is important to 
remember that in spite of Brooke-Smith's strong personal opinion which favoured 
Chinese presence in the Council, he, with his countrymen, voted against it. In other
81 Cohen, H istoiy in Three K eys , pp. 215-222. An illustrative work on more recent mythmaking see Jeffrey 
N. Wasserstrom, "History, Myth and the Tales o f  Tiananmen", in Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom and Elizabeth J.
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words, the Council's procedure "the Council or Committee acts as a whole; the individual 
opinions, though recorded in the Minutes, may never divulge to outside parties" appeared 
to overrule any dissenting opinions. In Brooke-Smith's correspondence, it seems that the 
question tormented him during the months of discussions between the parties concerned.
82  iHowever, the official records reveal no such hesitation. Brooke-Smith’s correspondence 
indicates that he engaged in pragmatic politics which allowed him to analyse 
circumstances notwithstanding his influential position as part o f the British expatriate 
community in China. This approach recognised the Chinese community's demands, but 
also accepted possible repressive operations resulting from these demands. Another 
example, already analysed in the third chapter, was Brooke-Smith's change of opinion 
which resulted in the sudden importance of strengthening the Settlement's police forces to 
maintain political and economic stability in the city. This obviously occurred after he had 
experienced the summer strikes and demonstrations. However much Brooke-Smith 
empathised with the May Fourth demonstrators' demands in the summer 1919, foreigners' 
existence was based on the uncompromising principles of political and military authority 
within the Settlement.
Foreigners' fears, individually expressed but often collectively experienced, were 
revealed in correspondence published in the journals. They included the fear of student 
predominance in the Settlement's administration if the Chinese were allowed to 
participate in the Council.83 Relying on judicially questionable Land Regulations, the 
legal justification to reject Chinese representation was pointed out in a furious article
Perry (eds.), Popular Protest and P olitical Culture in Modern China, (Boulder, 1994), 2"d edition, pp. 273- 
308.
82 JMA, S/O Shanghai and Other Ports, August-September 1919, no 34/4-13 Brooke-Smith to Bernard, 20 
August 1919; January-March 1920, no 70/2-10 Brooke-Smith to Johnstone, 7 January, 1920; January- 
March 1920, no 72/1-10 Brooke-Smith to Johnstone 12 January, 1920; SMA U l-3 -157 , file 1167, Shanghai 
Municipal Council, Secretariat, the Council minutes, 19 April, 1928.
83 BCCJ, Shanghai, vol. IV, no 8, September 1919, p. 172.
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which insisted that: "According to the Constitution of Shanghai they [the Chinese] have 
no say in its [the International Settlement's] management as they perfectly well know". 
On the other hand, Chinese administrative skills were assessed as weak and incompetent. 
This was revealed in their inability to manage complicated issues such as municipal 
drainage and in the recruitment of a police force as the British newspaper narrated. In the 
same newspaper comparison was made with Western administrative standards of 
impartiality, honesty and integrity, and Council members were perceived as relevant 
examples of this. Even the standard British rhetoric 'Shanghai, the mudflat that foreigners 
built up to be a modern city for foreigners only1 was incorporated in the criticism. When 
expressed by the highest British official in the city, it reflected a British arrogant attitude 
towards the Chinese in the city.84 The inflexible opinions reflected the British 
understanding in that they perceived the requirement for Chinese representation 
originating from the May Fourth Movement. From a foreigners' perspective, the May 
Fourth demonstrations continued in various forms throughout the autumn and winter of 
1919-1921, but were not necessarily as controlled as the Council had planned.
Repeating earlier anti-Council rhetoric, trouble was also expected from the American 
press. Indeed, the China Press had the in-depth report on anti-British demonstrations in 
Chengdu over the Tibet issue. Moreover, the Council was blamed for its heavy-handed 
operations during the June demonstrations and the paper insisted that the current 
turbulent atmosphere, the refusal to pay rates and the demand to secure Chinese
84 In traditional foreigners' rhetoric Shanghai had been just a mudflat before their arrival in the nineteenth 
century and foreigners had built it as a modem city. G. Lanning and S. Couling, The H isto iy o f  Shanghai ,11, 
(Shanghai, 1921), p. 277; NCDN, 19 August, 1919, p. 7; NCDN , 21 August, 1919, p. 4; NCDN, 22 August, 
1919, p. 4; NCDN, 23 August, 1919, p. 6; NCDN, 4 September, 1919, p. 4; PRO, F 0 6 7 1/447/584 Fraser to 
Jordan, 23 January, 1920.
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representation in the municipal administration were a direct result of earlier
o r
mishandlmgs.
5.4. May Fourth Nationalism in the International Settlement
Closely related to the Chinese representation question was the Chinese demand to abolish 
the foreign extraterritorial rights in the International Settlement. This request was based 
on international principle to guarantee countries' national self-determination as it had 
been agreed after the World War. Earlier in the spring 1919, the Armistice had been 
discussed firstly by the Chinese intelligentsia, and students had been especially active in 
campaigning for finalisation of the Armistice. Furthermore, President of the United 
States, Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Demands were understood to oppose the 
preservation of secret agreements, such as the one between Japan and Britain which 
allowed the Japanese to take over the German position in China. In spite of some 
American activists' support of the May Fourth Movement and its ideology in Shanghai, 
officially the American government and president Wilson offered only their sympathies, 
but never seriously considered the possibility of co-operating with Chinese nationalists to 
solve the country's problems.86
As early as January 1919, the Shanghai merchant organisations had distributed circulars 
to mobilise their groups to rally against the secret agreements. When the Chinese 
negotiators had refused to sign the Versailles Peace Treaty, agitation to abrogate the 
special spheres of influence and extraterritorial rights immediately intensified. As I have 
already explained in relation to the Press Licence discussion, the British press nullified all
85 China Press, 18 July, 1919, p. 10; China Press, 22 July, 1919, p. 9; China Press, 14 August, 1919, p. 10; 
China Press, 26 August, 1919, p. 10.
86 Zhang, China in the International System, pp. 76, 121.
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claims which would endanger foreigners' status quo in the Settlement. However, in view 
of the operation of the Wilson's principles, China had legitimate rights, for example, for 
national post and telegram systems and for autonomy in respect o f its customs tariff. 
According to the Chinese, withdrawal of foreign police forces and an abolition of foreign 
concessions appeared to be a natural continuation of this process. Modem Western rights, 
such as freedom of speech and of the press, and the right to public assembly were 
frequently analysed and published in the newspapers and distributed as pamphlets.87 In 
fact, the whole May Fourth Movement had been partly initiated to actualise these 
expectations. For the most part, China's societal change was the most urgent question and 
in order to achieve it, certain political changes, especially those related to the foreigners' 
prerogative establishments in China, were necessary.
From the British point of view, undermining the precious rules that justified their 
existence in the city was a serious violation of their virtually sovereign jurisdiction, with 
its own government, army and police force. Indeed, versions of amended Land 
Regulations for the International Settlement were distributed by the Chinese street unions 
and they were drawn up by their counsellor and lawyer Mr. Lineberger, to the great 
dissatisfaction o f the British community. Mr. Lineberger promoted Chinese 
representation in the Council by connecting increased taxation with it, and in order to 
secure approval, the extension of the Council's administrative authority was seen to be 
imperative. In this case it indicated a possible Settlement extension. Another amendment 
was to limit the Mixed Court's jurisdiction only to police cases excluding criminal and
87 Chen, The M ay Fourth M ovem ent in Shanghai, p. 67; NCH , 5 July, 1919, pp. 9, 13; SMA, U l-91-19 , 
file 18, Shanghai Municipal Police, McEuen to Jamieson, 8 September, 1919. For the full-length 
Memorandum presented by the Chinese Delegation in Paris see Kotenev, Shanghai: Its M ixed Court and 
Council, pp. 37-40.
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civil cases.88 The Mixed Court responded neither to the Chinese government's ruling, nor 
to Chinese traditional group authority exercised by the guild officials and the gentry, and 
the Mixed Court exercised power that the Chinese commercial community in particular 
was keen to possess. It is obvious that the merchants' effective interference in the form of 
the May Fourth strikes, demonstrations and the attempt to take charge o f the Mixed Court 
particularly intimidated British expatriates. As for the Land Regulations, it is true that the 
legal status of these, in relation to treaty port nationals, was always open to debate and 
subject to challenges in Western courts. For this reason, British officials attempted to 
keep them hidden from closer juridical scrutiny.
Even though the British press had failed to recognise it, the Consulate, the Council, and 
the business community seemed to identify the looming threat of Chinese popular 
opinion which would gradually turn against the treaty port system. On this occasion, 
British official correspondence revealed fears of surrendering foreign prerogatives and 
deeply entrenched vested interests back to the Chinese government. It is apparent that 
foreign disparagement of Chinese nationalism reflected these fears.89 When the Chinese, 
in challenging foreigners' authority, required the abolition of extraterritorial rights, it 
appeared that British official rhetoric resisted the idea on the grounds that the current 
Chinese administration was corrupt and incompetent in controlling the country. It 
especially appeared to be unable to secure British prevalent policy o f free trade in the 
whole of China.90
88 PRO, F 0671/447/555 Commissioner for Foreign Affairs to Senior Consuls and attachments, 4 
December, 1919; SM A, U 1-91-19, file 18, Shanghai Municipal Police, McEuen to Jamieson, 18 August, 
1919; Stephens, O rder and D iscipline in China, p. 51.
89 PRO, F 0 6 7 1/447/576, 579 Fraser to Siffertand Fraser to Jordan, 19 January, 1920.
90 PRO, F 0 6 7 1/447/553 Pearce to Siffert, 24 October, 1919; PRO, F 0 6 7 1/447/584 Fraser to Jordan, 23 
January, 1920.
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At this point it is feasible to argue that the principles presented and accepted in the 
Washington Conference of 1921-192291, reflecting the ideas of sovereign China as part of 
the international community, had already been presented in Beijing and Shanghai during 
the May Fourth demonstrations of summer and autumn 1919. Since Shanghai's general 
strike, however, the centre of the Movement had moved to Shanghai, where the foreign 
areas were politically immune to Chinese central government control. To some extent the 
growth of Chinese nationalism in the International Settlement was explicitly reflected in 
the agitation for Chinese representation in the Council. Just as an initial attempt to 
present national oneness was occurring, protests against the press licence were provoked 
in order to maintain the May Fourth protagonists' freedom to express opinions. Despite 
all these actions, there remained a lack of distinct national objective and on the whole, 
Chinese responses to nationalist issues lacked cohesion. Hence, by using International 
Settlement power politics, British officials and businessmen had again succeeded in 
postponing another major crisis of mounting nationalism.
5.5. Missionaries' May Fourth Agenda
The emotionally charged weeks at the missionary school unions had exhausted many 
foreign missionary educators. As a result of the May Fourth activities, class disturbances 
and cancellations had emptied the classrooms and the students committed themselves to
91 The Washington Conference was initiated by the Americans to tackle many problems left after the 
Versailles Peace Conference, and moreover, to establish a military equilibrium in the Pacific. The Beijing 
delegation had had high expectations and presented a proposal which asked the Conference participants to, 
for example, honour China's territorial integrity and political independence and to remove all limitations on 
her political, jurisdictional and administrative freedom. The Washington Conference system was, thus, not 
against to the colonial status quo in the region. In a way it protected a stable colonial order in the hands o f  
the victors o f  the WWI. Westel W., Willoughby, China at the Conference: A R eport, (Baltimore, 1922), 
passim .
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patriotic activities orchestrated by student unions, and numerous educational institutions
had therefore become centres for political discussion.
The May Fourth aftermath and the International Settlement's Chinese residents'
agitation had pushed British missionaries to the point where the return to daily
evangelistic duties appeared to be more attractive than involvement in local disturbances.
There is minimal evidence in the British missionary correspondence or in the published
materials that they had any direct comments to make regarding the press licence, the rate
agitation or Chinese representation in the Council protests. Despite casual remarks about
redefining reasoning for student protests, missionaries appeared to avoid political 
■ 92issues . Local politics in the Settlement was selectively excluded from missionary
. , . 93activities .
On the contrary, inactive functioning in local May Fourth politics was not reflected in 
the missionaries' work among the May Fourth participants. While the foreign municipal 
officials struggled to maintain political supremacy over Chinese residents, the missionary 
community united its forces to transform the May Fourth actions into 'a battle for the 
Christianity' in China. It is worth noting at this stage that the Protestant missionaries 
attempted to establish a collective response for 'China’s urgent need for Christian Gospel', 
as it was interpreted. Thereafter, the Gospel's role in developing the Movement and in 
providing spiritual guidance was understood to be essential. Taken as a whole, as soon as 
missionaries recognised that the May Fourth Movement represented the Christian and 
Western values of public opinion, liberty and democracy, against the 'corrupted' Chinese 
government, the May Fourth operations were perceived as less threatening. In this case, 
May Fourth ideas encouraged closer co-operation with the missionaries.
92 LMS, Central China, Reports, box 8, folder 4, Gerald Luxon, Shanghai, 1920.
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Parallel with May Fourth political activities in Shanghai, missionaries developed their 
own agenda in answer to the Chinese Christians’ nationalistic aspirations. A multi- 
denominational organisation, the China Continuation Committee, invited over one 
hundred missionaries and Chinese Christians to Shanghai in November 1919 to launch 
the 'China for Christ' movement. Although the Chinese church members had promoted 
the meeting, over half of the participants were British and American missionaries. The 
primary objective o f the gathering was to investigate the May Fourth Movement, and 
similarly, after evaluating the Movement, to gauge the Christians' contribution to helping 
the nation during the present troubled times.94 In a sense, the idea of an independent 
Chinese church fitted perfectly with the May Fourth ideas o f strengthening national unity. 
Thus, the 'China for Christ' campaign successfully combined the patriotic and Christian 
objectives o f initiating a stronger Chinese church. Because many o f its organisers around 
the country were Chinese the agenda was well adopted in the Christian community.95
In the 'China for Christ' meeting the missionary organisations named seven different 
commissions, each with a special perspective, to study the problems of China. The British 
missionaries o f Shanghai were represented at least in 'the Organisation' committee by 
Rev. Sparham and in 'the Social and Moral Welfare' committee by Dr. Davenport. Other 
committees analysed themes such as the spiritual life, missionary spirit and leadership 
cultivation. Sparham emphasised the Christians' need to educate themselves in directing 
the present national crisis that affected all missionaries. The message was clear. Even if 
students' and officials' connections with the Christians were sceptically approved as a
93 Missionaries were, however, active in suppressing brothels and successfully campaigned against taverns, 
see Christian Henriot, Prostitution and Sexuality in Shanghai: A Social History, 1849-1949 , (Cambridge, 
2001),pp. 291-300.
94 Bulletin o f  the China fo r  Christ M ovem ent, no 1, 10 January, 1920; The Challenge o f  China, Being the 
R eport o f  a Deputation sent out to visit the China Mission Fields o f  the B.M.S. 1919-1920, pp. 70-71; 
Latourette, A H istory o f  Christian M issions in China, pp. 776-777; LMS, Central China, Correspondence, 
box 31, E.C. Lobenstine, Shanghai to London, 28 January, 1920,
95 The Story o f  1920, Being the 107lh Annual Report o f  the Wesleyan M ethodist M issionary Society, p. 64.
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means to serve their own political interests, the Chinese educational and official groups 
were, however, too important to be ignored. As a result, it was decided to further activate 
the relations.96 Presumably the ultimate target was to strengthen the Chinese enlightened 
classes' interest in examining Christian values and truth. The Chinese educated class and 
officials had traditionally been the groups of people the Christians found most difficult to 
convert. In terms o f Christianity's permanent presence in the country, the support of 
these classes was crucial, as they were intellectually and politically the most influential 
people in China.
However, intellectuals' May Fourth activities instigated future problems for the 
Christian community, which exploded as anti-Christian sentiment at the beginning of the 
1920's. At that time Christians were accused of supporting and implementing Western 
cultural and political imperialism.97 On the contrary, during the May Fourth period 
missionaries presumed that it was the Christian religion and the missionaries' persistent 
social, educational and evangelistic work in the area that had been the origin of national 
liberation in China. In reality, very few missionaries associated their belief and work with 
imperial invasion of which they were accused. Missionaries' efforts to validate 
Christianity by promoting it as a source of democracy through Western education and 
religious practices made it an easy target for anti-imperialist and anti-Christian protestors.
Naturally, 'the Chinese Renaissance', 'the New Civilization Movement' or 'the New 
Thought Movement', as it was named in the missionary conference dominated the annual 
agenda. From the speakers' perspective the Movement challenged missionaries to practice 
genuine tolerance. Moreover, it provided a better means to promote their social welfare
96 China Press, 17 December, 1919, p. 7; China P ress, 18 December, 1919, p. 7.
97 Lutz, Chinese Politics and Christian M issions, pp. 55-59; Chen-main Wang, "’The Chinese YMCA and 
the Anti-Christian Movement in China in the 1920's ", Papers o f  the British Association fo r  Korean  
Studies, vol. 6, 1996, pp. 104-105.
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work.98 By the time the annual missionary conference was held, this kind of work had 
already been started in China. Besides relying on the evangelical organisations, 
Christians established more patriotic societies such as, "the Christian Church Save the 
Country Society" in Shanghai or "the Patriotic Prayers Union" in Tianjin.99 The materials 
do not reveal how extensive the British missionaries' support was or whether they 
actively attended the meetings. Perhaps the earlier policy o f disclaimed official 
connections with the Movement was still being followed. Thus, the missionary 
organisations officially avoided involvement, but they allowed individual members to co­
operate with student groups, and to support their Christian-patriotic associations.
From a very early stage it was apparent that the American missionaries actively 
promoted and supported the May Fourth Movement more openly than the other 
missionaries. At the foreigners' popular holiday resort area in Moganshan, near Hangzhou 
city, missionaries organised a seminar on the subject o f the "Student Patriotic 
Movement". Their programme covered the latest topics analysing the relationship 
between the Christians and the May Fourth Movement. The argument in favour of active 
co-operation with the Movement on the part of missionaries revealed the general 
perspective approved by the seminar participants. As it was proudly expressed: 
"Missionaries are in someway responsible for the movement. Christianity is a source of 
liberty - physical, intellectual, moral." The American influence was highlighted in the 
YWCA's programme which promoted lectures on democracy, patriotism and Christianity 
as uplifting, especially, the position of women.100 Moreover, protests against the 
corrupted Chinese politicians and officials were constantly supported within
98 SOAS, Conference o f British M issionary Societies Archives [hereafter CBM S], Area files, Asia-China, 
FBN1, China Continuation Committee Meetings 1914-1921, Proceedings o f  the Ninth Annual Meeting o f  
the China Continuation Committee, Shanghai, 5-10 May, 1921, pp. 4, 12-25, 33-37.
99 LMS, Central China, Reports, box 8, folder 4, Ernest Box, Shanghai, 1919; LMS, North China, Reports, 
box 8, J. Murray, Tianjin, 1920.
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YMCA/YWCA circles. Undoubtedly the Council was aware of the societies' active 
participation in providing premises for May Fourth activists in Shanghai.101
Another feature that illustrated missionaries' and all foreigners' experiences after the 
May Fourth general strike was that the variations in geographical, economic and social 
circumstances in the provincial cities, towns and villages began to highlight the 
differences between the Movement in Shanghai and in the other areas. An example came 
from a comment of a missionary in Jiujiang, who criticised the Chinese in the 
International Settlement for promoting nationalism that was unworthy and irrational. In 
contrast to problems in the interior, the Chinese Settlement residents were under the 
protection of foreign administration, and therefore, lived in a secure place where Chinese 
officials' punishments or local military troops' attacks could not reach them, as the 
missionary recalled. He argued in the commentary that most people in the Settlement had 
no understanding of life outside Shanghai. Therefore, sympathising with China was safer 
and more convenient for the Chinese in the Settlement than for their counterparts in the 
countryside and in the smaller cities.102
The provincial information reports from the consuls verified the significant change in 
the Movement's appearance around the country after the general strike in Shanghai.103 
Due to Shanghai's special characteristics and particularly its powerful foreign 
community, the Movement had adopted some unusual features there. The general strike 
was admired and similar attempts to strike were attempted in various towns across the 
periphery, but none of them succeeded in closing businesses as happened in Shanghai.104
100 China P ress , 17 August, 1919, p. 21.
101 SMA, U l-91 -19 , file 18, Shanghai Municipal Police, McEuen to Jamieson, 4,5,16 and 22 September, 
1919.
102 NCH, 12 July, 1919, pp. 100-101.
103 For reports o f  fragmented Movement see PRO, F 0228/3288 Political and Intelligence Reports, 1919- 
1921.
104 Attempts to follow  'the Shanghai Spirit' are analysed in PRO, F 0228/3526 , passim-, various China Press 
and N CH  issues in 1919-1921.
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There was no point in the other May Fourth demonstrator group arousing protests against 
licensing the press, as the Chinese government had already censured it. No efforts were 
made to ensure Chinese representation in the local foreign administrative council. 
Similarly, the rates agitation was an irrelevant question for students in the other towns. 
Although 'the Spirit of Shanghai' had disseminated the May Fourth ideals into the 
countryside and cities, after the summer o f 1919, the Movement gradually changed to 
incorporate regional issues.
This divergent construction of the May Fourth Movement has been illustrated in Yeh 
Wen-hsin's research 011 the Movement in Hangzhou and its surrounding province of 
Zhejiang. Here, the analysis of the Movement as a national phenomenon concentrates on 
the spatial dimensions of centre versus periphery. The study evaluates the Hangzhou 
students' co-operation with student representatives in Beijing or Shanghai. Since the 
provincial government of Zhejiang had acted instantly in dispersing classes for early 
summer recess, students could not actively campaign in May and June. For the same 
reason, students had no opportunity to associate with merchants and workers.105 The need 
for localised and multi-centred May Fourth research has also been recognised by Jeffrey 
Wasserstrom. He challenges the researchers to examine the fringe areas of the May 
Fourth Movement, and not only to widen the spectrum geographically, but also to extract 
themes that so far have been left unresearched. He too agrees that the Movement adopted 
some special features in Shanghai due to foreigners' presence in the city, but does not 
expand on his reasoning for this.106
A few incidents from across China are illustrated below in order to demonstrate the 
magnitude of participatory activities of the May Fourth demonstrators. In Tianjin, the 
governor jailed students as they had illegally arrested local shop-keepers for selling
213
Japanese products. This incited the town, and students launched a strike in the schools. In
a later instance, they succeeded in convincing some merchants to close the shops. This
was a local dispute between the Chinese authorities and students, and apparently students
had no formal connections with their colleagues in Shanghai or Beijing.107 On another
occasion, the local general in Ji'nan city had promulgated a martial law to control
protesting students and to make his point clear three anti-Japanese leaders were tortured 
108and later executed. Foreigners' fear of rising Bolshevism was due to students' anti- 
Christian propaganda distributed in Guangzhou, and anti-Japanese strikes were 
befittingly combined with arguments of local officials' appointments.109 Lastly, in Fuzhou 
city, the events took a different turn in November, 1919 when Japanese soldiers shot and 
wounded some YMCA students during their demonstrations. The governor hastened to 
shut down the student union office, but the damage was done and widespread strikes and 
strengthened boycotts against Japanese products spread around China.110 In contrast to 
the earlier flow o f information, this time the Shanghai May Fourth protestors responded 
to the provincial problems and the Fujian Guild in Shanghai initiated parades and 
distributed pamphlets to support the abolition of the Japanese extraterritoriality in 
Fuzhou.111 In spite of keeping Shanghai journals and lectures as the source of inspiration 
for their ideological orientations and the activities as guidelines for practical operations, 
from now on, the Movement which continued its activities at the provincial centres was 
characterised merely by the local conditions.
105 Yeh, Provincial Passages, pp. 147-173.
106 Wasserstrom, 'The M issing May 4ths', pp. 9-10, 22-23; Wasserstrom, Student P ro tests , pp. 234-237,
107 LMS, North China, Reports, box 8, folder 4, H.B. Longman, Tianjin, 1920; Sparham papers, Box 1, 
Files B6/2/3, Sparham to Mrs. Sparham, 19 March, 1920.
108 NCDN, 6 August, 1919, p. 7; NCDN, 8 August, 1919, p. 7.
109 PRO, F 0228 /3288  Political and Intelligence Reports, Guangzhou, September and December Quarters, 
1919.
110 CMS, Original papers, G 1/C H 4/0, John B. Carpenter, 1 and 6 December, 1919.
111 SMA, U 1-91 -19, file 18, Shanghai Municipal Police, Hilton-Johnson to Jamieson, 24 November, 1919.
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Conclusion
This chapter has concentrated on evaluating some British experiences of the May Fourth 
activities after Shanghai's general strike. In particular, Pearce's speech attempted to 
orchestrate the foreign opinions by creating unified images, and as a result, the 
Movement was described as seditious and dangerous to the foreign presence in the 
Settlement. In due course the events were mythologised and British officials' operations 
were legitimised in order to strengthen British supremacy in the city. In British minds the 
peaceful student movement had turned into 'the June Riots', which by its operations 
attempted to overcome British hegemony. Because of this, May Fourth activities were 
routinely condemned as anti-foreign acts. In preparation for future riots a wide range of 
preparations, from strengthening the armament to providing emergency laws and food 
supplies were arranged.
In chapters three to six I have attempted to characterise the British missionary, official 
and commercial community's experiences and reactions during the May Fourth events in 
the summer and autumn 1919 and continuing throughout the winter of 1920. All these 
groups formed peculiar rhetoric initially to define their attitudes, and accordingly to 
justify their position in the country. More specifically, three perspectives on the May 
Fourth experience appeared. British officials constructed the image of the May Fourth 
Movement as a rebellious protest against authority, and in the Settlement, against the 
Council's entrusted administration of affairs. According to the British officials' view, the 
principal objective was to challenge the regulations and to maintain peace and good 
order. In the contemporary commercial community's correspondence, the May Fourth 
protestors were almost invariably perceived in the context of a Japanese business boycott. 
Initially, the economic weapon of strike at the Japanese factories and the boycott of their 
products were remarkably profitable for the British companies. But later when the
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standstill o f market transactions dislocated the business and created immediate losses, 
British economic pre-eminence became threatened. The memory of paralysed markets 
and fear of its reappearance controlled their May Fourth image, as for the British 
commercial community it was essentially a boycott movement. The missionaries had 
identified the May Fourth activists as representatives of 'new young and Christian China' 
who fought against corrupt officials and warlords with the 'enlightened spirit and power 
of Christianity'. According to the missionaries' May Fourth image, it glorified the 
Christian teaching and promised a final salvation for the country.
However different the images created by British residents, they still shared some 
collective perspectives about the Movement. At first, fear of spreading xenophobia was 
illustrated in the Boxer rhetoric attached to a backward anti-foreign activity. Secondly, 
the need for peace and stability in the Settlement or in the area where the British operated 
was emphasised as it was obvious that the May Fourth demonstrations had disturbed 
British lives and work in the society. Thirdly, all researched groups had something 
'British', or at least from their perspective it was characteristically British to protect even 
if  it was only the British education system illustrated by the missionaries. In another case 
it was the principle of free trade as demanded by the commercial community including 
the free capital movements and a unified international monetary system. Finally, respect 
for the law and regulations were equated with British officials' principal ideals of the 
model society established in the International Settlement and no power was to question 
the authority the Council executed there.
Numerous police and consulate reports, however, confirmed the continuation of the 
Japanese boycott across the country until at least 1925112. Meanwhile, anti-Christian
112 M unicipal G azette , years 1919-1925; PRO, F 0228/3214, Shanghai Intelligence Bureau Minutes o f  
Meeting, years 1919-1920; PRO, F 0228/3288  Summaries o f  Intelligence Reports, years 1919-1925; PRO, 
F 0228/3527 , Boycotts and Strikes, 1919-1922.
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sentiment seemed to activate more profound anti-foreign and anti-imperialist movements 
which fully exploded after the May Thirtieth Incident of 1925. But for now, the British 
community was able to pause and concentrate on strengthening their presence in the 
International Settlement and in China.
My next chapter will analyse the Chinese response to foreigners' policies and 
operations and how this affected the development of the May Fourth Movement in 
Shanghai.
217
6. ’OUR FOREIGN FRIENDS ON THE NANJING ROAD’ - CHINESE 
EXPERIENCES IN THE INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENT 
DURING THE MAY FOURTH MOVEMENT
This chapter will examine the ways in which the British were affected by the May Fourth 
Movement in Shanghai. It discusses the implications British attitudes and reactions had 
011 the development of the Movement. In other words, the puipose is to identify the 
various forms of May Fourth activities which resulted from foreign operations and to 
determine the extent of foreign, particularly British influence, on the May Fourth 
Movement in Shanghai.
Scholars such as Joseph Chen, Tse-tsung Chow, Yingde Hao, Vera Schwarcz and 
Jeffrey Wasserstrom have already extensively researched the Chinese student, merchants 
and labour classes' activities in Beijing and Shanghai.1 However, this chapter focuses on 
Chinese May Fourth activities in relation to the Shanghai British community. Therefore, 
the analysis concentrates on operations, methods and techniques May Fourth protagonists 
used, especially when dealing with foreigners. Another purpose of this chapter is to 
evaluate the dynamics of interaction between the British and Chinese. It was apparent 
that from the beginning May Fourth activists benefited from operating under the 
International Settlement's protection, since the foreign area provided a haven in which to 
activate their 'progressive' ideas and actions. There is no doubt that it was an ultimate 
meeting place for educational, social and political societies which had been banned in 
other parts of the city. The situation was aggravated even further after Chinese officials' 
proclamation that prohibited all 'illegal' associations and it focused on politically
1 Chen, The M ay Fourth Movement in Shanghai; Chow, The M ay Fourth M ovem ent; Yingde Hao and 
Pengwen Shao, Zongguo xuesheng yundong jianshi, 1919-1949 , (A basic history o f  the Chinese student 
movement, 1919-1949), (Hebei, 1985); Schwarcz, The Chinese Enlightenment; Wasserstrom, The Student 
Protests.
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subversive groups2. Under these circumstances, many associations formed by urban 
workers, merchants or students were successfully activated in the Settlement. In 
principle, it offered a censorship free zone for printing pamphlets, handouts and 
magazines and provided the means for an extensive network to distribute printed 
materials around Shanghai and the whole country. Hence, by June 1919, Shanghai's 
International Settlement had become a centre for the May Fourth publications. It was also 
apparent that lack of intensive co-operation between three different jurisdictions in 
Shanghai (the French Concession, the International Settlement and the area of the 
Chinese Municipality) created a fertile ground to circumvent the prohibitions simply by 
moving the activities from one area into another administrative territory.
In contrast, in other parts of the country the governmental censorship had targeted 
protestors' newspapers, pamphlets, posters and handbills and it frequently paralysed 
communication channels which happened when the telegram connections were cut off in 
the beginning of May. In Beijing, a variety of publications were issued, but there the local 
officials were able to frighten some publishers by imprisoning their colleagues and 
censoring their materials. Students soon found out that it was difficult to organise 
themselves into working groups, as the police was constantly guarding the government's 
universities and colleges.3
After careful comparison the available research materials appear to support May Fourth 
students' statements. Initially, and for most of the Movement's duration, the Chinese were 
eager to co-operate in every way with foreign officials and residents in the city. The
2 SM A, U l-9 1 -1 9 , file 18, Shanghai Municipal Police, McEuen to Jamieson, 24 July, 1919; Hilton-Johnson 
to Jamieson, 25 September, 1919.
3 China P ress , 5 June, 1919, p. 2; China Press, 8 June, 1919, p. 4; F ar Eastern Review, vol. XV, July 1919, 
pp. 485-487; PRO, F 0228/2986/24  Jordan to FO, 24 May, 1919.
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maintenance of good relations with the British was a principal objective of students' 
policy in the International Settlement, Hence, British officials were actively contacted in 
order to obtain their approval for the May Fourth activities, and to assure them of the 
students' sincere attempts to maintain law and order. The May Fourth demonstrators 
applied various methods in expressing their May Fourth ideology. Accordingly, although 
their immediate intention was to convince all foreigners as a community, each British 
group was, nonetheless, also approached separately. In this process the students' role of 
distributing information by using multiple channels and techniques was crucial as the 
following discussion will explore.
The May Fourth protagonists' direct contacts with the British were conducted by 
personal visits, processions, volunteer corps, letters, articles, rumours, and circulars, all of 
which, in a different manner, communicated the May Fourth principles to foreigners. In 
addition, the message was given in indirect ways by holding meetings and by boycotting 
Japanese products. Numerous May Fourth operations in the Settlement were 
characteristically based on two principles. Firstly, protestors took active initiatives to 
communicate and explain their intentions and actions to foreigners, and secondly, they 
demonstrated persistently their eagerness to co-operate with the Settlement officials by 
obeying the Council's orders.
In doing so, students actually supplied the impetus to British repressive and extensive 
operations described in the previous four chapters. By making use of slogans and 
handbills, May Fourth protestors aroused their fellow countrymen to reshape Chinese 
society. Students' discursive practices were intended to, and, in fact did, shape reality in 
the Settlement, rather than merely passively reflecting or mirroring it. British rhetoric was
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designed to shape public sentiment, influence government politics, and to justify their 
existence in China. Similarly the May Fourth protagonists positioned themselves as 
advocates o f similar principles and communicated this discourse to foreigners.
6.1. Chinese Experiences and the British Officials
Following the outbreak of the May Fourth Movement in Beijing, student activists in 
Shanghai held a meeting to discuss, among other issues, which measures they should 
implement in order to avoid friction with local foreigners. In practice, it was well known 
among the Chinese residents of the Settlement that when May Fourth activists disturbed 
the Settlement's peace and order, or had any kind of serious confrontation with British 
municipal officials, the police, with the help of volunteer corps would immediately 
terminate the whole movement. Therefore, May Fourth protestors’ strategy to prevent 
such agitation was decided during the early stage of the Movement, and they were eager 
to demonstrate their peacekeeping methods in collaboration with the Settlement 
authorities. As a result, the Council and foreign consulates were approached on this 
matter. In order to discipline the strikers, Chinese student volunteer groups were 
established and Boy Scout Brigades were mobilised to patrol the streets to suppress any 
potential violent demonstrations in the Settlement.4
At this point it is important to note that just as the contemporary May Fourth ideology 
attracted Chinese male participants, women's activism was also stimulated by the 
Western thoughts promulgated through the May Fourth Movement. Advocating a
4 Chen, The M ay Fourth M ovem ent in Shanghai, pp. 89, 92, 95, 101; NCH, 31 May, 1919, p. 579; 
Wasserstrom, Student Protests, pp. 67-69.
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Western liberal concept of human rights, this new position empowered women to actively 
participate in the May Fourth operations. In this revivalist May Fourth atmosphere, the 
intellectual agitation for women's emancipation became a mark of modern citizenship.5 
Discovering their opportunity to influence and make their voices heard in Shanghai, local 
Chinese women established the 'Shanghai Social Services League'. In association with 
the YWCA's the 'Shanghai Returned Women Students' they sent telegrams to the Chinese 
government and to British and American ministers in the capital to announce their 
opinions for the sovereignty of China. In addition, Chinese women workers backed their 
fellow countryman and the police reported that thousands of female employees had 
shown their patriotism by walking out of the factories and mills.6
The May Fourth demonstrators' symbolic warfare against disturbances was conducted 
in an appropriate Western manner and by following the example of the Shanghai 
Municipal Police. To maintain the pretence that the student coips were merely positioned 
in order to mediate between the May Fourth protestors and the Settlement police, the 
student corps marched on the streets wearing uniforms which were decorated with badges 
bearing Chinese characters, 'no violence'. In the process, they tore down Japanese 
advertisements, and ordered demonstrators to avoid causing trouble. In addition, the May 
Fourth corps identified possible troublemakers and if necessary, threatened disobedient 
people with punishment. To complete the official look-alike appearance, some Chinese
5 For the feminist upsurge during and after the May Fourth Movement see Zheng Wang, Women in the 
Chinese Enlightenment: O ral and Textual H istories, (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1999), passim . In order to 
read som e personal accounts o f  women's May Fourth activities in Shanghai, see for example fascinating 
life stories o f  Lu Lihua pp. 145-172 and Chen Yongsheng pp. 259- 277 in the same book. Women's May 
Fourth operations in the other parts o f  China are discussed in Dymphna Cusack, Chinese Woman Speak, 
(Sydney, 1958), pp. 185-186 and Susanna Hoe, Chinese Footprints: Exploring Women's H isto iy  in China, 
Hong Kong and M acao, (Hong Kong, 1996), pp. 93-96.
6 NCH, 14 June, 1919, pp. 719-720; SM A, U l-91 -19 , file 19, Shanghai Municipal Police, McEuen to 
Fraser, 9 June, 1919.
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demonstrators bore Red Cross armlets to provide first aid in an emergency situation. 
Motor car drivers and cyclists who earned banners stating "Commit no violence" drove 
around the region, and similarly, megaphones were used to proclaim the importance of 
avoiding trouble.7 In doing so, students' appealed for British authorities' acceptance to 
legitimise their safeguarding position in the Settlement. Hence, a hierarchical discipline 
was constructed to validate the student volunteer corps' position, as was illustrated in the 
second chapter. The symbolic war conducted by slogans and uniforms had therefore
become a part o f the May Fourth collective challenge initially expressed by obstructing
» &Japanese business and organising strikes .
The apparent tension between the Shanghai Municipal Police and the Chinese student
corps had steadily increased since the beginning of the boycotts and it intensified during
the strikes. This tense situation seemed to have been recognised by May Fourth activists
who attempted to neutralise this strained atmosphere by placing the student coips around
the Settlement to assist the police when necessary. Even the Chinese traditional social
discipline organisations, called the 'group of ten', were re-established to cany out
disciplinary investigations and to locate shops that were selling prohibited Japanese
products. As a result, Japanese advertisements were tom down and burned along with
products that had been confiscated from shops. From the British perspective these were
violent actions, but the SSU interpreted that activities were non-violent and necessary for
the cause.9 Tslo violence' tactics were further demonstrated in written format and
7 China Press, 1 June, 1919, p. 2; NCH, 14 June, 1919, p. 717; SMA, U 1-91 -19, file 19, Shanghai 
Municipal Police, Police daily report, 6 June, 1919.
8 Tarrow, P ow er in M ovement, p. 4.
9 'Group o f  ten' or baojia  was a traditional household registration system, but for the May Fourth protestors 
it was a method to control the crowd as by swearing a collective oath o f  ten men to boycott Japanese 
products, individual members were each responsible to the group. F ar Eastern R eview , vol. XV, June 1919, 
p. 441; NCH, 17 May, 1919, pp. 415-416; Wasserstrom, Student Protests, pp. 66-67. ’Groups often ' were
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thousands of circulars were distributed. Various types of posters were placed in doors and 
on poles. All of this was to encourage May Fourth protestors to stay calm.10 Yet, in spite 
of these efforts to constrain violence and disturbances some Japanese were assaulted and 
a few of them were killed. Some other foreigners were also attacked.11 The May Fourth 
activists' initial strategy to co-operate with foreign municipal officials was, however, well 
followed. As soon as Chinese student coips were prohibited in the Settlement, students 
cancelled activities. In some cases, however, the student operations were hidden from the 
public and according to the foreign municipal police, meetings were held in secret 
locations.12
These activities were proof of discipline within the Movement that the foreign 
community refused to recognise. Certainly, May Fourth student coips saw themselves as 
legitimate as the British authorities. As it turned out, the student coips played a 
determinative role and eventually they agitated the foreigners to suppress the Movement. 
Especially when the student coips attempted to implement vigilante law, they were 
categorised, by the British, as 'a rebellious group anxious to control the whole society1. 
The resulting situation promised and subsequently produced friction between the two. In 
other words, the Chinese students failed to express their political significance and their 
operational mechanism for the foreign oligarchy, who, in turn, were unwilling to sacrifice 
the precious privileges in the Settlement. The common belief that the British 
administration would resist any degree of Chinese control was soundly based. For the
established around country, as a missionary report from w est China narrated, The West China M issionaiy  
News, vol. XXI, August, 1919, p. 23.
10 PRO, F 0228 /3214  Shanghai Intelligence Bureau Minutes o f Meeting, Summary o f  Intelligence for week  
ended May 29th, 1919; PRO, F 0 2 28 /3526 /31 Fraser to Jordan, 9 June, 1919.
u NCH, 14 June, 1919, pp. 714, 716, 723; Shanghai Municipal Council, Annual Report 1919, pp. 64A- 
65A, 85A, 87A; PRO, FO 228/3526/20 Fraser to Jordan, 8 June, 1919.
12 SMA, U l-91 -19 , file 19, Shanghai Municipal Police, McEuen to Phillips, 20 June, 1919.
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time being, the Chinese student corps who patrolled the Settlement streets undermined 
British prestige. For the Chinese students, it paved the way for May Fourth 
demonstrators' future activities and was an example of the students' ability to supervise 
the Movement. Moreover, it is apparent that the International Settlement provided 
students with 'a testing ground' where various persuasive and coercive May Fourth 
operations could be experimented with and modified for future operations.
The May Fourth activities in the International Settlement demonstrated that it was a 
matter of Chinese national pride to display strength and unity when they confronted 
foreign residents. A new sense of modern national identity introduced by the May Fourth 
Movement had to find a way of dealing with the Western and Japanese challenge, as 
during earlier periods Chinese national life had humiliatingly failed to do so. This 
manifestation was particularly important, as the Chinese often believed that the 
Settlement foreigners were not taking seriously their attempts to administer vigorously 
the growing May Fourth campaign. More significantly, Japanese newspapers had 
characterised the May Fourth Movement as a "five-minutes patriotism" that was merely a 
renewal of previous short-lived enthusiastic attempts to boycott and which would 
therefore die off as soon as activities threatened Chinese merchants' business or personal 
interests.13
It is true that even the most sympathetic British observers tended to underestimate the 
May Fourth Movement's future potential. Meanwhile, British extremists preferred to 
characterise it with patronising assumptions, predicting its coming failure or naming it, as
13 Lin, The Crisis o f  Chinese Consciousness, pp. 62-63; LMS, Central China, Correspondence, box 30, 
folder 2, Sparham to Hawkins, 14 June, 1919; NCH , 17 May, 1919, p. 446; NCH, 24 May, 1919, p. 507; 
NCH, 31 May, 1919, p. 579.
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the British Consul-General did, as "blind folly".14 In general, May Fourth demonstrators 
recognised those policies that fortified national honour crucial to the success of the 
Movement. In fact, all Chinese patriotic activities were perceived as essential to confront 
the Japanese and Western treaty port people. In the foreigners' community, there was no 
disposition to favour this view. The opposite, 'keeping face’ was recognised instead as a 
deeply embedded characteristic in the psyche of the Chinese people. 'Face pidgin' was 
another British concept that was used to criticise the Chinese way to respect maintaining 
of the face, and hence, your status.15 In this regard, Chinese May Fourth demonstrators' 
demand to conduct a final flag waving procession through the Settlement in order to 
celebrate the achievements of strike was identified by the British as another attempt to 
usurp the city. The victory parade was even more feared as predicting the foreign 
community's defeat by Chinese nationalism.16 Nonetheless, for the May Fourth 
protestors, the ending of the general strike was the Movement's first major victory, and a 
powerful demonstration o f Chinese patriotism. At the same time, Chinese merchants 
apparently expected a moral acceptance of their strike and boycott activities and needed a 
victory parade after a symbolically, but also realistically, successful strike17. Instead, 
celebrating demonstrators received a hostile response from British municipal authorities 
and the peaceful and patriotic parade was condemned as "a riot of a belligerent mob". For 
the time being, this incident revealed the ugly side of British authority. In contrast to all
14 PRO, F 0228/3526/33  Fraser to Jordan, 7 June, 1919.
15 NCH, 7 June, 1919, p. 649. Various contemporary British books and correspondence regularly listed the 
negative Chinese mental and physical characteristics to define the Chinese race. See for example The China 
Year Book, 1921-1922, (Tianjin, 1921), p. 547; N otes on Shanghai, (London, 1928), p. 35, appendix E; 
SOAS, PP/MS 49, Papers o f  the Scott Family, Box 1, file 2, Rev. Francis J. Griffith, Qingdao to Miss 
Heathcote, 19 August, 1919.
16 PRO, F 0228/3526/33 , 75b, 79,116 Fraser to Jordan, 7 and 11 June (2 letters), 1919 and Phillips to 
Jordan, 21 June, 1919; SM A, U l-91 -19 , file 19, Shanghai Municipal Police, McEuen to Fraser, 13 June, 
1919.
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expectations expressed by the Chinese community, the Council rejected the parade and 
surprisingly attacked it. Yet, the qualities of 'stiff upper lip' or 'protecting Western values 
and principles' were the equivalent principles the British expected to be respected by the 
May Fourth demonstrators. While the 'stiff upper lip' and 'Western values' mentality were 
seen as positive characteristics among British expatriates and to some extent among the 
Chinese intelligentsia, the Chinese 'maintaining face' or 'face pidgin' -disposition was 
described as a weakness from the British perspective.
In relation to victory parades, Wasserstrom has interestingly pointed out that by 
expecting certain types of activities to conclude the general strike honourably, the May 
Fourth demonstrators actually combined traditional Chinese festival celebrations with the 
idea of Western style victory processions, similar to the one organised in Shanghai after 
the Armistice to celebrate the victory of the Allies in the World W ar.18 Hence, the 
question of a victory parade in June 1919, represented British misinterpretation of the 
May Fourth students' objectives and manifestations throughout summer and autumn of 
1919. Predicating this possibility of misunderstanding, May Fourth students utilised 
alternative methods to gain British officials' acceptance.
Obviously, the student and merchant demonstrators were well aware of British officials' 
hegemony over the foreign and Chinese community in the Settlement. When analysing 
the May Fourth activists printed materials, it is possible, therefore, to obtain some 
understanding of their visions and expectations relating to British officials' operations. At 
one level, the hope was to establish a profound collaboration between the May Fourth 
protagonists and the British residents in the International Settlement and to salvage the
17 Chen, The M ay Fourth M ovement in Shanghai, pp. 167-168.
18 Wasserstrom, Student Protests, pp. 81-82.
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Movement from the Council's repressive notifications. A particularly interesting part of 
the communication was the manifestations designed and directed especially for 
foreigners.
The Shanghai Student Union had prepared itself for extensive propaganda work and 
formed a communication department to deliver internal messages to its members and to 
maintain external connections with other Chinese groups and foreigners.19 It was obvious 
that the students' influence on social events and public sentiment, through their 
propaganda campaign, was overwhelming. Various accounts garnered by the press and 
from official documents attest to the reality of the distribution of printed materials in the 
Settlement. The British consular officials, the Council members and police officers were 
frequently reminded of May Fourth principles, such as the policy to maintain the 
Movement's non-violence and they also emphasised the patriotic nature of the Japanese 
boycott. In addition, co-existence in the Settlement under the foreigners' regulations was 
another principle incorporated in the May Fourth agenda and the continuance of 'friendly 
relations' with Westerners was included in the manifestations.
At the beginning of the general strike, the SSU addressed a letter to the Council, 
indicating its earnest desire to serve "our foreign friends" at the Settlement, and it 
attempted to assure British officials of its ability to guarantee peace and order in the 
region. Coupled with this propaganda, a students' special committee had been appointed 
to promote understanding between May Fourth demonstrators and foreigners. Even 
before launching the general strike, the Citizens' Society had issued an explanatory letter 
to several Consuls-General in the city. It articulated the reasons for boycotting Japanese 
products and in another letter the society promised to advise all Chinese to purchase their
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goods only from British and American shops.20 Exaggerated rhetoric praising foreign 
friends was revealed in notices issued by Chinese student, merchant and educational 
organisations. A substantial part of texts complimented the whole foreign community's 
sympathy and goodwill towards the Movement. Brief references were made to the 
exceptional, organisational skills of the May Fourth demonstrators to maintain order 
during the strikes.21
Yet, it was difficult to identify any British consulate, Council or police members' 
attitudes from this description, especially when the British in particular had, in the 
meantime, tried to suppress all May Fourth activities. Despite this beautifully constructed 
discourse of 'foreign friends', in reality the notices were cleverly constructed propagating 
tools for the May Fourth demonstrators to receive popular acceptance for their operations 
among the foreign and Chinese communities. Indeed, it was a perceptibly fawning 
advertising campaign to attain approval from the suspicious British and to recruit more 
Chinese people in support of May Fourth activities.
On another occasion the British were reminded once more in a highly articulate and 
persuasive manner of their position as guardians of the Chinese Maritime Customs and 
administrators of the Settlement. Alongside these concessions, they had responsibilities 
towards the whole country, as the May Fourth pamphlet indicated. According to this 
conception, by supporting the Chinese nation against imperialist Japan, the British would 
in future ensure the continuation of their privileged presence in China. As the British now 
learned, the only opportunity to maintain a powerful British hegemony was to help the 
May Fourth demonstrators in their operations against Japanese aggression, otherwise the
19 Wang, Women in the Chinese Enlightenment, p. 266.
20 China Press, 10 June, 1919, p. 2; NCH, 7 June, 1919, pp. 649-650.
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Japanese would simply discard the British from the Settlement. Similarly, the letter 
addressed to the municipal electricity department repeated the rhetoric of the Western 
principle of democratic righteousness to protest when encountering imperialist 
aggression.22 Here, it is important to realise that the promulgation implied that the 
Japanese, and not the Chinese, were the hostile agents and were, in due course, forcing 
the British out of the Settlement in order to practice militarist politics in Shanghai. By 
including this in the letter, the May Fourth demonstrators wanted to establish a high level 
of co-existence and shared values and interdependence - perceived and actual - between 
the Settlement British and Chinese. In fact, it seemed as if the British and the May Fourth 
activists' collaboration to fight against a mutual enemy was a fundamental prerequisite in 
these types of political and financial circumstances. Another point to stress is that the 
demonstrators' discourse repeatedly articulated well-known Western values such as 
democracy, national liberalism, general education and women's emancipation. 
Underlying this reasoning was the idea that the British would understand and instigate a 
movement which represented modem ideologies similar to their own.
Shortly after starting the general strike, the SSU's immediate concern shifted from 
manifesting the May Fourth ideologies, to ensuring their own and other demonstrators' 
survival in the Settlement. The Council's domineering notifications in May and June 
1919, and the closure o f SSU office at the Settlement was followed by shutting down the 
French Concession premises, an incident which was undoubtedly initiated by British 
Council members. Eventually it forced students to accept a more intolerant Chinese
21 NCH, 14 June, 1919, pp. 718-719, 724.
22 SM A, U l-91-22 , Shanghai Municipal Police, Note from the commercial, educational and labouring 
communities to the Council, 9 June, 1919; SMA, U l-3 -67 , file 1044, Shanghai Municipal Council,
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municipal administration.23 Apart from losing the perfect site for headquarters, May 
Fourth demonstrators' operations in the Settlement did not seem to be greatly affected by 
the Council's notifications. The first order to not to interfere with shopkeepers' business 
was ignored by the student and merchant inspector coips and 'the groups of ten', who 
relentlessly investigated business premises in order to find prohibited Japanese products. 
In spite of the second note which called for the cessation of distributing inciting printed 
materials, the constant flow of printed propaganda was uncontrollable. In the Settlement 
alone the police reported that it possessed over 500 different kind o f handbills and 
cartoons. Other than preventing some processions, the third declaration to stop rumours 
and crowd gatherings was, in reality, fairly ineffective. A wave o f political and social 
agitation was too exciting to stop people from gathering together to exchange rumours 
and experiences and to predict future events. In fact, since the strikes had closed almost 
all schools, shops and factories, people simply had nothing else to do except to gather on 
the streets and talk about the situation. Eventually, the streets were crowded with 
increasing audiences who listened to the student street-comer speakers. A more effective 
prohibition was issued on 8 June, 1919 which removed May Fourth protestors' white 
clothes, caps and banners that had provoked the Chinese to ally with demonstrators to 
agitate around the city, as the British commonly believed. For the British it had been a 
recognisable signal for trouble in the Settlement.24
Secretariat, Shanghai Patriotic, Educational and Commercial Federation to the Manager o f  the Electricity 
Department, 12 December, 1919.
23 NCH, 21 June, 1919, p. 759; SMP, Special Branch, roll 65, dossier 6691, Extracts from the file on the 
1919 Japanese Boycott and the activities o f  the Students in connection therewith, C hief Detective Inspector 
Reeves to Headquarter Staff, 25 September, 1925.
24 Shanghai Municipal Council, Annual R eport 1919 , p. 88A; SMP, Special Branch, roll 65, dossier 6691, 
Extracts from the file on the 1919 Japanese Boycott and the activities o f  the Students in connection 
therewith, C hief Detective Inspector Reeves to Headquarter Staff, 25 September, 1925.
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More significantly, as Steve Smith has pointed out, the street comer orators came also 
front the merchant class who had thrown themselves into the business of educating and
• 25organising labour, discovering in the process a new political role in Shanghai. To 
strengthen their protest against the Council's prohibitions, Chinese printers working for 
the British printing house which published the notifications went on strike.26 But not even 
the Council's last notice was able to restrict the May Fourth operations. This is not to say 
that the SSU and street unions did not recognise the Council's manifestos. On the 
contrary, every notification was responded to by voluminous letters to the Council and 
the British newspapers, and each letter reminded the foreign authorities of existing 
'friendly co-operation' between the parties, and promised to fully obey orders. But once 
more, as they did earlier in May and June, the British probably realised that in practice, it 
was impossible to exercise complete control over May Fourth activists and their 
operations.
The May Fourth printed materials, especially those produced for foreigners in the 
Settlement, were compiled skilfully and the visual image was designed to support the 
Movement's ideology. Modem style and accurate reasoning expressed by using Western 
models demonstrated May Fourth protagonists' abilities to produce rational and 
intelligent ideas. This created some uneasiness among foreign circles in Shanghai and 
gave an added impetus for British authorities to suppress the Movement as soon as 
possible. A May Fourth demonstrator represented the modern, active and educated new 
Chinese generation that could easily challenge British privileges and extraterritorial 
rights. It was well acknowledged that by using their position, scholars were able to bring
25 Steve A. Smith, A R oad is M ade: Communism in Shanghai 1920-1927, (Richmond, Surrey, 2000), p. 10.
26 SMA, U l-91-19 , file 19, Shanghai Municipal Police, McEuen to Fraser, 8 June, 1919.
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considerable pressure to bear on more reluctant patriots. The traditional Chinese respect 
for scholars was still in vogue and if the British needed more proof o f their influence, the 
recently experienced general strike had realised scholars' potential to unify all classes in 
support o f the Movement.
The May Fourth students' impressive communication skills were illustrated in The 
Students' Strike -An explanation (see Appendix 1) -pamphlet which was already 
discussed in the fourth chapter in relation to British missionaries. When analysing the 
pamphlet in relation to May Fourth demonstrators' propaganda skills, it provides a 
relevant example of sentimental yet sophisticated reasoning. Finishing with a direct 
petition to foreigners, it used the May Fourth demonstrators' rhetoric to accentuate values 
that were honoured by the Westerners. This time priorities such as justice to the nations, 
battle against militarism, free trade and education were expressed. Finally, the Allies 
were reminded of a resemblance between the Japanese and German imperialists and the 
metaphor "Hun of the East" was effectively used in the concluding statement. The 
pamphlet also indicated in its conclusion that Japan was an equivalent enemy to China as 
Germany had been to the Allies in Europe. Not surprisingly, May Fourth students 
claimed that they were fighting for foreigners in China.
In contrast, short sentences and vernacular language were used in the May Fourth 
propaganda to promote ideas among the Chinese populace. Easily memorable phrases 
were recited to underline the principles of the Movement; "Return our Qingdao", "Down 
with Militarists", "China belongs to Chinese", "Boycott Japanese goods" were some of
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the popular slogans used to deliver their message.27 The difference between the rhetoric 
addressed to foreigners and the Chinese intelligentsia and on the other hand to the 
common Chinese people was immense. The former groups obviously needed more 
'eloquent argumentation' and accordingly the May Fourth propaganda reflected its target 
audience.
The British and American newspapers published numerous Chinese students' letters and 
articles. Therefore, the scope and scale of published materials confirmed the British 
argument that the foreign media was 'shrewdly used for the May Fourth propaganda'.28 
Chinese Western Returned Students in particular distinguished themselves as an active 
group, partly due to their good English language skills. They claimed to possess an 
appropriate knowledge of Western manners and ideologies. Moreover, according to them, 
they "had the blessing o f higher Western learning". It was proudly announced that the 
Western Returned Students' Union was actually created to promote the May Fourth 
ideology which supported Western ideals to fight against militarism. Their discourse was 
particularly persuasive because, in a sense, the juxtaposition between democratic "Allied 
foreign friends" and "Hun Oriental militarism" represented by the Japanese was 
supposed to help the British choose whose side they were on in this struggle. In order to 
help "the foreign friends" to select their side correctly, the British were reminded to live 
according to the principles they had advocated in international politics, and particularly at 
the Versailles Peace Conference. It is interesting to note that the researched materials 
give the impression of the Western educated students' eagerness to act as mediators
27 NCH, 31 May, 1919, p. 579; NCH, 14 June, 1919, p. 696; for more detailed discussion on the May 
Fourth propaganda among the Chinese populance, see Steve A. Smith, Like Cattle and Horses: 
Nationalism and Labour in Shanghai, 1895-1927, (London, 2002), 92-108.
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between the Chinese people and Shanghai foreigners.29 The Western educated students' 
activities were acknowledged by the contemporary Guomindang leaders, and 
consequently, Dr. Sun Yat-sen urged students to maintain patriotic principles.30
Under the guise of co-operation, however, the Western educated students formed a 
critical faction of Chinese intellectuals who had already begun to scrutinise British 
hegemony in the country. Thus, initial attempts to challenge the British semi-colonial 
presence were expressed during the May Fourth Movement. As local newspaper 
correspondence revealed, an extensive press licence discussion had infuriated Western 
educated students who claimed that the proposed press law had been manufactured and 
implemented by the British in order to undermine growing Chinese public opinion. Apart 
from receiving strong American support for this accusation, the Western returned 
students were not able to threaten British domination in the International Settlement. Yet, 
it represented a growing radical intellectual opinion that had begun to question 
Westerners, and particularly the British position in China.31 Defined largely in Western 
terms but presented as culturally unspecific, a variety of notions and practices were used 
by the Western educated students to launch appeals for the right to pursue Chinese 
national independence and to mobilise popular movement to implement it. Their co­
operative and pro-British rhetoric initially used was, however, about to change within the
28 For more Chinese May Fourth articles and letters published in the British and American newspapers see 
for example C elestial Em pire, China Press, Far Eastern Review, N CH  issues from May to December 1919.
29 China Press, 10 June, 1919, 2nd section, p. 10; China Press , 11 June, 1919, p. 10; China Press, 12 June, 
1919, p. 3; NCH, 31 May, 1919, p. 577; NCH, 14 June, 1919, p. 714 and pp. 721-722; NCH, 21 June, 1919, 
p. 782; NCH, 5 July, 1919, p. 43; M illiard's Review  o f  the Far E ast, vol. VIII, number 7, 12 April, 1919, 
pp. 237-239. The Western Returned Students Union combined earlier formed English and American 
Returned Student Clubs in Shanghai. Jerome Ch'en, China and the West: Society and Culture /675-1937, 
(London, 1979), pp. 168-173. More detailed research on the Chinese students abroad and their activities in 
China during the N ew  Culture Movement and the May Fourth M ovement see Y.C. Wang, Chinese 
Intellectuals and the West 1872-1949, (Durham, NC, 1966), pp. 306-361.
30 China Press, 31 August, 1919, p. 1.
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next five years. At the height of the May Thirtieth Movement of 1925 the same Western 
educated students were among the first to accuse the British government of oppressing 
China and as a final verbal attack accused Jardines of both segregating the Chinese and
32their "despising of the yellow race".
Possibly overestimating their cordial connections with Westerners in the summer 1919, 
the Western returned students devoted their energy to patriotic and propaganda activities 
and continuously expressed hope that mutual understanding between all the Settlement 
inhabitants might be reached on a firm basis. In spite of their active participation, the 
SSU remained the most influential of all May Fourth associations and societies.
But even more important May Fourth manifestations, perhaps, were the famous four 
demands to the Beijing government. Every literate and illiterate inhabitant of Shanghai 
was bombarded with resolutions which culminated in the following May Fourth 
principles. Firstly, the three traitors should be dismissed and punished, secondly, all 
secret and unequal treaties concerning China should be abolished, thirdly, all students 
should be released, and fourthly, the Qingdao area should be unconditionally returned to 
China. For British officials the demands reflected the Chinese central government's long­
term internal problems o f corruption and militarism. They were, therefore, unwilling to 
become involved and insisted on the maintenance of neutrality in the Settlement.33 Yet, 
Chinese articles and letters published in the newspapers encouraged the British to take 
collective action and to cany out their responsibilities to Chinese people by persuading 
their governments to act. For the message to be effective, it was hoped that practical
31 China Press, 13 July, 1919, p. 4.
32 JMA, S/O Shanghai to Hong Kong, January to June, 1925, Yui Wang, on behalf o f Western Returned 
Students, 2 July, 1925.
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nuisances such as deprivation of bread and meat would eventually press foreign 
governmental officials to use their power34.
Some May Fourth demonstrators, inspired by their early successful campaigning and 
with a greatly increasing number of followers, felt that the time was right for direct 
confrontation with the British. Hence, occasionally local May Fourth activists encouraged 
certain individuals and societies to threaten British expatriates. In the midst of the general 
strike a threatening letter was addressed to Sir Everard Fraser in order to intimidate 
British officials to change their offensive policies towards May Fourth demonstrators. 
'The Red and Blue Forces' society threatened to destroy all British and foreign property 
unless the Council withdrew its notifications. Moreover, this society demanded the names 
and addresses o f those who had interfered with May Fourth students and the crowd. At 
this point it naturally meant both foreign and Chinese police members. However, the 
strongly worded letter did not seem to present any tangible threat to British officials, and 
no action was taken to investigate the matter more thoroughly.35
A different type of opposition towards Westerners emerged immediately after 
Westerners' decision to organise the Allied Versailles Peace Treaty celebrations in 
Shanghai. Only a few weeks earlier the May Fourth demonstrators had been refused 
permission to hold a parade to celebrate their victory over the corrupt and inefficient 
central government. Now the Allied expatriates, led by the British majority, had made 
grandiose plans to commemorate victory in the war in Europe in the International
33 PRO, F 0228/3526/22 , 33 Fraser to Jordan, 6 and 7 June, 1919; SMA, U 1-91-22, Shanghai Municipal 
Police, McEuen to Fraser, 6 June, 1919; Shanghai Municipal Council, Annual Report 1919, p. 86A.
34 SMA, U l-91 -19 , file 19, Shanghai Municipal Police, McEuen to Fraser, 7 June, 1919.
35 PRO, F 0228/3526/75 Fraser to Jordan, 11 June, 1919; SMA, U l-91 -22 , Shanghai Municipal Police, 
Note from the 'Chinese Republican Association interested in Japanese affairs' to the Shanghai Municipal 
Police, 11 June, 1919.
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Settlement of Shanghai. For many Chinese, however, the peace treaty was nothing to 
celebrate. In spite of Chinese delegates' successful and widely publicised refusal to sign 
the peace treaty because of intensive May Fourth campaigning, the oppressive Japanese 
'Twenty One demands' were still effectively manipulating Chinese internal politics. A 
sense o f betrayal on the Westerners' part had humiliated the Chinese people and in the 
reinvigorated May Fourth atmosphere it infuriated the patriotic Chinese who associated 
the victory with concepts such as national 'disgrace', 'defacement' and 'injustice'. 
Accordingly, Chinese residents in the Settlement were advised to act in a similar way as 
they would during national mourning or during funerals, that is, to walk in an unusually 
quiet manner and to keep flags at half-mast. Not surprisingly, British police officers' 
correspondence again classified these Chinese operations as representing "the most 
obvious expression" in inciting anti-foreign sentiment in the Settlement.36 The peace 
treaty had only partly fulfilled Chinese patriotic expectations, but it had not yet 
completely transferred their feelings into radical anti-foreign sentiment, despite the fact 
that the British municipal police undoubtedly overreacted to all circulars distributed in 
the summer and autumn of 1919.37 The Settlement police themselves were occasionally 
attacked, particularly when they attempted to tear down provocative posters and banners, 
or when they tried to force Chinese merchants to open their shops. Meanwhile, the SSU
36 SMA, U l-9 1 -1 9 , file 19, Shanghai Municipal Police, McEuen to Jamieson, letters and circulars, 10,12 
and 14 July, 1919.
37 May Fourth researchers such as Chen and Wasserstrom have profoundly analysed numerous Chinese 
May Fourth publications in Shanghai and found very few  anti-Western notes. See Chen, The M ay Fourth 
M ovem ent in Shanghai, passim .; Wasserstrom, Student P rotests , pp. 52- 71.
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maintained its neutral policy and disassociated itself publicly from all violent operations
• 38whether against the Japanese, or other foreigners.
As has been pointed out earlier, the Settlement police forces were the principal 
informants of the socio-political currencies present in the city, and therefore, were 
recognised as potential May Fourth collaborators, since they had recruited various 
Chinese people into their ranks. Undoubtedly Chinese police members were the primary 
targets of the May Fourth propaganda, but simultaneously, the foreign police and 
especially British commanding officers were approached directly. In order to convince 
the foreign police o f their supervising abilities, May Fourth activists distributed 
manifestos among the police giving solemn evidence of their civic peacekeeping 
potential. The future character of the May Fourth demonstrator was praised as disciplined 
and reliable, which was in total opposition to the view taken by the central government’s 
officials. Moreover, the proclamation accused the Council o f not allowing the student 
volunteer coips to assist in the maintenance of order and condemned the Council's 
attempts to forcibly open shops. In summary, the May Fourth manifesto to the police 
pleaded for police co-operation and anticipated their approval. The British police were 
also expected to show that justice was done by remaining quiet and by not becoming 
involved in the Council's coercive policies.39 In trying to demonstrate their co-operative 
skills, the SSU's went one step further and suggested calling upon the police and SVC
38 SMP, Special Branch, roll 65, dossier 6691, Extracts from the file on the 1919 Japanese Boycott and the 
activities o f  the Students in connection therewith, C hief Detective Inspector Reeves to Headquarter Staff, 
25 September, 1925.
39 SMA, U 1-91-22, Shanghai Municipal Police, Note from 'the Chinese Republican Association interested 
in Japanese affairs' to the Shanghai Municipal Police, 11 June, 1919; Shanghai Municipal Council, Annual 
Report 1919, p. 86A; SMP, Special Branch, roll 65, dossier 6691, Extracts from the file on the 1919 
Japanese Boycott and the activities o f  the Students in connection therewith, C hief Detective Inspector 
Reeves to Headquarter Staff, 25 September, 1925.
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troops if  the situation required it. The announcement was published in Chinese and 
foreign newspapers to reaffirm the collaboration with 'foreign friends'.40
A small number of Chinese from the Settlement introduced a surprising element to 
police involvement in the Movement as they secretly contacted the British police officers 
to request protection against the May Fourth demonstrators. Some Chinese bankers and 
businessmen had privately encouraged the merchants to resume business. This infuriated 
May Fourth demonstrators who sent threatening letters in the name of 'the Iron and Blood 
Union1 to 'the country's traitors'. British police expressed their respect for the Chinese 
who attempted to pacify the situation in the Settlement and provided a detective to protect 
them free of charge 41 Evidently, the British police were anxious to co-operate with the 
influential Chinese in the Settlement rather than with 'rioting' and boycotting students.
Neither the Chinese student's organisations, nor merchant associations were properly 
equipped to control the message flow that was aptly described as 'Dame rumour'42. In 
people's mental images she floated around the city whispering o f present dangers and 
constantly predicting future discomforts. A major prerequisite for the emergence of the 
fear and the shared mentality of its participants, was created by Dame rumour. The highly 
volatile situation encouraged the activation of rumours when the free flow of information, 
for example, concerning the events in Beijing, was prevented. Rumours were circulated 
not only to define the uncertainty of the situation, but also to validate a course of
China P ress , 7 June, 1919, p. 1; SMP, Special Branch, roll 65, dossier 6691, Extracts from the file on the 
1919 Japanese Boycott and the activities o f  the Students in connection therewith, C hief Detective Inspector 
Reeves to Headquarter Staff, 25 September, 1925.
41 SM A, U 1-3-30, file 1037, Shanghai Municipal Council, Secretariat, Hilton-Johnson to Secretary o f  the 
Council, 12 December, 1919 and Sung Hang-chang from the Bank o f  China to Commissioner o f  Police, 12 
December, 1919.
42 NCH, 21 June, 1919, p. 761.
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collective action.43 A collective fear among the Chinese related to the unverified 
information o f Japanese expatriates poisoning food supplies or water wells. This belief 
most likely recruited more Chinese support for the May Fourth boycott than the 
distribution of any ideological pamphlets. As suggested in the previous chapter, the 
Japanese, in return, circulated rumours of British imperialist activities in various parts of 
China to incite anti-British sentiment.44 It was true that after repressive measures taken by 
the Council to suppress the Movement especially after the shooting on 12 June, 1919, the 
revivalist May Fourth atmosphere had developed to the point where anti-British protests 
were likely. It was apparent that both the Boxers' potential reappearance and anti-foreign 
rumours were equally feared among May Fourth organisers as they were among the 
British. The experience of the Boxer uprising had been a sufficient indication of danger 
more than any development could present for British interests. For the Chinese, the threat 
of civil war was an equally dreaded option as it might bring another full-scale military 
invention from outside in defence of the foreign settlements.
Until the beginning of June, 1919, the main body of the Movement had been composed 
of student groups and patriotic merchants, but after successful strikes, new labour and 
business associations were eager to manifest patriotic feelings. By joining the May 
Fourth campaigning, they expressed their willingness to achieve more visible authority in 
the Settlement's daily politics. According to their ideas, since the Settlement itself had 
provided an ideological and physical environment to form new societies, it would surely 
function as an ideal ground for executing their activities. For the Chinese living in the
43 Ramsay, The Ideology> o f  the Great Fear, p. XVI; Rosnow, Rumour and Gossip, pp. 51-56.
44 SMA, U l-91 -19 , file 19, Shanghai Municipal Police, McEuen to Jamieson, 12 July, 1919; SMP, Special 
Branch, roll 65, dossier 6691, Extracts from the file on the 1919 Japanese Boycott and the activities o f the
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Settlement, British local politics certainly provided grounds for further improvement in 
the form o f accepting Chinese representation in the Council. At the same time, the events 
in the summer and autumn of 1919 appeared to put new societies' organisational skills 
and ideological principles to the test. The associations' involvement in Settlement politics 
was prominent during the rates agitation. The press license dispute also strengthened the 
groups' power, and similarly, the question of Chinese representation on the Council 
further united the newly formed groups.45 What now rapidly emerged from the May 
Fourth activities was the co-operation between street unions, labour groups with 
traditional merchant guilds and student societies. Therefore, after successful boycotts and 
strikes, British officials' operations to introduce new rates and censorship the Settlement 
press faced strong resistance in the form of new Chinese pressure groups and their 
protests. The most pressing political consideration for foreign authorities was, however, 
growing public opinion to ask that Chinese representation be granted in the Council. 
There is no doubt that this issue was further hastened by the attitude which the Council 
adopted towards the May Fourth demonstrations and their subsequent campaign to obtain 
fuller powers to deal with the Settlement press. The question o f Chinese representation 
was activated as a result of May Fourth incidents and although it was not fully realised 
before 1928, the issue was never again ignored by the British residents.
It was feared in foreign circles that the above-mentioned activities would mature into 
more serious confrontation between foreigners and Chinese. The prevailing British 
official perspective was well articulated in the Consul-General's letter as follows:
Students in connection therewith, C hief Detective Inspector Reeves to Headquarter Staff, 25 September, 
1925.
45 PRO, F 0 6 7 1/447/537, 540, 541 McEuen to Jamieson, 13,18, 20 August, 1919.
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"Having had experience o f  a mild form o f  anarchy in the shape o f  students' riots, certain sections o f  the
Chinese in the Settlement have swallowed and absorbed the microbe o f  self-determination and have
46revived a cry of'n o  taxation without representation'."
Co-operation with British officials was a vital factor in allowing May Fourth activists 
to concentrate on the Settlement. The prospects of obtaining acceptance to operate in the 
Settlement clearly depended in the first instance upon agreement between demonstrators 
and the Council. When confronted with British municipal officials it soon became 
evident that the May Fourth demonstrators had to adapt their operations to fit the 
regulations prevalent in the Settlement, and riots or violent activities were out of 
question. Therefore, the May Fourth organisers found it essential to place volunteer corps 
around the area to secure peace and order within the Settlement borders. By imitating the 
manners and practices of the British police, students' attempted to control the Movement. 
The root cause for collision, however, still remained the same: British officials were 
extremely reluctant to accept any other authority in the Settlement, and consequently, 
student corps and their operations were prohibited. It was apparent that when the May 
Fourth leaders chose symbols with which to frame their manifestos, they set a strategic 
course between their cultural setting, political opponents, ordinary citizens and the British 
expatriates whose support they relied on.
Another tactic o f ensuring British support for May Fourth operations was to implement 
propaganda machinery geared to produce information to foreign authorities. Consistent 
campaigning was directed at all foreign groups in Shanghai, but in particular, 
uncompromising British officials were primary targets, because without their approval 
the May Fourth operations would have been quickly terminated, and it would have 
caused an embarrassing situation for May Fourth demonstrators. It was apparent that the
46 PRO, F 0671/447/536  Jamieson to Jordan, 12 August, 1919.
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Settlement provided fertile ground for anti-govemment campaigns not only because of 
the area's 'untouchable' status, but also British general opinion utterly disregarded the 
central government in Beijing. In the ideal world of the Britons, foreign intervention was 
required to modernise the Chinese traditional administration system, and in this way the 
anti-govemmental demonstrations served British political and financial interests in China. 
What was desired, in practice, was a strong stable government, which would ensure 
conditions favourable to foreign trade.
May Fourth activists' 'friendship' rhetoric was based on an assumed mutual 
understanding between two parties concerned. Thus, Westerners were May Fourth 
demonstrators' 'friends' and allegedly approved their actions, while the Chinese, in return, 
agreed to respect and primarily promote British interests and presence in China. At least, 
in analysing Chinese conduct, this might be the case. Given the quasi-submissive posture 
of the May Fourth demonstrators in the face of the Council's uncompromising operations 
in the Settlement over the previous weeks, the demonstrators had good reason to believe 
that their undertakings were finally in accord with the Council's policy. By following the 
Council's regulations, the May Fourth activists in return expected a more positive attitude 
from the British. None of the British sources researched, however, support the fulfilment 
of the May Fourth protestors' expectations for extensive co-operation with the Council. 
May Fourth protagonists' operations connected with the foreign commercial community 
suggest, however, that the Chinese commitment to cordial co-existence with Westerners 
was also fragile, and open to misinterpretations as the following analysis of Chinese 
attempts to collaborate with the British business community will reveal.
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6.2. Chinese Experiences and the British Commercial Community
The May Fourth commercial boycotts and strikes operated to paralyse Japanese business, 
but later they disturbed entire Western and Chinese trade in the country. In contrast, prior 
to the general strike in Shanghai, May Fourth demonstrators had actively encouraged 
their fellow citizens to consume British and American products. Following the initiative 
and acting on the advice of May Fourth demonstrators, Chinese consumers had begun to 
utilise non-Japanese commodities, and within weeks British business had almost 
recovered to profitable wartime conditions. In addition, in order to promote national and 
Western goods, the Chinese merchants and guilds also approached the foreign 
commercial community to obtain their understanding in pursuing economic nationalism.
Jardines was an ideal target for the May Fourth operations for four obvious reasons. 
Firstly, it was the most influential company in Shanghai and China, both politically and 
financially, and its actions were always monitored and frequently adopted by the smaller 
treaty port entrepreneurs. Jardines' impact was easily justified, as the corporation 
employed, in China, over 100,000 workers in its factories, godowns, insurance companies 
and mills. Since following May Fourth protestors' demand for collective action, all 
classes including industrial workers had been persuaded to participate in the Movement. 
It was apparent that success in implementing May Fourth ideology and boycotts among 
the Jardines' workers would have provided a great propaganda victory for Chinese 
nationalism.47 Secondly, Jardines had an extensive network for up-country distribution
47 Feuerwerker, The Foreign Establishment in China, p. 81; JMA, S/O Shanghai and Other Ports, June to 
July, 1919, no. 14/1-12, Brooke-Smith to Bernard, 11 June, 1919; August to September, 1919, no. 45/7-22, 
Brooke-Smith to Bernard, 9 October, 1919; Bernard Wasserstein, Secret War in Shanghai: Treacheiy, 
Subversion and Collaboration in the Second World War, (London, 1998), p. 5.
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which, in turn, maintained commerce and service trade in Shanghai. Actually, it seemed 
that trading problems in the interior were followed by further irregularities in the already 
depressed Shanghai markets. Jardines' influence in the other provinces was fortified with 
numerous investments in property and land, and in all probability, from the perspective of 
May Fourth demonstrators, Jardines' interior connections provided a valuable avenue to 
disseminate patriotic ideas and consolidate the May Fourth Movement's impact around 
the countryside. Understandably, powerful compradores' perceptions of and reactions to 
the May Fourth Movement played a crucial part in the interior areas. The feasibility of 
the May Fourth activists' plan was unquestionable. Thus, Jardines' distressed reports 
recalled spreading boycotts, work stoppages and in normal circumstances highly 
trustworthy compradores' decisions to join the Movement and to boycott the business.48 
The third important impetus in encouraging Jardines' management to recognise May 
Fourth principles was its trade with the Chinese government. British imports of railway 
equipment and machinery, and in addition, the production of fabric to manufacture army 
uniforms, had strengthened the company's connections with Beijing government. It was 
therefore assumed that by pressuring Jardines, British government officials would act on 
behalf of the enterprise and would eventually urge the Chinese government to accept 
May Fourth demonstrators' conditions in order to end financially burdensome boycotts 
and strikes.49 Fourthly, it was crucial to intervene with Jardines' exports from Japan. 
Cross-border deals with Japan included the importation of coal which was cheaper than
48 JMA, S/O Shanghai and Other Ports, June to July, 1919, no. 22/39-40 Smith to Bernard, 4 July, 1919; no. 
23/84-85 Chengdu A gency Business Report for June, 1919; no. 30/64-69 Qingdao A gency Business Report 
for July, 1919; August to September, no. 28/120-123 Qingdao Agency Business Report for September, 
1919.
49 JMA, S/O Shanghai and Other Ports, June to July, 1919, no. 19/15-17, D.R. Mackenzie, Beijing to 
Brooke-Smith, 13 and 26 June, 1919; JMA, S/O Shanghai and Other Ports, January -March, 1920, no. 
72/54-57 Davidson to Owen, 19 December, 1919,
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Chinese inland coal. Therefore, half of the International Settlement's coal supplies were 
of Japanese origin. In accordance with May Fourth co-operational principles, a variety of 
British firms were approached with circulars which appealed to them to terminate 
shipping of Japanese products on patriotic grounds. Another pamphlet was sent to 
Chinese workers employed by British companies to demand them to join the patriotic 
strike. The general strike finally succeeded in interfering with Jardines' strongly criticised 
export of Japanese goods.50 Thus, while in theory, boycotts of non-Japanese goods were 
over, in practice, Jardines discovered during the following months that continuing 
boycotts of Japanese products complicated sales and paralysed business particularly with 
Japanese merchants.51 It was evident that the interests of Chinese consumers had become 
unfavourable to Japanese products. Therefore, Jardines' shipments and profits declined.
Changing the socio-political situation had had a severe impact on Chinese consumers' 
behaviour and it was reflected in market conditions. As a result, current events had 
formulated a renewed concept of consumption as 'a national act'. To some extent, the 
Japanese boycott, provoked after the Twenty-One demands in 1915, provided an 
appropriate example of successful trade embargo prior to the formation of May Fourth 
Movement. The 1915 boycott was, however, smaller in scale in its economic
* 52 *effectiveness. Nevertheless, it was not fashionable for modem and patriotic Chinese to
50 BCCJ, Shanghai, vol. IV, no. 5, June 1919, p. 39; JMA, S/O Yokohama to Hong Kong, 1919, no. 27-28 
List o f  Japanese Business Connections and no 158-159 [J.F.Owen m ost likely] to Chicken, 25 June, 1919; 
PRO, F 0228/3526/29  Consul o f  Jiujiang to Jordan, 5 June, 1919; SMA U 1-3-67, file 1044, Shanghai 
Municipal Council, Secretariat, Shanghai Patriotic, Educational and Commercial Federation to the Manager 
o f  the SMC Electricity Department, 12 December, 1919; Manager o f  the SMC Electricity Department to 
Shanghai Patriotic, Educational and Commercial Federation, 17 December, 1919.
51 JMA, S/O Shanghai to Hong Kong, January to March, 1920, no. 216-228, 'Report on Visit to Tientsin 
and River Ports', January-February, 1920.
52 Remer, A Study o f  Chinese Boycotts, pp. 46-54; for further discussion on "national goods" -campaigns see 
Wen-hsin Yeh, "Shanghai Modernity: Commerce and Culture in a Republican City", in Frederic Wakeman Jr. 
and Richard Louis Edmonds (eds.), R eappraising Republican China, (Oxford, 2000), pp. 121-140.
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buy or use products imported from the country that oppressed China and violated her 
sovereign rights as a nation. Understandably this description fitted Japan perfectly. 
Instead, use of domestic products was encouraged, and if  necessary, goods imported from 
'friendly countries' that is, America and Britain, were approved. May Fourth activists 
initiated anti-Japanese campaigns which condemned Japanese products as inferior in 
quality. Moreover, it was claimed that they were highly oveipriced when compared with 
products from other countries. The commitment to paralyse the menace of a Japanese 
economic invasion culminated in the destruction of storage facilities in the harbour and 
around commercial areas in Shanghai. To illustrate the success, piles of Japanese straw 
hats were burned on a ’victorious' bonfire.53
In carrying out their programme to demolish unpatriotic products, enthusiastic Chinese 
nationalists indiscriminately targeted British companies and commodities. In a few cases 
British goods were boycotted or their supplies were destroyed. Yet despite May Fourth 
demonstrators' assurance that the incidents were purely unintentional, such occurrences 
obviously infuriated the British business community. When analysing the cases, both 
parties seemed to present relevant arguments because earlier in May, 1919, the Japanese 
had forged British trademarks and used them in their own products to circumvent the 
boycott. Apparently May Fourth activists detected this, and assumed accordingly that 
some British products were originally Japanese. According to other sources, British 
companies had allegedly terminated the shipments from Japan and stopped distributing
53 HSBC, SHG 764.1 Correspondence between Shanghai and London and copies o f  correspondence to 
branches in China 1918-1932, D. & Co., Shanghai to the HSBC, Shanghai, 18 February, 1921; NCH, 24 
May, 1919, p. 508; Shanghai Municipal Council, Annual Report J9I9,  p. 85A.
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Japanese products in China due to May Fourth protests.54 If these sources are reliable, 
British firms had little or no Japanese products in storage.
With the awakening of Chinese nationalism, domestic commodities came to be 
regarded as a form of human struggle for survival and development. The May Fourth 
protagonists utilised this image to accentuate economic patriotism. The development of 
the national economy accelerated the competition between domestic and foreign 
commodities and this time greatly enhanced the opportunity for the former to increase 
demand and expand the markets. Therefore, some researchers' tendency to regard 
Chinese economic post-war advances primarily as a result o f reduced foreign competition 
ignores completely the growing nationalist consumerism initiated by the May Fourth 
demonstrators' anti-Japanese boycotts and the successful general strike in Shanghai55.
As I have shown in the previous chapters, May Fourth demonstrators, by implementing 
the commercial strike, attacked the heart of the British business establishment in China 
since the maintenance o f their profitable trade was the major interest in the country. 
Apart from the period during the general strike, however, May Fourth activists' primary 
objective in Shanghai was to avoid confrontation with the Western business community. 
Almost all May Fourth propaganda appears to support this principle. Furthermore, 
according to the May Fourth blueprint, Westerners' were supposed to replace Japanese 
business activities and reinforce an insufficient and often obsolete local economy.56
54 BCCA, box 75, Letters to G. Jamieson 1911-1920, Mayers to Jamieson, 14 June, 1919; BCCJ, Shanghai, 
vol. IV, no 5, June, 1919, pp. 1-2; no. 7, August, 1919, p. 113; no 8, September, 1919, p. 151; JMA, S/O  
Shanghai and Other Ports, June to July, 1919, no. 14/1-12, Brooke-Smith to Bernard, 11 June, 1919; PRO 
F 0228/3526/9 , 78 Acting Consul o f  Ningbo to Jordan, 29 May and 8 June, 1919.
55 Blake, Jardine M atheson, pp. 219-223; Smith, A R oad is M ade , p. 1.
55 BCCA, box 97, Correspondence o f  S. F. Mayers, S.W. Lao to Mayers, 19 June, 1919; Maze papers, I 
Confidential Letters and Reports etc., vol. I, Chinese Mantime Customs Service Annual Trade Reports 
1900-1928, Tianjin -Trade Reports for the Year 1919, pp. 178-179, 195; NCH , 14 June, 1919, pp. 718, 722.
249
Nonetheless, May Fourth students needed Jardines' cotton fabrics to produce uniforms 
and caps which symbolised their unified commitment to the cause as has been discussed 
earlier. In this context, British business directly consolidated May Fourth demonstrators' 
efforts to build the national economy based on domestic and Western ventures and at this 
stage British companies were needed as co-operative partners. In the meantime, Chinese 
businessmen attempted to develop their own industry and commerce in Shanghai and 
other larger cities. The process of constructing a modern national identity involved the 
development of a domestic industry, which, at least implicitly, reinforced subsequent 
demands in the 1920's to abolish foreign business establishments, revise the treaty ports' 
extraterritorial rights maintaining them, and eventually, to recapture the wealth and 
power that foreign capitalists had taken for themselves.
In the midst o f the commercial strike, some Chinese employees working for foreign 
films found themselves in a contradictory position between patriotic demands to join the 
students' and merchants' strike and as a result be dismissed from the company, or 
alternatively, face the humiliating prospect of being labelled as unpatriotic citizens. In 
many ways, the latter option carried a real threat of becoming a target for sporadic 
collective violence which had frequently troubled 'the national traitors' around the 
country. Clearly, public beatings and burning properties or commodities were not 
uncommon during the May Fourth period. Unpredictable conflicts threatened citizens and 
their businesses as long as the aroused crowds were looking for outlets in order to express 
their indignation. In spite of imminent public pressure to join the general strike, some 
Chinese workers held meetings and decided against joining, although in principle, they 
supported May Fourth ideas. It was announced that the most likely way to resolve the
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situation was to ensure peace and order in the Settlement and to maintain friendly 
relations with foreigners, and it was declared that any confrontation would conflict with 
foreigners' understanding attitude towards the May Fourth activities. The decision was 
congruent with many other Chinese inhabitants working for foreign firms in the 
Settlement,57 Again 'the foreign friend' rhetoric was invoked, this time to express the 
workers' motives. It is apparent, however, that the fear of losing well-paid and highly 
respected work at the foreign company had an equally important impact on this decision­
making process. Furthermore, reacting to the grave situation, certain individuals had 
begun to question the validity o f a strike as the hardship among workers and small 
merchants was becoming unbearable. The united front of the May Fourth Movement was 
soon challenged by the labouring classes, as losses in salaries, production and sales were 
gradually becoming more important than patriotic enthusiasm.
According to the researched sources, May Fourth protestors working for foreign firms 
in other cities or in the interior frequently acted in an opposing way to their colleagues in 
Shanghai. Some May Fourth success stories were distributed in business reports 
throughout the country, which affirmed that large sections of workers attempted to 
express their rising national consciousness. Almost everyone who wished to join the 
Movement was inevitably confronted with the fear of imminent dismissal from work.58 
Yet, the May Fourth Movement had inspired a rising national sentiment which had 
succeeded in reaching 'the grassroots' of Chinese society and encouraged people from all 
classes to express their national integrity by boycotting and striking. The situation was
57 NCH, 14 June, 1919, pp, 720-722; SMP, Special Branch, roll 64, dossier 2882, Meeting at the Cantonese 
Club, 23 July, 1919.
251
exceptional since the rural population, in general, remained uninvolved in political issues 
outside their localities. But as the May Fourth events confirmed, particularly in the 
smaller towns and in the interior where foreign political authority was less influential, the 
situation enabled more active participation of Chinese workers.
These activities are congruent with the argument that May Fourth demonstrators in 
Shanghai implemented divergent operations in order to adjust their Movement to 
maintain the city's modern consumerism and apply various methods to satisfy foreigners' 
and especially British policies. Accordingly, there was a discrepancy between May 
Fourth activities in the capital and in other treaty port centres of industry and commerce, 
and in the interior on the one hand and in Shanghai's International Settlement on the 
other. Obviously foreign hegemony affected the prevailing political atmosphere in 
Shanghai and it was reflected in the development of the May Fourth Movement. 
Understandably, the foreign presence created a different physical and intellectual 
environment. It was a fruitful arena for new May Fourth ideas and practices to arise and 
ultimately spread around the country and eventually dominate the broader May Fourth 
debate.
In another case the Shanghai May Fourth activists prohibited certain segments of the 
work force from striking. This included telephone, water and electricity company 
workers and postal workers who were recognised as indispensable for distributing May 
Fourth ideology and maintaining the basic infrastructure of the city. Similar reasoning
58 Cochran, B ig Business in China , pp. 103-104; JMA, S/O Shanghai and Other Ports, June-July, 1919, no. 
22/39-40 Smith to Brooke-Smith, 30 June, 1919; PRO, F 0228/3526/78 Consul o f  Ningbo to Jordan, 8 
June, 1919.
252
was articulated to certain vegetable and meat shopkeepers to encourage them to keep 
their premises open.59
In the financial world, the HSBC received a fair share of pronouncements from May 
Fourth activists. At this time it was apparent that although the bank represented foreign 
financial domination in the country, it made political sense to persuade the influential 
foreign bank to embrace the May Fourth activists' rhetoric, since the HSBC was seen as a 
smaller enemy than the Japanese banks. The HSBC surprisingly gained undeserved credit 
from May Fourth students for not joining the Japanese government's pact to provide 
another emergency loan for "the corrupted Chinese government", as it was perceived by 
students. The bank's correspondence, however, pointed out that two practical reasons, 
namely delays in the telegram system and the Chinese New Year having postponed the 
British government's agreement to authorise the loan, prevented, coincidentally, the 
HSBC from making loan arrangements. The bank managers' discussions simply revealed 
that the bank had no altruistic motives in favouring the Chinese radical nationalists 
instead of a business deal.60 Meanwhile, the SSU's letter to the HSBC highlighted the 
urgency to acknowledge the formal equality of China within the international system of 
states and the right of its own territorial sovereignty. In the letter the means for national 
liberation was to be found in Western ideals of democracy and sovereign governance of 
the country, ideas which, in substance, were similar to British rights fought for during the 
World War when the militaristic despotism of Germany threatened those principles. 
These vocabularies and images o f democratic governance and the people's right to
59 Chen, The M ay Fourth Movement"in Shanghai, pp. 151-152; /VC/7, 14 June, 1919, p. 696.
60 HSBC, K.1.7, King letters 1919, Stephen to Stabb, 17 June, 1919; HSBC, K.1.8, King letters 1919, Allen 
to Addis, 2 March, 1920; HSBC, SHG 11/48, Tianjin Managerial Correspondence 1919, Lowson to Hynes, 
10 June, 1919.
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express their opinions freely, and further, to conduct righteous battle against oppressive 
nations were meticulously described in the SSU's letter to the bank. The letter assured 
that 'friendship' between the British and Chinese people was renewed in the HSBC's 
decision to support Chinese nationalism in refusing the loan for the Chinese government. 
In return, the SSU promised to secure open trade among all foreign and Chinese 
merchants in the country, and because of the bank's 'unselfish act', the letter predicted for 
it a prosperous business year.61
The message in the SSU's letter to the HSBC appeared to inteipret the discourse of 
authority within the May Fourth Movement, since the SSU had obtained for itself a 
legitimate position to express the May Fourth activists' requests, in the same way as the 
Council held a sanctioned position in the International Settlement. In fact, the SSU spoke 
of a prolonged crisis of political authority in China which required efforts to strengthen 
the cultural as well as the political unity of the state. The long-term political reality of an 
unreliable national government had provided the conditions for Chinese students and 
intelligentsia to portray themselves as legitimate leaders of China as it took initial steps to 
establish a sovereign state. In addition, the World War and the Versailles Peace 
Conference had provided a legitimate framework to express and defend national demands 
similar to their counterparts in Europe. As representatives o f the Chinese national 
movement the students and intelligentsia perceived themselves as authorised mediators in 
proclaiming the citizens' will. To strengthen their nationalist credentials, sanctioned 
forms of rhetorical speech, often adopted from Western propaganda, were implemented 
in the texts and speeches in accordance with May Fourth ideology. Hence, it is feasible to
61 HSBC, SHG 302.8 Correspondence June 1916-November 1922, SSU to HSBC, 26 February, 1920 
(telegram and a letter).
254
suggest that the May Fourth activists, like the SSU, frequently utilised Western 
vocabulary in order to legitimise their position and operations.
6.3. Chinese Experiences and the British Missionaries
Not surprisingly, out of all foreign groups in China, missionaries experienced the most 
intensive pressure to react to the Movement as they lived and operated within Chinese 
communities. For this reason and because of missionaries' involvement in teaching 
modern Western values and principles, various Chinese Christians approached their 
mentors and teachers and expected them to contribute to the creation of new nationhood. 
Given the extent of the Movement, foreign missionaries found themselves in a situation 
where it was practically impossible to remain neutral, and the intensity of the situation 
forced them to comment on the issue. As previously suggested, some British 
missionaries' correspondence revealed a sudden preoccupation and uneasiness with an 
unexpectedly explosive nationalism62. For others, the patriotic wave had brought 
opportunities to reach different 'convertible' audiences since the previously untouchable 
and influential classes of Chinese merchants and intelligentsia actively participated in 
May Fourth Movement activities and attended meetings for nationalist reasons. It is 
understandable that some foreign missionaries began to join with the Chinese in
62 The Land o f  Sinim, North China and Shandong Mission Quarterly paper, Chronicle o f  the Church o f  
England M ission, vol. XXVIII, no 1, January, 1920, Letter from Bishop Geoffrey Durnford Iliff, Shandong.
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demanding the implementation of modern democratic values in Chinese society, but 
naturally, their blueprint was enriched with Christian teachings.63
Surprisingly May Fourth incidents encouraged some Chinese merchants to financially 
support the missionary schools in order to encourage Christian educators to continue their 
valuable work for the Chinese nation. One o f the supporting arguments declared that "the 
new spirit of unselfish patriotic feeling in the country was the outcome of the Christian 
education which had been carried out for so many years in China."64
In contrast to British missionaries' problems in identifying their role in facing the 
national movement, the enthusiasm of Chinese Christians to promote the national spirit 
and facilitate a national revival among fellow countrymen was quickly transferred into 
active participation. Thus, manifestations of the May Fourth principles were often filled 
with religious aspirations. As for the rising tide of nationalism, Chinese Christians 
continually initiated new patriotic associations and the Christian denominations afforded 
them natural meeting places since the church buildings or school premises had been 
traditional venues for distributing information among the community. Accordingly, 
Sunday services or Bible school meetings served as communication channels and 
operated as recognised mediums in expressing May Fourth ideas.65 In the coastal cities 
and in the interior towns extraterritorial treaties were drawn up during the nineteenth 
century to protect foreigners' imperialist privileges. These now operated as a protective
63 LMS, Central China, Reports, box 8, Ernest Box, Shanghai, 1919; LMS, North China, Reports, box 8, S. 
Lavington Hart, Tianjin, 1919.
64 LMS, Central China, Correspondence, box 30, folder 3, Sparham to Lenwood, 11 October, 1919; LMS, 
North China, Correspondence, box 21, folder 5, Longman to Hawkins, 1919; LMS, North China, Reports, 
box 8, 1919; S. Lavington Hart and J. Murray, Tianjin, 1919.
65 LMS, North China, Reports, box 8, Freer Kelsey, Tianjin, 1919; PCE, South Fujian, Individuals A-J, box 
18, Andersson to Maclagan, 20 June, 1919; PRO, F 0228/3526/8  Consul o f  Xiamen to Jordan, 20 May, 
1919; SMA U l-91 -19 , file 19, Shanghai Municipal Police, McEuen to Jamieson, 26 June, 1919.
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shield in safeguarding foreign religious premises. Similar to the status of the International 
Settlement, Christians were able to sustain May Fourth projects which would have been 
immediately banned elsewhere by local Chinese officials. Entangled in the treaty system, 
the Chinese government never officially adopted the policy of investigating missionary 
compounds during the May Fourth Movement because of the fear of foreign intervention 
which may have followed inspection operations. Instead, Chinese officials fiercely 
criticised Christian May Fourth activities, but were unable to execute any oppressive 
censorship manoeuvres which were implemented in other areas.66
The Chinese Christians' methods of circulating May Fourth ideologies to missionaries 
and common people followed, in principle, those of the Shanghai Student Union. 
However, the May Fourth rhetoric directed to missionaries articulated not only 
nationalistic ambitions, it also promoted the Christian means to achieve them. Again it 
was Westerners whose presence determined the May Fourth rhetoric and operations, only 
this time it was, in principle, addressed to the foreign missionaries.
The typical orthodoxy emerging from the encounter of Chinese Christians with May 
Fourth ideology was the idea of identifying the Christian religion with global democratic 
values similar to those taught in missionary schools and colleges. Thereafter, the 
principle of self-strengthening of the nation was frequently discussed in relation to 
Christian practices. As a result, the concept of nation building became an integral part of 
Chinese Christians' May Fourth rhetoric directed at foreigners. The nation was a 
conceptual category as well as a physical reality for May Fourth demonstrators and they 
appealed to nationalism to unify the people to fight against Japan. In the eyes of Chinese
66 LMS, Central China, Correspondence, box 30, folder 2, Sparham to Hawkins, 14 June, 1919; PRO, 
F 0226/3526/8 , 9 Consul o f  Xiamen to Jordan, 20 May, 1919 and Consul o f  Ningbo to Jordan, 29 May,
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Christians this notion formulated the core o f Christianity's formulated position, and 
redefined missionaries' responsibilities in relation to restoration and reformation of the 
nation.67 At the same time foreign newspapers and companies were contacted by the use 
of articles and pamphlets and this correspondence reflected Chinese Christians' 
nationalist parlance which was offered to foreign residents.68
At the beginning of the Movement, the Christian students who had studied in the 
Western countries had been highly respected within missionary communities, mainly 
because of their determined rejection of conventional authority presented in traditional 
Confucian thinking. Moreover, returning Christian students embraced modern Western 
ideologies and values. But as the Movement intensified and gathered momentum these 
students appeared to switch their preferences from Christian ideology to a more secular 
philosophical perspective in order to save the nation. For the majority of missionaries, 
this was intolerable and against Christian principles.69 Accordingly, dissonant voices 
among the missionary societies expressed a growing split between modernist and 
conservative approaches within the church which I discussed in the chapter four. 
Moreover, what began as a sentiment against Confucianism during the New Culture 
Movement, progressed during the May Fourth Movement, to gradually embrace religions 
in general and Christianity in particular. By the beginning o f the 1920's it had matured
1919.
67 China's M illions, vol. XLV, no. 9, September, 1919, pp. 100-102; Chinese R ecorder, vol. LIV, August, 
1923, pp. 447-489; The Chronicle, vol. XXVII, July 1919, pp. 99-100, 124-125.
68 NCDN, 25 July, 1919, p. 4; NCH, 7 June, 1919, p. 648; NCH, 14 June, 1919, pp. 715, 719-720; NCH, 12 
July, 1919, p. 87; NCH, 19 July, 1919, pp. 148-149; SGCC Annual Report 1919, Minutes o f  the Annual 
General Meeting, Letter from Chinese organisations in Shanghai to the SGCC, June 4, 1919.
69 Annual Report o f  the Wesleyan M ethodist M issionary Society 1921, p. 68; LMS, Central China, Reports, 
box 8, J. W allace W ilson, Hankou, 1919.
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into making sporadic anti-Christian attacks and expanded later into a systematic
* • 70movement against 'the imperialist religion of Christianity' in 1921 -1922 .
In keeping with the May Fourth spirit, appeals for collaboration of Christian forces 
were distributed around missionary and Chinese Christian communities in 1919. They 
promoted total resistance against all oppressive powers. In doing so they did not 
differentiate between Japanese imperialists and domestic warlord leaders who had, by 
prolonging the North and South conflict, succeeded in terrorising interior regions for 
years. Furthermore, according to the contemporary May Fourth parlance, a few 
government ministers in Beijing who were portrayed as betrayers o f the country were 
also perceived as unjust officials. In addition to moral support, Western missionaries 
were asked to contact their governments in order to achieve political and apparently 
financial assistance for the May Fourth operations.71
Reverend C.Y. Cheng, who had been actively working within the LMS and who was 
currently the Chinese Secretary of the China Continuation Committee, understood the 
importance of constructing an accurate May Fourth framework in which all the factors 
relating to the Movement were thoroughly analysed. He challenged prevailing arguments 
which had been formulated to criticise the Movement and initiated to condemn Christian 
participation in the May Fourth Movement. At the same time Cheng used rhetoric which 
combined Christian and democratic values, and undoubtedly captivated the missionaries' 
interest. His constant repetition of key concepts which included 'public consciousness' 
and 'national righteousness and justice' reshaped contemporary Christian evangelical 
doctrines and encouraged Christians to actively participate in the national movement. To
70 Lutz, Chinese P olitics and Christian M issions, pp. 40-54.
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convince his readers Cheng emphasised that it was "a divine duty" to assist China in 
developing guidelines circumscribed in the Bible, and that the Christian church could not 
neglect its responsibilities in uplifting the nation.72
Similar to non-Christian students, some Christian scholars organised school strikes and 
demonstrations. In addition, they boycotted Japanese products and organised patriotic 
seminars, processions and meetings in Shanghai and other parts o f the country. Following 
their colleagues in government schools they also confronted school authorities and 
teachers, demanding the revision of the national curriculum.
Undoubtedly, the most significant Christian organisation inaugurated to promote and 
evaluate the May Fourth principles was the 'China for Christ' movement initiated in 
Shanghai in November 1919. Since the prominent features o f the 'China for Christ' 
movement from the British missionaries' perspective have already been defined in the 
previous chapter it is now necessary to explore briefly Chinese Christians' strategy in 
advocating the movement. An ambitious programme for nation building was launched in 
the autumn 1919 in answer to an alleged demand to discover the Christian solution to the 
national crisis. Hence, the principles in implementing the agenda were carefully 
constructed, and soon widely published within the community. As its name, 'China for 
Christ', revealed, the ultimate aim was to enlighten the whole society with Christian 
ideals and particular attention was directed at awakening the local intelligentsia. 
Traditional methods of praying, holding meetings and publishing pamphlets were 
organised, based on topics which included 'the Christian and the Political Crisis',
71 China Press, 5 June, 1919, p. 2; CMS, Original papers, G l/C H l/O , An Appeal to the Christians o f  Great 
Britain and America, November 1919.
72 Chinese Recorder, vol. L, July 1919, pp. 456-460.
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73'Nationalism and Christianity' and the 'New Civilisation Movement'. Furthermore, 
women established separate prayer and social service groups to emphasise their 
commitment in promoting Christian objectives during national unrest.74 The core 
objective of'China for Christ' activities was explained as follows.
"The aim o f  the movement is to stimulate Chinese Christianity into a nation-wide movement through 
which their patriotism can find an adequate and satisfactory expression and through which the heart o f  
China could be made to feel the power o f  Christ to produce the character which w ill save the nation." 75
This inter-denominational movement attracted members from all major Protestant 
churches, connecting Christians evenly across the country. Foreign missionaries' 
participation in the 'China for Christ' operations was perceived as indispensable for 
maintaining co-operation between the foreign and Chinese societies.76
In general, continuing connections with the British missionaries was thought to 
strengthen the Movement itself since Christian education had introduced some valuable 
models for modem nation building. Hence, Rees' position as adviser for May Fourth 
student activities and foreign missionaries' participation in the new Christian 
organisations promoted national growth and provided examples of Christian co­
operation.77
It is true that emerging Christian patriotism permeated various conferences, meetings, 
newspapers, magazines and associations throughout the country. Furthermore, strong
73 Bulletin o f  the China fo r  Christ Movement, no 1, 10 January, 1920, passim', China Press, 18 December, 
1919, p. 7; CBMS, Area files, Asia-China, FBN1, China Continuation Committee Meetings 1914-1921, 
Proceedings o f  the Ninth Annual M eeting o f  the China Continuation Committee, Shanghai, 5-10 May, 
1921, pp. 12-25.
74 Annual R eport o f  the Wesleyan M ethodist M issionary Society 1920, pp. 64-65; LMS, Central China, 
Reports, box 8, folder 4, A lice Clark, Shanghai, 1919.
75 The Challenge o f  China, Being the Report o f  a Deputation sent out to visit the China Mission Fields o f  
theB.M .S. 1919-1920, pp. 70-71.
76 China's Millions, vol. XLVI, no 5, May 1920, p. 60.
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Chinese nationalist aspirations promoted reform of the national curriculum in schools 
following the lines of Western science and connected to the requirement of attaining 
qualified educators to teach new courses. These initiatives potentially encouraged the
y o
growth of radical activism amongst the student population. Apparently, the YMCA's 
missionary agenda, where Christianity was presented as a religion of modernisation and 
as the ideological force behind the Western science and education, attracted radical 
Christians who also supported the May Fourth Movement. Under the influence of 
nationalism some Chinese educators joined the YMCA, since its modem science lectures 
programme and unreserved campaigns to support May Fourth principles appeared to 
demonstrate their notions of reconstructing China.79
From these activities emerged a new Chinese Christian sense of national identity. In 
principle, signifying oneself as a modern citizen of the Republic was open to men and 
women, Christian and non-Christian, but the church organisations naturally emphasised 
Christian values in achieving citizenship. The ambitious scheme focused on the concept 
of Christianity as an uniting and driving force which would help people form an 
internationally acknowledged sovereign country. In fact, Protestant Christianity had had 
a particular influence on the New Culture movement, in which China's new intelligentsia 
sought to integrate Western liberalism with rising nationalism. For the moment, Christian 
teachings appeared to provide sufficient structure for national reconstruction.
77 China P ress, 17 December, 1919, p. 7; 18 December, 1919, p. 7; LMS, Central China, Correspondence, 
box 30, folder 2, Rees to Hawkins, 21 June, 1919; LMS, Central China, Reports, box 8, Ernest Box, 1919; 
LMS, North China, Reports, box 8, S. Lavington Hart, 1919.
78 Balme, The Awakening o f  China, p. 15; China Press, 2 July, 1919, p. 6; China Press, 17 August, 1919, p. 
21; Cui, The Cultural Contribution o f  British Protestant M issionaries, pp. 178-179; LMS, North China, 
Correspondence, box 21, C.H.B. Longman to Hawkins, 10 August, 1919; SMA, U l-91-19 , file 19, 
Shanghai Municipal Police, McEuen to Jamieson, 5 September, 1919.
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Beneath the surface, however, Christianity was defenceless against fierce attacks which 
claimed Christian teachings were unscientific and that the church itself had supported 
Western exploitation, capitalism and imperialism80. It was inevitable that in principle the 
May Fourth Movement's and Western ideals of social evolution and human progress 
could easily undermine Christianity. Hence, the 1920’s upsurge o f anti-Christian 
sentiment was partly provoked by students' disillusioned understanding o f the religion's 
powerlessness to guarantee nation-wide regeneration. Above all, Christian students were 
severely disappointed when they realised that some missionaries, particularly the British, 
maintained a conservative and uncompromising attitude towards the radicalisation of the 
May Fourth Movement and especially towards its positive implications to contemporary 
Chinese society. As a result, accusations gradually intensified against foreign Christians' 
role to expand Western cultural and political imperialism.
The final insult which triggered anti-Christian sentiment was the World's Student 
Christian Federation's annual conference in 1922 with its publication of "The Christian 
Occupation o f  China”. Inspired by Communist ideology and scholars such as Bertrand 
Russell who strongly opposed Christianity, various anti-Christian associations were 
established in Shanghai and Beijing. More significantly, among the first associations to 
be criticised was the 'China for Christ' movement founded by Chinese Christians to 
respect May Fourth ideals and to promote Chinese nationalism by Christian education 
and social work.81 Nonetheless, a few years later during the anti-Christian movement, 'the
79 China Press, 12 July, 1919, p. 2; China Press, 13 July, 1919, p. 2; China Press, 17 August, 1919, p. 21; 
Garret, Social Reformers, pp. 165-166; NCDN, 23 July, 1919, p. 4; NCDN, 25 July, 1919, p. 4; Wang, "The 
Chinese YMCA", pp. 103-104.
80 Chinese R ecorder, vol. LIV, August 1923, pp. 463-465.
81 Bertrand Russell, The Problem  o f  China, (London, 1922), passim .; The Christian Occupation o f  China, 
(Shanghai, 1922); Lutz, Chinese Politics and Christian M issions, pp. 48- 52; Stanley, The Bible and the 
Flag, pp. 142-143.
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China for Christ' activists were allegedly attempting to denationalise Chinese youth, and 
education organised in missionary schools and universities was accused of advocating 
cultural imperialism promoted by the Western powers.
Conclusion
As British government circles in Beijing anticipated, opposition against British municipal 
administration in Shanghai had intensified because of harsh treatment of the Chinese 
during the May Fourth Movement. A shooting incident at the end of the general strike 
stifled demonstrators' plans to organise processions and festivals to celebrate 'the first 
victory of the public voice'.82 As analysed in the previous chapters, the Council had 
decided to suppress the protestors' operations at any cost. Many Chinese were arrested 
and the lawbreakers were charged with offences such as displaying inciting posters, 
distributing intimidating handbills or circulating poison rumours.83 Consequently, the 
comparative success o f the Council and comparative failure o f the Chinese played an 
important role in determining the events that followed the general strike in the 
International Settlement. To summarise, strikes against new taxation, press licence and 
demonstrations for Chinese representation in the Council, and strengthening demands for 
the revision of the Land Regulations indicated a growing discontent among influential 
Chinese residents in the International Settlement. Since the success of the general strike 
had demonstrated to the May Fourth activists the value of organisation, from here on, the
82 PRO, F 0 6 7 1/447/539 Jordan to Jamieson, 16 August, 1919
83 C elestial Empire, 21 June, 1919, pp. 587, 593; C elestial Empire, 28 June, 1919, p. 641; NCH, 28 June, 
1919, p. 836; M unicipal Gazette, 21 June, 1919, p. 202; M unicipal Gazette, 19 July, 1919, p. 249; 
M unicipal G azette , 30 August, 1919, p. 300.
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unification of the Chinese masses to support operations was perceived as crucial. In order 
to promote common interest, one of the immediate results of the Movement was 
manifested in the formation of unions and associations. It was verified in the coming 
months that new organisations were capable of exercising considerable influence in the 
Settlement, which seriously undermined British authority in the city.
Particularly, the Chinese intelligentsia, but increasingly the merchant and labour classes 
also were activated in promoting their occupational and national interests in Shanghai and 
in the whole of China. In addition to the associations already investigated, 'the Industrial 
and Commercial Association' and ’the Chinese Labourers Union’ were established in 
Shanghai to improve the conditions of Chinese industrial workers in the factories. An 
indication of increased activity among the labour class were the sporadic strikes and 
boycotts organised in the Settlement during the coming years.84 For the first time also 
women’s consciousness and hopes of emancipation were illustrated by their active 
participation during the May Fourth Movement. Thus, forthcoming women's 
organisations demanded social, cultural and political changes that would allow their 
active involvement in every day politics. At this early stage, contemporary women in the 
West were perceived as models for this enlightenment process.85
Another important element was anti-British sentiment which had, after the May Fourth 
incidents, steadily intensified among certain circles in Shanghai. Provocatively 
strategically distributed propaganda pamphlets fostered images o f famine stricken India
84 PRO, F 0228 /3214  Shanghai Intelligence Bureau Minutes o f Meeting, Summary o f  Intelligence for week  
ended January 29th, 1920; SMA, U l-91-19 , file 19, Shanghai Municipal Police, McEuen to Jamieson, 13 
September, 1919; SM A, U l-91 -23 , file 19, Shanghai Municipal Police, Extract from the Council minutes, 
26 November, 1919. For more detailed research on backgrounds and fomration o f  labour organisations and 
unions and their activities during the 1920's see e.g. Chesneaux, The Chinese Labour M ovement 1919- 
1927 , passim .
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which was, according to the manifesto, ruled by the British imperialist government. 
Initially, this type of propaganda was directed at political imperialism conducted 
particularly by the British, but later at the other foreigners in China.86 Hereafter, the 
Chinese intelligentsia and merchants perceived Britain's authoritative position in 
Shanghai as being more oppressive than ever before. British reaction provided an 
exemplary contrast to Chinese radical nationalists who promoted the doctrine of 
legitimate government that was national self-government. China was currently controlled, 
however, by foreign governments which were protected by the extraterritorial treaties. 
Exceptionally, the Russian government had, in 1920, provided an appropriate contrast to 
other foreign nations by abolishing all unequal treaties made between China and Russia87.
In the commercial world, British business was challenged by Chinese investments and 
gradual improvements were made to domestic industry in an attempt to modernise it, and 
by a nation-wide movement which encouraged buying national products only. British 
economic imperialism had been clearly visible in Shanghai and profoundly rooted in the 
commercial life of the city.88 The May Fourth general strike in June, 1919 and the 
boycotts, however, challenged the commercial status quo in Shanghai and revealed its 
vulnerability during internal unrest.
Similarly, the anti-Christian movement was directed against foreign imperialism which 
flourished in the educational and cultural spheres of society. Ideological accusations were 
made against Western cultural exploitation, along with Christian doctrines and teaching
85 Wang, Women in the Chinese Enlightenment, pp. 13-16.
86 PRO, F 0228/3214  Shanghai Intelligence Bureau Minutes o f  Meeting, Summary o f  Intelligence for week 
ended March 4th, 1920; PRO, F 0228/3288  Summary o f  Intelligence Reports, September Quarter, 1919.
87 Chow, The M ay Fourth M ovem ent, pp. 210-213.
88 PRO, F 0228/3527  Harry Fox, Commercial Counsellor, Shanghai to Sir Beilby Alston, Minister at 
Beijing, 13 June, 1921
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which allegedly supported the political invasion of foreign governments in Chinese 
society.
It was apparent that the May Fourth Movement had highlighted questions and problems 
in the International Settlement which had developed throughout decades of British 
domination in the area. Moreover, the seeds of future troubles were germinating, due to 
the disappearance of the Chinese imperial institution and the entire state structure 
supporting it. It had created a power vacuum which was to be partly replaced by modem 
foreign ideologies. Therefore, the rise of radical Chinese nationalism was connected with 
ideologies such as communism, bolshevism, socialism, liberalism and anarchism89. It was 
this transformation, more than any readily identifiable concrete changes which was 
responsible for the rise in popularity of democratic values. In addition, the realisation of 
foreigners' privileged position in China, and particularly the exploitation of this position, 
aggravated local nationalists. For the May Fourth activists, British inflexibility during the 
May Fourth Movement and their attempt afterwards to strengthen a semi-imperialist hold 
in China served as a classical example of foreign oppression conducted in China.
89 PRO, F 0228/3288  Summary o f  Intelligence Reports, September and December Quarters, 1920.
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7. CONCLUSION
In the autumn of 1919, the May Fourth Movement protagonists altered their tactics, but 
continued to pursue nationalist policies in a more organised manner, because the 
prevailing political atmosphere in the International Settlement had changed greatly. 
Significantly, however, British post-movement correspondence created a different image, 
and the threat of Chinese radical nationalism was a major concern of the British 
community at that time, as the following letter illustrates.
"As you are aware Shanghai has, since I last wrote you at length, past [sic] through some troublesome 
times and the last has not been heard o f  them yet. We had the Students Demonstration over the Shantung 
question which eventually reached the proportions o f  the riot and necessitated the use o f  armed force to 
quell the disturbances. It is only fair to say that i f  the students had been able to control the situation, in all 
probability, no serious rioting would have taken place but once the demonstration was started it gave the 
opportunity to all the riff-raff and malcontents and loafers to join in and create trouble. The very fate, 
however, o f  the students demonstrations at all shows the trend o f  events in China and the inconvenience 
caused by the closing the shops and the striking employees in foreign employ showed the Chinese the 
power o f  'passive resistance1 tactics and one may be sure in the future they will not be slow  to avail 
themselves o f  the same means o f  attaining the ends."1
Inevitably, the May Fourth Movement left a permanent mark on the foreign society's 
privileged presence in Shanghai. Likewise the British community significantly 
restructured the Movement's activities and challenged its ideology. It can be argued, 
therefore, that foreign, and especially British operations throughout 1919-1920 had a 
more profound effect on the development of the May Fourth Movement than recent 
scholarship has recognised. Apart from remoulding events in Shanghai, in some cases the 
effect of British policies implemented in the International Settlement spread across the 
country, as has been explained in previous chapters.
1 CA, China Association Circulars, vol. XVII, numbers 261-278, 28th Feb. 1918-15Ul April, 1920, China 
Association Shanghai Branch to CA in London, 14 October, 1919.
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The British May Fourth rhetoric
A closer look at the nature of British experiences in the International Settlement from 
1919 onwards reveals several distinctive features which constructed the framework for 
the May Fourth discourse and subsequent interaction between the Chinese and foreign 
communities. According to British officials' perception, the Movement's activities were 
no more than a rebellious protest against authority, and in the Settlement, against the 
Council's omnipotent administration. This understanding emphasised that the 
Movement's 'principal motives' were to overrule regulations and to disturb peace and 
good order. For the commercial community, however, the May Fourth Movement 
represented economic boycotts against Japanese businesses, and these operations were 
profitable for the British companies. It was not until the standstill o f all market 
transactions and dislocated business activities that British economic superiority was 
threatened. The memory of paralysed markets and fear of a recurrence formed the British 
view of the May Fourth Movement. For British businessmen it was predominantly a 
boycott movement. In contrast, the British missionaries had identified May Fourth 
activists as representatives of a new, young and Christian China who fought against 
corrupt officials and warlords with the enlightened spirit and power of Christianity. 
Stimulated by this belief, the missionaries cautiously supported Chinese Christian 
students who had joined the May Fourth Movement, since they honoured the Christian 
teachings and promised a final salvation for the country.
Having witnessed the Movement, British residents shared some collective perceptions 
which, in turn, reflected fears and expectations related to their presence in China. At first,
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fear of spreading xenophobia was illustrated in the Boxer rhetoric associated with the 
May Fourth activities and serious attempts were made to delegitimise the Movement as 
an anti-foreign demonstration. Secondly, the British community expressed the necessity 
to maintain peace and stability in the Settlement or in the area where the British operated. 
Thirdly, they all had something 'British', - or at least from their perspective it was 
characteristically British, - to protect. The British education system and the principle of 
free trade including free capital movements were examples of British prestige in China. 
Moreover, respect for Western law and regulations was equated with the British officials' 
principal ideals of the model society established in the International Settlement. 
Therefore, the British assumption was to expect everyone to respect the Council's 
authority.
Abandoning any idea of upsetting the status quo in the Settlement, British municipal 
officials constructed the May Fourth discourse and implemented policies to restrict the 
influence of the Movement. Recognition of British political superiority in the Settlement 
encouraged the Council’s activities and supported the formation of the official May 
Fourth rhetoric. The official British myth was intentionally created to establish a 
collectively accepted understanding of the Movement and simultaneously this reasoning 
justified the Council's repressive measures against it. One of the British primary 
objectives was to unify all foreigners behind this myth. In particular, the official myth 
was implemented to strengthen British economic and political supremacy in the city. 
While the British community in principle supported the Council's worldview and actions 
maintaining it, personal opinions challenged the legitimacy of the Council's decisions and 
questioned the fairness of the policies implemented. British legitimacy to rule depended
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on satisfying the expectations and aspirations of foreigners in the Settlement, but 
increasingly it was also affected by a changing Chinese urban society.
The British May Fourth discourse did not simply reconstruct an ideology or a set of 
ideas to be constantly repeated. It was, rather, a way of creating and responding to the 
reality that was infinitely adaptable in its function of preserving the basic structures of 
power. The British May Fourth rhetoric earned on a constant uncertainty that led to an 
inherent confusion of identity and difference, simultaneous avowal and disavowal of its 
own authority. This fundamental instability constructed a rich profusion of rhetorical 
forms which often clashed with one another, but which were all entered equally into the 
matrix of relations of power that characterised a British colonial-like presence in 
Shanghai. Observing the situation from a wider perspective, the British government had 
to constantly reconcile its long-term global imperial strategy with its short-term regional 
interests. Shanghai and its International Settlement, nonetheless, was not as important for 
imperial security and the economy as its British residents frequently alleged.
The Chinese May Fourth rhetoric
The Chinese May Fourth propaganda, especially rhetoric produced for the Settlement 
foreigners, was compiled skilfully. In Shanghai, May Fourth activists implemented 
divergent operations in order to adjust the Movement to existing regulations in the 
Settlement. As a result, they applied various methods to satisfy foreign, especially British 
municipal authorities. Much of the Chinese May Fourth rhetoric in the International 
Settlement was carefully articulated and successfully established in May. Failure to
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deliver an acceptable image of the Movement in June left the demonstrators without 
foreign support and the Council eventually attempted to eliminate all operations. Yet, the 
modem style and accurate reasoning expressed by using Western models verified the 
May Fourth protagonists' abilities to produce rational and intelligent ideas.
This sudden rise o f Chinese radical nationalism was indeed a serious threat to foreign, 
and particularly British, hegemony in the International Settlement. For the British, May 
Fourth demonstrators represented a potential change in the existing intellectual, political, 
social and economic status quo which, for decades, had guaranteed a British privileged 
position in the city. The ideas which the May Fourth Movement imparted to the scholars 
was also evident among the Chinese bourgeoisie or the new urban elite including 
merchants and businessmen. Thus, in the form of sheet and labour unions their ideas 
became more dynamic also among workers in the factories. In addition to growing class 
considerations during the May Fourth Movement2, the greatest threat for the British 
municipal authorities was the May Fourth demonstrators' ability to agitate political 
consciousness among classes traditionally excluded from power, and who therefore, for 
the most part, had usually been reluctant to join mass movements.
The critical faction of the Chinese which included groups of students and intellectuals, 
but increasingly also sections of the bourgeoisie and workers had begun to scrutinise 
British hegemony in the country. As a whole, new Chinese organisations reinterpreted 
emerging resistance against domestic and foreign oppression in China and during the life 
of the May Fourth Movement these groups expressed initial attempts to challenge the 
British semi-colonial presence. As local newspaper reports revealed, the press licence
2 For more detailed discussion on development o f  class consciousness see e.g. Smith, Like Cattle and 
H orses, pp. 92-115.
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discussion had instigated Chinese Western -educated students to accuse the entire law 
being manufactured and implemented by the British designed to destroy growing Chinese 
public opinion. In addition, Westerners' unfulfilled promises of treaty revision gave a 
strong impetus to the rise of radical nationalism among the Chinese. It was partly due to 
British inflexible policies towards May Fourth Movement which caused the modernising 
and radical fringe in China to begin to question the Western, and particularly the British 
position in China.
The May Fourth protestors, especially the urban and educated men, dominated public 
articulations of national identities. With their control of knowledge production and in 
some cases control of state bureaucracies, elite men could make demands for the nation, 
often fusing their own group need with particular definitions of the nation. The Chinese 
search for equality in foreign relations was humiliatingly rejected during the Versailles 
Peace Treaty. Furthermore, humiliation and degradation o f the country profoundly 
affected the students particularly. For Chinese nationalists, the May Fourth Movement 
provided, to some extent, an opportunity to express love of country in the foreign enclave 
beyond the immediate reach of the Chinese government. It was apparent, therefore, that 
successful May Fourth boycotts and strikes initiated permanent expansions in 
participation and provided the instruments for implementing radical activism required for 
later movements.
In the aftermath of the May Fourth Movement's activities, existing Chinese societal 
organisations were joined by numerous new associations and publications. 
Unquestionably, some of them had been established in response to British May Fourth 
policies. Shanghai's urban elite expressed their increased political consciousness in co­
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operation with other classes and formed voluntary associations. Newly founded societies 
continued to promote various social and political issues among the Chinese in the city. 
Apparently British municipal officials' operations in the summer of 1919 at the 
International Settlement provoked some of these activities.
Legacy of the Shanghai May Fourth Movement
Chinese May Fourth propaganda and operations undoubtedly challenged foreign 
presumptions of the world order in the Settlement and seriously undermined British 
authority. The International Settlement was, however, at least from the British 
perspective, part of the imperial existence and while protecting the Settlement they 
secured imperial peace and expressed their respect towards their home country. For the 
British, Nanjing Road was considered as important as Oxford Street in London. 
Therefore, British May Fourth discourse was implemented to reinforce the legitimacy of 
the foreign dominated status quo which had been threatened by May Fourth activists. As 
a result, British policies provoked and interfered with a series of May Fourth operations, 
and these operations were originally shaped and appropriated by Chinese indigenous 
politics, but were finally provoked by an international power struggle in Europe and Asia.
How did British May Fourth policies, then, encourage the emergence of anti-Christian 
and anti-foreign sentiment in the 1920's? According to this study, various reasons are 
offered for this phenomenon. One explanation emphasises the growing awareness of the 
collective interests of Chinese residents. This increased consciousness was partly 
provoked by British oppressive operations in the Settlement during the May Fourth
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activities. Later debates aiming to secure Chinese ratepayers' representation in the 
Council, demands for lower taxation and the agitation to prevent the implementation of 
the press licence indicated a new Chinese urban elite's recognition of their political value 
in the Settlement administration. It is worth remembering that it was commonly known 
that the initiative to implement the above-mentioned schemes came from the British 
community. Another explanation stresses the growth of co-ordinated activities pursued 
for patriotic puiposes. Thus, the tone of forthcoming boycotts, strikes and demonstrations 
was increasingly anti-foreign. Chinese sentiment of the disapproval of Japanese 
militarism was gradually compared with equally unacceptable Western cultural and 
political imperialism in China.
On the question o f the anti-Christian movement o f 1920's, it seemed to have been partly 
rooted to British missionaries actions during the May Fourth Movement. Apparently the 
British missionaries' very reluctant approval or complete rejection of the Movement's 
principles were perceived as indications of their intention to denationalise Chinese 
students. It also signified a fundamental crisis within Christian society in China and 
illustrated a fraction between the fundamentalist and modernist sections in Protestant 
missionary society. Above all, Chinese Christians were severely disappointed when they 
realised that some missionaries, especially the British, maintained a conservative and 
uncompromising attitude towards the radicalisation of the May Fourth Movement and 
against its positive implications in contemporary society. Beneath the surface, it had 
become evident that Christianity was had no defence against claims that the church itself 
had supported Western exploitation of capitalism and imperialism. It was inevitable that 
in principle the May Fourth Western ideals of social evolution and human progress could
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be easily turned against Christianity, Hence, the upsurge of anti-Christian sentiment in 
the 1920's was partly provoked by students' disillusioned understanding of religion's 
powerlessness to guarantee nation-wide regeneration. Hereafter, some Chinese Christians 
found it impossible to reconcile their church allegiance with patriotism and decided in 
favour of their country. This was followed gradually by intensified accusations against 
foreign Christians who blamed the missionary societies for strengthening Western 
cultural and political imperialism.
Chinese anti-foreign and anti-imperialist sentiments culminated in the May Thirtieth 
Movement o f 1925. In a way, British operations against May Fourth Movement were for 
the first time fully implemented in 1925, when anti-foreign sentiment arose against the 
British. Apparently, British municipal police actions were harsh enough to provoke anti- 
foreign demonstrations. But apart from British operations in 1925, an older anti-foreign 
atmosphere had prevailed for years and careful examination o f the May Fourth events in 
the International Settlement has provided some evidence to explain the reasons for it. 
Throughout the early 1920's May Fourth ideology and activities had provoked great 
expectations for the country's modernisation. Thus, China's participation in the League of 
Nations was it was felt, sure to guarantee full membership in the international society. 
The failure of the Washington Conference, from the Chinese perspective, to fulfil these 
hopes provided another reason to reject and oppose foreign privileges in China. But as I 
discussed earlier, initial attempts to maintain control over foreign administered maritime 
customs, tariffs, postal communications, salt monopoly revenues and the abolition of the 
extraterritoriality rights had already been expressed during the May Fourth events.
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Within the wider framework of research into China's Republican era and a reappraisal 
o f the May Fourth Movement, the assessment of British May Fourth discourse in this 
thesis has addressed some of the issues identified by Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom as being 
relatively neglected. Research on the May Fourth fringe areas has broadened conceptions 
on the issues of the Movement's dynamics and increased appreciation of local, regional 
and national variances in the Movement. Furthermore, it has indicated how the May 
Fourth activities and orientations may have been linked. We cannot understand the fine 
nuances o f the Shanghai May Fourth Movement without recognising the crucial role of 
foreign residents, particularly the British community's influence on the events. From this 
perspective, future research on American residents, especially their missionary societies' 
involvement in the Movement would undoubtedly evaluate some undiscovered areas of 
conventional May Fourth research. Similarly, the French Concession provided another 
haven for the May Fourth radicals and dissidents. Therefore, a study of the Movement's 
activities in this area would unquestionably introduce another piece for the May Fourth 
puzzle in Shanghai and China as a whole.
As operations in Shanghai have revealed, the foreign society played an active role in 
moulding and mediating May Fourth activities, which in turn encouraged the Movement 
activists to respond to the socio-political realities of the British controlled International 
Settlement. In other words, the foreign presence in Republican China can no longer be 
understood exclusively through evaluation of extraterritorial rights, economic domination 
and political oppression. Rather, the foreign presence in Shanghai represented constantly 
overlapping group interests between the Chinese and foreign communities. Moreover, a 
wide variation of national identities were mixed with either their governmental or
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international strategies which were constantly present in Chinese politics. The May 
Fourth Movement in the Shanghai International Settlement was but one of these Sino- 
foreign encounters in Republican China.
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Appendix 1
The Students’ Strike 
An explanation
Shanghai Students' Union
51 Bubbling Well Road 
Shanghai, China
I
For the first time in the history o f China a genuine democratic movement has appeared. 
The entire Chinese people have risen. No officials head this movement. No great men 
have attached their names to this cause. Spontaneously out of the schools, among boys 
and girls, among shopkeepers and merchants, among labourers and coolies, has arisen 
this historic defence the rights of the rights of China, this demand for good government.
On the anniversary of the Twenty-One demands when the Chinese people were 
mourning because of the shame their country had suffered at the hands of Japan, news 
arrived that China had been defeated at the Paris Peace Conference. For months previous 
to this day, since the signing or the armistice, China had high hopes that she would have 
an opportunity to develop as a nation, that the wrongs she had suffered from militarism 
while the nations of the world were fighting militarism in Europe would be righted. But 
now China was hopeless. In Peking was a government corrupt to the core. In one year it 
had borrowed £220,000,000,00 from Japan ceding to her richest resources of the land. 
Coal mines, iron mines, forests, future railroad rights, control of the army, control of the 
finances, control of the few great industries of the country, have been thrown away for a 
mess of pottage. Great China, the land richest in resources, richest in manpower, richest 
in territory had become a plaything because of the militarism of Japan and the corruption 
of her own officials.
The Manchus were driven out by small band of intrepid revolutionists in league with 
enlightened officials. But the Chinese people took no part in the first revolution. The 
monarchist movement of Yuan Shi-kia was killed by Peking officialdom. But the people 
of China were silent. Chang Hsun's attempted restoration of the Manchus was squelched 
by the very officials who are betraying their country today. But the people took no 
interest.
Since then a Great War has been fought in Europe. On the fields o f France and Belgium 
the fairest sons of the great nations of the west had given their lives that the democracy 
and justice might exist upon the earth. Throughout the world like the voice of a prophet 
has gone the word of Woodrow Wilson strengthening the weak and giving courage to the 
struggling. And the Chinese people have listened and they too have heard. They have 
been told that their four thousand year old doctrine that peace is the greatest of all aims of 
the nation has become a slogan of mankind. They have been told that in the dispensation 
which is to be made after the war unmilitaristic nations like China would have an 
opportunity to develop their culture, their industry their civilisation unhampered. They
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have been told that secret covenants and forced agreements would not be recognised. 
They looked for the dawn of this new Messiah; but no sun rose for China. Even the cradle 
of the nation was stolen.
The masses of people looked toward Peking. There they found only corruption and 
treason. They looked towards Paris. There they found that a compromise had to be made 
because of the injection of the question of Fiume and the racial discrimination. There was 
no hope there. They looked toward their own enlightened young men who had studied 
abroad. They found that they were inadequately prepared to offer a practical plan to save 
the country. The merchants lacked initiative; they were looking for a leader. And the 
leadership came from school boys and school girls who were ready to sacrifice their 
future careers, liberty and life that China might continue to exist. The students of China 
refused to participate in the usual affairs of life until China was free. They clogged the 
machinery of the nation. They brought the issue to a head. They demanded immediate 
restitution o f the rights of China and the immediate democratisation of the government. 
These students were Chinese trained. They had never, most of them, left the country. 
They had not forgotten the nation in the glamour of foreign travel. Their cry was, "sell us, 
sell everything we have or may at anytime have, but let the nation live."
II
Students of Shanghai spontaneously gathered in the Public Recreation Ground, West 
Gate, on May 7. There was no pre-arranged program but before the meeting had 
proceeded very far it was clear that the students demanded the dismissal of the corrupt 
officials, the return of Tsingtao to China or effective guarantees by the Allied Nations 
that Japan would make such a return with reasonable time, and that the Twenty-One 
demands and other secret treaties written between the Peking militarists and the Japanese 
militarists would be renounced.
Immediately the Shanghai Students' Union was organised. It consists of 83 Schools in 
S'hai and represents 20000 students including about 5000 girls.
Similar action was taken in Peking, Tientsin, Nanking, Hankow, Canton, Hangkow, 
Soochow, Ningpo and other cities in China.
The Peking organisation became particularly effective. Peking Government Univ. has 
during the past year, under the guidance of its Chancellor, Tsai Yuen-pei and other 
enlightened professors become an intellectual centre of China. The democratisation of the 
Chinese language, the development of a modern Chinese literature, the growth of 
political discussion centred about the Peking Government University were the first to 
strike for Chinese freedom. Mandarin-like the Government looked upon this is as a 
schoolboy prank. They threatened. They cajoled. They intimidated. They attempted to 
bribe. But the Students would not return to the desks as long as Tsao Ju-lin, Chang 
Tsung-hsiang, Little Hsu and other traitors remained in power. Came a day when the 
Students marched to the house of Tsao Ju-lin. They wanted to tell him that he ought to 
resign. Who should be in his house but arch-traitor, China's Minister to Japan? And in 
their company was a Japanese. And on Tsao's wall was a portrait o f the Mikado. The 
minds of the Students were inflamed. What new rascality was being hatched? What 
concession was being bargained away? What mine, what forest, what railroad was Japan 
stealing at the moment. The result was well known. Tsao Ju-lin ran away. Chang Tsung- 
hsiang was beaten almost to death. But much more important was the fact that this
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demonstration awakened the entire student body of China to the fact that immediate 
action was necessary. In every city of China the students left their books and went out on 
strike.
Ill
What is it that they demand?
1. First and foremost if China is ever to rise out of her present shameful condition 
every one of her sons must be taught that treason to this country is man's greatest crime. 
Chinese officialdom has grown up under the old Mandarin system in which corruption is 
not only tolerated but expected. The officials were poorly paid and they were to earn 
enormous incomes by robbing the country. Under the Manchus this system could prevail, 
in a Republic it has no place. The Peking officials have not only sold the wealth of the 
country but they have betrayed her integrity. The worst enemies of China are not in 
Tokyo but in Peking. Not only to avenge the wrongs that China has suffered must the 
traitors go, but to prevent the recurrence of treason, to inspire future generations to set an 
example for the very boys and girls, the future fathers and mothers of China, who are 
now on strike, must they be driven out. The fate of the nation depends upon it and with 
this principle there can be no compromise.
2. China demands that effective guarantees be secured from the Allied 
Governments that Tsingtau and the German rights in Shangtung be returned her 
immediately, Tsingtao was stolen from China by Germany. When China entered the war 
it was understood that this territory would be returned to her. When Japan prevented 
China from joining the Allies and captured Tsingtau she promised the Government of 
U.S. that she would return the territory to China. The Peace Congress has maintained the 
principle that territories forcefully seized and unjustly held shall be returned to the nation 
whose people inhabit them.
The foreigners will say "But Japan intends to return the territory". China has suffered 
too long from Japan's intentions. China cannot accept a promise from Japan for it is like a 
whisper in the wind. China has been betrayed too often by her island neighbour to accept 
her covenant. She is a nation whose word is bankrupt. One need only think of Korea, 
Formosa, Manchuria, Siberia to realise the uselessness of a Japanese promise. It is to 
avoid the blood shed that might be entailed in this use of force that the students want 
effective guarantees made now that Japan will not be permitted to deceive China in this 
matter.
3. The Students demand that the Twenty-One Demands shall be cancelled. They were 
agreed to by China under duress. When the nations of the western world were at war 
Japan sneaked in like a thief in the night and demanded that China give up her sovereign 
right. An ultimatum of war was made. What could China have done but to agree to 
Japan's proposal made at the point of the bayonet? But these demands cannot be acceded 
to. China can never agree to the Twenty-One demands. Until every one o f them has been 
cancelled, China will always be in a state of turmoil. For the peace of Asia, of the world, 
they must be expunged from history.
281
4. The Students demand that freedom of speech and of the press shall be preserved 
as an inalienable right o f citizens of the Republic. To secure this the Students desire that 
the Constitution of China shall be completed and this right included.
IV
To secure these rights the Students have adopted the principle of passive resistance. They 
are unable to fight against the Peking militarists and enough blood has already to been 
spilled in China. There is no ballot in this country. The only thing that could be done was 
to shrike, peacefully, quietly but effectively. To strengthen themselves the Students joined 
with merchants, bankers and labourers so that if  moment arose when everything else 
should fail and it become absolutely necessary to force the hand of the Peking militarists 
there would be unanimity of aim and action in China. Such unanimity exists today.
The shops and banks are shut. The schools are without pupils. Labour is on strike. Can 
any government continue to exist in the presence of the unanimous will of the people of 
the country that the government should cease to be? Today China must decide whether 
she becomes a tributary of Japan or an independent nation. Four million heads are ready 
to fall before China will become servile to the Huns of the East.
Allied Friends of China:
Your statesmen are at this moment sitting in Paris trying to mete out justice to the nations 
of the world. You have given of all your strength to destroy imperialism.
But the danger is as great for you as it is for China. You have come here honestly to 
trade and to teach. One need no recite all the crimes that Japan has committed against you 
in China. You know them well. She has damaged your goods, forged your labels, opened 
your letter, broken every rule of honest competition. But do you need more proof of what 
will happen to you in a Nipponized China than what has already happened in Korea, 
Manchuria and Formosa. Your missionaries have already been expelled from Tsingtau. 
Your business will go next.
The Students are now fighting your battle. If they fail now you will have to take up the 
war against militarism in the East sooner or later. You can prevent their failure by 
sympathising with their cause, by bringing pressure on your government immediately to 
retum Tsingtao to China. The Students are sacrificing themselves for you as well as for 
China. Do you who live in China help them to destroy the Hun o f East.
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Appendix 2
Municipal Gazette, 11 July, 1919, p. 242 
Special Meeting of the Ratepayers, in July 10,1919.
E.C. Pearce, Chairman, Shanghai Municipal Council:
The Power which we ask you to vest in us in terms of the Resolution which I shall shortly 
read, calling for the licensing of printing establishments and of the Press cannot be dealt 
with with such brevity as the last Resolution. For the part fortnight some of our local 
pressmen have held up their hands in horror, they have regarded you with trenchant 
articles on the sanctity of the freedom of the press; they have told you that the very idea 
of the restriction of this freedom by a system of licensing is repugnant to the constitutions 
of all free countries; they have told you that the laws of America and the Great Britain 
and of other countries will not tolerate such a thing; they have told you that the Council 
contemplates muzzling the press - the Council has told you that it does not: they have told 
you that the laws of each individual nation here represented provide all that is necessary 
in this matter of restraining the publication of scurrilous and inciting printed matter - the 
Council tells you that they do not.
Some o f the opponents of the licensing of printing establishments and the Press seem to 
forget that this Settlement is not America, it is not Great Britain, it is Shanghai. You 
cannot by any stretch o f the imagination compare conditions here with those of any city 
in the West. There are so entirely different, they are, I suppose unique. This fact has long 
since been recognised and for the purposes of local government, a code of local laws has 
been - so to speak - superimposed upon the extraterritorial laws o f each one of us. As 
Americans and Britons or the subjects of other Nations, we are naturally jealous of our 
National laws, but these laws must on occasion by very reason of the different conditions 
under which we live here give the way to the Code of Laws devised to meet our needs as 
a cosmopolitan community - as Shanghailanders, Should this Code which consists of our 
Land Regulations and our Byelaws prove to be inadequate, and I say most empathetically 
that is has, surely it is up to us to see that we make good in this inadequacy. As your 
Council, entrusted with the administration of the affairs of the Settlement and with 
practical experience of the difficulties with which the maintenance of peace and good 
order are beset, I claim that we are qualified to advise you as to the powers that should be 
vested in us to enable us to properly carry out our duties to you collectively and 
individually.
In the North China Daily News of July 5th, the following paragraph appears under 
the caption of Shanghai Students Union caption: "The above Union being alive to the 
danger that the Students Patriotic agitation may lead to unscrupulous politician using it to 
serve the latter's own ends has. etc"
I ask you did those who bolstered up the students movement foresee whither that 
movement was leading? Did they realize, what the students are now realising 
themselves? The answer is no. Did your Council realize the danger of this movement - 
did it fore see what it would lead to ? - emphatically, yes. Now ladies and gentlemen, 
whose advice are you going to take - theirs or ours, which is that you vest in us the power 
to license printing establishments and the press, and thus enable us to combat in some
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measure the printing and publication of indecent, seditious and inciting printed matter. 
You are told that if  you vest us with this power, we shall abuse it by muzzling the press, 
you are told the newspapers won't be permitted to criticise our actions as a Council, That 
is ridiculous - if  it is constructive, it is welcome - if destructive, it matters not so long as it 
does not disturb peace and good order. We do not wish to curb freedom of expression, 
constructive or destructive. It is likely that we should muzzle the press unless it became a 
danger to public order and peace.
Are we to govern the virulent press or is it to govern and lead public thought into 
paths of violence. Are we to allow the spread of false and malicious rumours which 
baseless as they are and credited by the masses merely because they appear in print - 
rumours which baseless as to the poisoning of the food and water, that gave rise to 
attacks against the innocent Chinese and Japanese with fatal results in more than one 
instance during the recent unrest.[..] Are we in a state of unrest, when every trade in the 
place is on strike? Are we in this Settlement - which mark you was specially set aside for 
the residence of foreigners - to be dictated by the students, political malcontents and 
agitators, as to whether our markets are to be opened, as to whether our industries to be 
work? Or whether at their pleasure we are to be allowed chauffeurs to drive our motor 
cars? Is this Settlement to be used as a pawn in Chinese politics? Are we going to allow 
the Chinese population however well meaning and patriotic their motives may be to 
cause chaos, disorder and conditions that might conceivably lead to the worse from the 
Bolshevism. Remembering that the prosperity of the Settlement is largely founded on its 
neutrality, and allow abandon this neutrality in the politics of China and allow the 
Settlement to be made the jumping off ground for all political upheavals. I say, 
empathetically, no. What has the responsible press to fear, we are not after them, we are 
after the purveyors o f seditious, violent and scurrilous printed material.
The usual process of law, whilst sufficient in normal times, is all insufficient in 
abnormal times. Under normal conditions the issue of warrant and the subsequent 
proceedings in Court meet the requirements of the case, but under abnormal conditions - 
conditions of unrest - is we are to obliged to await the issue of a warrant and the 
subsequent Court proceedings before we can take a drastic action, why, God help us, it 
might be too late - you know how quickly a flare-up can be set going in China and you 
know well as I know what a flare-up can mean.
You will be ask how is licensing going to provide the panacea for these ills, the answer 
it cannot, but it will assist in combating them. The measure of its assistance will of course 
depend on the license conditions that you may from time to approve and the Consular 
Body may confirm. With these conditions we are not at the moment concerned, but our 
views on the subject will be put to you in the next and last Resolution. All we ask you 
under the resolution to which I am now speaking is that you endorse the principle of the 
licensing of printing establishments and the Press with the safeguard that the conditions 
of license shall first be approved by you in meeting assembled and thereafter confirmed 
by the Consular Body, before they are imposed.
With the exception of Mr. Dollai', who is opposed to the principle of the licensing of 
printing establishments and the press, my colleagues on the Council are unanimous in 
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